# Brock

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · April 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11309668

## Case

- **Full name:** David Brock v. Jon Hall, Cheryl Carlson, David Mitchell, Edward Escamilla, and Latoya Hughes
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DAVID BROCK , )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-3174
)
JON HALL, CHERYL CARLSON, )
DAVID MITCHELL, EDWARD )
ESCAMILLA, AND LATOYA )
HUGHES, )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on Defendants Jon Hall’s,
Cheryl Carlson’s, David Mitchell’s, Edward Escamilla’s, and Latoya
Hughes’ (“Defendants”) Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
to Dismiss (d/e 9). Plaintiff David Brock’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint
(d/e 1) does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, so
Defendants’ Motion (d/e 9) is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint (d/e 1)
and are accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Bible v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015).
At the times relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff was a

Correctional Lieutenant employed by the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”) working at its Pinckneyville Correctional
Center (“Pinkneyville”). See d/e 1, p. 2, ¶ 3. At all times relevant to

this complaint, Defendants were employed by IDOC: Defendant Jon
Hall as an administrative assistant who also served as a hearing
officer, Defendant Cheryl Carlson as an administrative assistant

who also served as a management representative, Defendant David
Mitchell as the Pinkneyville Warden, Defendant Edward Escamilla
as IDOC Chief of Investigations and Intelligence, and Defendant

Latoya Hughes as Acting IDOC Director. Id. at ¶¶ 4-8.
On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff was involved in an incident in
which he ultimately deployed pepper spray on an inmate. Id. at p.

3, ¶ 10. IDOC maintains a policy outlining when security staff are
lawfully allowed to use force in their employment capacity, which is
set forth at 20 Ill. Admin. Code 501.10 et seq. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 9.
Plaintiff alleges that he complied with IDOC’s policy on resort to

force and chemical agent usage at all times during the June 15,
2023 incident and that the IDOC administration acknowledged and
understood that he had. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 11.
Plaintiff alleges that, nonetheless, Defendants all determined

that Plaintiff needed to be heavily disciplined for utilizing pepper
spray—contrary to IDOC’s written policies. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 12. Plaintiff
alleges that, because Defendants Hughes and Escamilla have

thought throughout their IDOC tenure that force should never be
used against inmates, Defendants Hughes and Escamilla “have
continually insisted that employees be seriously disciplined and

discharged for actions that fully comply with [I]DOC’s written
policies.” Id. at p. 3, ¶ 13.
On November 22, 2023, Defendant Hall oversaw an employee

review board hearing regarding Plaintiff “as a result of the directives
of” Defendants Mitchell, Escamilla, and Hughes, though Plaintiff
does not allege the contents of those directives or the location of the

hearing. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants knew
at that time that Plaintiff complied with the use of force policies and
that he reasonably relied upon those policies. Id.
At the employee review board hearing, Defendant Carlson

pushed for Plaintiff’s termination. Id. Defendant Hall recommended
that Plaintiff be terminated from his employment. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 15.
Defendant Hall’s recommendation was forwarded to Defendant
Mitchell, who concurred, and also recommended that Plaintiff be

terminated from his employment. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 16.
On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff was notified of his termination
effective that day. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 17; see also id. at p. 2, ¶ 3.

On June 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a one-Count Complaint
against Defendants in this Court. See d/e 1. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants did not apply IDOC’s applicable use of force rules to

him and instead applied “different unspoken and unwritten
arbitrary rules” to him, such that IDOC’s use of force rules as
applied to Plaintiff provided no notice or warning that his June 15,

2023 actions involving pepper spray were improper. Id. at p. 4,
¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that the rules as applied to him were therefore
unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at

p. 4, ¶¶ 19-20.
Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants played a role in
disciplining him and knew that his actions complied with IDOC’s
policies. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 21. Plaintiff sues all five Defendants in their

individual capacities, and Defendants Mitchell, Escamilla, and
Hughes additionally in their official capacities for the limited
purpose of obtaining equitable relief. Id. at p. 2, ¶¶ 4-8.
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendants violating his

Fourteenth Amendment rights, he sustained damages including lost
wages, emotional distress, and lost opportunities for promotion. Id.
at p. 5, ¶ 22. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff seeks damages as to

all Defendants and also seeks equitable relief of IDOC expunging
his disciplinary record of any reference to his IDOC policy violations
and reinstating him to the position he would have held absent

IDOC’s violation of his rights. Id. at p. 1, ¶ 1; p. 5, ¶ 23.
On September 15, 2025, Defendants filed a Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (d/9). On October 13, 2025,

Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e 13).
Notably, Plaintiff’s Response alleges that the policy IDOC
applied to him “effectively provides that any use of force

[Defendants] are personally uncomfortable with against an inmate
subjects an employee to discipline.” d/e 13, p. 1. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants “created a new unwritten policy—a policy that was
neither promulgated nor distributed—and held him to those higher

standards,” such that the newly created policy that Defendants
“relied upon in disciplining him” was “vague.” Id. at pp. 2-3.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is a federal
statute. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1331 (“The district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
Venue is proper because the Defendants are or were employed

by IDOC, which is headquartered in Springfield, Illinois in the
Central District of Illinois, and because Plaintiff alleges that many of
the decisions underlying Plaintiff’s claims were made in Sangamon

County, Illinois in the Central District of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C.
' 1391(b), see also d/e 1, p. 1, ¶ 2.
III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) challenges the complaint’s sufficiency. Christensen v. Cnty.
of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). A complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief” that puts the defendant on notice of the
allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), see also Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d
437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court accepts all well-pled facts
alleged and draws all possible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
The complaint must put forth plausible grounds to
demonstrate a claim for relief—namely, the “[f]actual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A
plausible claim is one from which the court can draw reasonable

inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Additionally, the
complaint must raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence of liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A complaint
merely reciting a cause of action or conclusory legal statements is
insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A policy “is impermissibly vague if it ‘fails to provide a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.’” Brown v.
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253

(2012)). However, “the government acting in the role of employer
enjoys much more latitude in crafting reasonable work regulations
for its employees” compared to the standard for government
regulations for the public. Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 369

(7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). “[A]n employee code of
conduct need not be as clear as a criminal law.” Brown, 824 F.3d at
717.

“[W]here the plaintiff alleges a pattern or a series of incidents
of unconstitutional conduct, then the courts have found an
allegation of policy sufficient to withstand a dismissal motion.”

Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to

Dismiss argues that “Plaintiff has alleged without any basis in fact
that IDOC has taken the view that force should never be used
against inmates.” d/e 9, p. 3. Defendants further argue that

“Plaintiff was in fact on notice of what standard[] his conduct was
required to conform to[,] as the phrase ‘last resort’ clearly means
that force may be used only when no other means are available or
effective,” such that “[t]he rules are not vague and IDOC’s discipline

of the Plaintiff for violating their clearly stated rules does not violate
the Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at pp.
3-4.

Illinois Administrative Code Section 501.20 defines “force” to
mean “physical contact used to coerce or prevent some action on
the part of a committed person, and the use of chemical agents.” 20

Ill. Admin. Code 501.20 (1984). Pursuant to Illinois Administrative
Code Section 501.30, titled “Resort to Force,” “Force shall be
employed only as a last resort or when other means are unavailable

or inadequate, and only to the degree reasonably necessary to
achieve a permitted purpose.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code 501.30 (1984).
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Illinois

Administrative Code Sections 501.20 and 501.30 are not
unconstitutionally vague. Section 501.20 explicitly includes use of a
chemical agent, which pepper spray indisputably is, in defining

“force.” Section 501.30 authorizes force only as the last or only
available option and to the extent necessary. Therefore, Plaintiff had
“fair notice [it] is prohibited” for him to use pepper spray outside of
specific circumstances. Brown v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d

713, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2016).
However, Plaintiff alleges that IDOC applied, not its “applicable
use of force rules,” but instead “different unspoken and unwritten

arbitrary rules,” to Plaintiff such that the use of force rules, as
“applied to [Plaintiff], are unconstitutionally vague” because the
rules “provided no notice or warning that any of his actions on June

15, 2023, were improper.” d/e 1, p. 4, ¶ 19.
To allege that IDOC applied “a pattern or a series of incidents
of unconstitutional conduct [as] an allegation of policy,” see Powe v.

City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981), Plaintiff’s
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555-56 (2007).
Plaintiff’s Response alleges that the policy IDOC applied to him
“effectively provides that any use of force [Defendants] are

personally uncomfortable with against an inmate subjects an
employee to discipline.” d/e 13, p. 1. Plaintiff alleges that IDOC
“created a new unwritten policy—a policy that was neither
promulgated nor distributed—and held him to those higher

standards,” such that the newly created policy IDOC “relied upon in
disciplining him” was “vague.” Id. at pp. 2-3.
Plaintiff’s assertion resembles that in Nolan v. Wilks, No. 22-
CV-3264, 2024 WL 6861681 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2024), in which the

plaintiff, Nolan, alleged an “unspoken, unwritten arbitrary rule[]”
that “employees who use force against an inmate should be
seriously disciplined and discharged, due to [IDOC leadership’s]

view that force should never be used against inmates.” Id. at *3.
Notably, the district court found that Nolan “alleged several pieces
of evidence that supports the existence” of such a rule:

First, he alleged that the employee review board hearing
management stated that “Lt. Nolan was 100% justified for
the use of force.” But despite that statement, it was
recommended that Nolan be suspended for seven-days for
his administration of pepper spray. In support of his claim,
Nolan included information that the Illinois Fraternal
Order of Police Lodge 263 has described the rules
governing prisoner actions as being “watered down” under
the leadership of Jeffreys and Lindsay and that similar
applications of the purported unwritten policy have
occurred in at least two other instances.

Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
The Court finds that, unlike in Nolan, Plaintiff alleges no such
evidence that supports the existence of an IDOC policy “that any
use of force [Defendants] are personally uncomfortable with against
an inmate subjects an employee to discipline.” See d/e 13, p. 1.
Plaintiff alleges, without stating how, that the Defendants
“determined…that [Plaintiff] needed to be heavily disciplined for

utilizing pepper spray.” d/e 1, p. 3, ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Hughes and Escamilla, “[t]hroughout their tenure at
[I]DOC,” “have taken the view that force should never be used

against inmates” and that, “[a]s a result of their view,” Defendants
Hughes and Escamilla “have continually insisted that employees be
seriously disciplined and discharged for actions that fully comply

with [I]DOC’s written policies.” Id. at p. 3, ¶ 13.
However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that any
employees, including Plaintiff, were seriously disciplined or

discharged at Defendants Hughes’ and Escamilla’s insistence
stemming from their alleged view that force should never be used
against inmates or for use of force that any or all Defendants were

personally uncomfortable with against an inmate.
Plaintiff alleges that the employee review board hearing on his
use of pepper spray occurred “as a result of Defendants Mitchell’s,
Escamilla’s, and Hughes’ directives.” Id. at p. 4, ¶ 14. But Plaintiff

also alleges that Defendant Carlson pushed for Plaintiff’s
termination at the hearing, Defendant Hall oversaw the hearing and
recommended that Plaintiff be terminated, and Defendant Mitchell
concurred with Defendant Hall and recommended that Plaintiff be

terminated. Id. at p. 4, ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff notably does not allege
that any Defendant recommended his termination, or that he was
ultimately terminated, because of his “use of force [that Defendants

were] personally uncomfortable with against an inmate.” See d/e
13, p. 1.
In sum, Plaintiff’s factual allegations of a pattern or a series of

incidents of unconstitutional conduct constituting an IDOC policy
“that any use of force [Defendants] are personally uncomfortable
with against an inmate subjects an employee to discipline,” d/e 13,

p. 1, or “that force should never be used against inmates,” d/e 1, p.
3, ¶ 13, are not “enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-

56 (2007), see also Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th
Cir. 1981). Therefore, Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9) is GRANTED.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9) is GRANTED. The Court notes
that while Defendants’ Motion (d/e 9) only requests dismissal by
Defendants Carlson, Hughes and Escamilla, see d/e 9 at pp. 1, 5,

Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1) is DISMISSED as to all Defendants
without prejudice with leave to re-file an amended complaint within
30 days of entry of this Order.

ENTERED: April 13, 2026.
FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11309668. Public record. Not legal advice.