# Griffin

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310458

## Case

- **Full name:** Nathaniel Griffin v. City of South Pasadena and The St. Petersburg International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 747
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310458

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of a disparate treatment claim when plaintiff alleged nowhere that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably
- discussing the “special needs” exception
- affirming dismissal for failure to plead the existence of similarly situated employees when plaintiff merely generically referenced younger males

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

NATHANIEL GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-02787-WFJ-CPT

CITY OF SOUTH PASADENA,
and THE ST. PETERSBURG
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 747,

Defendants.
________________________________________/

ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants City of South Pasadena (the “City”) and the
St. Petersburg International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 747’s (“Local 747”)
Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and request
to strike duplicative claim in the Complaint. Dkts. 30, 31. The City moves this Court
to dismiss Counts I–VIII of the Complaint and strike Count IV. Dkt. 30. Local 747
moves to dismiss the single count alleged against it in Count IX. Dkt. 31. Plaintiff
Griffin has responded in opposition, Dkt. 32, and Defendants replied. Dkts. 33, 34.
After careful consideration, the Court grants the City’s motion to dismiss Counts I–
VIII and grants Local 747’s motion to dismiss Count IX.
BACKGROUND
This employment dispute centers around Plaintiff Griffin’s termination from

the South Pasadena Fire Department due to the alleged manipulation of his annual
physical evaluation, which all South Pasadena Fire Department employees must
undergo pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between Local

747 and the City.
On or about June 8, 2018, Plaintiff was hired by the City to be a
“firefighter/paramedic.” Dkt. 5 ¶ 13. The following year, on August 28, 2019, the
City and Local 747 finalized a CBA that applied to all South Pasadena Fire

Department employees. Id. ¶ 15; see Dkt. 31-1 (showing CBA between the City and
Local 747).1 Under Article 6 of the CBA, all South Pasadena Fire Department
employees are subject to annual physical examinations “to determine whether or not

the employee is fit for duty.” Dkt. 31-1 at 12; see Dkt. 5 ¶ 16. When evaluating the
results of the physical examination, the CBA requires the physician to follow the
national guidelines set forth in the National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”)
1582, Chapter 9. Dkt. 31-1 at 12. As relevant to this lawsuit, the annual physical

1 Ordinarily, when ruling upon a motion to dismiss, a court considers only the “four corners of the complaint” and the
exhibits attached to the complaint. Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010); see Turner v.
Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 583 n.27 (11th Cir. 2023). However, under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, a court
may also consider a document outside the four corners if it “is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in
terms of authenticity,” regardless of whether it is “mentioned in” or “attached to” the complaint. Maxcess, Inc. v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005); see Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1299–
1300 (11th Cir. 2024). Here, the CBA attached to Defendant Local 747’s motion to dismiss is central to Plaintiff’s
claims, as the Complaint references the CBA multiple times in connection with his ADA, Title VII, and GINA claims,
and the attachment’s authenticity is not disputed by Plaintiff. Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 15, 16, 39, 40.
examination includes tuberculosis (“TB”) testing, which may require an additional
chest X-ray if the TB test comes back positive. Id. Plaintiff alleges that at some

unspecified point during the CBA negotiations, he objected to the CBA agreement
due “to the breath [sic] and intrusive nature of the mandatory medical examinations.”
Dkt. 5 ¶ 17. Plaintiff further alleges that he continually voiced his objection to the

CBA, even after the agreement was adopted on August 28, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18, 19.
On August 12, 2022, Plaintiff underwent his annual physical examination at
Life Scan Wellness Center (“Life Scan”). Id. ¶ 21. During his examination, Plaintiff
completed most of the medical examination without issue, except for the TB test. Id.

¶¶ 22, 28–34. The City opened a formal investigation into Plaintiff for allegedly
asking the Life Scan technician to skip the TB test but fraudulently report that a test
had been done. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31. A hearing was held on August 29, 2022, at which

Plaintiff presented testimony and answered questions about what occurred during
the annual physical examination. Id. ¶¶ 24, 25. On September 7, 2022, Fire Chief
Mixson provided Plaintiff with a “written memorandum regarding FF/Paramedic
Griffin[’s] Conduct and Work Performance.” Id. ¶ 26. The memorandum stated that

“a Life Scan technician informed [Fire Chief Mixson] that the Plaintiff did not want
the ТВ test performed on him,” and that Plaintiff had “asked that he receive
paperwork stating he underwent the test. When told [Life Scan] would not provide

such documentation, the Plaintiff underwent the test.” Id. ¶ 30. The memorandum
concluded that “Plaintiff’s behavior did not meet City standards, was
insubordinate[,] and significantly undermined public trust.” Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff denies

ever asking the Life Scan technician to lie about whether a TB test had been done.
Id. ¶ 34.
Based on the investigation results, Fire Chief Mixson recommended

terminating Plaintiff's employment. Id. ¶ 36. On September 13, 2022, the City asked
if Plaintiff wished to resign, which Plaintiff declined. On the same day, the City
terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶¶ 37, 38. On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff
filed a grievance under the CBA, but the City refused to participate in the CBA’s

grievance process. Id. ¶¶ 39, 40. On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination against the City with the Florida Commission on Human Rights
(“FCHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),

asserting discrimination based on disability, genetic information, and sex, as well as
retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 10, 41. Plaintiff received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights from
the EEOC on July 22, 2025. Id. ¶ 11. Although not alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff
also filed an EEOC charge of discrimination against Local 747 on May 4, 2023, also

alleging discrimination based on disability, genetic information, and sex, as well as
retaliation. Dkt. 31-2 (showing EEOC charge against Local 747).2

2 Again, the Court considers the attached EEOC charge against Local 747 under the doctrine of incorporation by
reference. The EEOC charge is central to Plaintiff’s single ADA claim against Local 747, and the attachment’s
authenticity is not disputed by Plaintiff. Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 98–102.
On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, bringing nine
counts against Defendants. See Dkt. 5. Against the City, Plaintiff asserts eight

counts: (1) an Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
discrimination claim; (2) ADA retaliation claim; (3) violation of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”); (4) retaliation under GINA;

(5) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); (6) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (7) 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments;
and (8) violation of the Florida Constitution’s right to be free from unreasonable

search and seizure. Id. ¶¶ 42–96. In Count IX, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a single
ADA discrimination claim against Local 747. Id. ¶¶ 97–102. In January 2026,
Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss and strike duplicative claims. Dkts.

30, 31.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief to give the defendant fair

notice of the claims and grounds. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (citation omitted). The plaintiff is required to allege “more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Id. (citation omitted). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wiersum v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015). A complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78
(2009) (citation modified). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted

deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION

Based on a careful review of the pleadings, the Court grants the City’s motion
to dismiss. As discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the ADA,
GINA, Title VII, and Section 1983. As to Local 747, the Court grants the motion to

dismiss Count IX since Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim is time-barred. The
Court’s discussion will begin with the City’s motion to dismiss the eight counts
against it and then consider Local 747’s motion to dismiss the single ADA claim.
I. The City’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I–VIII

a. Counts I & II—ADA discrimination and retaliation claims
The City seeks dismissal of the ADA discrimination claim in Count I,
primarily arguing that the annual physical examination requirement “constitutes a

lawful, job-related medical examination within the meaning of the [ADA].” Dkt. 30
at 1. Plaintiff responds, contending that his ADA claim survives dismissal as the
annual physical examination is not job-related or consistent with “business

necessity.” Dkt. 32 at 3. While the City might be correct that an annual physical
examination for firefighters does not violate the ADA, the City’s business-necessity
argument is an affirmative defense under 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), which should be

raised in the City’s answer. However, the Court still dismisses Count I for failure to
state a claim.
In Count I, Plaintiff asserts that the City’s mandatory physical examination
for all South Pasadena Fire Department firefighters is an impermissible medical

inquiry under the ADA. Dkt. 5 ¶ 44. The ADA provides in relevant part:
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not
make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the
disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related
and consistent with business necessity.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). An individual need not be disabled to be protected
under this section. See Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310–11
(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, to prove discrimination under this section of the ADA, a
plaintiff must show the employer required a disability-related medical examination
or made a disability-related medical inquiry. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). If a
plaintiff makes that showing, then the employer can avoid liability if it demonstrates
that the examination or inquiry was “job-related and consistent with business
necessity.” See Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1316–1317 (11th Cir.
2009) (“To benefit from the affirmative defense [in 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)], an

employer must prove that the pertinent qualification standard is job-related and
consistent with business necessity.”); see also Owusu-Ansah, 715 F.3d at 1311
(applying Allmond’s definitions to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)).

Here, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege a violation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(4)(A). Article 6 of the CBA requires all South Pasadena Fire Department
employees to undergo an annual physical examination, and Plaintiff had an
examination in August 2022. Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 16, 21–22; see Dkt. 31-1 at 12. However, the

Complaint never specifies which aspects of Plaintiff’s physical examination at Life
Scan were an improper inquiry into the nature or severity of his disability or whether
he is an individual with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). While Plaintiff

states that he “completed all available portions of the medical examination[,] which
included tuberculin injection, ultrasonic imaging of the visceral organs and genitalia,
medical questionnaire, vision/auditory testing[,] and physical fitness evaluation,”
Dkt. 5 ¶ 22, the Complaint never identifies which portions of the examination were

violations of the ADA. To be sure, Plaintiff has several specific allegations
concerning his refusal to get tested for TB during the examination, but he never
alleges that he is a disabled individual with TB or that the tuberculin injection portion

of the physical examination violated the ADA. See id. ¶¶ 22, 30–34. Instead, the
allegations in Count I vaguely state that the City’s “mandatory annual medical
examinations violate the Plaintiff’s rights under the ADA. Specifically, the

examinations violate the ADA’s prohibition against medical examinations and
disability- related inquiries.” Id. ¶ 44. This assertion is nothing more than a formulaic
recitation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), which is insufficient to state a claim. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.”). Therefore, the Court grants the City’s motion to dismiss Count
I for failure to state a claim.
As to whether the annual physical examination is job-related and consistent

with business necessity, this inquiry is an affirmative defense under the ADA, see
Allmond, 558 F.3d at 1316; 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), and the Eleventh Circuit has been
clear that “[a] complaint need not anticipate and negate affirmative defenses and

should not ordinarily be dismissed based on an affirmative defense unless the
defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
960 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171,
1175 (11th Cir. 2011)); see Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93 F.4th 1221, 1224 (11th Cir.

2024) (citation modified) (noting “a plaintiff is not required to negate an affirmative
defense in its complaint”). While there might be binding caselaw that suggests
Plaintiff’s ADA claims will not survive summary judgment under the business-

necessity affirmative defense, see Watson v. City of Mia. Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935–
36 (11th Cir. 1999), the Court cannot say that the affirmative defense appears on the
face of the Complaint. The City, however, is not barred from reraising this

affirmative defense at a later time.
Turning to Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim in Count II, the City argues that
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should be dismissed since he “did not engage in any

protected activity.” Dkt. 30 at 10. Plaintiff contends that “he objected to unlawful
examinations and discriminatory treatment, Defendants knew of this opposition, and
he suffered adverse actions as a result.” Dkt. 32 at 7.
The ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual “because such individual

has opposed any act or practice made unlawful [by the ADA] or . . . made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).3 When a plaintiff relies on

circumstantial evidence, as Mr. Griffin does here, courts evaluate an ADA retaliation
claim using the same burden-shifting framework applied to Title VII retaliation
claims. Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1219 (11th Cir. 2021).
Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

retaliation. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2018). “To

3 As discussed below, the Court will apply this same framework when discussing Plaintiff’s Title VII and GINA
retaliation claims. See Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e
assess ADA retaliation claims under the same framework we employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.”);
Conner-Goodgame v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:12-CV-03426-IPJ, 2013 WL 5428448, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Sept.
26, 2013) (“Because GINA's anti-retaliation provision tracks the language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, the
court has analyzed Plaintiff's retaliation claim under Title VII’s framework for retaliation.”).
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either act, an employee must
demonstrate (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) that she

suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that a causal connection exists
between the two.” Id. at 1329. The City’s motion to dismiss does not challenge the
second element, so the Court addresses the first and third. Dkt. 30 at 11.

A statutorily protected activity for an ADA retaliation claim is “oppos[ing]
any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); see also
Calvo v. Walgreens Corp., 340 F. App’x 618, 625–26 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that
opposing unlawful practices or filing charges against the employer are the bases for

a retaliation claim).
To satisfy the causation requirement, Plaintiff needs only to “prove that the
protected activity and the adverse action are not completely unrelated.” Higdon, 393

F.3d at 1220 (citation modified). This element is satisfied if the plaintiff “provides
sufficient evidence of knowledge of the protected expression and that there was a
close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse
action.” Id. (citation modified). For temporal proximity alone to be sufficient

circumstantial evidence of a causal connection, it “must be very
close.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “If there is a substantial delay between the
protected expression and the adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending

to show causation, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that he engaged in protected
activity. Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss claims he “objected to unlawful

examinations and discriminatory treatment.” Dkt. 32 at 7 (citing Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 50–52).
However, an examination of the Complaint only shows a conclusory allegation that
“Plaintiff opposed and complained about the unlawful employment practices and the

foregoing adverse actions were taken because the Plaintiff opposed the invasive and
illegal mandatory medical procedures that the Defendants required for their annual
fitness for duty.” Dkt. 5 ¶ 50. This allegation is nothing more than a “formulaic
recitation” of a retaliation element that “will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

When looking at other parts of the Complaint, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that
“throughout his employment with the [City,] [he] voiced his objections to the
breadth and intrusive nature of the mandatory medical examinations. Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 17,

18. These unsubstantiated allegations do not allege that Plaintiff engaged in
protected activity, as they do not describe to whom he made these objections, when
he made said objections following the CBA’s adoption in August 2019, and how the
content of these objections related to an unlawful practice under the ADA. To the

extent Plaintiff claims his testimony at the August 29, 2022, investigation hearing is
protected activity, the Complaint says nothing about whether Plaintiff complained
about an unlawful practice under the ADA at said hearing. See id. ¶¶ 24–34. At most,

the Complaint shows only that Plaintiff told the Life Scan technician—not Fire Chief
Mixon or any other decision-maker—that he did not want to take a TB test. Id. ¶¶
32, 33.

Even if Plaintiff’s continued objections to the annual physical examinations
constituted a protected activity, the Complaint still fails to show causation. Again,
the Complaint claims that Plaintiff’s termination was the “direct and proximate

result of the violations of the ADA,” but fails to allege any facts supporting this
assertion. Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 51, 52. While the Court accepts as true that Plaintiff continually
objected to the annual examination mandated by the CBA, the Complaint does not
allege that Fire Chief Mixson or any other decisionmaker terminated Plaintiff

because he objected to the mandatory examinations.4 Nor does the Complaint
provide any dates to determine when these continuing objections were made. As
such, the Court cannot even determine whether Plaintiff is relying on temporal

proximity to prove causation, since the Complaint lacks specific dates for when the
protected activity occurred. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361,
1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing temporal proximity limitations). As pled, the
Court dismisses the ADA retaliation claim in Count II.

4 Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint seems to allege the opposite, stating that Fire Chief Mixson was well aware of
Plaintiff’s objections to the mandatory physical examinations, but no adverse employment action was ever taken
against Plaintiff during the three years between the CBA’s adoption in August 2019 and the August 2022 examination
at Life Scan. See Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 15, 19, 21. Moreover, the allegations in the Complaint make clear that Plaintiff’s
termination was due to his (alleged) attempt to manipulate the results of his annual physical, not due to his ongoing
complaints that the mandatory physical examination violated the ADA. Id. ¶¶ 24–35.
b. Counts III & IV—GINA discrimination and retaliation claims
In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff brings GINA discrimination and retaliation

claims, alleging that the City “required genetic test and information” from Plaintiff.
Dkt. 5 ¶ 55. The City moves to dismiss the GINA discrimination claims because
Plaintiff has failed to allege that Plaintiff was required to disclose genetic

information. Dkt. 30 at 7. The Court agrees.
Under GINA, it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or otherwise
discriminate against an employee “because of genetic information with respect to
the employee” or to request, require, or purchase an employee’s genetic information,

except in certain circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)–(b). As noted by other
district courts in the Eleventh Circuit, “genetic information isn’t the same as medical
information generally.” Gabriel v. SLS Lux Brickell Hotel, No. 24-CV-23572, 2025

WL 2020154, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2025), appeal dismissed sub nom. Gabriel v.
SLS LUX Brickell Hotel & Residences, No. 25-12416-F, 2025 WL 2902042 (11th
Cir. Aug. 21, 2025); see also Gonzalez v. Real Hosp. Grp., LLC, 2022 WL 706709,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2022) (collecting cases). The statute narrowly defines

“genetic information” as information about an “individual’s genetic tests,” the
genetic test of an individual’s family members, and “the manifestation of a disease
or disorder” in an individual’s family members. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A). A

“genetic test” is “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or
metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.” Id. §
2000ff(7)(A).

Based on the text of the statute, other district courts have found that “[t]he
basic intent of GINA is to prohibit employers from making a predictive assessment
concerning an individual’s propensity to get an inheritable genetic disease or

disorder based on the occurrence of an inheritable disease or disorder in [a] family
member.” Bell v. PSS World Med., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-381-J-99MMH, 2012 WL
6761660, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:12-CV-381-J-99MMH, 2013 WL 45826 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2013); see also 42

U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A)(iii) (“The term ‘genetic information’ means, with respect to
any individual, information about . . . the manifestation of a disease or disorder in
family members”).

Here, Plaintiff’s sparse allegations for his GINA discrimination claim never
allege that the City ever requested, required, or used his “genetic information” to
determine whether he (or a family member) had a genetic disorder. See Dkt. 5 ¶¶
55–57. Nor does the Complaint even allege that Plaintiff underwent a “genetic test”

as defined by GINA. Indeed, the August 2022 medical evaluation only involved “a
tuberculin injection, ultrasonic imaging of the visceral organs and genitalia, medical
questionnaire, vision/auditory testing[,] and physical fitness evaluation,” Dkt. 5 ¶

22, none of which involve “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes,
proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal
changes.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(7)(A).

To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that the TB test (via the tuberculin injection)
counts as a “genetic test” that produces “genetic information,” it clearly does not—
tuberculosis is an infectious disease generally caused by the Mycobacterium

tuberculosis bacteria, not a genetic disorder. Taking it a step further, even if the TB
test results fall within GINA, Plaintiff has not presented any allegation that the City
used the information to discriminate against Plaintiff—that is, the City terminated
Plaintiff because of the TB test results. Notably, the Complaint does not mention the

results of the TB test or any other medical outcome from the August 2022
examination at Life Scan. In short, Plaintiff does not fall within the ambit of the
statute. See Bell, 2012 WL 6761660, at *3 (holding that a plaintiff fails to state a

valid claim under GINA with conclusory allegations devoid of factual support);
Roberts v. Computer Disc. Warehouse, No. 2:22-CV-00250-SCJ-JCF, 2023 WL
11979713, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 2:22-CV-0250-SCJ, 2024 WL 4800521 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2024) (finding

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under GINA). Thus, the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s GINA discrimination claim in Count III.
Plaintiff’s GINA retaliation claim in Count IV does not fare any better. Under

GINA, “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this title or because
such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6(f).
“Because GINA’s anti-retaliation provision tracks the language of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision, [this] [C]ourt . . . analyse[s] Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under

Title VII’s framework for retaliation. Conner-Goodgame v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 2:12-CV-03426-IPJ, 2013 WL 5428448, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013)
(comparing 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–6(f) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that Defendants

discriminated against them on the basis of genetic information, a prerequisite to
bringing an anti-retaliation claim under GINA. Bonanza v. Walmart Corp., No. 6:24-
CV-1076-JSS-DCI, 2024 WL 5671535, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2024). Regardless,

Plaintiff’s GINA retaliation claim also fails for the same reasons discussed when
dismissing Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim. Again, Plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege when he engaged in protected activity, to whom he made these
complaints, and how any complaints about alleged GINA violations led to his

termination. See Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 55–57. Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations that
he objected to required “genetic tests and information,” and that these “objections
were a motivating factor” for his termination, id. ¶¶ 55, 57, are nothing more than

“legal conclusions masquerading as facts.” Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262. The Court
grants the City’s motion to dismiss the GINA retaliation claim in Count IV.
Plaintiff’s counsel should examine his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

obligations before reasserting any such claims.
c. Counts V & VI—Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation claims
Next, the City seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination claim,

alleging that he was subjected to disparate treatment after objecting to the City
allowing some medical evaluations to be optional for females but mandatory for
males. Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 68–72. The City argues the “Complaint does not plead any facts
plausibly demonstrating that the Defendant took any actions against him on the basis

of his sex. Rather, he merely pleads, in conclusory fashion, that some of the medical
testing was optional for female employees while mandatory for males.” Dkt. 30 at
10. Plaintiff responds, contending the City’s arguments are fact-intensive and require

discovery to determine “whether differing testing standards reflect bona fide
occupational qualifications, legitimate biological distinctions, or a pretext for
discrimination.” Dkt. 32 at 5.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, national

origin, religion, and sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e−2(a)(1). Where, as here, a plaintiff
alleges Title VII discrimination based on disparate treatment, he must show intent
to discriminate. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir.

2000). A plaintiff may “use direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both” to
demonstrate disparate treatment discrimination in violation of Title VII. Tynes v.
Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2023). When relying on

circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie discrimination by
showing that: “(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was subjected to an
adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified to perform the job in question, and

(4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her class more
favorably.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The fourth requirement is met when the
plaintiff presents “evidence of a comparator—someone who is similarly situated in

all material respects.” Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified). “A ‘similarly situated’ comparator typically will have engaged in the
same basic conduct (or misconduct); be subject to the same employment policy,

guideline, or rule; have the same supervisor(s); or share the plaintiff's employment
or disciplinary history.” Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 972, 996 (11th Cir.
2025) (citing Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2019)
(en banc)).

Here, assuming Plaintiff has satisfied the other requirements, Plaintiff has
failed to sufficiently allege the fourth requirement of identifying a similarly situated
individual of a different sex who was treated more favorably than Plaintiff. Indeed,

the complaint does not “even try to draw a stick figure[,]” of
comparators. Bartholomew v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-695-FTM-
38MRM, 2020 WL 321372, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2020). Instead, all that is

provided are the unsupported allegations that “Plaintiff inquired about medical
evaluations which were optional for female employees but were mandatory for male
employees,” and “Defendant subjected the Plaintiff to harassment and disparate

treatment based upon his objections and sex.” Dkt. 5 at ¶¶ 69, 71. Notably, the
Complaint does not even allege that these nebulous “female employees” were also
firefighters or paramedics like Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 13, 69. As pled, Count V cannot
withstand dismissal. See Arrington v. Alabama Power Co., 769 F. App’x 741, 746

(11th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal for failure to plead a prima facie case
of disparate treatment when plaintiff did not plead that a similarly situated employee
outside of its protected class was treated less favorably); Litman v. Sec’y, of the

Navy, 703 F. App’x 766, 769 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of
a disparate treatment claim when plaintiff alleged nowhere that similarly situated
employees were treated more favorably); Arafat v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 549
F. App’x 872, 874 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal for failure to plead the

existence of similarly situated employees when plaintiff merely generically
referenced younger males).
To be clear, while the “McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework is

an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement,” Plaintiff still needs to “provide
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional [sex] discrimination”
under Title VII. Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir.

2015) (citation modified). Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Complaint does Plaintiff identify
a similarly situated individual of a different sex who was treated more favorably than
Plaintiff, see generally Dkt. 5, and simply alleging that he was treated differently

because of his sex is insufficient to state a disparate treatment claim under Title VII.
See Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1271 (citation omitted) (“[U]nsupported conclusions of law
or of mixed law and fact are not sufficient to withstand a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6).”); Garvey v. Sec’y, United States Dep’t of Lab., No. 8:22-CV-2309-WFJ-

AEP, 2023 WL 3057474, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2023). Thus, the Court dismisses
the sex discrimination claim in Count V.
As to Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim in Count VI, the Court incorporates

by reference its discussion dismissing the prior ADA and GINA retaliation claims
against the City. None of the allegations in Counts VI provides additional facts that
would alter the Court’s previous finding that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are due to
be dismissed. Again, the Complaint never alleges when he engaged in protected

activity of “object[ing] to the disparate practice,” to whom he made these objections,
and how these objections about alleged Title VII violations were a “motivating
factor” for his termination. Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 70–72. Put simply, Plaintiff’s meager

allegations are totally devoid of any factual support and nothing more than “legal
conclusions masquerading as facts.” Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262. Therefore, the Court
also dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim in Count VI.

d. Counts VII & VIII—Section 1983 and Florida Constitution claims
Finally, Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state constitutional claim are
also due to be dismissed. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is an

impermissible shotgun pleading. A shotgun pleading fails “to give the defendants
adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir.
2015) (citations omitted). “It employs a multitude of claims and incorporates by

reference all of its factual allegations into each claim, making it nearly impossible
for Defendants and the Court to determine with any certainty which factual
allegations give rise to which claims for relief.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898

F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2018).
In this case, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim “commits the sin of not separating
into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at
1322–23. In a single sentence, Plaintiff alleges violations under three different

constitutional amendments—the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth. Dkt. 5 ¶ 91. Worse
yet, Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations indicating what type of Section
1983 claim is being brought under the Fourth Amendment (e.g., excessive force,

unlawful arrest, etc.) or the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., Equal Protection Clause,
substantive due process, or procedural due process). Nevertheless, the Court believes
Plaintiff is attempting to allege a municipal liability claim under Section 1983 for

violation of “Plaintiff’s personal privacy rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. ¶¶ 91, 92. Accordingly, the Court focuses its analysis on the
alleged Fourth Amendment violation under Section 1983.5

Generally, municipalities—like the City—cannot be held liable on a theory of
respondeat superior or for acts committed by their officers. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 693–94 (1978). Instead, municipal entities
may be held liable under § 1983 only where “action pursuant to official municipal

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691. This standard requires
a plaintiff to show “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the
municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that

constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

5 The Court will also analyze Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Section 1983 claim in Count VII and the alleged violation
of the Florida Constitution’s search and seizure provision in Count VIII together, as the Florida Constitution’s search
and seizure provision follows the United States Supreme Court’s caselaw on the Fourth Amendment. See Johnston v.
Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In evaluating [the plaintiff’s] claim under the Florida
Constitution, we are compelled to apply the facts of this case to Florida constitutional law as interpreted by the Florida
Supreme Court, and, absent a contrary ruling by the Florida Supreme Court, Florida’s intermediate appellate courts. .
. . As the text of the Florida Constitution’s search and seizure provision explains, the Florida Constitution affords the
same protections against unreasonable searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment, and Florida courts follow
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Florida Constitution’s search and seizure protections.
. . . Our analysis of [the plaintiff’s] claims under the Fourth Amendment therefore applies equally to [the plaintiff’s]
claims under the Florida Constitution.”).
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet the first requirement because it fails to
demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated. Article I, Section 12 of the

Florida Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
afford protections against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Fla. Const. Art. 1 §
12; U.S. Const. amend. IV. If Plaintiff is asserting a Fourth Amendment claim under

Section 1983, much more is needed. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps.
Council 79 v. Scott, 717 F.3d 851, 869 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Hatley v. Dep’t of the
Navy, 164 F.3d 602, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (“Another category—a natural extension
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Von Raab—encompasses police officers, . . .

correctional officers who interact with parolees or inmates in a prison, . . . and
firefighters.”); Friedenberg v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 911 F.3d 1084, 1091
(11th Cir. 2018) (discussing the “special needs” exception).

Here, even when accepting the meager factual allegations as true, Plaintiff
fails to allege any Fourth Amendment violation since the Complaint fails to allege
that any private interests outweigh the City’s interest in public safety. The Complaint
vaguely asserts that the August 2022 physical examination violated “Plaintiff’s

personal privacy rights” due to the exam’s “breadth and intrusive nature.” Dkt. 5 ¶¶
18, 92. But Plaintiff never specifies what aspect of the physical examination was so
“intrusive” and overbroad that it violated Plaintiff’s diminished expectation of

privacy due to his job as a firefighter and paramedic. See Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989) (“[I]t is plain that certain forms of
public employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to . . .

personal searches.”); Scott, 717 F.3d at 869 (“Another category—a natural extension
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Von Raab—encompasses . . . firefighters.”);
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, No. CV 120-100, 2021 WL

2827293, at *7 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2021) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
search and seizure claim, as her employer’s drug test fell under the special needs
exception).
Plaintiff must also address consent to the annual physical examinations. The

annual physical examinations stem from the CBA between the City and Local 747,
Dkt. 5 ¶¶ 15, 16, and Plaintiff explicitly admits he “was a member of St. Petersburg
Fire Fighters Union, Local 747 and covered by the bargaining unit and subject to

Local 747’s Collective Bargaining Agreement with the City of South Pasadena and
the South Pasadena Fire Department.” Id. ¶ 8. In other words, Local 747 represented
the unionized firefighters in St. Petersburg—including Plaintiff—during
negotiations, and the CBA adopted on August 28, 2019, binds Plaintiff to the

agreement’s terms. See id. ¶ 15 (“The Parties are subject to a [CBA] dated August
28, 2019, between the City of South Pasadena and the St. Petersburg Association of
Firefighters Local 747.”).
In short, Plaintiff has failed to present any significant allegations that support
his claim that the City violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Without any

underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim and Florida
constitutional violation claim fail. The Court grants the City’s motion to dismiss
Counts VII and VIII.

II. Local 747’s Motion to Dismiss Count IX
Local 747’s motion seeks dismissal of the single ADA discrimination claim
in Count IX. Local 747 asserts that the ADA claim is time-barred since Plaintiff
“failed to file a charge against the Local challenging the medical exam requirement

at issue within 300 days after Local 747 entered into the CBA on August 28, 2019.”
Dkt. 31 at 5. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that the ADA claim
against Local 747 is time-barred and due to be dismissed.

Plaintiff claims Local 747 violated the ADA when it “negotiated for
mandatory annual medical examinations” since the examinations were
impermissible medical inquiries. Dkt. 5 ¶ 99; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
However, an ADA plaintiff must file a charge complaining about an allegedly

unlawful employment practice with the EEOC within 180 days of the employment
practice, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), “but the period for
filing a charge with the EEOC may be extended to 300 days if the complainant first

files a timely charge in a state or local agency in a deferral state,” like Florida.
Maynard v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 256 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation
modified); see Joe’s Stone Crabs, 296 F.3d at 1271 (“For a charge to be timely in a

deferral state such as Florida, it must be filed within 300 days of the last
discriminatory act. . . . Accordingly, only those claims arising within 300 days prior
to the filing of the EEOC’s discrimination charge are actionable.”).

Despite this strict deadline, a plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim may still
be viable past the deadline under the continuing violations doctrine. See Joe’s Stone
Crabs, 296 F.3d at 1271. When determining whether a discriminatory employment
practice constitutes a continuing violation, the Court “must distinguish between the

present consequence of a one-time violation, which does not extend the limitations
period, and the continuation of the violation into the present, which does.” Id.
(citation modified). Further, the doctrine does not apply to untimely claims of

discrete acts, “even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Rather, “[e]ach
discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Id.
Here, the Court finds that the ADA discrimination claim against Local 747 is

time-barred because the alleged unlawful employment practice—Local 747’s
negotiation and adoption of a CBA in August 2019—is a discrete employment
action. The Complaint plainly states that the City and Local 747 adopted the CBA

on August 28, 2019, Dkt. 5 ¶ 15, and it is Local 747’s “negotiat[ion] for mandatory
annual medical examinations which violate the Plaintiff’s rights under the ADA.”
Id. ¶ 99. Because the negotiation and subsequent adoption of the CBA is a discrete

act, Plaintiff’s awareness of and duty to assert his rights was triggered once the CBA
was adopted in August 2019. See Prieto v. City of Mia. Beach, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1340,
1348 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Knight v. Columbus, Ga., 19 F.3d 579, 585 (11th

Cir.1994)) (noting that the adoption of a consent decree that violates Title VII is a
discrete act, so if “such a violation was known to the plaintiffs at the time of their
hire, . . . the continuing violation theory is inapplicable”); see also Joe’s Stone Crabs,
296 F.3d at 1272 (noting “discrete, one-time employment events that should have

put the [plaintiff] on notice that a cause of action had accrued” do not constitute
continuing violations). Therefore, if the annual physical examination provision in
the CBA violated the ADA, Plaintiff’s discrimination charge must have been filed

with the FCHR or the EEOC within 300 days—i.e., by June 23, 2020. The
Complaint, however, clearly alleges that his charge of discrimination with the FCHR
and EEOC (assuming it was against Local 747)6 was not filed until April 24, 2023.
Id. ¶¶ 10, 41. Thus, Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination charge is untimely.

6 Local 747’s motion claims that the discrimination charge alleged in the Complaint was only against the City, not
Local 747. Dkt. 31 at 3 n.1. The actual charge of discrimination against Local 747, dated May 4, 2023, is attached to
Local 747’s motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 31-2 at 2. When considering this EEOC charge, Plaintiff’s ADA
discrimination claim in Count IX remains untimely because May 4, 2023, falls well outside the 300-day filing window
for a charge of discrimination.
Plaintiff resists this outcome, arguing that Local 747 “misstates” his ADA
claim and that the continuing violation doctrine applies. Dkt. 32 at 9. Plaintiff

contends he is challenging “the repeated enforcement of Article VI’s medical
examination requirements during the statutory period[,] not merely the 2019
adoption of the CBA.” Id. at 10. The Court disagrees for two reasons.

First, as discussed above, the Complaint unmistakably alleges that the ADA
violation in Count IX is Local 747’s “negotiat[ion] for mandatory annual medical
examinations which violate the Plaintiff’s rights under the ADA.” Dkt. 5 ¶ 99. As
such, the Court construes the Complaint to be bringing a (discrete) ADA violation

for Local 747 negotiation and adoption of an unlawful CBA on August 28, 2019. Id.
¶ 15. Contrary to Plaintiff’s claims, the allegations in Count IX are not about
Plaintiff’s ongoing objections to the CBA during his employment.

Second, the enforcement of the CBA’s physical examination provision in
August 2022 constitutes a separate and distinct ADA violation that forms the basis
of Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim in Count I against the City. Id. ¶¶ 21, 44.
While the alleged violations in Counts I and IX may be related due to the CBA, the

continuing violation doctrine does not apply to untimely discrete acts, “even when
they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113;
see Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Army Sustainment, LLC, No. 1:20-CV-234-

RAH-CWB, 2023 WL 6276341, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2023) (declining to apply
the continuing violation doctrine since the alleged unlawful employment
practices were all discrete acts). In other words, two discrete ADA violations are

being alleged—an untimely ADA violation in Count IX based on the adoption of an
unlawful CBA in August 2019 and a timely ADA violation in Count I based on the
August 2022 physical examination. Accordingly, the continuing violation doctrine

does not extend the actionable time period here beyond the charging period. The
Court grants Local 747’s motion to dismiss Count IX as time-barred.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendant City of South Pasadena’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 30, is
GRANTED.
2. Defendant Local 747’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 31, is GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff Griffin’s Complaint, Dkt. 5, is DISMISSED. Any amended
complaint is due within FOURTEEN (14) days from the entry of this
Order.7
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on February 6, 2026.

/s/ William F. Jung
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7 Plaintiff’s counsel and his client should also reexamine their position. Firefighters reside in close quarters. They
must be strong and hale. They must be able to provide emergency lifesaving techniques in difficult circumstances to
people of varying health. See Cremeens v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 427 F. App’x 855, 858 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The
physical fitness requirements are directly related to a Fire Investigator’s duty to fight fires, and they are necessary to
ensure that Fire Investigators are able to perform that function when called upon to do so.”).
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310458. Public record. Not legal advice.