# Wilson

> District Court, W.D. New York · April 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310955

## Case

- **Full name:** Michaela W. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** April 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310955

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that remand is not necessary “[w]here an ALJ’s analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAELA W.,1

Plaintiff,

v. 23-CV-782-LJV
DECISION & ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

Defendant.

On August 3, 2023, the plaintiff, Michaela W. (“Michaela”), brought this action
under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Docket Item 1. She seeks review of the
determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) that she was
not disabled.2 Id. On December 8, 2023, Michaela moved for judgment on the
pleadings, Docket Item 8; on February 2, 2024, the Commissioner responded and
cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 12; and on February 16, 2024,
Michaela replied, Docket Item 13.

1 To protect the privacy interests of Social Security litigants while maintaining
public access to judicial records, this Court will identify any non-government party in
cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only by first name and last initial. Standing Order,
Identification of Non-Government Parties in Social Security Opinions (W.D.N.Y. Nov.
18, 2020).
2 Michaela applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), which is paid to a
person with a disability who also demonstrates financial need. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).
For the reasons that follow, this Court denies Michaela’s motion and grants the
Commissioner’s cross motion.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The scope of review of a disability determination . . . involves two levels of
inquiry.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). The court “must first

decide whether [the Commissioner] applied the correct legal principles in making the
determination.” Id. This includes ensuring “that the claimant has had a full hearing
under the . . . regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Social
Security Act.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation modified)
(quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)). Then, the court “decide[s]
whether the determination is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Johnson, 817 F.2d at
985 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
“Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison

Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “The substantial evidence standard means
once an ALJ finds facts, [the court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable fact finder
would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation modified) (emphasis in original); see McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

3 This Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history,
and the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and refers only to the facts
necessary to explain its decision.
interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld.”). But “[w]here there is a
reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application
of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an
unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability

determination made according to the correct legal principles.” Johnson, 817 F.2d at
986.
DISCUSSION

I. THE ALJ’S DECISION
On May 31, 2022, the ALJ found that Michaela had not been under a disability
since August 13, 2020, the date her application was filed. See Docket Item 5 at 30–31.
The ALJ’s decision was based on the five-step sequential evaluation process under 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). See id. at 20–21.
At step one, the ALJ found that Michaela had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the date her application was filed. Id. at 21. At step two, the ALJ found
that Michaela suffered from two severe, medically determinable impairments: “learning

disorder/neurodevelopmental disorder and anxiety disorder.” Id. at 22.
At step three, the ALJ found that Michaela’s severe, medically determinable
impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See id. More specifically, the ALJ found that
Michaela’s impairments did not meet or medically equal listing 12.06 (anxiety and
obsessive-compulsive disorders) or 12.11 (neurodevelopmental disorders). Id. In
assessing Michaela’s mental impairments, the ALJ found that Michaela was mildly
limited in adapting or managing herself and moderately limited in understanding,
remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; and concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace. Id. at 22–23.
The ALJ then found that Michaela had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)4
to “perform work a full range of work at all exertional levels” except that:

[Michaela] can understand, remember, and carry out simple[,]
routine instructions and tasks; she can maintain attention and
concentration and regular attendance at work for simple[,] routine
work; but she cannot make independent decision[s] or set her own
goals, nor can she perform strict production quotas as with assembly
line work. She is limited to minimal changes in work routine and
processes, and occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers,
and the general public. Finally, she cannot do team or tandem work.

Id. at 23.
At step four, the ALJ found that Michaela had no past relevant work. Id. at 29.
But given Michaela’s age, education, and RFC, the ALJ found at step five that Michaela
could perform substantial gainful activity as a cleaner, laundry worker, or kitchen helper.
Id. at 29–30; see Dictionary of Occupational Titles 323.687-0914, 1991 WL 672783
(Jan. 1, 2016); id. at 361.684-014, 1991 WL 672983 (Jan. 1, 2016); id. at 318.687-010,
1991 WL 672755 (Jan. 1, 2016). The ALJ therefore found that Michaela had not been
under a disability since the date her application was filed. See Docket Item 5 at 30.
II. ALLEGATIONS
Michaela raises one argument: that the ALJ failed to account for limitations in the
opinions of D. Brown, Psy.D.; L. Dekeon, Psy.D.; and Todd Deneen, Psy.D.—opinions

4 A claimant’s RFC is the most “an individual can still do despite his or her
limitations . . . in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” SSR 96-
8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996). “A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Id.; see Melville v.
Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999).
that the ALJ found at least somewhat “persuasive.” See Docket Item 8-1 at 11–16. For
the reasons that follow, this Court disagrees.

III. ANALYSIS
An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is]
consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir.
2013); accord Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). But that does not mean
that an RFC must “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources
cited in [an ALJ’s] decision,” Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56, or even be based on opinion
evidence, see Rubin v. Martin O’Malley, Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 116 F.4th 145, 155 (2d
Cir. 2024). So long as an ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately

analyzes any medical opinions, an RFC consistent with the record is not error. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.945; Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that
remand is not necessary “[w]here an ALJ’s analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant’s
functional limitations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial
review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence”).
On December 21, 2020, Dr. Deneen completed a psychiatric evaluation of
Michaela. See Docket Item 5 at 303–06. He opined that Michaela had no limitations in
using judgment to make decisions; interacting appropriately with others; sustaining a
routine and regular attendance; maintaining hygiene and dressing appropriately; and

being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. Id. at 305. He also
found that Michaela had only mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and
applying simple instructions and in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and
maintaining well-being. Id. On the other hand, Dr. Deneen found Michaela to be
moderately limited in understanding, remembering, and applying complex instructions
and in sustaining concentration and performing at a consistent pace. Id. He concluded
that “[t]he results of the examination appear[ed] to be consistent with psychiatric and
cognitive problems” but that those problems “d[id] not appear to be significant enough to

interfere with [Michaela’s] ability to function on a daily basis.” Id. at 306.
On February 12, 2021, Dr. Brown completed a mental RFC assessment. See
Docket Item 5 at 70–80. Dr. Brown opined that Michaela was “[n]ot significantly limited”
in understanding, remembering, and carrying out short and simple instructions; working
within a schedule and maintaining regular attendance; making simple, work-related
decisions; interacting appropriately with coworkers; and responding appropriately to
changes in the workplace. Id. at 75–77. But Dr. Brown found that Michaela had
moderate limitations in understanding and remembering detailed instructions;
maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; sustaining an ordinary
routine without special supervision; working with others without being distracted;

performing at a consistent pace; interacting appropriately with the general public; and
making plans independently of others. Id. at 75–78. And Dr. Brown found Micheala to
be markedly limited in carrying out detailed instructions. Id. at 75. Dr. Brown concluded
that, “[g]iven [Micheala’s] psychiatric[] impairments[,] she should be capable of
performing simple[,] low public contact work.” Id. at 72.
Dr. Dekeon later reviewed the record and affirmed Dr. Brown’s findings. See id.
at 88–89.
The ALJ found Dr. Brown’s opinion and Dr. Dekeon’s opinion to be persuasive,
and he found Dr. Deneen’s opinion to be partially persuasive. See id. at 27–28. More
specifically, the ALJ discounted Dr. Deneen’s opinion insofar as Dr. Deneen found
Michaela less limited than Drs. Brown and Dekeon opined. See id. at 28. Michaela
argues that in light of those “persuasive” opinions, the ALJ erred by not including
restrictions in the RFC addressing their moderate limitations—that is, in “maintain[ing]

attention and concentration for extended periods, sustain[ing] an ordinary routine
without interruptions . . ., and perform[ing] at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods.” Docket Item 8-1 at 14–15. But that argument is
factually incorrect.
To begin, the RFC restricted Michaela to “simple[,] routine work” involving only
“simple[,] routine instructions and tasks” and with “minimal changes in work routine and
processes.” Docket Item 5 at 23. Courts in this Circuit repeatedly have found such
restrictions sufficient to account for moderate limitations like those that Drs. Deneen,
Brown, and Dekeon found. See, e.g., Karl E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL
3003714, at *5 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2025) (“[T]he ALJ limited [the p]laintiff to ‘simple

tasks,’ which accounts for [the p]laintiff’s moderate difficulty in concentrating, persisting,
or maintaining pace.”); Arthur M. v. Saul, 2021 WL 2309884, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. June 7,
2021) (“[T]he restrictions imposed by the RFC, including that [the] plaintiff can perform
only simple and routine tasks . . . are sufficient to account for [the] plaintiff’s moderate
limitations with regard to completing a normal workday or workweek without interruption
as well as performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length
of rest periods.”); see also Denise Marie T.-W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL
4162490, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2024) (“Moderate limitations in some or all areas of
mental functioning may be accounted for in an RFC by limiting a plaintiff to simple,
routine work . . . .”). So the limitations incorporated in the RFC—that Michaela could
perform only “simple, routine work” and complete only “simple[,] routine instructions and
tasks”—accounted for the limitations in Drs. Deneen, Brown, and Dekeon’s opinions.
See Docket Item 5 at 23.

What is more, and as noted above, Dr. Deneen explicitly found that Michaela’s
mental health issues “d[id] not appear to be significant enough to interfere with
[Michaela’s] ability to function on a daily basis.” Id. at 306. And Drs. Brown and
Dekeon agreed that notwithstanding Michaela’s impairments, she could perform
“simple, low public contact work.” See id. at 72 (Dr. Brown), 88–89 (Dr. Dekeon). The
RFC’s limitation to “simple[,] routine work” and only “occasional interaction with
supervisors, co-workers, and the general public” was therefore more than sufficient to
account for Michaela’s mental health issues. See id. at 23.
In fact, while Dr. Deneen opined that Michaela was not limited in interacting with
others, see id. at 305, the ALJ accepted the opinions of Dr. Brown and Dr. Dekeon that

she had moderate limitations in that domain, see id. at 28. Consistent with that
conclusion, the RFC limited Michaela to only “occasional interaction with supervisors,
co-workers, and the general public” and to no “team or tandem work.” See id. at 23. In
other words, the ALJ agreed with the most restrictive limitations about which the doctors
opined, and the RFC included restrictions addressing those limitations. That certainly
was not error.
Michaela also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to explain how the RFC
accounted for the limitations about which Drs. Deneen, Brown, and Dekeon opined.
See Docket Item 8-1 at 13. But “[a]n ALJ does not have to state on the record every
reason justifying a decision,” Valdez-Ocasio v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 3573761, at *1 (2d
Cir. May 22, 2023) (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d
Cir. 2012)); rather, so long as an ALJ’s decision provides “an adequate basis for
meaningful judicial review . . . and is supported by substantial evidence,” there is no

error, Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). And that is precisely the
case here.
In sum, the ALJ crafted an RFC that was consistent with the opinions of Drs.
Deneen, Brown, and Dekeon and with the medical evidence in the record. Indeed, the
ALJ addressed the most severe limitations in those opinions and explicitly accounted for
them in the RFC. Because the ALJ was “entitled to weigh all of the evidence available
to make an RFC finding that was consistent with the record as a whole,” Matta v.
Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013), and because the ALJ did just that, his
decision was supported by substantial evidence. This Court will not second-guess it.
See Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010).
CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s decision was not contrary to the substantial evidence in the record, nor
did it result from any legal error. Therefore, and for the reasons stated above,
Michaela’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 8, is DENIED, and the
Commissioner’s cross motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 12, is
GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED, and the Clerk of Court shall close the file.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2026
Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310955. Public record. Not legal advice.