# R. Brown v. PPB

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · April 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310514

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 15, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Wallace
- **Judges:** Wallace
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310514

## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Raymond Brown, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 1815 C.D. 2024
: Submitted: March 3, 2026
Pennsylvania Parole Board, :
Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: April 15, 2026

Raymond Brown (Brown) petitions for review of the December 3, 2024 order
(Order) of the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board) that denied his administrative
appeal of a May 30, 2024 Board decision (Decision) recommitting him as a
convicted parole violator (CPV) and denying him credit for time spent at liberty on
parole. Additionally, Brown’s appointed counsel, Dana E. Greenspan, Esq.
(Counsel), filed a no-merit letter and an Application to Withdraw as Counsel
(Application to Withdraw) under Turner.1 After review, we grant Counsel’s
Application to Withdraw, and affirm the Board’s Order.

1
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2017, following convictions for aggravated assault, unlawful restraint with
risk of serious bodily injury, terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, simple
assault, and two counts of endangering the welfare of children, Brown received an
aggregate sentence of 9 ½ years to 19 years’ imprisonment, with a maximum
sentence date of March 22, 2030. Certified Record (C.R.) at 1, 3. The Board granted
Brown conditional parole by order dated May 17, 2021, and on August 11, 2021,
released him from State Correctional Institution (SCI) Mercer to reside at Self Help
Movement, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 7-12, 17. Prior to release, Brown
signed Conditions Governing Parole/Reparole (Conditions), which included the
following: “If you are convicted of a crime committed while on parole/reparole, the
Board has the authority, after an appropriate hearing, to recommit you to serve the
balance of the sentence or sentences which you were serving when
paroled/reparoled, with no credit for time at liberty on parole.” Id. at 13. Brown
also signed Special Conditions of Parole (Special Conditions), acknowledging his
placement on domestic violence protocol. Id. at 22.
On July 20, 2022, the Board ordered Brown to stay away from his child’s
mother because of the filing of a Protection from Abuse (PFA) petition, which was
later dismissed. Id. at 55. On the same date, the Board placed Brown on GPS
monitoring, with a warning to stay more than 300 feet from the mother’s home. Id.
at 30, 31, 55. On February 9, 2023, the Board again placed Brown on GPS
monitoring because of another PFA action filed against him, and Brown signed
additional Special Conditions to “remain in compliance with the [PFA] order issued
against him.” Id. at 34-35, 55.

2
On June 22, 2023, the Department of Corrections (Department) issued a
warrant for Brown for violation of a parole condition, failure to refrain from
assaultive behavior. Id. at 39. On October 18, 2023, the Board determined the
Department failed to establish the alleged violation by a preponderance of the
evidence, ordered Brown to continue on parole, and canceled the warrant, effective
October 27, 2023. Id. at 40-42.
On November 6, 2023, the Philadelphia Police Department arrested Brown in
connection with incidents occurring on June 14, 2023 and June 17, 2023 and charged
him with several crimes, including two counts of indirect criminal contempt under
the PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a), (PFA contempt) relative to each incident. Id. at
51, 53, 58-74. The trial court set bail at $25,000 for each case, but Brown never
posted bail. Id. at 60, 69. On that same date, the Department issued a second warrant
for Brown’s committal. Id. at 43. On December 12, 2023, the Board ordered Brown
to remain detained pending the disposition of the criminal charges. Id. at 44.
On April 9, 2024, the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County (Municipal
Court) found Brown guilty of the PFA contempt counts, dismissed the remaining
charges, and sentenced him to serve three months to six months of incarceration with
credit for time served, followed by six months of consecutive probation. Id. at 58-
74. On April 26, 2024, the Board provided Brown notice of charges and notice of a
revocation hearing. Id. at 48-49. On that same date, Brown waived his rights to
counsel, a panel hearing, and a revocation hearing; he also admitted to the PFA
contempt convictions. Id. at 45-47. As part of the written waiver (Waiver), Brown
acknowledged: “I understand and agree that this admission is binding and may only
be withdrawn if I submit a written withdrawal to my supervising agent, within ten

3
(10) calendar days of the date written above [April 26, 2024].” Id. at 45. Brown did
not submit a written withdrawal within 10 days of April 26, 2024.
Based on Brown’s Waiver, the Board canceled a revocation hearing,
scheduled for June 30, 2024, and the hearing examiner issued a report. Id. at 75-87.
The Board issued its Decision to “recommit [Brown] to [an SCI] as a [CPV] to serve
a recommitment period of 6 months,” and determined a new recommitment
maximum date of August 10, 2032. Id. at 88-89 (capitalization omitted). The Board
listed as its reasons: convictions in a court of record, poor adjustment under
supervision, and failure to comply with sanctions. Id. The Board did not award
credit for time spent at liberty on parole because Brown’s “behavior reflects
domestic violence issues that warrant denying credit for time at liberty on parole.”
Id. at 89 (capitalization omitted).
Brown filed an administrative appeal of the Board’s Decision. The Board
denied the administrative appeal and affirmed the Board’s Decision. Id. at 107-10.
Brown now appeals the Board’s Order. On appeal, Brown raises three issues
for our review. First, Brown alleges the Board erred in not providing a revocation
hearing despite his timely submission of a written withdrawal of his waiver.
Brown’s Br. at 4. Second, Brown claims the Board abused its discretion in
recommitting him when “he was not convicted in a court of record,” and in
misapplying an offense gravity score (OGS) of 1 under the 8th Edition of the
Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines). Id. Lastly, Brown contends the
Board abused its discretion in denying him credit for time in good standing on parole
as the record does not contain convictions for domestic violence. Id.

4
Additionally, this Court appointed Counsel for Brown, and afforded Counsel
time to file an Amended Petition for Review. Thereafter, Counsel filed an
Application to Withdraw and a Turner letter.2
II. Turner Letter and Application to Withdraw
Before considering the merits of Brown’s appeal, we must first address
Counsel’s Turner letter and Application to Withdraw. Where court-appointed
counsel believes the petitioner’s case lacks merit, this Court may permit counsel to
withdraw from the representation if counsel submits a Turner letter that “detail[s]
the nature and extent of [counsel’s] review and list[s] each issue the petitioner
wished to have raised, with counsel’s explanation of why those issues [are]
meritless.” Turner, 544 A.2d at 928. Further, we must confirm counsel satisfied the
following procedural requirements: (1) counsel notified the petitioner of the request
to withdraw; (2) counsel provided the petitioner with a copy of a Turner letter; and
(3) counsel advised the petitioner of his right to retain new counsel or file a brief on
his own behalf. Miskovitch v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2013). Where counsel satisfies the procedural requirements, we conduct
an independent review of the issues and, if we concur in counsel’s assessment, we
may grant counsel leave to withdraw. Hont v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 680 A.2d
47, 48 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
Here, Counsel satisfied the technical requirements of Turner. Counsel’s letter
sets forth the relevant factual and procedural history. Counsel states that, following
review of the record and relevant case law and statutes, and after consultation with
Brown, “[i]n preparing the appellate brief . . . counsel has come to the conclusion

2
“Turner letter” references our Supreme Court’s decision in Turner, 544 A.2d at 928-29, wherein
the Court set forth “the appropriate procedures under Pennsylvania law” for “the withdrawal of
court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks on criminal convictions.”

5
that the issues raised in the Petition for Review lack merit and that there exists no
legal basis to challenge the Parole Board determination.” Turner Letter at 1.
Counsel analyzes the issues Brown raised in his administrative appeal. Counsel
provided Brown a copy of the Turner letter informing him of his right to retain
substitute counsel and his right to file a pro se brief with this Court. Id. at 10. Thus,
Counsel complied with Turner’s technical requirements to withdraw from
representation. Accordingly, we now independently review the merits of Brown’s
Petition for Review.
III. Discussion
We review the actions of the Board to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the Board’s decision, whether the Board committed an error of law, or
whether the Board violated a parolee’s constitutional rights. Bailey v. Pa. Parole
Bd., 323 A.3d 259, 263 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (quotation omitted). “ʻSubstantial
evidence’ has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and “requires something more than a
scintilla creating a mere suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.”
Chapman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 484 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).
When presented with a question of law, such as statutory interpretation, our standard
of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 473 (Pa. 2017). Where the law grants the Board discretion,
we review for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 473-74.
A. Waiver of Right to Revocation Hearing
First, we address Brown’s contention the Board erred in failing to provide a
revocation hearing. The United States Supreme Court has recognized due process
requires a timely revocation hearing before the parole authority’s revocation

6
decision, at which the parolee must have, following proper notice to him, an
opportunity to appear and to present evidence. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
487-88 (1972). Section 71.4 of the Board’s Regulations, 37 Pa. Code § 71.4,
enumerates a 120-day timeframe for the revocation hearing following a triggering
event, and recognizes the parolee’s right to waive that hearing. 37 Pa. Code § 71.4.
Here, Brown does not contest that, on April 26, 2024, he waived in writing
his right to a revocation hearing. Brown’s Br. at 9. Nor does Brown dispute the
validity of the waiver form. Id. Rather, Brown asserts that on May 3, 2024, within
the requisite 10-day period, he submitted a written waiver withdrawal form
(Withdrawal) to parole staff, which staff did not process. Id. at 9-10. Brown
included a copy of this alleged two-page Withdrawal as “Exhibit A” to his
administrative appeal, along with purported proof of mailing “to his parole officer
Edward Jones and a copy to M. Ortiz” as “Exhibit B” (Exhibit B). C.R. at 96-97,
99-100.
Contrary to Brown’s assertions, the Certified Record does not contain any
indicia that Brown’s supervising agent received the purported Withdrawal within 10
calendar days of April 26, 2024, as required by the language of the Waiver.
Similarly, the Certified Record contains no evidence the Board ever received the
Withdrawal. Moreover, Brown’s own evidence, Exhibit B, reflects a postmark date
of June 16, 2024, well beyond the 10-day calendar period. Thus, we discern no error
by the Board in finding Brown waived his right to a revocation hearing.
B. Propriety of Recommitment
Preliminarily, Brown contends the Board cannot recommit him because the
Municipal Court is not a court of record under Section 6138(a)(1) of the Prisons and
Parole Code (Code), 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1), and his PFA contempt convictions
constitute summary offenses. Brown’s Br. at 11-12 (citing Chesson v. Pa. Bd. of

7
Prob. & Parole, 47 A.3d 875 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)). Section 6138(a)(1), in pertinent
part, endows the Board with discretion to revoke an offender’s parole for conviction
of a crime punishable by imprisonment “in a court of record.”
61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1).
In Chesson, we determined a conviction for a summary offense before the
Municipal Court of Philadelphia, normally a court of record, does not constitute a
conviction in a “court of record” for purposes of Section 6138(a)(1) of the Code.
Chesson, 47 A.3d at 880 (emphasis added). Brown attempts to pigeonhole his PFA
contempt convictions into this window. However, because PFA contempt carries a
maximum sentence punishable by up to six months of incarceration, the courts of
this Commonwealth have treated it as a misdemeanor. See Commonwealth v. Bartic,
303 A.3d 124, 133 (Pa. Super. 2023) (appellant permitted to petition for allowance
of appeal because a conviction for indirect criminal contempt under Section 6114 of
the PFA is a misdemeanor).3 Moreover, our Supreme Court has clearly recognized
the impropriety of summarily punishing PFA contempt convictions. Commonwealth
v. Stevenson, 283 A.3d 196, 205 (Pa. 2022) (“indirect criminal contempt cannot be
punished summarily” because, unlike direct contempt where the conduct occurs
within the court’s immediate view, indirect criminal contempt includes the right to
a trial by jury for determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Because Brown
has supplied no authority to support whether the Municipal Court’s convictions for
non-summary crimes constitute convictions “in a court of record,” we discern no
error by the Board.

3
Although Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, they may provide
persuasive authority where they address analogous legal issues. DeSantis v. Lenox Place Condo
Assoc., Inc., 316 A.3d 1119, 1121 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).

8
Additionally, Brown asserts the Board erred in recommitting him to a term of
six months of incarceration, based upon an OGS of 1, because the Sentencing
Guidelines do not ascribe any OGS to PFA contempt. The Board concedes the
Sentencing Guidelines do not designate an OGS for PFA Contempt; however, the
Board asserts it appropriately utilized an OGS of 1, the lowest OGS, for Brown’s
convictions. Board’s Br. at 18.
We have held a PFA contempt was a criminal conviction sufficient to
warrant recommittal as a CPV under the Code. See Dunkelberger v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole, 593 A.2d 8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). Section 311.5(b)(1) of
the State Parole Recommitment Guidelines (Recommitment Guidelines),
204 Pa. Code, § 311.5(b)(1), enumerates the following specific provisions for
CPVs, such as Brown, in pertinent part:

(1) Convicted violator recommitment ranges are to be considered by the
Board in the exercise of its discretion, while accounting for the
following factors:

(i) The seriousness of the initial conviction offense. Seriousness
is based on the determination under the State parole guidelines
whether the person is designated as a violent or non-violent
offender.

(ii) The level of seriousness of the new conviction offense. The
seriousness of the new conviction offense is determined by
identifying the highest OGS assignment under the 8 th Edition
Sentencing Guidelines of all new conviction offenses, and then
determining the corresponding sentencing level for that
offense. . . . Summary offenses are assigned the lowest offense
gravity score (OGS 1) and the corresponding sentencing level
(Level A). . . .

(iii) The time required to receive treatment and programming to
meet the rehabilitative needs of the paroled person. The

9
corrective programming required to address the needs of the
paroled person associated with the recommitment, which
begins after a hearing or waiver of a hearing, may require a
recommitment period shorter or longer than the recommended
recommitment range.

204 Pa. Code § 311.5(b)(1). The table in Section 311.6(b) of the Recommitment
Guidelines identifies a CPV recommitment range of one to six months for new
convictions with OGS 1 to OGS 3, committed by both non-violent and violent
offenders. 204 Pa. Code § 311.6(b). This is the least amount of recommitment time
for a CPV. Id.
Here, the Board applied a recommitment range of one to six months, the
lowest recommittal range. C.R. at 108. Despite Brown’s contention the Sentencing
Guidelines do not identify an OGS for PFA contempt, the Recommitment Guidelines
identify an OGS of 1 for summary offenses. 204 Pa. Code § 311.5(b)(1). Similarly,
Brown received the benefit of the application of the lowest OGS and recommittal
range for his convictions, which cannot be summarily punished. See Bartic, 303
A.3d at 133; Stevenson, 283 A.3d at 205. Further, the Board did not exercise its
discretion to exceed the recommended range. 204 Pa. Code, § 311.5(b)(1)(iii).
When the recommitment period falls within the presumptive range, a parolee cannot
challenge the Board’s decision. Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 574 A.2d 558
(Pa. 1990). Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in recommitting
Brown for six months.
C. Credit for Time at Liberty on Parole
Lastly, we address Brown’s contention the Board abused its discretion by
denying him credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole. The Code provides if
the Board determines to recommit a parolee as a CPV, as it did with Brown, “the
offender shall be recommitted to serve the remainder of the term which the offender

10
would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been granted and, except as
provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on
parole.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2). Except in certain limited circumstances, none of
which apply here, Paragraph 2.1 of Section 6138(a) of the Code endows the Board
with discretion to award an offender credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole.
61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1).
In Pittman, our Supreme Court concluded the Board must provide an
explanation for its decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time served at liberty
on parole. Pittman, 159 A.3d at 474-75. The Supreme Court explained, “an
appellate court hearing the matter must have [a] method to assess the Board’s
exercise of discretion,” and a single sentence will often suffice. Id. at 474, 475 n.12.
Additionally, this Court has determined the Board’s reasons must be “documented
by the record.” Plummer v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 216 A.3d 1207, 1212 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2019).
Here, the hearing examiner’s report included a checked box indicating “[t]he
offender’s behavior reflects domestic violence issues that warrant denying credit for
time at liberty on parole.” C.R. at 80. Brown argues the inadequacy of the Board’s
stated reason, contending the Certified Record does not “[reflect] domestic issues,”
because it does not contain any PFA complaints or PFA findings of abuse. Brown’s
Br. at 16. Brown also relies upon the Board’s October 18, 2023 determination that
he did not engage in assaultive behavior, as well as the Municipal Court’s dismissal
of burglary and robbery charges. Id. at 16. We disagree.
Our review of the record supports the Board’s articulated reason for denying
credit. Before his release from incarceration, Brown signed the Conditions, wherein
he acknowledged the Board’s authority, upon recommittal for conviction of a new

11
crime, to deny him credit for time spent at liberty on parole. While on parole
supervision for aggravated assault and related offenses, and while subject to the
Special Conditions for domestic violence protocol and for PFA protocol, Brown
received two new PFA contempt convictions. On two separate occasions, Brown
was placed on GPS monitoring, related to PFA incidents. The Board followed
Pittman by supplying a rationale for its decision to deny Brown credit for time spent
at liberty on parole, and the record supported the rationale. Thus, the Board did not
abuse its discretion by denying Brown credit for time spent at liberty on parole.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Counsel fulfilled the requirements of
Turner, and our independent review confirms Brown’s arguments lack merit.
Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s Application to Withdraw. Additionally, we
conclude the Board did not err or abuse its discretion, and we affirm the Board’s
Order.

______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge

12
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Raymond Brown, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 1815 C.D. 2024
:
Pennsylvania Parole Board, :
Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 15th day of April 2026, the April 25, 2025 Application to
Withdraw as Counsel filed by Dana E. Greenspan, Esq. is GRANTED and the
December 3, 2024 order of the Pennsylvania Parole Board is AFFIRMED.

______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310514. Public record. Not legal advice.