# Jessica Morgan, on behalf of L.S., a Minor v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11309060

## Case

- **Full name:** Jessica Morgan, on behalf of L.S., a Minor v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JESSICA MORGAN, on behalf of L.S., a
Minor,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-CV-2292-NJR

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jessica Morgan, on behalf of her minor son, L.S., (“Plaintiff”) appeals to
the district court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act.
L.S. suffers from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and epilepsy, which
requires him to take certain medications and creates challenges for him in school and at
home. Nevertheless, because substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision,
it is affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB on behalf of L.S. on February 16, 2022, alleging disability
due to his ADHD and epilepsy. She claimed that L.S. was disabled as of January 1, 2020.
(R. 58). Her claim was denied on August 1, 2022. (R. 55-58). Plaintiff sought a hearing
before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who determined that L.S. was not disabled.
(R. 21). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-3).

Plaintiff now appeals the denial of DIB to this Court. She raises three issues:
(1) whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that L.S. was not
disabled; (2) whether the ALJ failed to fully develop the record; and (3) whether the ALJ
failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of record. (Doc. 15). The Commissioner
filed a brief in opposition (Doc. 21).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A reviewing court may enter judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for
a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” Id. “Substantial
evidence is not a high threshold, as it means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 746
(7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, an ALJ’s decision should be reversed
“only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or based on a legal error.” Hopgood ex
rel. L.G. v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2009).
“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide

a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.” Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th
498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021)). The reviewing court may not “reweigh the evidence, resolve
debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for the
ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence supports it.” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d
893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021).
Even when the ALJ commits error, a remand is not necessary if the error is

harmless. McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Spiva v. Astrue,
628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2010)). Where the Court “look[s] at the evidence in the record”
and can “predict with great confidence” that a remand to the ALJ would generate the
same result, the error is deemed harmless. Id.
DISABILITY UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the

applicable statutes. “A child qualifies as disabled and therefore may be eligible for SSI if
he has a ‘medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked
and severe functional limitations’ and the impairment ‘has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’” Hopgood, 578 F.3d at 699 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i)). This analysis proceeds in three steps: First, if the child is

engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled under the Social Security Act.
Id. Second, the child will be deemed not disabled if he “does not have a severe medical
impairment or combination of impairments.” Id. If the child satisfies these two initial
requirements,—i.e., he is not engaged in substantial gainful activity and he suffers from
a qualifying impairment or combination of impairments—the analysis proceeds to step

three, which requires the child’s impairments to “meet a duration requirement and . . .
meet, medically equal or functionally equal, the severity of any of the Listings of
Impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.924(a) (outlining mechanics of three-step disability examination).
Here, the issue is whether L.S.’s impairments “functionally equaled” the listings.
This determination turns on L.S.’s ability to function in six “domains,” which reflect

“broad areas of functioning intended to capture all of what a child can or cannot do.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). This inquiry examines the severity of the child’s impairment
with respect to: “(i) Acquiring and using information; (ii) Attending and completing
tasks; (iii) Interacting and relating with others; (iv) Moving about and manipulating
objects; (v) Caring for yourself; and (vi) Health and physical well-being.” Id. Functional
equivalence to a listing means that the child’s impairment or combination of impairments

results in “marked” limitations in two domains or a “severe” limitation in one domain.
Hopgood, 578 F.3d at 699. A “marked” limitation exists when the impairment “interferes
seriously with [the child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete
activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). An “extreme” limitation involves an impairment
that “interferes very seriously with [the child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain,

or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i).
The ALJ found that L.S. suffered from a marked limitation in his health and
physical wellbeing. (R. 18). She found that he had less than marked limitations in
acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, interacting and
relating with others, and in caring for himself. (Id.). She also found that L.S. had no

limitation moving around and manipulating objects. (Id.). Plaintiff only contests the ALJ’s
findings with respect to her determination that L.S. had less than marked limitations in
the domains of interacting and relating with others and caring for himself.
EVIDENTIARY RECORD
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in preparing
this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record focuses on the points

raised by Plaintiff.
I. Relevant Medical Records
Dr. Christopher Suhre diagnosed L.S. with ADHD on October 7, 2019. (R. 307).
Teachers had noted an “elevation in inattention and hyperactivity” in L.S., and Plaintiff
reported that he “gets a timeout daily in school.” (R. 306). Plaintiff also told Dr. Suhre

that the “teacher will have to give [L.S.] instruction multiple times” and that he often
“forget[s] to complete task[s].” (Id.). By December 11, 2019, however, after L.S. began
taking medication for his ADHD symptoms, he reported that he was “focusing well in
school” although he also experienced a loss in appetite. (R. 296). On September 1, 2020,
Plaintiff told Dr. Suhre that L.S.’s ADHD “medication is working good.” (R. 288). Then,

in March 2021, Dr. Suhre noted that L.S. was “doing well” with his ADHD medication
and that he and Plaintiff had “no concerns.” (R. 272).
Although Plaintiff told doctors that L.S. began experiencing seizures around 2018,
(R. 41), the record suggests he did not undergo regular medical treatment for this
condition until October 19, 2021, when he presented at the Washington University Sleep

Medicine Clinic for “nighttime spells.” (R. 395). On November 1, 2021, Plaintiff sent
doctors a video showing a “nocturnal spell.” (R. 413). On November 8, 2021, Dr. Jitendra
Pathak ordered an electroencephalogram (“EEG”) to evaluate these spells. (R. 319). The
result of the EEG was “abnormal” and “consistent with benign focal epilepsy.” (R. 320).
Although the EEG revealed these abnormal findings, Dr. Pathak explained to Plaintiff
that L.S.’s diagnosis of benign epilepsy had a “good prognosis.” (R. 430-431). On

November 23, 2021, L.S. underwent Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“MRI”) of his brain to
identify potential causes of his seizures. (R. 316). The reviewing physician, Dr. Brian
Cusworth, concluded that the MRI permitted “[n]o findings to explain [L.S.’s] seizures.”
(Id.).
Doctors prescribed Keppra to address L.S.’s seizures. (R. 449) After one month,
Plaintiff reported that L.S. had become “very, very moody.” (Id.). By March 2022, L.S.’s

moodiness had gotten “significantly worse,” as he would “throw a fit over the smallest
things.” (R. 455). Plaintiff told doctors that although Keppra had seemingly prevented
further seizures since it was prescribed, L.S.’s “mood side effects are not tolerable.” (Id.).
Throughout 2022 and into 2023, L.S.’s medical records reveal several communications
between Plaintiff and his doctors in which they discuss concerns about his mood swings

and how they might be triggered by Keppra. (R. 455-489).
On October 13, 2023, L.S. saw Dr. Suhre for his annual checkup (he was ten years
old at the time). (R. 134-135). Dr. Suhre recorded the following impressions:
[L.S.] reports 3 meals/day, well-balanced diet, normal portions,
appropriate dairy intake, diet includes fruits, and diet includes vegetables.
He reports regular dental visits and brushes teeth 2 times/day. He reports
has structured bedtime routine, sleeps through the night, and no trouble
getting up. He reports normal bowel movement frequency and normal
consistency. He reports safe practices around pool & water, understanding
of sun protection, understands insect repellant, uses helmet for
biking/scootering, maintains adequate hydration, and understands conflict
resolution/violence prevention. He [] denies drug use, denies alcohol use,
and denies tobacco use. He reports no behavior problems, normal
transition, and normal attention span. He reports socializes well with peers
and responds well to discipline (privilege restrictions). He reports gets
regular exercise and no family crises stressors. (R. 134).

II. School Records
On February 17, 2023, Ms. Lora Wagner, L.S.’s fourth grade teacher, completed an
evaluation form in connection with Plaintiff’s DIB claim. (R. 217-224). Ms. Wagner noted
that L.S.’s reading level was in the 53rd percentile nationally, and his math level in the
55th percentile. (R. 217).
Ms. Wagner also evaluated L.S. based on the six domains that determine
functional listing equivalence. She found “no problems” in L.S.’s ability to acquire and
use information and in his ability to move about and manipulate objects. (R. 218, 221).
Ms. Wagner found that L.S. had problems in his ability to attend to and complete tasks,

but she identified only “a slight problem” in two of thirteen functional categories:
completing class/homework assignments and organizing his own things and school
materials (she found no problems in the other eleven categories). (R. 219). Ms. Wagner
also found that “[w]hen medicated, [L.S.] is very independent.” (Id.). She also determined
that L.S. had problems in his ability to interact and relate with others: L.S. had “obvious

problems” in seeking attention appropriately and in expressing anger appropriately; he
also had “slight problems” in playing cooperatively with other children and in
respecting/obeying adults in authority. (R. 220). In nine other categories, however, L.S.
had no problems including in making and keeping friends, taking turns in a conversation,
and relating experiences and telling stories. (Id.). Ms. Wagner also indicated that a “plan”

was in place “to help [L.S.] deal with his emotions,” because he had “shut down on
multiple occasions + refused to talk to the adult in charge.” (Id.). With respect to L.S.’s
ability to care for himself, Ms. Wagner found that L.S. had obvious problems in five

categories including handling frustration appropriately, and in responding to changes in
mood. (R. 222). But, according to Ms. Wagner, L.S. had no problems in five other
categories including taking care of personal hygiene, caring for physical needs, and using
good judgment regarding personal safety and dangerous circumstances. (Id.). Finally,
Ms. Wagner noted that with respect to L.S.’s physical conditions and wellbeing, he had a
“history of seizures which occur during sleep, seizures may cause drowsiness, or absence

the following day” and that his medication “causes more attention seeking behavior +
more frustration.” (R. 223). In addition, Ms. Wagner indicated that L.S. had 30 visits to
the school nurse over the course of the ongoing school year. (Id.).
L.S.’s remaining school records show struggle and promise. In the first grade, L.S.
went from “satisfactory” to “excellent” in math, “unsatisfactory” to “satisfactory” in

english, was graded “satisfactory” consistently in science, and consistently “excellent” in
art, music, and physical education. (R. 177). He also improved from “needs
improvement” in the categories of “works carefully” and “works neatly” to “satisfactory”
in those areas. (Id.). More broadly, with respect to each of the ten study habits on which
L.S. was evaluated, his performance either improved or remained consistent throughout

the first grade. (Id.).
A separate report card from Nelson Primary School shows L.S. was consistently
rated “excellent” in his ability to “listen while others are speaking” and in his ability to
be “considerate in speech and manners.” (Doc. 193). His ability to follow directions and
his organizational skills fell off slightly over the course of the 2021 school year from
“excellent” to “satisfactory.” (Id.).

In 2022, at Woodland Intermediate School, L.S. received three term grades of “A”
in math, and an A+, A-, and a B in english. (R. 191). He also received grades of
“satisfactory” in all categories under evaluation, including in his ability to work well with
others, class room effort, and his ability to work carefully and neatly. (Id.).
III. State Agency Examiners
In response to Plaintiff’s DIB application, a State Agency Disability Determination

was conducted. (R. 40-45). Dr. Jeanne Yakin reviewed medical treatment records from
Dr. Suhre and noted that L.S. was “attentive” but “very active in the room.” (R. 41). In a
treatment note from December 11, 2019, Dr. Suhre noted that L.S. was “focusing well at
school” but that his ADHD medication was causing decreased appetite. (Id.). In a
telehealth visit on September 1, 2020, Plaintiff noted that L.S.’s “meds are working good.”

(Id.).
As to L.S.’s seizures, Dr. Yakin found that this condition began around 2018 and
that they occur “randomly” but in “monthly” intervals. (Id.). Seizure activity includes
“convulsions, eye rolling, extremity stiffness, and turning head to the side,” and usually
lasts between two and five minutes. (Id.).

Dr. Yakin also evaluated L.S.’s ADHD, epilepsy, and seizure conditions against
the six domains outlined above. She found no limitations in his ability to attend to and
complete tasks, interact and relate with others, move about and manipulate objects, and
care for himself. (R. 42-43). She found that L.S. had less than a marked limitation in
acquiring and using information, and a marked limitation in terms of his health and
physical wellbeing. (R. 42-43). Based on these findings, Dr. Yakin determined that L.S.

was not disabled. (R. 44).
On March 24, 2023, the State Agency, through Dr. James Hinchen, conducted a
“Recon” evaluation of L.S.’s disability and reached largely the same findings and
conclusion as Dr. Yakin. (R. 48-53).
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
Plaintiff appeared via telephone and was represented by counsel at the hearing

before the ALJ on November 16, 2023. (R. 27). Counsel informed the ALJ at the beginning
of the hearing that “[t]he record is complete” and that there was no “additional”
documentary evidence outstanding. (R. 30). On the merits, counsel explained that L.S.
should be deemed marked in the domains of health and wellbeing, caring for himself,
and attending to and completing tasks. (R. 30-31).

Plaintiff was the only witness to testify at the hearing. She stated that L.S. has a
two-year-old brother and an eight-year-old sister. He and his sister “always fight” and
bicker “like husband and wife.” (R. 31-32). L.S., a fifth grader at the time, was only
42 inches tall, weighed 40 pounds, and routinely got bullied in school for his height.
(R. 34). Plaintiff also testified that she gets approximately three calls from the school per

week about L.S. and that he was put on a 504 plan to address his conditions. (R. 33). She
also testified that L.S. wets the bed three to four times per week, a symptom she attributes
to “triggers” in his brain that can be brought on by his seizures. (R. 36). She conceded,
however, that L.S. finishes his homework “most times” and that he had not experienced
a seizure for four to six months. (R. 34-35).
Plaintiff has tried to sign L.S. up for organized activities including karate,

gymnastics, and baseball. (R. 32). L.S. “never follows through” on these activities and
wants to quit after Plaintiff has paid for them. (Id.). Karate was especially problematic for
L.S. because he “didn’t have the self-discipline” and only wanted to “chop a board.” (Id.).
As to L.S.’s medications, Plaintiff testified that he takes Keppra to help with his
seizures, and that he is on Focalin XR for ADHD. (R. 33). Keppra triggers noticeable mood
swings in L.S., which creates “issues with both in-home and social skills.” (R. 35). She

described how “one minute [L.S.] will be happy, laughing, the next minute he’ll be sad,
crying, the next he’ll be anxious, then he’ll be irritable, then he’ll be all angry, then he’ll
go back to happy.” (R. 37). Plaintiff also described Focalin XR as ineffective because
“we are still having issues, and it’s severe” because she gets frequent calls from school
about L.S.’s behavior and because L.S. gets into fights and gets bullied. (Id.). She further

explained that even with L.S.’s ADHD medication, “he is a rock,” and he either “jump[s]
off the wall” or “isn’t awake.”
DECISION OF THE ALJ
In reaching her decision, the ALJ considered the entire record.
At step one, the ALJ determined that L.S. was not engaged in substantial gainful

activity. (R. 16). At step two, the ALJ determined that L.S. suffered from two severe
impairments in the form of ADHD and epilepsy. (Id.). She also determined that L.S.
suffered from non-severe impairments of asthma and gastroesophageal reflux disease.
(Id.). Thus, having determined that L.S. satisfied steps one and two, the ALJ moved on to
consider step three.
At step three, the ALJ first examined whether L.S. had an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments. (Id.). She determined that L.S.’s epilepsy and resulting seizures did
not meet this standard because his “seizures occur less frequently than once a month
when treated with prescribed medication.” (R. 17). She also considered whether L.S.’s
ADHD symptoms could satisfy this disjunctive element of step three. (Id.). But here too,
the ALJ determined that L.S. did not suffer an impairment that met or medically equaled

a listing based on his “generally average to above average academic performance, the
lack of significant disciplinary history involving problems interacting with others, the
lack of significant allegations regarding concentration issues, and the lack of significant
evidence that the claimant struggles to adapt or manage himself in a way that
significantly interferes with his functional abilities.” (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ

determined that L.S. did not satisfy step three by meeting or medically equaling a listing.
(Id.).
With these findings, the ALJ proceeded to consider whether L.S. suffered an
impairment or a combination of impairments that functionally equaled a listing. She
conducted a holistic assessment of the record, which included “objective medical

evidence and other relevant evidence from medical sources; information from other
sources, such as school teachers, family members, or friends; the claimant’s statements
(including statements from the claimant’s parent(s) or other caregivers); and any other
relevant evidence in the case record, including how the claimant functions over time and
in all settings (i.e., at home, at school, and in the community).” (R. 18). After completing
her review and consideration of Plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ arrived at the following
subsidiary conclusions with respect to each functional domain:
>» less than a marked limitation in acquiring and using information;
>» less than a marked limitation in attending and completing tasks;
>» less than a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others;
> no limitation in moving about and manipulating objects;
>» less than a marked limitation in the ability to care for himself; and
> amarked limitation in health and physical well-being.
(id.) (underlined in original). The ALJ credited Plaintiff's testimony that L.S. “struggles
academically and behaviorally at school and that his difficulty with social interaction may
be aggravated by his medication.” (R. 19). She also appeared to credit Plaintiff's
description of L.S.’s symptoms that included seizures and frequent bedwetting. (Id.). But
the ALJ found that “the allegations concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record.” (Id.). Thus, she proceeded to explain each domain-based
subsidiary conclusion.
Health and physical wellbeing. The ALJ found that L.S. had a marked limitation
in this domain. (Id.). This finding was based on L.S.’s benign focal epilepsy, which
resulted in periodic seizures when L.S. was asleep. (Id.). The ALJ also found L.S.’s
“delayed development” in terms of his body weight—which placed him in the bottom
10% for his age group —to suggest significant limitations in this domain. (/d.).
Page 13 of 24

Acquiring and using information. Here, the ALJ found that L.S. had a less than a
marked limitation. (Id.). She determined that L.S. “generally performs well in school.”

(Id.). She based this conclusion on L.S.’s “satisfactory” and “excellent” marks in all areas
of assessment during the 2019-2020 school year, his “near mastery” of writing, and his
proficiency in math. (Id.). She also cited Ms. Wagner’s report as evidence that L.S.
“ha[d] no problems in the area of acquiring and using information.” (Id.).
Attending to/completing tasks. The ALJ found that L.S. had less than a marked
limitation in this domain. Here too, she cited Ms. Wagner’s observation that L.S. had

“‘mostly no problems in completing tasks’ except for completing and returning makeup
work following absences from school.” (Id.) (quoting Wagner Report). The ALJ
recognized L.S.’s ADHD diagnosis but observed that his function had improved since his
initial diagnosis in 2019: “the claimant has since been noted by teachers and his parents
as doing well with ADHD medication.” (R. 20).

Interacting/relating with others. The ALJ determined that L.S. had less than a
marked limitation in this domain. Here, she noted some conflicting evidence. She found
that although Ms. Wagner determined that L.S. had “mostly no problems” interacting
with others, he had “obvious problems” in seeking attention properly. (Id.). She also
noted that after L.S. began taking Keppra to manage his seizures, he became increasingly

moody and was prone to “exaggerated emotional reactions.” (Id.). The ALJ also appeared
skeptical of Plaintiff’s testimony concerning L.S.’s inability to get along with his fellow
students. On this point, she noted the lack of evidence corroborating this claim. (Id.). And
more broadly, the ALJ determined that “[t]he record does not contain additional
significant evidence that the claimant experiences problematic interactions with teachers
or fellow students.” (Id.).

Caring for himself. The ALJ found L.S. to have less than a marked limitation in
this domain. Although he had occasional trouble staying on his seizure medication, the
ALJ found that “the record does not contain significant evidence of failures to attend basic
personal needs such as personal hygiene.” (Id.). She also found that although L.S.
“has been assessed by teachers as having difficulty controlling his emotions and caring
for himself emotionally, . . . the record does not contain significant allegations that would

rise to the level of a marked limitation in this area.” (Id.).
Moving about/manipulating objects. The ALJ found no limitations in this domain
because the record revealed no indication that L.S. had difficulty ambulating or
manipulating objects. (Id.).
The ALJ also reviewed the findings of the State Agency Disability Determination

and found them to be “partially persuasive.” (Id.). She agreed with the findings of
Dr. Yakin and Dr. Hinchen on the domains of acquiring/using information (less than
marked) and health/physical wellbeing (marked). (R. 20-21). But the ALJ disagreed with
the conclusion by Dr. Yakin and Dr. Hinchen that L.S. had no limitations in the domains
of attending/completing tasks, interacting/relating with others, and caring for himself.

(R. 21). On these points, the ALJ emphasized L.S.’s emotional struggles, his difficulty
interacting with figures of authority, and his struggles expressing anger and seeking
attention. (Id.). Thus, the ALJ found that L.S. “experiences limitations, albeit less than
marked limitations, in these areas.” (Id.).
The ALJ found Ms. Wagner’s assessment of L.S. “persuasive.” (Id.). She explained
that Ms. Wagner provided detailed assessments of L.S.’s functional and emotional

capacity and offered additional “notes” about his emotional state and the challenges he
faces. (Id.). The ALJ specifically highlighted Ms. Wagner’s assessment that L.S. had “no
problems in the majority of activities related to interacting and relating with others.” (Id.).
Thus, having found that L.S. only suffered a marked limitation in one of the six
functional domains, the ALJ determined that he was not disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act. (Id.). Plaintiff, as noted, contests the ALJ’s decision only with

respect to her findings that L.S. had less than marked limitations in the domains of
interacting and relating with others and in caring for himself.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the ALJ erred in finding that L.S. had less than marked limitations in
Interacting and Relating with others and in Caring for Himself.

The crux of Plaintiff’s criticism of the ALJ’s decision focuses on the lack of weight
she assigned to her testimony about L.S.’s struggles. She also accuses the ALJ of
overemphasizing Ms. Wagner’s report as evidence of less than marked limitations in the
two domains she contests. The Court will examine the record with respect to L.S.’s
limitations in these domains to determine if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. But in doing so, the Court’s role is limited as it may not “reweigh the evidence,
resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, [and] determine credibility,” Gedatus, 994 F.3d
at 900.
Interacting/relating with others. This domain considers how well L.S. can
“initiate and sustain emotional connections with others, develop and use the language of
[his] community, cooperate with others, comply with rules, respond to criticism, and

respect and take care of the possessions of others.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i). Plaintiff
disputes the ALJ’s determination of a less than marked limitation in this domain. She
cites Ms. Wagner’s assessment that L.S. had “obvious problems” seeking attention
properly and expressing anger appropriately.
Plaintiff also cites her own testimony to emphasize L.S.’s struggles. She testified
that L.S. and his sister bicker like husband and wife and that he never follows through

on organized activities including gymnastics, baseball, and karate. She attributes L.S.’s
struggles in karate specifically to his lack of self-discipline. Plaintiff also emphasized
L.S.’s mood swings, his behavioral problems in school, and the fact that she routinely gets
three calls per week from teachers because L.S. refuses to engage with people in
authority. She also explained how “one minute [L.S.] will be happy, laughing, the next

minute he’ll be sad, crying, the next he’ll be anxious, then he’ll be irritable, then he’ll be
all angry, then he’ll go back to happy.”
The ALJ was not bound to credit Plaintiff’s testimony word for word. Prill, 23 F.4th
at 748. Although Plaintiff testified that she received frequent calls from school about L.S.’s
behavior, and that L.S. was bullied by his fellow students, the ALJ was entitled to credit

Ms. Wagner’s account that “[w]hen medicated, [L.S.] is very independent” and that he at
most had “slight problems” playing cooperatively with other children and in
respecting/obeying adults in authority. In nine other relevant categories, moreover, Ms.
Wagner concluded that L.S. had no problems including in making and keeping friends,
taking turns in a conversation, and relating experiences and telling stories. And while the
ALJ did not specifically mention Dr. Suhre’s treatment notes from October 13, 2023, his

observation that L.S. “socializes well with peers and responds well to discipline (privilege
restrictions)” bolsters her decision to weigh Ms. Wagner’s report more heavily than
Plaintiff’s own testimony. See Butler, 4 F.4th at 501 (“An ALJ need not specifically address
every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his
conclusions.”); Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 903 (“An ALJ need not rehash every detail each time
he states conclusions on various subjects.”). Accordingly, the record does not

demonstrate that the ALJ’s decision was “patently wrong” on this point. Prill, 23 F.4th
at 748.
The Court does not question the seriousness of L.S.’s behavioral struggles or the
treatment he occasionally receives from fellow students about his size. But the Court is
prohibited from re-examining the ALJ’s credibility determinations. At best, Plaintiff’s

testimony reveals an evidentiary conflict, which is not enough to warrant an order of
remand. See Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 903 (“[T]he presence of contradictory evidence and
arguments does not mean the ALJ’s determination is not supported by substantial
evidence.”).
For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision that L.S. suffered only a

less than marked limitation in his ability to interact and relate with others was based on
substantial evidence.
Caring for himself. This domain considers L.S.’s ability to “maintain a healthy
emotional and physical state, including how well you get your physical and emotional
wants and needs met in appropriate ways; how you cope with stress and changes in your
environment; and whether you take care of your own health, possessions, and living

area.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(k). The ALJ determined that L.S. had a less than marked
limitation in this domain. She acknowledged that L.S. “has been assessed by teachers as
having difficulty controlling his emotions and caring for himself emotionally.” But this
finding did not outweigh the record evidence as a whole, which, in her view, “does not
contain significant allegations that would rise to the level of a marked limitation in this
area.”

Here too, Plaintiff relies heavily on favorable notes in Ms. Wagner’s assessment of
L.S. and her own testimony to make what effectively amounts to a weight of the evidence
argument. She cites Ms. Wagner’s finding that L.S. had “shut down on multiple occasions
+ refused to talk to the adult in charge.” She notes L.S.’s frequent bedwetting, his repeated
absences from school, his 30 visits to the school nurse, and his problems sleeping. She

also cites her testimony where she described L.S. acting like a “rock” when he is on his
ADHD medication, and that he either “jump[s] off the wall” or “isn’t awake.” And she
points to L.S. being the victim of bullying by other students, the school’s challenges in
handling his behavioral outbursts, and his disruptive behavior during class as further
evidence of his inability to properly care for himself.

Here, the Court acknowledges that the ALJ’s reasoning is somewhat tenebrous.
But that does not mean it was not based on substantial evidence. Again, “[a]n ALJ need
not rehash every detail each time he states conclusions on various subjects.” Gedatus,
994 F.3d at 903. Many of Plaintiff’s arguments criticizing the ALJ’s decision in this domain
rest on the same testimony she highlighted on the issue of L.S.’s ability to interact and
relate with others. And the Court has already explained why this testimony cannot carry

the day when viewed in the context of other record evidence that refutes the seriousness
or intensity of the challenges Plaintiff described.
Moreover, on the issue of L.S.’s ability to care for himself, the record offers
additional indications supporting the ALJ’s decision. As noted above, Dr. Suhre recorded
the following observations in October 2023, three months before the ALJ issued her
decision:

[L.S. consumes a] well-balanced diet, normal portions, appropriate dairy
intake, diet includes fruits, and diet includes vegetables. He reports regular
dental visits and brushes teeth 2 times/day. He reports has structured
bedtime routine, sleeps through the night, and no trouble getting up. He
reports normal bowel movement frequency and normal consistency. He
reports safe practices around pool & water, understanding of sun
protection, understands insect repellant, uses helmet for biking/scootering,
maintains adequate hydration, and understands conflict
resolution/violence prevention. He [] denies drug use, denies alcohol use,
and denies tobacco use. He reports no behavior problems, normal
transition, and normal attention span. . . . He reports gets regular exercise
and no family crises stressors.

These treatment notes strongly support the ALJ’s decision that L.S. did not have a marked
limitation in his ability to care for himself. Nor does the recency of Dr. Suhre’s notes
undermine their evidentiary value because they are consistent with Ms. Wagner’s
observation that L.S. had no problems taking care of personal hygiene, caring for physical
needs, and using good judgment regarding personal safety and dangerous
circumstances.
Again, the Court is not permitted to resolve the evidentiary conflict between
Plaintiff’s testimony and other record evidence that tells a different story. There is no
doubt that L.S. struggles behaviorally, emotionally, and physically. But the question is

not whether the record contains evidence supporting that finding—it does. The relevant
question is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that L.S.’s
limitations are less than marked. And on that question, the record reveals such evidence
too. Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination that L.S. had less than a marked limitation in
his ability to care for himself is supported by substantial evidence.
II. Whether the ALJ failed to fully develop the record.

Plaintiff also faults the ALJ for denying her claim for DIB based on an incomplete
record. This argument is unavailing because Plaintiff offered an affirmative
representation at the hearing that “[t]he record is complete.” It is well-settled that a
plaintiff may not wait until an appeal to raise an issue she finds meritorious; the failure
to raise it before the ALJ results in waiver. Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th

Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff’s argument also relies on pure speculation as to what the purportedly
missing records might say. She points to Ms. Wagner’s reference to L.S.’s 504 plan and
faults the ALJ for not obtaining a copy of it before rendering a decision. But Ms. Wagner’s
evaluation suggested that the “plan” would “help [L.S.] deal with his emotions.” (R. 220).

There is no indication to suggest that the plan would reveal information that would
undermine the ALJ’s decision and the evidence on which it rests. The same is true of Ms.
Wagner’s observation that L.S. visited the nurse 30 times. Neither Plaintiff’s brief, nor her
testimony at the hearing, offer any indication of why L.S. saw the nurse so often. And
even if Plaintiff could offer such evidence, to conclude that it would undermine the
validity of the ALJ’s conclusion requires speculative leaps that are not appropriate.

Accordingly, remand is not warranted based on the gaps in the record that
Plaintiff only identified on appeal.
III. Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of record.

Plaintiff’s final argument targets the ALJ’s evaluation of certain medical opinions
in the record. As the Court understands her argument, she criticizes the ALJ for not
sufficiently explaining her determination that the reports of Dr. Yakin and Dr. Hinchen
were “partially persuasive.” Drs. Yakin and Hinchen reached largely consistent
conclusions with respect to L.S.’s limitations, and the ALJ agreed with their findings in
the domains of acquiring/using information (less than marked) and health/physical
wellbeing (marked). (R. 20-21). But the ALJ disagreed with the conclusions of Dr. Yakin
and Dr. Hinchen that L.S. had no limitations in the domains of attending/completing

tasks, interacting/relating with others, and caring for himself. On these points, the ALJ
emphasized L.S.’s emotional struggles, his difficulty interacting with figures of authority,
and his struggles expressing anger and seeking attention. Thus, the ALJ found that L.S.
“experiences limitations, albeit less than marked limitations, in these areas.”
Plaintiff faults the ALJ for not sufficiently evaluating the “supportability” of the

opinions of Dr. Yakin and Dr. Hinchen. Supportability is one of the criteria that an ALJ
considers in determining the weight she will assign to a medical opinion. “The more
relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a
medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1).

But Plaintiff’s argument is fundamentally perplexing because the ALJ disagreed
with the conclusions of Dr. Yakin and Dr. Hinchen in the domains she contests. In effect,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not adequately considering the supportability of
these medical opinions. But the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that she gave no credence to
these opinions with respect to the domains that matter here. This means that the ALJ
effectively agreed with Plaintiff that the conclusions of Dr. Yakin and Dr. Hinchen

regarding L.S.’s ability to interact and relate with others and his ability to care for himself
were not sufficiently supported. Indeed, she said exactly that in her written decision. The
opinions of Drs. Yakin and Hinchen, according to the ALJ, were “inconsistent with the
record as a whole with regard to the assessments of no limitations in the areas of
attending/completing tasks, interacting/relating with others, and caring for self.”

Courts “will not remand a case to the ALJ for further explanation if we can predict
with great confidence that the result on remand would be the same.” Schomas v. Colvin,
732 F. 3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff has offered at best a procedural error in
the ALJ’s review, without explaining how this error led to an unfavorable outcome.
Considering the ALJ’s departure from the conclusion of Dr. Yakin and Dr. Hinchen that

L.S. had no limitations in his ability to interact and relate with others and in caring for
himself, the ALJ’s failure to examine the supportability of these opinions more fully
amounts to harmless error, if it amounts to an error at all. See Joan K. v. Saul, No. 19-2255,
2020 WL 6930515, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2020) (failure to resolve conflict between medical
opinions was harmless error). And for that reason, the Court can say with great
confidence that the result on remand would be the same, notwithstanding the ALJ's
purported failure to strictly follow 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff's
application for Disability Insurance Benefits is AFFIRMED, and this action is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner of
Social Security.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 31, 2026

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11309060. Public record. Not legal advice.