# Cooper

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · April 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310452

## Case

- **Full name:** Clint Cooper v. Hydril USA Distribution, LLC, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLINT COOPER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1005
HYDRIL USA DISTRIBUTION, SECTION "E" (5)
LLC, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant QGOG
Constellation US LLC (“Defendant”).1 Plaintiff Clint Cooper (“Plaintiff”) did not file an
opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the Court considers Defendant’s statement of
uncontested facts to be admitted pursuant to LR 56.2. Although the dispositive motion is
unopposed, summary judgment is not automatic, and the Court must determine whether
Defendant has shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff while working as a
seaman aboard the LONE STAR vessel.3 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that much of
the crew working on board the LONE STAR were employed or under the control of
Defendant.4 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s negligent failure to properly train and
supervise the employees working aboard the vessel contributed to his injuries.5 However,
Defendant argues it played no role in the operation of the LONE STAR.6 Defendant argues

1 R. Doc. 22.
2 See, e.g., Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. P. 56(a).
3 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 9.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 R. Doc. 22-1 at p. 3.
1
its business activities consist of identifying new potential contractors and vendors in the
United States that may be eligible to do work for its parent companies, Constellation
Services Ltd. and Constellation Oil Services Holding S.A.7 Defendant argues its work is
limited to commercial and marketing services, not technical or operational services
related to any vessel.8

The following facts are undisputed. Defendant is a Texas limited liability company
registered and in good standing with the State of Texas.9 Defendant’s only employee is
Mr. Seung Han Ryoo.10 Mr. Ryoo has never been on board the LONE STAR.11 Defendant
does not own the LONE STAR and does not, and did not at the time of Plaintiff’s alleged
accident, operate the LONE STAR.12 Plaintiff performed his work on board the LONE
STAR pursuant to a contract between his employer, Hydril USA Distrubtion LLC
(“Hydril”) and Lone Star Offshore, Ltd;13 Defendant did not enter into a contract with
Hydril at any time.14
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”15 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”16
When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the

7 Id. at p. 2. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant explain the Constellation affiliates’ role in the operation of the
LONE STAR.
8 Id.
9 R. Doc. 22-2 at ¶ ¶ 1, 2.
10 Id. at ¶ 4.
11 Id. at ¶ 7.
12 Id. at ¶ ¶ 8-9.
13 Id. at ¶ 11.
14 Id. at ¶ 10.
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
16 DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
2
evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”17 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.18
There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving
party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.19

If the dispositive issue is one for which the moving party will bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would
‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’”20 If the
moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party
successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving
party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the
record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material
fact does indeed exist.21
On the other hand, if the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of
production by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element

of the nonmovant’s claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to
establish an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.22 When proceeding under the

17 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
18 Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
19 Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
20 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.
v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)).
21 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24.
22 Id. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987)
(citing Justice Brennan’s statement of the summary judgment standard in Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, and
requiring the Movers to submit affirmative evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s
claim or, alternatively, demonstrate the nonmovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
3
first option, if the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the
movant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.23 When, however, the
movant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking summary judgment on the
ground that the nonmovant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim,

the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court’s
attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by
the moving party.”24 Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.25 If the
movant meets this burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the
nonmoving party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving
party’s papers, (2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue
for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further
discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).”26 “Summary judgment should be
granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after
the nonmoving party responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its

ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for

element); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Celotex,
and requiring the movant to make an affirmative presentation to negate the nonmovant’s claims on
summary judgment); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2727.1 (2016) (“Although the Court issued a five-to-four decision, the majority and
dissent both agreed as to how the summary-judgment burden of proof operates; they disagreed as to how
the standard was applied to the facts of the case.” (internal citations omitted)).
23 Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253, 288-89 (1980); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
24 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332.
25 Id at 332-33.
26 Id. at 332-33 n.3.
4
trial.”27
Still, “unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence.
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the
record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports the claim.
“‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in

search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.’”28
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence
claim.

Because Plaintiff alleges that he was a seaman injured on board a vessel at sea, his
claims against Defendant arise under the general maritime law.29 To recover under
general maritime law for negligence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) there was a duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) there was a breach of duty, (3) the plaintiff sustained
an injury, and (4) there is a causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury.30
In Matter of Savage Inland Marine, LLC, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas found that a defendant entity which did not have any personnel working
on a vessel and that was not involved in the operation of the vessel owed no duty to a
plaintiff injured in an accident on that vessel.31 Similarly, in Bolden v. Offshore Exp., Inc.,
this Court dismissed a negligence claim against a third party vessel owner when the

27 Id.; see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 289.
28 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins,
Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
29 Matter of Savage Inland Marine, LLC, 539 F. Supp. 3d 629, 647 (E.D. Tex. 2021).
30 Id.
31 539 F. Supp. 3d 629, 651 (E.D. Tex. 2021)( “[Defendant] had no crew present on board the EMS 368 at
the time or place of the Incident, and [Defendant] was not participating in the operation to resecure the
Savage Fleet at the time of the Incident. [Defendant] was not even aware of Wood’s injuries until Savage
provided notice of its limitation action six months after the incident. Thus, [Defendant] was a non-present,
non-actor and owed no duty. . .”).
5
owner did not employ the plaintiff and did not supervise, direct, or control any of the work
on the platform where the plaintiffs injury occurred.32
In this case, Defendant did not own, charter, or operate the LONE STAR.33
Moreover, Defendant and its sole employee were not involved in the LONE STAR’s,
Hydril’s, or Plaintiffs operations at the time of the incident.34 As it is undisputed that
Defendant played no role in the activities or operations of the vessel where Plaintiff
suffered his injuries, Defendant did not owe a duty to Plaintiff, and the Court will dismiss
Plaintiffs negligence claim against it.35
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.°° Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of April, 2026.

SUSIE oath
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32 No. 91-2160, 1992 WL 275417, at *1-2 (E.D. La. May 8, 1992).
33 R, Doc. 22-2 at 1 4 7-9.
34 Td,
35 The only other possible basis under which Plaintiff could assert a claim against Defendant would be under
an alter ego theory of liability. However, Plaintiff has not alleged an alter ego theory of liability in his
complaint, nor has he pleaded any facts that could possibly state an alter ego claim.
36 R. Doc. 22.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310452. Public record. Not legal advice.