# The City of South Charleston and City of South Charleston Property Board v. M. Alex Urban and West Virginia Department of Agriculture

> Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia · February 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310206

## Case

- **Court:** Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia
- **Decided:** February 24, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Nature of suit:** Civil-Other
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310206

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the commission properly defined “connive” and “corrupt” based upon their ordinary meanings and were not required to rely on specific definitions applied by the board of stewards and hearing examiner
- declining to apply the broad definition of “teacher” from the education statutes to interpret the same term in a criminal anti-nepotism statute

## Opinion text

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
THE CITY OF SOUTH CHARLESTON and February 24, 2026
CITY OF SOUTH CHARLESTON PROPERTY BOARD, ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
Defendants Below, Petitioners OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 25-ICA-51 (Cir. Ct. of Kanawha Cnty. Case No. CC-20-2023-C-683)

M. ALEX URBAN,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

and

WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Intervenor Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioners the City of South Charleston and City of South Charleston Property
Board (collectively the “City”) appeal the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s January 23,
2025, order, which denied the City’s motion for summary judgment and granted the
separate motions for summary judgment filed by Respondent M. Alex Urban and
Respondent West Virginia Department of Agriculture (“Department”). Mr. Urban and the
Department each filed a response.1 The City filed a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds that there is error in the circuit court’s decision but no
substantial question of law. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of
Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for reversal in a memorandum decision.
For the reasons set forth below, the court’s decision is reversed, and this case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

1
The City is represented by W. Michael Moore, Esq., and Marey Casey, Esq. Mr.
Urban is represented by Guy R. Bucci, Esq., and Ashley N. Lynch, Esq. The Department
is represented by Attorney General John B. McCuskey, Esq., and Deputy Attorney General
Anthony D. Eates II, Esq.

1
This matter began in October of 2022 when Mr. Urban applied with the City for a
permit to harbor two honeybee hives at his residence located within City limits. The
application was made in accordance with the former version of City Code, which provided:

No person shall keep or harbor any cow, calf, horse, colt, mule, pony, goat,
sheep, hog, swine or any other wild or domestic animal within the City unless
the owner thereof shall have first obtained from the Property Board a permit
to keep or harbor such animal; provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to mean or include dogs or cats.

The Property Board may issue such permit if it, in its opinion, determines
that such animal shall not constitute a nuisance, health problem or unsanitary
condition.

South Charleston, W. Va., Code § 505.06(a) (2014) (“2014 Code”); see W. Va. Code § 8-
12-5(25) (2023) (stating that municipalities have plenary power and authority “[t]o regulate
or prohibit the keeping of animals or fowls and to provide for the impounding, sale or
destruction of animals or fowls kept contrary to law or found running at large[.]”).2

The City’s Property Board (“Board”) held a hearing on Mr. Urban’s application on
November 1, 2022. Thereafter, the Board made the decision to deny Mr. Urban’s
application, which was memorialized in a written decision dated January 3, 2023. In
support, the Board’s decision noted the following: that there are inherent safety concerns
with the practice of beekeeping; it requires specialized equipment, techniques, and training;
Mr. Urban could not give specific details regarding his purported twelve years of
beekeeping experience; Mr. Urban’s residence abuts five residences of similar size with an
additional three residences directly across the street from his residence; honeybees become
aggressive if the hive is threatened; and that beekeeping activities could constitute or create
a nuisance, health problem, or unsanitary condition, in that bees can swarm, sting, and
cause allergic reactions and other serious, adverse health consequences.

Mr. Urban filed his original complaint in circuit court on August 9, 2023,
challenging the City’s decision and the 2014 Code. However, on August 17, 2023, the City
lawfully amended the 2014 Code.3 As amended, the new code provisions replaced the
Property Board’s permitting process with language containing the following prohibition:

2
For consistency, we cite to the current version of this statute in this decision.
However, we note that this statutory language, although renumbered, remains unchanged
from earlier versions of the statute. See W. Va. Code § 8-12-5(26) (2008) and W. Va. Code
8-12-5(26) (2014).
3
See generally W. Va. Code § 8-11-4 (2022) (setting forth the procedure to amend
municipal ordinances).
2
“No person may keep or harbor any cow, calf, horse, colt, mule, pony, goat, sheep, hog,
swine, bee, chicken, duck, goose, turkey, pigeon, or any other wild or domestic animal
within the City.” South Charleston, W. Va., Code § 505.06(a) (2023) (“2023 Code”).4

The City filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Urban’s complaint on August 30, 2023,
arguing that because the City adopted the 2023 Code, Mr. Urban could not obtain relief for
his challenges based upon the 2014 Code. The Department filed a motion to intervene on
October 10, 2023, and a response in opposition to the City’s motion to dismiss on
November 8, 2023. That same day, the City filed a response challenging the Department’s
intervention.

The circuit court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and motion to intervene
on November 15, 2023, and addressed each motion through separate orders. Namely, by
order entered on December 4, 2023, the court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that
the complaint survived an analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure. Also in this order, the court granted Mr. Urban’s oral motion to amend his
complaint and entered a briefing schedule for the filing of summary judgment motions,
supporting memoranda, and proposed orders. On December 12, 2023, the court granted the
Department’s motion to intervene, determining that intervention was warranted under
Rules 24(a) and 24(b)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.5

On November 30, 2023, Mr. Urban filed his amended complaint.6 His amended
complaint sought declaratory judgment on three points: first, he sought a declaration that a
bee was not an animal under the 2014 Code or West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25); second,
he requested a finding that the 2014 Code and 2023 Code are void and unenforceable
because they have been preempted by the authority granted to the Department’s
Commissioner (“Commissioner”) under the West Virginia Apiary Act (West Virginia
Code §§ 19-13-1 to -20), the West Virginia Right to Farm Act (West Virginia Code §§ 19-
19-1 to -8), and corresponding regulations; and third, he sought a declaration that the 2014
Code violated due process for lack of ascertainable standards.

4
The 2023 Code also contains a list of exceptions to this prohibition, none of which
are applicable to this case. See South Charleston, W. Va., Code § 505.06(b) (2023).
5
Rule 24(a) provides for intervention as a matter of right, and Rule 24(b)(2)
provides for the permissive intervention of a government agency or official.
6
We acknowledge that Mr. Urban’s original complaint sought relief through
declaratory judgment or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus. However, because Mr.
Urban’s amended complaint abandoned his request for mandamus relief and was the
pleading from which the circuit court granted summary judgment, this Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-11-4.
3
The City filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on December 18, 2023.
The City argued that both the 2014 Code and 2023 Code were lawfully enacted pursuant
to West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25). The City further argued that the term bee falls within
the plain meaning of the term animal; that preemption does not apply because neither the
Apiary Act nor the Right to Farm Act contain any preemptive language; and the adoption
of the 2023 Code moots Mr. Urban’s challenges to the 2014 Code. The parties also
complied with the court’s scheduling order regarding summary judgment.

On January 23, 2025, the circuit court entered the order presently on appeal. In its
decision, the circuit court found that summary judgment in favor of Mr. Urban was proper
for two reasons.

First, the court found that the language of the 2014 and 2023 codes was not the
prevailing issue, but rather, the issue was whether a bee was an animal under the language
of West Virginia Code 8-12-5(25), which was necessary for the City to have the authority
to regulate bees and beekeeping. Here, the circuit court concluded that a bee was not an
animal and, thus, the City lacked authority to regulate bees in the first instance. See Syl.
Pts. 1-2, Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of W. Va. v. City of Morgantown, 144 W. Va.
149, 107 S.E.2d 489 (1959) (recognizing that a municipality only has the authority granted
to it by the constitution and legislation). Instead, the circuit court concluded that because
the term animal is not defined under West Virginia Code § 8-12-5, the court must define
the term based on its plain language. To that end, the court determined the plain meaning
of animal exclusively by reviewing how animal and related terminology have been defined
by separate provisions of West Virginia Code. Specifically, the court relied upon West
Virginia Code § 19-9-1(b) (1982) (defining animal for legislation governing Diseases
Among Domestic Animals and Euthanasia of Diseased Animals); § 19-18-1(e) (2022)
(defining livestock under the General Stock Law); §§ 19-34-2(2) and -2(3) (2014) (defining
both dangerous wild animal and domestic animal for the Dangerous Wild Animals Act);
and § 19-16A-3(3) (1990) (defining animal for the West Virginia Pesticide Control Act).
In sum, because none of those definitions expressly mentioned bees, the court reasoned
that the City could not prove that a bee is an animal. As an additional step in its analysis,
the circuit court also cited the definition of agriculture under the Right to Farm Act (West
Virginia Code § 19-19-2(a) (2019)) and opined that because the definition includes the
words animal and apiary, a bee is clearly not an animal.

Second, the circuit court determined that even if bees are animals, the City’s
prohibition on bees and beekeeping within City limits conflicts with the Apiary Act and
Right to Farm Act, and therefore the City Code is invalid because under the statutory
language of the acts, the regulation of beekeeping is solely vested with the Commissioner.
Particularly, the court noted that under the Apiary Act, the Commissioner “may propose
rules”:

4
(1) To effectively eradicate, suppress or control honey bee pests as far as may
be practical; (2) to regulate the keeping and maintaining of bees, bee
equipment, queen breeding equipment, apiaries and appliances; (3) to
regulate treatments, retreatments, and fees for the services; and (4) any other
rules necessary to effectuate the enforcement of this article.

W. Va. Code § 19-13-3(a) (2003). The court also noted that the Apiary Act authorizes the
Commissioner to cooperate with our state’s political subdivisions “to carry out the effective
administration of this article.” W. Va. Code § 19-13-3(c). Next, the court summarized the
Apiary Act’s corresponding regulations. See generally W. Va. Code R. §§ 61-2-1 to -5.
Particularly, the circuit court noted that West Virginia Code of State Rules § 61-2-1 sets
forth the “general operating rules and procedures for the inspection of apiaries, control of
bee diseases, and limitation of liability for beekeepers,” and that West Virginia Code of
State Rules § 61-2-3.1 permits the Commissioner the authority to issue certificates of
registration to beekeepers (West Virginia Code of State Rules § 61-2-3.1). The circuit
court, albeit without any citation to the applicable regulation(s), also offered the broad
observation that: “The rules also set forth regulations for safe beekeeping and authorize the
Commissioner to enforce safety standards.” Based on this statutory and regulatory
language, the circuit court noted that while the Apiary Act does not create an entitlement
to beekeeping, it does provide for the regulation of beekeeping and, thus, the City’s
prohibition exceeds its authority because it prevents the Commissioner from complying
with their duties under the Apiary Act.

The circuit court also found that the City’s regulation on beekeeping contradicted
the public policy of the Right to Farm Act, which states, in part:

Whereas, the infringement upon agricultural lands and agricultural
operations by other uses and occupancies which are either adverse or
incompatible with the continued agricultural utilization may be of such
nature as to endanger orderly agricultural production, it is hereby declared to
be the public policy of this State that agricultural production and the
utilization of land in agricultural productive operations be protected and
preserved.

W. Va. Code § 19-19-1 (1982). The court observed further that under West Virginia Code
§ 19-19-2, the Right to Farm Act declares:

(a) “Agriculture” shall mean the production of food, fiber and woodland
products, by means of cultivation, tillage of the soil and by the conduct
of animal, livestock, dairy, apiary, equine or poultry husbandry, and the
practice of forestry, silviculture, horticulture, harvesting of silviculture
products, packing, shipping, milling, and marketing of agricultural

5
products conducted by the proprietor of the agricultural operation, or any
other legal plant or animal production and all farm practices.

(b) “Agricultural land” shall mean any amount of land and the improvements
thereupon, used or usable in the production of food, fiber or woodland
products of an annual value of $1,000 or more, by the conduct of the
business of agriculture, as defined in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) “Agricultural operation” shall mean any facility utilized for agriculture.

Given these considerations, the circuit court noted that honeybees not only produce
honey, but as stated in the amended complaint, “honeybees are pollinators that are essential
to agriculture because they play a vital role in insuring a bountiful harvest of fruits,
vegetables, flowers, and nuts.” Therefore, the court found that while Mr. Urban’s property
does not meet the definition of agricultural land, his beekeeping activity qualifies as an
agricultural operation, and as a result, the Right to Farm Act protects Mr. Urban’s
activities from civil or criminal actions brought by a municipality. See W. Va. Code § 19-
19-7(d) (2019) (“No state or local agency may bring a criminal or civil action against an
agricultural operation for an activity that is in material compliance with all applicable state
and federal laws, regulations, and permits.”). For these reasons, the circuit court concluded
that the 2023 Code was unenforceable and granted summary judgment in favor of Mr.
Urban. This appeal followed.7

In West Virginia, it is well established that a de novo standard of review applies to
appellate review of orders granting summary judgment. Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192
W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo.”). This Court applies the same standard for granting summary judgment
that a circuit court must apply, and that standard states, “[a] motion for summary judgment
should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and
inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” United
Bank, Inc. v. Blosser, 218 W. Va. 378, 383, 624 S.E.2d 815, 820 (2005) (quoting Syl. Pt.
2, Painter, 192 W. Va. at 190, 451 S.E.2d at 756). “Summary judgment is appropriate if,
from the totality of the evidence presented . . . the nonmoving party has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.” Syl.
Pt. 2, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995). “[T]he party
opposing summary judgment must satisfy the burden of proof by offering more than a mere
‘scintilla of evidence’ and must produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in
a nonmoving party’s favor.” Id. at 60, 459 S.E.2d at 337 (quotations and citations omitted).

7
The court’s order also stated that because the court resolved the matter through
summary judgment, the City’s December 18, 2023, motion to dismiss was denied as moot.

6
Furthermore, a de novo standard of review also applies to matters of statutory
interpretation. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of
law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl.
Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995); accord Syl.
Pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West Virginia, 195 W. Va. 573, 466
S.E.2d 424 (1995) (“Interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents
a purely legal question subject to de novo review.”). With these established principles in
hand, we proceed to the matter on appeal.

On appeal, the City raises nine assignments of error that include challenges to the
circuit court’s rulings regarding the City’s motion to dismiss, the Department’s motion to
intervene, and the parties’ summary judgment motions. However, because the core,
dispositive substantive issues in this matter center on the circuit court’s determinations on
questions of law at summary judgment, the Court does not need to address the remaining
assignment of errors in this decision. Therefore, we will only address the parties’ arguments
concerning the court’s summary judgment order, and to that extent, have consolidated and
restated those issues for ruling. See Tudor’s Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley, 229 W. Va.
396, 402, 729 S.E.2d 231, 237 (2012) (stating the general proposition that related
assignments of error may be consolidated for ruling); Jacquelyn F. v. Andrea R., No. 16-
0585, 2017 WL 2608425, at *1 n.2 (W. Va. June 16, 2017) (memorandum decision)
(restating assignments of error where they involve clearly related issues); Perry v.
Ravenscroft, No. 24-ICA-134, 2024 WL 5002991, at *3 (W. Va. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2024)
(memorandum decision) (consolidating and restating petitioner’s assignments of error on
appeal). As to summary judgment, the City generally contends that the circuit court’s
summary judgment ruling must be reversed because the court erroneously determined as a
matter of law that: (1) The City cannot regulate beekeeping because a bee is not animal
under West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25); and (2) The Apiary Act and Right to Farm Act
otherwise invalidate the aforementioned statute and 2023 Code.

We begin our review by addressing the circuit court’s determination that the City
lacked the authority to regulate beekeeping because a bee does not fall within the definition
of the term animal as used in West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25). The City argues that the
circuit court failed to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the term animal. Conversely,
Mr. Urban and the Department separately contend that as West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25)
plainly excludes bees and beekeeping, the principles of statutory construction such as the
rule of in pari materia apply, and the circuit court correctly relied upon other legislative
acts to define the term animal. Upon review, we agree with the City and conclude that the
circuit court erred in its statutory construction of West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25).

The question of law before the Court is whether a bee qualifies as an animal under
West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25). To answer this question, we must first address whether
West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25) is unambiguous. “When a statute is clear and
unambiguous[,] and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by

7
the courts, and in such case[,] it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the
statute.” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign
Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959); see also Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.
Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous
and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be
given full force and effect.”). In contrast:

A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires
interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or
more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable
minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. In other words, a
statute is ambiguous when the statute’s language connotes doubtfulness,
doubleness of meaning, or indistinctness or uncertainty of an expression.

State v. McClain, 247 W. Va. 423, 429, 880 S.E.2d 889, 895 (2022) (citation modified).

We begin by noting that while Mr. Urban and the Department each contend that the
circuit court properly concluded that West Virginia Code § 8-12-5 was ambiguous and
correctly resolved the ambiguity at summary judgment, this contention is not an accurate
reflection of the circuit court’s order. In this case, there is no express language within the
four corners of the January 23, 2025, order wherein the circuit court finds that West
Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25) is ambiguous, susceptible to multiple meanings, indistinct, or
otherwise uncertain. See Dunlap v. Friedman’s Inc., 213 W. Va. 394, 398, 582 S.E.2d 841,
845 (2003) (“A finding of ambiguity must be made prior to any attempt to interpret a
statute.”). Therefore, it must be inferred that the court found the word animal to be
unambiguous and that its subsequent analysis represents an attempt to apply the plain
meaning of animal to discern whether the City’s authority under West Virginia Code § 8-
12-5(25) extended to bees. While this Court agrees with the circuit court that the term
animal is not ambiguous, as set forth below, we find no merit in or need for the circuit
court’s subsequent analysis and ultimate determination as to the accepted meaning of
animal.

As previously established, the circuit court found that to give West Virginia Code §
8-12-5(25) its full force and effect, the ordinary meaning of animal must be extrapolated
from other provisions of West Virginia Code. To support its exclusive dependence upon
other statutes, the circuit court relied upon the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia’s (“SCAWV”) decision in Saleh v. Damron, 242 W. Va. 568, 836 S.E.2d 716
(2019). In Saleh, the Court was presented with a certified question from federal district
court regarding whether an ectopic embryo or fetus qualified as a “person” under the West
Virginia Wrongful Death Statute. Id. at 569, 836 S.E.2d at 717. The majority’s opinion
answered that question in the negative by looking to the statutory definitions of “embryo”
and “fetus” as set forth by our Legislature in The Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection
Act and Unborn Victims of Violence Act, and indicating that “while not controlling, we

8
find these provisions indicative of how the Legislature would define the terms ‘embryo’
and ‘fetus’ in relation to the Wrongful Death Statute.” Id. at 576, 836 S.E.2d at 724 (citation
modified). It is that limited statement, which formed the circuit court’s basis in this case
for using other portions of state code to define the word animal.

However, we find fault with the circuit court’s approach. It is soundly established
that “undefined words and terms in a legislative enactment will be given their common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State ex rel. Cohen v. Manchin, 175
W. Va. 525, 336 S.E.2d 171 (1984) (citation modified). Such meaning, however, has not
been, as the circuit court’s order suggests, appropriately derived from cross-statutory
definition borrowing. Rather, undefined terms and words have been historically defined by
using dictionary definitions. In fact, the SCAWV recently reemphasized this point, noting:

This Court has routinely looked to dictionary definitions to afford undefined
terms their common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. See e.g., State v.
McClain, 247 W. Va. 423, 880 S.E.2d 889 (2022) (the terms “crash” and
“involved” as used in our “hit-and-run statute,” West Virginia Code § 17C-
4-1); King v. West Virginia’s Choice, Inc., 234 W. Va. 440, 766 S.E.2d 387
(2014) (the phrase “subject to” as used in West Virginia Code § 21-5C-1(e)
of the Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards statute); State v.
Soustek, 233 W. Va. 422, 758 S.E.2d 775 (2014) (the terms “financial” and
“transaction” as used in the identify theft statute, West Virginia Code § 61-
3-54); State v. Sulick, 232 W. Va. 717, 753 S.E.2d 875 (2012) (the phrase
“threat of force” as used in the criminal civil rights statute, West Virginia
Code § 61-6-21(b) (1987)); CSX Hotels, Inc. v. City of White Sulphur
Springs, 217 W. Va. 238, 617 S.E.2d 785 (2005) (the term “survey” as used
in the annexation procedure set forth in West Virginia Code § 8-6-2(a)); In
re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005) (the term “recognized”
as used in the statutory definition of “legal parent,” West Virginia Code §
48-1-232).

Eldercare of Jackson Cnty., LLC v. Lambert, 250 W. Va. 291, 303 n.18, 902 S.E.2d 840,
852 n.18 (2024) (defining the term “actual malice” for the purposes of the COVID-19 Jobs
Protection Act, West Virginia Code §§ 55-19-1 through 9 (2021)).8

Likewise, the SCAWV has an established history of rejecting invitations to establish
the common meaning of terms based upon their assigned definitions from statutes and other

8
See also Christopher P. v. Amanda C., 250 W. Va. 53, 60 n.20, 902 S.E.2d 185,
192 n.20 (2024) (defining the word “imminent” as it relates to Rule 5.04 of the West
Virginia Trial Court Rules and recognizing: “We frequently look to dictionary definitions
for the common, ordinary, and accepted meaning of undefined terms.”).

9
alternative sources. See, e.g., Watts v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Res./Div. of Hum.
Servs., 195 W. Va. 430, 434-35, 465 S.E.2d 887, 891-92 (1995) (declining to interpret the
undefined term “generic” as used within the job description for Social Service Worker II
positions based upon language created years later to describe Social Service Worker III
positions); W. Va. Racing Comm’n v. Reynolds, 236 W. Va. 398, 402-03, 780 S.E.2d 664,
668-69 (2015) (finding that the commission properly defined “connive” and “corrupt”
based upon their ordinary meanings and were not required to rely on specific definitions
applied by the board of stewards and hearing examiner); Soustek, 233 W. Va. at 425 n.12,
758 S.E.2d at 778 n.12 (rejecting petitioner’s invitation to use federal code definitions and
case law to define “financial” and “transaction”); W. Va. Educ. Ass’n v. Preston Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 171 W. Va. 38, 297 S.E.2d 444 (1982) (declining to apply the broad definition of
“teacher” from the education statutes to interpret the same term in a criminal anti-nepotism
statute).

Further, despite the circuit court’s reference to various statutory definitions from
Chapter 19 of our code to reach its conclusion that a bee is not defined as an animal under
West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25), the court’s reliance is hindered because those outside
sources contain language specifically limiting the applicability of those definitions to the
body of law to which they are ascribed. See Coordinating Council for Indep. Living v.
Palmer, 209 W. Va. 274, 282-83, 546 S.E.2d 454, 462-63 (2001) (citation modified)
(finding that the tax commissioner’s attempts to reinforce the meaning of “community care
services” under a tax statute through additional statutory definitions were misplaced
because “the various definitional statutes cited by the commissioner are limited to the
specific body of law of which they are a part.”). As it relates to this case, West Virginia
Code § 19-9-1 strictly limits the scope of its definitions to “as used in this article, or in any
rule or regulation authorized thereunder, unless the context otherwise requires or a different
meaning is specifically prescribed[.]” Notably, there is no authorizing rule or regulation
within the subject article implicating application of its definitions to West Virginia Code
8-12-5. Similar limiting language is found with respect to other statutes used by the circuit
court. See W. Va. Code § 19-16A-3 (“As used in this article”); § 19-19-2 (“For the purposes
of this article”); § 19-34-2 (“As used in this article unless otherwise specified”).

For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court erred in its attempt to give plain
meaning to the word animal under West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25). Instead, we note that
according to Black’s Law Dictionary, an animal is “any living creature (besides plants)
other than a human being.” Animal, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary defines the term as “any of a kingdom (Animalia) of living things
including many-celled organisms and often many of the single-celled ones (such
as protozoans) that typically differ from plants[.]” Merriam Webster Online,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/animal (last visited February 19, 2026). As
such, we find that these definitions represent the plain, ordinary, and common meaning of

10
the word animal for the purposes of West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25).9 Accordingly,
because the circuit court’s summary judgment analysis did not afford animal its plain
meaning, the court’s summary judgment ruling is hereby reversed.

However, our review does not end there. Our final consideration is whether the
circuit court erred when it made the alternative determination that even if the City had the
authority to regulate bees under West Virginia Code 8-12-5(25), that statutory provision
was invalid because it conflicts with the Commissioner’s duties established by the Apiary
Act and Right to Farm Act. On appeal, the parties frame their arguments as one of express
and implied preemption. However, preemption is imprecise as it addresses hierarchical
conflicts in which a federal law displaces state law, or state law displaces municipal
ordinances. The circuit court’s reasoning is more accurately understood as repeal by
implication. Rather, the dispositive issue presented is whether there is an intra-code conflict
between the City’s authority under West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25) and the
Commissioner’s duties outlined by the Apiary and Right to Farm Acts. In other words, the
issue is whether the Commissioner’s duties under the subject acts apply to the exclusion of
the City’s authority under West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25). As explained below, we
conclude the circuit court erred when it determined that a conflict existed that nullified the
City’s authority to regulate beekeeping under the statute.

“Statutes generally conflict when they are explicitly contrary to, or inconsistent
with, each other.” State v. Schober, 251 W. Va. 34, 41, 909 S.E.2d 69, 76 (2024) (citation
modified). “Courts will not adjudge a statute to have been repealed by implication unless
a legislative intent to repeal or supersede the statute plainly and clearly appears.” Rice v.
Underwood, 205 W. Va. 274, 285, 517 S.E.2d 751, 762 (1998) (citation modified). The
SCAWV has also held: “To warrant the adjudication of the repeal of a statute by
implication there must exist such a positive repugnancy between the statute claimed to be
repealed and the subsequent enactment that they cannot, by any reasonable hypothesis, be
consistently reconciled.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Thompson v. Morton, 140 W. Va. 207, 84
S.E.2d 791 (1954). Measured against this standard, the circuit court’s determination does

9
Mr. Urban suggests that we should not apply these common definitions of “animal”
because they render the word “fowls” in West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25) superfluous.
This argument relies on the “rule of statutory construction that the Legislature is presumed
to intend that every word used in a statute has a specific purpose and meaning.” State ex
rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W. Va. 579, 582, 251 S.E.2d 505, 508 (1979). However,
where, as in this case, “the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no basis
for application of rules of statutory construction.” State v. Mills, 243 W. Va. 328, 337, 844
S.E.2d 99, 108 (2020) (citation modified). While Mr. Urban contends that application of
this rule “create[s] ambiguity” in West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25), the SCAWV has
explained that “[r]ules of interpretation are resorted to for the purpose of resolving an
ambiguity, not for the purpose of creating it.” Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 719,
172 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1970).
11
not withstand scrutiny. As previously established, the circuit court relied upon certain
language related to the Apiary Act and Right to Farm Act to summarily conclude that a
conflict existed to the exclusion of the City’s statutory authority to regulate beekeeping.
See W. Va. Code § 19-13-3(a); W. Va. Code R. § 61-2-1 to -5; W. Va. Code §§ 19-19-1
and -7. However, upon review, we find no conflict between the statutes relied upon by the
circuit court and the operative language of West Virginia Code 8-12-5(25).

In this case, there is no express language under either the Apiary Act or Right to
Farm Act that plainly and clearly shows a legislative intent for the acts to supersede or
repeal the City’s authority to regulate beekeeping under West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25).
Instead, the language relied upon by the circuit court merely speaks in general terms,
regarding beekeeping and the Commissioner’s duties with respect thereto. The duties are
administrative and supervisory in nature. No such “positive repugnancy” exists between
the statutes; at most, the statutes overlap in subject matter (beekeeping as agriculture). A
close review of the Apiary Act and the Right to Farm Act reflects a statutory scheme that
contemplates concurrent and cooperative regulation, not silent displacement. Critically
absent is any language that unambiguously vests the Commissioner with the sole authority
to regulate beekeeping or language that the Commissioner expressly supersedes or
invalidates the authority of any other government body to regulate beekeeping. We also
find it significant that neither act makes a specific reference to municipal authority under
Chapter 8, Article 12 of our code.

Further, contrary to the assertions of the respondents, the rule of in pari materia
cannot be applied to support the circuit court’s decision in this case.10 “As a threshold
matter, courts may not regard separate and distinct statutes in pari materia unless the
Legislature’s intent is ambiguous with respect to the statute in question.” State ex rel.
Perdue v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 236 W. Va. 1, 6, 777 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2015); see Syl. Pt.
1, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“The rule that statutes which
relate to the same subject should be read and construed together is a rule of statutory
construction and does not apply to a statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous.”).
However, as addressed above, West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(25) is unambiguous, so this
rule is inapplicable.

Lastly, we note our agreement with the City’s argument that the circuit court erred
by finding that the language of the subject acts illustrated a legislative intent to prevent
municipalities from relying upon the word animal to regulate bees under West Virginia
Code § 8-12-5(25). We temper this observation with the knowledge that “courts presume

10
We note that the circuit court’s order does not expressly rely upon this rule to
support its ruling. However, because respondents rely upon the rule as one of the bases to
support the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in their favor, we have chosen to
address it.

12
the legislature drafts and passes statutes with full knowledge of existing law.” W. Va.
Health Care Cost Rev. Auth. v. Boone Mem’l Hosp., 196 W. Va. 326, 336, 472 S.E.2d 411,
421 (1996) (citation modified). As previously set forth, the legislature recently amended
and reenacted West Virginia Code § 8-12-5 in 2023 and, thus, it must be presumed that
they acted with full knowledge of the existence of the Apiary and Right to Farm Acts.
Accordingly, we discern that had the legislature desired to limit or prohibit a municipality
from regulating beekeeping, it would have done so, either expressly or by specifically
defining the term animal to the exclusion of bees. We are also cognizant that a “judicial
challenge is not a license for this Court to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices.” State v. Butler, 239 W. Va. 168, 176, 799 S.E.2d 718, 726 (2017) (citation
modified). See also Martin v. Randolph Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 195 W. Va. 297, 312, 465
S.E.2d 399, 414 (1995) (citation modified) (“Courts must presume that a legislature says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”). We are also aware
of the repeated unsuccessful legislative efforts to amend the Apiary Act and Right to Farm
Act to preempt and supersede the regulation of certain agricultural activities, including
beekeeping, and place plenary power with the Commissioner.11 See Butler, 239 W. Va. at
176, 799 S.E.2d at 726 (noting that courts have found that the repeated rejection of
legislation to be an expression of legislative intent). These failed efforts are certainly
symbolic of a legislative intent not to expand the Department’s or Commissioner’s
authority or otherwise wane the plenary authority granted to municipalities under Chapter
8, Article 12. As such, the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reversed.

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s January 23, 2025, order granting
summary judgment in favor of Mr. Urban and the Department, and remand the matter to
the circuit court for entry of its order granting summary judgment in favor of the City.

Reversed and Remanded.

ISSUED: February 24, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge S. Ryan White

11
In the City’s brief, the following are cited as failed legislation: H.B. 2454 (2025);
H.B. 2725 (2025); S.B. 916 (2025); and S.B. 943 (2025). See also H.B.5533 (2024).
13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11310206. Public record. Not legal advice.