# James

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · March 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311137

## Case

- **Full name:** Najee Devontae James v. Cook County Department of Corrections, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311137

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

NAJEE DEVONTAE JAMES
Plaintiff,
Case No 23-cv-743
v.
Hon. Judge Franklin U.
COOK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF Valderrama
CORRECTIONS, et al.

Defendants.
ORDER
The Fourteenth Amendment requires jail officials to “safeguard the health and
safety of pretrial detainees and section 1983 provides a cause of action for detainees
to vindicate those constitutional guarantees.”1 Plaintiff Najee Devontae James is and
was a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC). R.2
47, Third Amended Complaint (TAC). According to James, while in pretrial custody,
he was beaten, sexually assaulted, and denied medical care. James sued Thomas
Dart, the Sherriff of Cook County, along with a group of CCDOC officers, directors,
and related medical personnel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his
constitutional rights. Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by a
subset of the Defendants—Dart, Johnson, Yoksoulian, Peraino, Lucente, and Acey
(collectively, Defendants)—for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

1 Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., 40 F.4th 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2022).
2 Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number and, where
necessary, a page or paragraph citation.
Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 65, Mot. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants in part
and denies in part Defendants’ motion.
Background3

Plaintiff Najee Devontae James was at all relevant times a pretrial detainee of
CCDOC. TAC ¶ 4. As the TAC asserts different allegations against each Defendant,
the Court addresses the allegations against each Defendant separately, where
appropriate.
A. Defendant Yoksoulian
On June 10, 2022, James was sent from CCDOC to the Cermak Section

(Cermak) of CCDOC for medical services because of a suicide attempt. Id. ¶ 21. The
staff at Cermak subsequently ordered that James be transferred to Stroger Hospital.
Id. ¶ 22. Defendant Martha Yoksoulian, a CCDOC officer, was responsible for
managing the day-to-day operations of the CCDOC. Id. ¶ 10. James contends that
Yoksoulian was also responsible for implementing and executing the policies of the
External Operations Section (ExOps) at CCDOC. Id. James alleges on information
and belief that Yoksoulian created a list for self-harm pre-trial detainees called the

“Foreign Body Ingestors,” or “F.B.I” list. Id. ¶ 23. James alleges that Yoksoulian
ordered individuals on the F.B.I. list to be placed last on the pickup list by ExOps for
transfer to Stroger. Id. ¶ 25. Yoksoulian, according to James, implemented a policy
requiring ExOps to hold F.B.I. list detainees for at least twenty-four hours before an
emergency medical transfer. Id. ¶ 26. After receiving the order to transfer James to

3 The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the James. Platt v. Brown, 872 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2017).
Stroger Hospital, the ExOps waited over twenty-four hours before transporting him
to Stroger Hospital. Id. ¶ 27.
B. Defendant McGonegal

On October 1, 2022, following a death in his family, James experienced suicidal
thoughts and was seen by Margaret McGonegal, a licensed clinical professional
counselor at Cermak. Id. ¶ 11. During the visit, James informed McGonegal that he
was suicidal due to a death in his family. Id. ¶ 29. McGonegal dismissed his suicidal
thoughts and refused to send James to the psychiatric unit in Cermak. Id. ¶ 31. As a
result, James continued to suffer from depression, which caused him to cut his arm

and wrist after returning to his cell. Id. ¶ 33-34. Two days later, James was sexually
assaulted by his cellmate. Id. ¶ 35. That same day, James informed “multiple CCDOC
staff members” of the sexual assault but was ignored. Id. ¶ 36. On October 5, two
days after his sexual assault, James was sent to Cermak. Id. ¶ 37.
C. Defendant Dr. Tawadros
At Cermak, James saw Dr. Mina Tawadros. Id. ¶ 38. James thought the
consultation was for him to discuss the October 2022 sexual assault. Id. Dr.

Tawadros, however, informed him that he was sent to Cermak only for the injuries
to his left arm. Id. James told Dr. Tawadros that he had filed a grievance and
submitted a health form regarding the October 2022 sexual assault, and explained
he was sent to Cermak by Sgt. Szul. Id. ¶¶ 40, 41. Dr. Tawadros then advised against
any treatment for the sexual assault, but James persisted. Id. ¶ 43. Despite his
persistence, Dr. Tawadros “denied James a sexual assault kit and sent James to sit
outside in the cages” and cleared him to return to his cell at CCDOC. Id. ¶ 44. James,
however, refused to leave Cermak until he received a sexual assault kit. Id. ¶ 45.
When Sgt. Szul and another officer were called to escort James back to his cell, James

explained the incident to Sgt. Szul, who then spoke to Dr. Tawadros. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
During that conversation, Dr. Tawadros falsely told Sgt. Szul that James refused the
sexual assault kit. Id. ¶ 48.
On December 27, 2022, James was again sexually assaulted by another
detainee. Id. ¶ 75. On December 30, 2022, James was sent to Cermak for a rape kit
and was again seen by Dr. Tawadros. Id. ¶ 76, 77. Dr. Tawadros told James that she

did not believe that he had been raped and refused to allow James to go to Stroger
Hospital. Id. ¶ 78. On January 1, 2023, James was seen by another doctor at the
psychiatric unit. Id. ¶ 80. The doctor placed an order to send James to Stroger for a
rape kit. Id. ¶ 81. James received the rape kit the next day but was informed that no
evidence could be collected. Id. ¶ 83. James attributes this issue to the delay initiated
by Dr. Tawadros’s refusal to send him to Stroger. Id. ¶ 83.
D. Defendant John Doe

On October 14, 2022, James was housed in a cell with an active alert indicating
that he should not have a cellmate. Id. ¶¶ 50-51. On that date, Defendant CO John
Doe permitted another inmate to enter James’s cell. Id. ¶ 49. The unknown inmate
beat, strangled, and raped James at knifepoint throughout the night. Id. ¶ 52. The
next day James was placed in segregation. Id. ¶ 53. Following the assault, James did
not receive any medical or mental health treatment for his injuries. Id. ¶ 54.
E. Defendant Johnson
On November 11, 2022, James attempted suicide while in segregation. Id. ¶
55. As a result, James was “supposed to be sent” to a psychiatric unit. Id. ¶ 56.

However, following his suicide attempt, James was placed in a holding cage in the
basement at Cermak and confined in a blue box and restraints for three consecutive
days. Id. ¶ 57. According to James, Defendant Wilesha Johnson, a CCDOC officer,
implemented a policy by which any incarcerated individual labeled as a “green suit
inmate” would be subject to a “blue box” for hours and days at a time in handcuffs
and a belly chain in the “back cages” of the Cermak basement while waiting to be

seen by Cermak medical staff, conditions James endured each time he was sent to
Cermak’s basement Id. ¶¶ 57-63.
F. Defendant Sellers
On November 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2022, James swallowed a handful of needles
in a suicide attempt. Id. ¶ 64. Defendant Thelma Sellers, a nurse at CCDOC at
Cermak, denied James any medical treatment following his suicide attempts. Id. ¶
65. Rather, James alleges that she cleared him without any medical attention. Id. ¶

66.
G. Defendant Dr. Khan
On December 19, 2022, James was sent to Cermak with symptoms of diarrhea
and vomiting. Id. ¶ 69. Upon arriving at Cermak, James was seen by Dr. Marghoob
Khan. Id. ¶ 70. James described his symptoms to Dr. Khan and informed her that he
was in pain. Id. ¶ 71. Dr. Khan, without examining James, told him he would be okay.
Id. ¶ 72. Following the visit, Dr. Khan sent James back to his unit. Id. ¶ 74.
H. Defendant Lucente

Defendant Michael Lucente was at all relevant times a CCDOC officer at
James’s facility with the rank of Director. Id. ¶ 18. On or about February 16, 2023,
James was called into Lucente’s office. Id. ¶ 84. Lucente asked James to inform him
on “dirty” officers and nurses at CCDOC. Id. ¶ 85. When James insisted that he did
not know of any, Lucente threatened to keep James on “out alone/house alone” status
for an extended period of time if he refused to comply. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. After their

meeting, James filed grievances against Lucente related to these threats. Id. ¶ 88.
Following the submission of James’s grievances, Lucente ordered James to remain on
out alone/house alone status. Id. ¶ 89.
I. Defendants Peraino and Acey
On April 28, 2023, James informed A. Peraino, a CCDOC correctional officer,
that he wanted to file a sexual assault incident report. Id. ¶ 90. Peraino told James
that he would not act on his request until he returned to his cell, subsequently

ordering several officers to use force to bring James back to his cell. Id. ¶¶ 91-92.
During this incident, “while James was restrained by a belly chain, handcuffs, and
confined in a blue box,” Defendant K. Acey, another CCDOC correctional officer,
punched James repeatedly on his right temple, causing injuries. Id. ¶ 93.
James sued the Defendants, asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims against
Defendants Yoksoulian (Count I); McGonegal (Count II); Dr. Tawadros (Count III);
John Doe (Count IV); Johnson (Count V); Sellers (Count VI); Khan (Count VII); a
First Amendment claim against Lucente (VIII); Fourteenth Amendment claims
against Peraino (Count IX); and Acey (Count X); and a Monell claim against Dart

(Count XI). R. 47. Before the Court is the Defendants Dart, Johnson, Peraino,
Lucente, and Acey’s fully briefed motion to dismiss the TAC under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mot.
Legal Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the complaint.
Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th

Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual
allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,
rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
Analysis
I. Qualified Immunity as to Defendants Lucente, Acey, and
Peraino

Defendants Lucente, Acey, and Peraino argue that James’s claims against
them are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. R. 65, Mot. at 11-12. Qualified
immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate
clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 582 U.S. 548, 554 (2017) (cleaned up).4 “The doctrine of
qualified immunity balances dueling interests—allowing officials to perform their
duties reasonably without fear of liability on the one hand and affording members of
the public the ability to vindicate constitutional violations by government officials
who abuse their offices on the other.” Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 993 F.3d 981,
987 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect ‘all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Humphrey v.
Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
Crucially, when a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to defeat this defense. See Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2722 (2020); see also Buchanan v. Pfister, 2020 WL
902829, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2020). Here, Defendants Lucente, Acey, and Peraino

have properly raised a qualified immunity defense. As a result, the burden shifts to

4 This Order uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, and
citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 18
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
James to defeat this defense. See Buchanan, 2020 WL 902829, at *12; see also Leiser,
933 F.3d at 701. A plaintiff may defeat qualified immunity by showing that (1) the
defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the violated right was

clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d
467, 478 (7th Cir. 2009). A court can choose which element to address first. Lopez,
993 F.3d at 987.
As to the second element, “[a] plaintiff can show that a right is ‘clearly
established’ by statute or constitution in at least two ways: (1) he can point to an
analogous case establishing the right to be free from the conduct at issue; or (2) he

can show that the conduct was ‘so egregious that no reasonable person could have
believed that it would not violate clearly established rights.’” Steidl v. Fermon, 494
F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 742
(7th Cir. 2001)). A right is “clearly established” if the conduct is so clearly prohibited
that every “reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates
that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). There need not be a case
exactly on point for a right to be clearly established, but “existing precedent must

place the lawfulness of the particular arrest beyond debate.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S.
48, 64 (2018) (cleaned up); see also Alicea v. Thomas, 815 F.3d 283, 291 (7th Cir.
2016). Still, the right must have been clearly established “in a particularized sense,
rather than at a high level of generality.” Id. Put another way, “the official must have
[had] fair warning that his conduct [was] unconstitutional.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d
843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
As an initial matter, James argues that Defendants’ qualified immunity
argument is premature at the motion to dismiss stage. R. 70, Resp. at 12. On a more
substantive basis, James insists that his allegations against Lucente, Acey, and

Peraino survive the qualified immunity inquiry at this stage. Id. at 13-16. James is
correct that the Seventh Circuit has explained that “[b]ecause a qualified immunity
defense so closely depends on the facts of the case, a complaint is generally not
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.” Alvarado v. Litscher,
267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). However, dismissal based on qualified immunity
“may be appropriate at the pleading stage where the plaintiff asserts the violation of

a broad constitutional right that had not been articulated at the time the violation is
alleged to have occurred.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). It is within this framework that the Court examines Defendants’
qualified immunity arguments.
A. Defendant Lucente
The Court begins with Defendant Lucente. Recall that after James declined
Lucente’s invitation to snitch on “dirty” officers and nurses, Lucente threatened to

keep James on “out alone/house alone” status. After James filed a grievance, Lucente,
according to James, acted on this threat and ordered that James remain on out
alone/house alone status. In contending that Lucente violated his clearly established
constitutional right, James points to Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir.
2012), in which the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately alleged a
violation of his First Amendment right to use the prison grievance system. After filing
a grievance, the plaintiff was retaliated against by being sent to another facility
where he had “known enemies.” See id.
The first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is satisfied, because a

pretrial detainee, like a prisoner, “has a First Amendment right to make grievances
about conditions of confinement.” Id. (quoting Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 798
(7th Cir. 2010)). As to the second, James maintains that Gomez demonstrates that
this right was clearly established at the time of its alleged violation. See Resp. at 13-
14. From James’s perspective, Lucente’s alleged retaliation after the submission of
his grievance violated his First Amendment right and deterred future First

Amendment activity. In reply, Defendants do not address Gomez as it relates to their
qualified immunity argument. See R. 71, Reply at 6-8. Instead, they merely argue
that James does not state “that he was not able to file a grievance.” Id. at 7.
Defendants miss the point. True, James was able to file his initial grievance against
Defendant Lucente, but James’s central contention is that Lucente retaliated against
him for exercising a constitutionally protected right.
Recall that James has the burden of establishing that his right was clearly

established. The only case James cites, Gomez does not accomplish that task. In
Gomez, for his First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff alleged that his
retaliatory transfer was a direct result of his grievance. Specifically, he alleged that
the IDOC Director sent an investigator to threaten the plaintiff with a transfer to
another prison if he pursued his grievance. Even after the plaintiff indicated that he
would no longer pursue his grievance or file a lawsuit if he could stay at his current
prison, he was told it was “too late.” No other explanation for the plaintiff’s transfer
was advanced. Gomez, 680 F.3d at 866-67. Here, by contrast, James does not allege
that the filing of his grievance was the direct cause of his continuation on out

alone/house alone status. Rather, James alleges that Defendant Lucente ordered this
continuation due to James’s refusal to snitch on “dirty” officers and nurses. In other
words, and unlike the situation in Gomez, there is no connection between James’s
filing of his grievance and any alleged First Amendment retaliation. Before James
ever filed his grievance, he had already been told that his failure to reveal dirty
correctional officers would have adverse consequences. As such, the Court finds that

James does not satisfy his burden with respect to the “clearly established” prong of
the qualified immunity analysis as it applies to Defendant Lucente, and therefore
holds that his claim against Defendant Lucente is barred.
B. Defendant Acey
James alleges that Defendant Acey punched him repeatedly in the right side
of the head “while [he] was restrained by a belly chain, handcuffs, and confined in a
blue box.” TAC ¶ 93. Notably, James admits that he does not point to a case directly

on point concerning Defendant Acey’s conduct. Resp. at 15-16. Recall that a plaintiff
may satisfy the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis” by (1)
pointing to an analogous case establishing the right to be free from the conduct at
issue; or (2) showing that the conduct was so egregious that no reasonable person
could have believed that it would not violate clearly established rights. Steidl, 494
F.3d at 632. Here, James follows the second route. See Resp. at 15-16. If no case exists
that is directly on point, the Court must examine “all relevant case law in order to
determine whether there was such a clear trend in the case law that [it] can say with
fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely

a question of time.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 781 (7th Cir. 2010)
(cleaned up). Officials can be “on notice that their conduct violates established law
even in the absence of earlier cases involving fundamentally similar or materially
similar facts.” Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 (7th
Cir.1996) (“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, liability is not predicated upon

the existence of a prior case that is directly on point.”).
Courts in this circuit have held that punching a confined prisoner constitutes
a violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Alvarado v. Milwaukee County,
2019 WL 2075972 (E.D. Wis. May 10, 2019) (“At this stage, the plaintiff's allegations
that Jackson punched him and used her taser on him are sufficient to state a claim
against her [under Fourteenth Amendment].”). Defendants argue that James’s
allegations about Acey are “simply not plausible” because they are “merely conclusory

assertions the Court need not accept.” Reply at 8. Defendants’ argument misses the
mark. Under applicable case law, James’s allegations are sufficient at this stage to
demonstrate that Defendant Acey’s conduct amounted to a violation of James’s
clearly established constitutional rights, effectively defeating Defendant Acey’s
qualified immunity defense at this stage.
C. Defendant Peraino
Finally, the Court evaluates whether qualified immunity bars James’s claim
against Defendant Peraino. James alleges that he informed Defendant Peraino that

he sought to file a sexual assault incident report. Peraino told James that he would
not act on his request until he returned to his cell, subsequently ordering several
officers to force James back to his cell, during which altercation Defendant Acey
punched James repeatedly in the head. In support of his contention that this right
was clearly established, James leans on Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir.
2005). In Budz, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant violates a prisoner’s

constitutional rights when he knows of “highly probable attacks.” Id. at 911. “[A]
‘substantial risk’ could exist where prison officials place a detainee in a cell in which
‘they know that there is a cobra there or at least a high probability of a cobra there.’”
Id. (quoting Billman v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Specifically, the plaintiff in Budz—a Caucasian man—demonstrated that the
defendants failed to protect him from another prisoner who had a known propensity
to attack Caucasian prisoners. See id.

Here, by contrast, James alleges that Defendant Peraino failed to protect him
from harm by not allowing him to file a grievance before he was back in his cell and
by ordering other officers to physically force him back into the cell. From James’s
point of view, Defendant Peraino “ignored Plaintiff’s request, dismissed the matter,
and directed officers to use force to return Plaintiff to his cell.” Resp. at 15. James
contends that “this disregard mirrors the examples outlined in Budz.” Id. The Court
disagrees. Unlike the plaintiff in Budz, James does not allege that he was at
particular risk of harm due to Defendant Peraino’s failure to act, nor does he argue
that Defendant Peraino knew of any particular high risk of him being subject to

violence. Defendant Peraino telling James that he would not discuss the matter until
he was back in his cell is a far cry from the defendants in Budz allowing an inmate
with a known propensity for violence against Caucasian individuals to be given access
to a common recreation room where he subsequently assaulted the Caucasian
plaintiff. See Budz, 398 F.3d at 910-12. Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that
Defendant Peraino did not prevent James from filing a grievance, but rather informed

James that he first needed to go back to his cell. See Reply at 7-8. James also fails to
establish that Defendant Peraino ordered, or even could have predicted, the level of
force subsequently used by Defendant Acey. Such conduct, based on James’s own
allegations, fails to establish that Defendant Peraino violated James’s clearly
established constitutional rights. Accordingly, James’s claim against Defendant
Peraino is barred under qualified immunity.
The Court now turns to Defendants’ 12(b)(6) arguments for dismissal.

II. James’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Defendant Acey

James alleges that Defendant Acey violated his Fourteenth Amendment right
to be free from excessive force by repeatedly punching him in the right temple while
he was restrained.
Defendants argue that James fails to state a claim of excessive force, noting
that James’s allegations against Defendant Acey constitute only one sentence and
lack sufficient detail. See Mot. at 8, Reply at 5-6. The way Defendants see it, James’s
allegations as to Defendant Acey are “conclusory” and need not be accepted by the
Court. Mot. at 10, Reply at 5. Moreover, Defendants argue, “de minimis uses of force

do not implicate the Eighth Amendment.” Reply at 5.
To state a claim for excessive force, a pretrial detainee must allege that the
defendant “purposefully or knowingly” used force against him, and that that force
was “objectively unreasonable.” Morehead v. Milwaukee Cnty. Police Dep't, 2018 WL
1175356, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 5, 2018) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S,
389, 398 (2015)).

To begin, the Court is perplexed by Defendants’ reference to the Eighth
Amendment, especially after James correctly stated the correct standard for pretrial
detainees lies under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Resp. at 10-11. This distinction
matters. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Supreme Court held that “a pretrial
detainee can prevail [on an excessive force claim] by providing only objective evidence
that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.” 576 U.S,

389, 396-97 (2015). Further, “[t]he language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature
of the claims often differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted
prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’” Id. at
400-01. Thus, in analyzing an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, “there is no need . . . as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case,
to determine when punishment is unconstitutional.” Id. at 401. In evaluating
Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims, courts “may consider several factors,
including the relationship between the need to use force and the amount of force used,
the extent of the plaintiff's injury, any effort by the officer to limit his or her use of

force, the severity of the security concern, and the threat perceived by the officer.”
Thompson v. Cook County, 2023 WL 2838449, at *3 (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).
The Court nevertheless disagrees with Defendants’ central position that
Defendant Acey’s repeated punches to James’s head were in any way “de minimis.”
See Reply at 5-6. Nothing in the complaint supports that conclusion, and indeed, case
law has found the opposite: “examples of force greater than de minimis, which could

support an excessive force claim include: punching a prisoner with a closed fist.”
Jackson v. Stubenvoll, 2022 WL 991950, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2022) (citing Thomas
v. Stalter, 20 F.3d 298, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A punch in the face to subdue Mr.
Thomas was not necessary to carry out the court order.”)). The Court is additionally
unpersuaded by Defendants’ assertion that James’s allegations are conclusory. In
support, they cite Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 and Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
576 U.S. 389, 398-99 (2015) but proffer little additional reasoning as to why James’s

allegations about Defendant Acey’s punches and his resulting injuries are in any way
conclusory. See Reply at 5-6. Ironically enough, Defendants’ argument skews more
conclusory than James’s. James alleges that Defendant Acey “punched [him]
repeatedly in the right side of the temple resulting in injuries” “while [he] was
restrained by a belly chain, handcuffs, and confined in a blue box.” TAC ¶ 93.
Repeated punches to the head, especially while James was allegedly restrained,
extend beyond the bounds of reasonable force. Accordingly, James sufficiently states
an excessive force claim against Defendant Acey.
III. James’s Claims Against Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian

James sues both Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian in their official
capacities. “Government officials can be sued in their official capacity (which is really
a claim against the government entity), their individual capacity (which is a claim
against the official personally), or both.” Lamb v. Cty. of Lake, 2021 WL 4306144, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2021). To maintain an official-capacity suit under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that his injury resulted from the execution of an official policy,
custom, or practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). Moreover, “a plaintiff suing a public employee in his official capacity cannot
obtain relief unless that defendant has final policy making authority.” Jett v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); see also Long v. Mercer County, Ill., 795
F. Supp. 873, 876 n.1 (“To sue [defendant] in his official capacity, Plaintiff must allege
that [he] acted pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice, or that he was a
municipal policy maker with final policy making authority relative to the acts

complained of.”).
James alleges that Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian implemented or
administered policies that caused James significant harm. As to Defendant Johnson,
James asserts that she “created a policy for green suit inmates,” requiring these
prisoners “to be restrained in a blue box for hours and days at a time in handcuffs
and a belly chain, in the back cages in the Cermak Section basement while waiting
to be seen by medical staff.” TAC ¶¶ 59-63. As for Defendant Yoksoulian, James
alleges that he created an “F.B.I. list” and “implemented a policy” requiring that
individuals on the list to be put last on the pickup list for transfer to Stroger Hospital,
resulting in James’s transfer being delayed. Id. ¶¶ 23-27.

Defendants argue that Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian are not final
policymakers and therefore cannot be held liable for actions taken in their official
capacity. Mot. at 5-7. James, in reply, “acknowledges that his claims against
Yoksoulian and Johnson in their official capacities are . . . effectively claims against
Sheriff Dart.” Reply at 5. Nevertheless, James insists that these claims remain viable
because his injuries were caused by an official policy or practice carried out within

the scope of Yoksoulian and Johnson’s official duties. Id. James maintains that
further factual discovery is necessary to determine whether Defendants Yoksoulian
and Johnson have policymaking authority on the actions in question. Resp. at 5-6
(citing Novick v. Village of Bourbonnais, 695 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1030 (C.D. Ill. 2023)).
But Novick, as Defendants correctly point out, is distinguishable. See Reply at 1-2.
The Novick court held that the police chief defendant could be considered a final policy
maker after a press conference revealed that the police chief “retains complete

authority over how criminal investigations are conducted” and that he is therefore a
“final policymaker.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Logan v. City of Evanston, 2020 WL 6020487,
at *6, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2020)). Here, James does not allege that Defendants Johnson
or Yoksoulian retained similar policy-making authority.
Although James alleges that Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian effectively
“created” and “implemented” the policies which caused his injuries, he does not allege
that either Defendant possessed the requisite “final policy-making authority” to
satisfy Monell. See Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 676 (7th Cir.
2009) (“Officials with final decisionmaking authority are deemed policymakers for

Monell purposes.”). Indeed, James concedes that his claims against Defendants
Yoksoulian and Johnson are essentially claims against Sheriff Dart. As such, the
Court agrees with Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian that they are not final
policymakers for Monell purposes and consequently holds that James’s official
capacity claims against them must be dismissed.
IV. James’s Monell Claim Against Defendant Dart

James brings a claim for Monell liability against Sheriff Dart for the actions
committed by the other named Defendants. Under Monell, a municipality may be “on
the hook” for decisions “made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy.” Cozzi v. Village of Melrose Park, 592 F.
Supp. 3d 701, 714 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (2018)). Sheriff Dart—in his official capacity as the head
of the Sheriff's Office—may be liable under § 1983 only if the alleged constitutional

violations resulted from the execution of one of its policies. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
“This may be established by alleging: (1) an express policy that caused the
constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled that it
constitutes a policy; or (3) that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with
final policymaking authority.” Armour v. Country Club Hills, 2014 WL 63850, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2014) (citing Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir.
2007)).
In response to Defendants’ argument that he failed to adequately allege a

plausible Monell claim, James focuses solely on whether Sheriff Dart possesses “final
policymaking authority,” arguing that discovery is needed to answer this question.
Resp. at 16-17. But that is not the relevant question before the Court. As an initial
matter, it is uncontested that Sheriff Dart retains final policymaking authority. See
Wuerffel v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 2016 WL 1660497, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2016)
(“In Illinois, a sheriff has final policy-making authority.”). Crucially, however, James

does not allege that Sheriff Dart himself caused his injuries. The Court therefore
focuses its attention on the first two Monell factors: whether there exists an express
policy or widespread practice that caused his constitutional deprivation. As to the
actions taken by Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian, Defendants argue that James
fails to adequately allege that the “F.B.I.” list or green suit regulations were express
policies or widespread practices. Mot. at 14. The Court agrees with Defendants. In
sum, James has not alleged that the actions taken by Defendants Yoksoulian and

Johnson constituted an express policy, a widespread, permanent, well-settled
practice, or that Sheriff Dart caused his injuries. See Armour, 2014 WL 63850, at *5.
The same reasoning applies to James’s Monell claim as it relates to the actions
taken by the other Defendants, namely concerning improper responses to sexual
assaults and suicide attempts. Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that James
does not allege any widespread practice or policy connected to the treatment he
received, nor does he point to any causal link between the injuries he suffered and
his treatment. Mot. at 14; see also Cozzi, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 713-14 (“The plaintiff also
must establish ‘the requisite causation, meaning ‘the policy or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.”) (quoting Gable v. City of
Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, James’s Monell claim
against Sheriff Dart is dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part
Defendants Dart, Johnson, Yoksoulian, Peraino, Lucente, and Acey’s motion to
dismiss James’s Third Amended Complaint [65]. The Court grants the motion as to
James’s claims against Defendants Dart, Lucente, Peraino, Johnson, and Yoksoulian
without prejudice. The Court denies the motion as to James’s claim against
Defendant Acey.

Date: 3/16/2026 Ly é /,
United States District Judge
Franklin U. Valderrama

22

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311137. Public record. Not legal advice.