# Collins

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · March 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311009

## Case

- **Full name:** Justin Collins v. Vanessa Fang, Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** March 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311009

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a district court should allow pro se plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to develop pleadings.
- stating that a pro se plaintiff should be given an opportunity to particularize potentially viable claims
- explaining that a district court should allow pro se plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to develop pleadings.

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

JUSTIN COLLINS,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:26-cv-00197

VANESSA FANG, ELYSSA O. SLUTZKY,
and JAVIER E. ORTIZ,

Defendants.

PROPOSED FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

This matter is assigned to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United States
District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by
standing order for submission of proposed findings and recommendations for disposition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 4). Before this Court is the Application to
Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs filed by Plaintiff Justin Collins (“Plaintiff”),
who is proceeding pro se in this civil action. (ECF No. 1). For the reasons explained more
fully herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that this civil action be DISMISSED,
and Plaintiff’s Application be DENIED as moot.
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Justin Collins filed a three-sentence complaint against Defendants
Vanessa Fang, Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz (“Defendants”) on March 13, 2026.
(ECF No. 2). Specifically, the Complaint alleges in full, as follows:
1. Defendants delayed the ruling,
2. This case is brought on diversity,
3. Plaintiff demands damages over $75,000.

Id. at 1. Plaintiff provides a mailing address in Honolulu, Hawaii, although the envelope
in which the Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis arrived bears a New York City
postmark. (ECF No. 1-1).
The undersigned takes judicial notice that the foregoing allegations in Plaintiff’s
Complaint and the parties involved are identical to other complaints filed by this same
Plaintiff during the same time frame in a large number of U.S. District Courts, as set forth
in the following chart, infra:
Date Case Style Case No. U.S.
Filed Dist. Ct.
03/11/26 Justin Collins v. Vanessa Fang, 1:26-cv-11199 D. Mass.
Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz
03/11/26 Justin Collins v. Vanessa Fang, 8:26-cv-1058 D. Md.
Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz
03/13/26 Justin Collins v. Vanessa Fang, 1:26-cv-250 M.D.N.C.
Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz
03/12/26 Justin Collins v. Vanessa Fang, 3:26-cv-196 W.D.N.C.
Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz
03/12/26 Justin Collins v. Vanessa Fang, 1:26-cv-152 D.R.I.
Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz
03/12/26 Justin Collins v. Vanessa Fang, 1:26-cv-36 W.D. Va.
Elyssa O. Slutzky, and Javier E. Ortiz

While it is wholly unclear from the record who the named Defendants are or their
role in the purported events giving rise to this civil action, the undersigned takes judicial
notice that Defendant Vanessa Fang was appointed as a Judge of the Housing Court, Civil
Court of the City of New York, New York County, New York, in 2021; Defendant Elyssa O.
Slutzky was appointed as a Judge of the New York City Civil Court, Housing Court, Kings
County, New York, in 2024; and Javier E. Ortiz was appointed as a Judge of the Civil
Court of the City of New York, Brooklyn Civil Part, Brooklyn, Kings County, New York, in
2
2024.
Another U.S. District Court has already dismissed Plaintiff’s identical complaint
sua sponte pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Collins
v. Fang, 1:26-cv-152 (D.R.I. Mar. 13, 2026). In that case, District Judge Melissa R. DuBose
entered a text order stating as follows, in full:

This plaintiff, who purports to be a resident of Honolulu, HI, contends that
the three named defendants, who are not identified in any way beyond their
names, "delayed the ruling." That is the sum total of information about the
case offered and no federal question is identified. While the plaintiff claims
diversity jurisdiction, he does not disclose the addresses (or states of
residence) of the defendants, and his own address is not recognized by the
United States Postal Service as a legitimate address. The plaintiff bears the
burden of showing jurisdiction, and here there has been no real effort to do
so. Smith v. Roger Williams Univ. Law Sch., No. 1:21-cv-133-PJB-AKJ,
2023 WL 3303866, *1 (D.R.I. May 8, 2023). While the Court would
ordinarily extend an opportunity to amend, in this case it does not: there
are too many defects and it is evident to the Court that this is a "ghost"
complaint, not brought by a real person who suffered a real injury as a result
of a real violation of federal or any other law. The case is DISMISSED
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) and the In Forma Pauperis Motion
(ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot.

Id.
The undersigned further takes judicial notice that this case is strikingly similar to
another civil action recently adjudicated by this Court, see Mills v. Bluth, 2:26-cv-133, at
ECF No. 4 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 26, 2026). That case involved a similar “shotgun” filing of a
barebones complaint across numerous U.S. District Courts vaguely naming New York
state judges as defendants. There thus appears to be an emerging pattern of what District
Judge DuBose terms “ghost” complaints emerging from an unnamed source in New York.
II. LEGAL STANDARD

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court has a
duty to “screen initial filings . . . to independently assess the merits of in forma pauperis
3
complaints” and “exclude suits that have no arguable basis in law or fact.” Eriline Co.
S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951,
953–54 (4th Cir. 1995)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). This Court must “dismiss a complaint
filed in forma pauperis ‘at any time if [it] determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is
frivolous or malicious . . . [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.’”

Eriline Co., 440 F.3d at 656 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). When reviewing an in forma
pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim, this Court applies the same standards that
it applies to review a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing
De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003)). That is, this Court first
“identif[ies] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). This Court then
“assume[s] the[] veracity” of the complaint’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” and
“determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint “must be sufficient ‘to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d
639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
A complaint that alleges enough facts “to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created
by [the relevant] statute” will survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 648 (quoting McCleary-
Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir.
2015)). This Court construes a pro se plaintiff’s allegations “liberally,” but the complaint
must nonetheless “contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
4
face.” Thomas, 841 F.3d at 637 (quotations omitted); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007).
Because such deference is given to pro se complaints, the Court should grant leave
to amend where a pro se complaint can be remedied by an amendment, to allow the
development of a potentially-meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980);

Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151-53 (4th Cir. 1978) (explaining that a district court
should allow pro se plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to develop pleadings.); Coleman
v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965) (stating that a pro se plaintiff should be given
an opportunity to particularize potentially viable claims). Nonetheless, the requirement
of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the
pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). The mandated liberal construction afforded to
pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid
claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may

not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the
plaintiff's legal arguments for him, or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to
the court. Randolph v. Baltimore City Atates Atty., 14-3176, 2014 WL 5293708, at *1 (D.
Md. Oct. 14, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Randolph v. New Tech, 588 Fed. App’x 219 (4th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted)). Thus, the Court may deny leave to amend when “the
amendment would be futile,” such that “it is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face” or
“if the claim it presents would not survive a motion to dismiss.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles
Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010); Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C.
5
Dep’t of Transp., 914 F.3d 213, 228 (4th Cir. 2019).
III. DISCUSSION

Dismissal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). First, dismissal is proper
because Plaintiff has identified no basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma found under similar circumstances, “the factual allegations
are too threadbare to decipher the basis for any claim . . . . Thus, the Complaint is subject
to dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.” Mills v. Bluth, 26-cv-322 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 23,
2026) (finding that vague reference to a “due process violation” insufficient to establish
federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
Additionally, dismissal is proper because Plaintiff has identified no basis to
overcome Defendants’ judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). The
Defendants appear to be state-court judges, and the lawsuit appears to be premised upon
these judges’ action while presiding over a civil action in their respective courts. Simply
put, “it is well-settled that judges are absolutely immune from suit for a deprivation of
civil rights brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if such acts were allegedly done

maliciously, corruptly, or in bad faith and no matter how erroneous the act may have
been, and however injurious in its consequences the judicial act may have proved to the
plaintiff.” Neal v. Varien, 3:24-cv-493, 2025 WL 973617, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2025)
(citing King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1992)). “Importantly, judicial immunity
protects judges from more than just paying damages—it is immunity from suit
altogether.” Clinton v. Groh, 5:22-cv-00230, 2023 WL 4106222, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. June
21, 2023) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam)). Moreover, this
broad immunity “is not easily cast aside.” Id. Only two narrow exceptions to the general
6
rule exist: (1) actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity; or (2) actions “taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. None of the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint
give rise to a plausible inference that either of these exceptions are present in the instant
action. To the contrary, Plaintiff appears to seek relief from a ruling made by the
Defendants in their judicial capacity as officers presiding over an action before the state

court over which they presided. Without more, Defendants are immune from suit.
Dismissal is likewise proper because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth
sufficient factual allegations to assert a plausible claim for relief; it is fundamentally
insufficient to offer nothing more than a threadbare conclusion that the Defendants
delayed an unspecified ruling in an unspecified lawsuit in a New York state court. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. As the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota found under
similar circumstances, “Plaintiff’s complaint does not meet the most liberal of pleading
standards[.]” Mills v. Bluth, 1:26-cv-47 (D. N.D. Feb. 24, 2026). The complaint does not
include basic facts such as how, when, or where Plaintiff’s rights were violated and what,
if any, injury he suffered as a result. Consequently, it is subject to dismissal for failure to
state a claim for which relief may be granted. See id.

As the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of North Dakota further pointed
out, “[t]here is also the issue of venue.” Id. at 3. Federal statute generally permits a
plaintiff to bring a civil action in one of three places: (1) a judicial district in which any
defendant resides when all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claims occurred; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise
be brought, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). There is nothing in the
7
complaint to indicate that either the Plaintiff or the Defendants have any connection to
West Virginia whatsoever or that any of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim occurred
in West Virginia. Consequently, there is nothing in the record to even remotely suggest
that venue is proper in this Court.
Finally, as the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of North Dakota found,

under similar circumstances, “this action appears malicious.” Mills v. Bluth, 1:26-cv-47
(D. N.D. Feb. 24, 2026). “[A] plaintiff’s duplicative complaint is an abuse of the judicial
process and is properly dismissed” as malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Id. (citing Daker
v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2021); accord McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d
573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993); Bailey v.
Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988); Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). As noted supra, Plaintiff has filed identical actions in multiple districts.
Consequently, it appears that Plaintiff’s duplicative filing in this district was intended to
harass rather than initiate legitimate litigation against Defendant. The U.S. District Court
for the District of Rhode Island found that Plaintiff’s identical litigation in that district
was a “ghost” complaint that was not brought for a proper purpose. See Collins v. Fang,

1:26-cv-152 (D.R.I. Mar. 13, 2026). As such, dismissal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the presiding
District Judge DENY Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees or
Costs (ECF No. 1) and DISMISS this action.
The parties are notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is
hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United
8
States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule
72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days
from the date of the filing of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to file with the
Clerk of this Court specific written objections identifying the portions of the Proposed
Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis of such
objection; further, pursuant to Rule 6(d), any unrepresented party shall have an
additional three (3) days after this fourteen-day period if service is made via U.S. Mail.
Extension of this time period may be granted by the presiding District Judge for good
cause shown. A copy of any objections shall be provided to Judge Goodwin, and to each
opposing party—except that, if any opposing party is represented by counsel, that party’s
copy should be provided to his or her counsel.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de
novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985);
Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841,
846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to file this Proposed Findings and Recommendation, and
to transmit a copy to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.
ENTERED: March 16, 2026

LO Dwane L. Tinsley
~.. United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311009. Public record. Not legal advice.