# Harris

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · April 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11309664

## Case

- **Full name:** Clinton Harris v. SAI Nashville Motors, LLC d/b/a Audi Nashville
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** April 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CLINTON HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:24-cv-00791
v.
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
SAI NASHVILLE MOTORS, LLC d/b/a Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans
AUDI NASHVILLE,1
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Through his second amended complaint, filed on April 28, 2025 (Doc. No. 53), plaintiff
Clinton Harris (Harris) is suing defendant SAI Nashville Motors, LLC (Audi Nashville) over a
credit check that occurred on July 1, 2023. Harris has asserted multiple theories of liability, but
the core of his allegations concerns how Audi Nashville induced him to let the credit check happen.
According to Harris, he made clear to Audi Nashville employees that he would proceed with a
possible purchase if and only if he could arrange for “in-house financing.” Harris alleges that both
he and Audi Nashville understood the term to mean that Audi Nashville itself, or Audi Financial
Services, or some other internal division of Audi AG would furnish the necessary financing
without resort to third-party lenders. With the purported understanding in mind, Harris signed a
credit application2 that included the following language about what he was authorizing:

1 Consistent with the answer to the second amended complaint (Doc. No. 56), the Clerk of
the Court is directed to conform defendant’s name in the docket to the name as listed in the caption
of this Memorandum Order.
2 Among other information in the application, Harris is listed as having a weekly gross
income of $105,000. (Doc. No. 98-1 at 87.) An annual interval likely was intended.
By signing this application:

I authorize dealer and any finance company, bank or other financial institution to
which the dealer submits my application (“you”) to investigate my credit and
employment history, verify my income, obtain credit reports, and release
information about your credit experience with me as the law permits.

I further authorize you to forward my application and all related information to
other creditors for evaluation as a method of effectuating my request for credit.

If an account is created, I authorize you to obtain credit reports for the purpose of
reviewing or taking collection action on the account, or for other legitimate
purposes associated with the account.

(Doc. No. 98-1 at 88.) Consistent with the language in the credit application, Audi Nashville did
forward the application to third-party lenders. Harris, however, believes that Audi Nashville
induced him to sign the credit application under false pretenses, which is why the second amended
complaint includes allegations that Audi Nashville violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681q and is liable for
damages under the private right of action provisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o. See, e.g.,
Cheatham v. McCormick, No. 95-6558, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29702, at *11 (6th Cir. Nov. 12,
1996) (table case) (citation omitted); Fluker v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-12240, 2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 110724, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2024) (citations omitted); see also Fisher v.
Quality Hyundai, Inc., No. 01 C 3243, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 407, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2002)
(false-pretenses claim sufficiently pled, where car dealer told customer that credit application was
needed even though customer was approved for a loan through her credit union).
The summary of allegations that the Court recited above will help provide a framework for
assessing Harris’s pending motion to compel. (Doc. No. 118.) Discovery generally should be broad
enough to allow inquiries reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
E.g., Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Even
pro se litigants must follow basic civil procedure rules, however, including the need to show
proportionality. See Warren v. United States, No. CV 6:19-78-KKC-EBA, 2022 WL 1046200, at
*6 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 7, 2022) (pro se litigants must follow basic procedural rules) (citations omitted);
compare Hardy v. Genesse County Cmty. Action Res. Dep’t, No. 24-11190, 2026 WL 926119, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2026) (denying motion to compel for, inter alia, failure to analyze relevance

and proportionality) with Apex Bank v. Rainsford, No. 3:19-CV-130, 2020 WL 12840131, at *5
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2020) (“[T]he Federal Rules scarcely allow [a bank and its officers] to sue
someone [who is pro se] for two million dollars and then refuse to produce the only records that
could substantiate that person’s defense. Rainsford is entitled to present a truth defense, needs
Apex’s debt-collection records to do so, and now seeks those records.”).
I. Depositions of Sonic Automotive Executives
Harris wants to compel depositions of Jeff Dyke, Dino Bernacchi, and Kevin Gaither,
officers at Audi Nashville’s corporate parent Sonic Automotive, Inc. Harris wants to conduct these
depositions to obtain relevant information about “Sonic Automotive’s corporate policies,
marketing language, the company’s internal understanding of ‘in-house financing,’ employee
training, and oversight of financing procedures across Audi Nashville, BMW of Nashville,

EchoPark (TN), and Mercedes-Benz of Nashville.” (Doc. No. 118 at 4.) Without deciding any
issues right now, Harris generally is allowed to explore proportional and relevant information
pertaining to his allegations of false pretenses.
The problem, however, is that the Court has nothing to compel right now because Harris
does not appear to have used proper procedure to submit prospective deposition witnesses to the
Court’s jurisdiction. Individuals named as defendants generally can be deposed without leave of
court under Rule 30. The individuals in question here are not named defendants. Harris can depose
an appropriate agent of a named corporate defendant—again without leave of court—under Rule
30(b)(6). The Court cannot discern whether Harris served the individuals in question with
enforceable Rule 30(b)(6) notices. Whether employees of a parent company can be deposed under
Rule 30(b)(6) because of the control exerted over the subsidiary company is not an issue before
the Court at this time. See In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. CIV A 507-CV-353-JMH, 2009
WL 1313311, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 12, 2009) (denying protective order where parent corporation

exercised sufficient control over subsidiary) (citations omitted). In other instances generally,
deposing a non-party witness requires a proper subpoena under Rule 45. See, e.g., Satija v.
Permanent Gen. Assurance Corp. of Ohio, No. 1:13-CV-00082, 2014 WL 12591693, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 30, 2014) (noting that a subpoena of an officer of a parent corporation was quashed
because the officer had no personal knowledge of the subject matter); see also 9A Fed. Prac. &
Proc. Civ. § 2452 (3d ed. and 2026 Supp.) (“Federal Rule 45 has a close relation to the proper
functioning of the discovery rules. Most notably, a subpoena is necessary to compel someone who
is not a party to appear for the taking of a deposition or for the production of various material
things and electronic information.”) (citations omitted). Harris appears not to have served the
individuals in question under Rule 45. The Court has no jurisdictional instrument to enforce here

until Harris serves the individuals in question with an enforceable notice under either Rule 30 or
Rule 45, as he deems appropriate, and those individuals challenge the notice through appropriate
means.
Accordingly, the Court denies Harris’s motion to compel with respect to depositions of Jeff
Dyke, Dino Bernacchi, and Kevin Gaither, but without prejudice to renew after proper service
under either Rule 30 or Rule 45 and a proper objection to that service.
II. Customer Contact Information (Interrogatory No. 16)
During discovery, Harris served Audi Nashville with an interrogatory that stated, “List all
customer complaints received from 2020–2025 regarding misleading financing, unauthorized
credit pulls, or racial discrimination.” (Doc. No. 118 at 10.) Audi Nashville responded to the
interrogatory by stating that it received none. (Id.) Harris believes that Audi Nashville lied in its
response and should be compelled to produce full responses, based on the following logic:
1) There are legal and regulatory authorities generally available that have
defined the word “complaint” broadly to include informal communications
and online postings. (Id. at 13.)
2) Audi Nashville monitors reviews about the dealership that people post on
third-party platforms such as Google and Yelp. The general manager
reaches out to contact people who leave negative reviews. (Id. at 11–12.)
3) Online reviews, therefore, are deemed to be “complaints” that Audi
Nashville “received” and must produce in response to the interrogatory.
There are several problems with Harris’s logic. While there might be authorities generally
available that define what a complaint is,3 Harris did not define the term for the purposes of his
interrogatory. Harris also did not define what he meant by “received.” As served, the interrogatory
does not appear to have put Audi Nashville on notice that it would have to obtain copies of
customer reviews posted on third-party websites and furnish them to Harris. The Court will not
address the propriety of requiring a defendant to scour third-party sources for information; the
point for now is that Harris has not sufficiently explained why third-party reviews would be
considered received even if they are monitored. Only now has Harris defined more specifically
what he wanted from the interrogatory. (Doc. No. 118 at 13–14.) Within the Federal Rules of Civil

3 The two cases that Harris has cited for this point are inapplicable. In re Cooper Tire &
Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2009), mentions in passing that “requests regarding
information in other complaints or suits” was permitted in a product liability case about tires. Lewy
v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1988), discusses complaints about defects
in a rifle that had been submitted to a jury as evidence of conscious disregard for the safety of
others.
Procedure and the discovery orders and deadlines in this case, Harris might be able to serve an
amended interrogatory with more carefully defined and more enforceable terms. Cf. Shackleford
v. Vivint Solar Dev., LLC, No. CV ELH-19-954, 2020 WL 6273892, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 26, 2020)
(noting, in reciting case history, that prior consumer complaints about a credit consent form were

relevant to proving willfulness under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n); Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., LP, No.
119CV00853RLYMJD, 2019 WL 5618800, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 30, 2019) (plaintiff entitled to
information about prior customer complaints concerning accessed consumer reports for debts
discharged in bankruptcy, to establish willfulness under Section 1681n); Iraheta v. Equifax Info.
Servs., L.L.C., No. CV 17-1363, 2019 WL 13292761, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 22, 2019) (defendant
required to respond to a narrowed interrogatory about prior lawsuits that could establish willfulness
under Section 1681n). Currently, though, the response that Audi Nashville served to the
interrogatory is not technically wrong and thus not subject to a motion to compel. The Court thus
denies Harris’s motion to compel with respect to the interrogatory, but without prejudice to renew
if Harris serves an amended interrogatory to which Audi Nashville objects. The Court also will

deny as moot Harris’s motion for a protective order regarding the production of customer contact
information (Doc. No. 124). That motion presupposed that production would be ordered in
response to the current interrogatory. If Harris serves an amended interrogatory then the Court can
revisit protection of customer information if necessary.
III. Remote Deposition of Joe Vergen
Harris also wants to depose former Audi Nashville employee Joe Vergen (Vergen). As with
the Sonic Automotive executives discussed above, Vergen appears to be neither a named party nor
a current representative of Audi Nashville. Accordingly, the only way to submit Vergen to the
Court’s jurisdiction, for purposes of a deposition, is to serve him with a subpoena under Rule 45.
See 9 Moore’s Federal Practice–Civil § 45.02 (“If a deposition of a nonparty is sought, not only
must the nonparty be subpoenaed, but notice of the deposition must be provided to all parties as
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1) (‘The deponent’s
attendance may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45.”). Harris does not need any permission
to serve a subpoena on Vergen; he needs only to follow the procedures outlined in Rule 45.
Whether Harris should seek a remote format by stipulation under Rule 30(b)(4) or simply
announce it in the subpoena under Rule 45(c) is an issue not currently before the Court; the Court
will not address that issue unless a proper objection arises. See, e.g., Borchetta v. Brown, No. 3:25-
MC-00024, 2025 WL 3285497, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 25, 2025) (motion to quash Rule 2004
bankruptcy examination denied, where “courts around the country addressing remote testimony
have concluded that, if a subpoena provides for a witness to appear for an examination remotely
by Zoom from a location within 100 miles of where the witness resides, or is employed, or
regularly transacts business in person, the subpoena complies with Rule 45(c)(1)(A)”) (collecting
cases).
Because Harris already has the means to procure Vergen’s deposition without leave of
court, the Court denies this portion of Harris’s motion to compel but without prejudice to renew
upon proper objection.
IV. Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, Harris’s motion to compel (Doc. No. 118) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Harris’s motion for a protective order (Doc. No. 124) is DENIED AS
MOOT. _
It is so ORDERED. oY
fo Ie
oo oe me
LUKEA.EVANS* SOS”
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11309664. Public record. Not legal advice.