# Lamon

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308961

## Case

- **Full name:** Andrew Lamon v. R-4 Control Officer (Alina Bleisch)
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308961

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that courts may conduct these inquiries in either order

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANDREW LAMON #R16056, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:21-CV-01024-DWD
)
R-4 CONTROL OFFICER (ALINA )
BLEISCH), )
)
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant Alina Bleisch’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 122). Plaintiff Andrew Lamon (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief against Defendant
for the following claims: (1) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference for the delayed
response to chest his pain, and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the
reasons detailed below, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND1
The following facts are undisputed. On February 9, 2021, Plaintiff was an inmate
at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). On that day, Defendant Alina
Bleisch, who worked as a “pod officer”, was assigned to the control unit where Plaintiff
was housed. As a pod officer, she was responsible for monitoring the call lights and

1 Consistent with SDIL LR 56.1, the parties each submitted their respective “undisputed material facts” with their
briefing papers on the present motion. While the Defendant appropriately responded to the Plaintiff’s undisputed
material facts, Plaintiff did not reciprocate by “specifically disputing” the Defendant’s. Pursuant to SDIL LR 56.1, (g)
“all material facts set forth in the State of Material Facts or Statement of Additional Material Facts shall be deemed
admitted for the purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed”.
notifying the other officers if they needed to respond to a certain cell. Specifically, when
an inmate would “push” the emergency call button in his cell, a light would illuminate

on a board being monitored by the pod officer that would correspond to his cell number.
Around noon on February 9, 2021, the Plaintiff asserts that he began pushing the
emergency call button in his cell because he was experiencing chest pain and shortness
of breath. No response came in response. It was not until approximately 12:25 P.M. that
Plaintiff got the attention of Correctional Officer Crespi who stated that he discovered
Plaintiff suffering from chest pain and shortness of breath on his tour of the wing. There

is no testimony or other evidence indicating that Correctional Officer Crespi was
dispatched by Defendant to Plaintiff’s cell.
At 12:26 P.M., a call for medical emergency was made from Plaintiff’s cell house
and he was moved to the healthcare unit by 12:41 P.M. After initial treatments did not
relieve Plaintiff’s symptoms, an ambulance was called. Pinckneyville Ambulance Service

arrived at approximately 1:00 P.M. and began to treat Plaintiff and placed him in the
ambulance. The ambulance departed Pinckneyville with Plaintiff at 1:16 P.M.. Plaintiff
received care while in the ambulance enroute and arrived at SIH Memorial Hospital in
Carbondale at 1:47 P.M. (Doc. 122-1, P. 41) Plaintiff had suffered a heart attack. Id.
Defendant does not dispute that on February 9, 2021, “Plaintiff suffered from a serious

medical need, i.e. chest pain”. (Doc. 122, P.6)
Plaintiff claims that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical condition when she failed to respond to Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to summon
help during a 30 minute period of pushing the emergency call button. (Doc. 1, P. 10).
Defendant claims that she is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ claims
because she was not aware of any substantial risk of serious harm and, even assuming

Defendant was aware, Plaintiff cannot prove any alleged delay caused harm. (Doc. 122,
pg. 5-6)
APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In
determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most

favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary
judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge's function at summary
judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). However, a non-movant must do more than rest upon the allegations
made in the complaint to withstand summary judgment. See e.g., Gabrielle M. v. Park
Forest-Chi. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]o withstand
summary judgment, the non-movant...may not rely on vague, conclusory

allegations.”); see also, Liu v. T & H Mach., Inc., 191 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A party
must present more than mere speculation or conjecture to defeat a summary judgment
motion.”).
Generally, prison officials and correctional officers, violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct shows a deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs. Jones v. Mathews, 2 F.4th 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gutierrez
v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)); Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir.
2017) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must prove (1) an

objectively serious medical condition and (2) that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent
to the prisoner’s health or safety. Jones, 2 F.4th at 612 (citing Orlowski v. Milwaukee Cnty., 872
F.3d 417, 423 (7th Cir. 2017)); accord Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 694-95 (7th Cir. 2021);
Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 544-45 (7th Cir. 2019); Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 716
(7th Cir. 2019).
“A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment by acting with subjective
‘deliberate indifference’ to an inmate's ‘objectively serious’ medical condition.” Reck v.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 27 F.4th 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2022). In order to prevail on a claim
of deliberate indifference, a prisoner must satisfy a two-part test. See Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The first consideration is whether the
prisoner has an “objectively serious medical condition.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at
750; accord, Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). The second consideration is

if the prisoner has demonstrated subjective indifference to his situation. The plaintiff
need not show the individual “literally ignored” his complaints, but that the individual
was aware of the condition and either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v.
Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference involves “intentional or
reckless conduct, not mere negligence.” Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620).

In addition to refusing treatment or providing treatment that is inadequate, a
prison official may also be liable for deliberate indifference based on allegations that they
needlessly delayed treatment. To demonstrate that a delay caused a cognizable injury, an
inmate must show that the delay either exacerbated his injury or that it unnecessarily
prolonged the pain. Thomas v. Martija, 991 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2021). In cases where
prison officials delayed rather than denied treatment, the plaintiff must offer verifying

medical evidence that the delay (rather than the underlying condition) caused some
degree of harm. Id. at 749 (citing Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013)).

ANALYSIS
A. Deliberate Indifference and Defendant’s Lack of Knowledge

The thrust of Defendant’s motion is that “plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim
fails because Defendant Bleisch was not aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to
Plaintiff. (Doc. 122, P.6) Indeed, “[t]o be deliberately indifferent, the official must know
of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653
(7th Cir. 2005). In other words, to be held liable a correction officer must be shown to have

been subjectively aware of a risk of harm faced by the inmate. But the requirement that
she be aware of the existence of a risk does not mean that the correction officer must know
the specifics of the risk or appreciate the magnitude of the risk beyond it being
“substantial”.
In Velez v. Johnson, a pre-trial detainee was being assaulted by his cellmate.2 Velez
depressed an emergency call button repeatedly without response from Johnson, who was

manning the control center and was responsible for providing responses to emergency
calls. Due to the lack of response from Johnson, Velez was raped by his cellmate. Velez
claimed that Defendant Johnson ignored Velez’s assault when he did not respond to the
emergency call. Johnson claimed he could not have violated Velez’s constitutional right
for failure to respond because he was unaware that the assault was occurring. In
determining that Johnson did not enjoy qualified immunity the Court noted:

Johnson argues that he could not have violated Velez's constitutional rights
because he had no specific awareness that Zayas had a razor to Velez's
throat or that he was planning a rape. We disagree. Johnson did not have
to know the specifics of the danger to be culpable. Indeed, accepting
Johnson's position would essentially reward guards who put their heads in
the sand by making them immune from suit—the less a guard knows the
better. That view is inconsistent with Farmer. What matters is that Johnson
was aware of a serious risk of harm in some form, be it assault or the more
serious transgression that actually occurred.
Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 736 (C.A.7 (Wis.), 2005).
In this matter, it is not disputed that Defendant was not able to see Plaintiff’s cell
from inside the control unit. However, as the pod officer, Defendant was responsible for
monitoring call lights from cells. Defendant testified that the emergency call buttons from
cells are “constantly going off” due to inmates pushing them for other reasons, but that
if she notices a particular call button continued to go off, she would send an officer to that

2 “Velez, as we said, was a pretrial detainee at the time of the assault; therefore, his claim arises under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment. But as we have noted time and again, there is “little
practical difference between the two standards.” Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.2000). This is so
because it would be bizarre indeed to afford greater protection to a convicted prisoner than to a pretrial detainee.”
Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 735 (C.A.7 (Wis.), 2005).
particular cell. Defendant stated it was her procedure that once the call light was
illuminated by an inmate depressing his emergency call button she would clear it right

away, and if a light had been cleared two prior times she would notify another
correctional officer.
Plaintiff testified that he did not have any contact with Defendant on the day in
question. Plaintiff testified that he would only ever activate his call button when he had
a pass or if there was a medical emergency, otherwise he would have risked receiving a
disciplinary ticket. Plaintiff testified that “I don’t think [Defendant] intended to kill me. I

think she was overwhelmed, and she just didn’t see the alarm go off. That’s what I think.
She’s not a bad person. I never heard her do nothing to nobody or nothing like that. That
is just my opinion.” Plaintiff also stated that “I think that the woman is probably – she
was probably doing something that she shouldn’t have been doing and she just didn’t
see it. That is what I think, you know.” (Doc. 122-1, P. 11-12)

According to Plaintiff, he pushed the emergency call button repeatedly for 30
minutes before help arrived in the form of another correctional officer while on tour. If
functioning, the light corresponding to the Plaintiff’s cell should have illuminated the
board being monitored by the Defendant. If that is true, then the Defendant must have
either ignored the light or continually reset it, thereby ignoring the apparent urgency.

Defendant’s job required her to act as the gatekeeper of inmate’s self-reported
emergencies, not to simply disregard them. See Hardy v. Rabie, 147 F.4th 1156, 1166 (10th
Cir. 2025) (“A jail official exhibits deliberate indifference if he “knows that his role in a
particular medical emergency is solely to serve as a gatekeeper for other medical
personnel capable of treating the condition, and if he delays or refuses to fulfill that
gatekeeper role due to deliberate indifference[.]”)

The Plaintiff’s pushing of the emergency call button is a clear indication that an
emergency was occurring. At the same time, Defendant points to no reason for not
responding other than “the lights go off all the time” when inmates press the button for
non-emergencies. But the record is devoid of evidence of history of the Plaintiff pressing
the emergency button for reasons other than emergency.
Viewing the facts in a light favorable to the Plaintiff, material questions of fact

emerge that could reasonably support a jury finding Defendant deliberately indifferent.
B. Defendants Delay and Plaintiff’s Proof of Damages
Next the Defendant claims in a largely undeveloped argument that Plaintiff cannot

prove that the delay in responding to Plaintiff’s emergency call caused him harm.
Defendant then suggests that there is no evidence that the undisputed cardiac event and
subsequent surgery could have been avoided but for the delay. So, while the Defendant
does not dispute that Plaintiff’s condition constituted an objectively serious medical need,
she does dispute that her failure to respond to Plaintiff’s emergency calls caused him

harm. However, the possible lack of connection between Defendant’s delay in
responding and the cardiac event may address the total amount of damages in this case,
it does not necessarily deprive of the Plaintiff of his claim for other damages. Here, the
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered chest pain and shortness of breath during the period of
delay. He also relates that ambulance personnel almost immediately administered
morphine, a potent opioid analgesic employed for those in severe pain. Damages for pain
attributable to delay in treatment are recoverable. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has

recognized that pain associated with delay in treatment of even non-life-threatening may
support an Eighth Amendment claim. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d
816, 829 (7th Circ. 2009) (pain associated with the poorly placed intravenous needle for
several days despite inmate’s complaints of pain). See also Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d
1030, 1040 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that a complaint alleging that a prison nurse refused to
give pain medication prescribed by a physician stated a claim under the Eighth

Amendment); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830–32 (7th Cir.2007) (holding that a
prisoner's claim against a doctor survived dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A where the
prisoner was forced to wait two days for proper treatment of his severely injured finger,
leading to “permanent disfigurement, loss of range of motion, and the infliction of
unnecessary pain”). In contrast, however, minor pains cannot give rise to such a claim:

Deliberately to ignore a request for medical assistance has long been held
to be a form of cruel and unusual punishment ... but this is provided that
the illness or injury for which assistance is sought is sufficiently serious or
painful to make the refusal of assistance uncivilized.... A prison's medical
staff that refuses to dispense bromides for the sniffles or minor aches and
pains or a tiny scratch or a mild headache or minor fatigue—the sorts of
ailments for which many people who are not in prison do not seek medical
attention—does not by its refusal violate the Constitution.
Rodriguez, 577 F.3d 816, 829 (7th Circ. 2009)
Pain associated with a cardiac event suffered as a result of delay of half an hour
and so severe that medical professionals administered morphine, is not “minor” so as be
beyond the reach of Eighth Amendment. It is presumed that the Plaintiff will testify at
trial consistent with his deposition testimony regarding the extent, nature and length of
the pain he endured between his first emergency call and being discovered by

Correctional Officer Crespi. The damage value of Plaintiff’s pain will be for the jury to
determine. But whether the delay caused any medical harm beyond pain is not, in this case,
properly addressed in a motion for summary judgment. The record is not currently
sufficient. Defendant may, however, present for consideration via motion in limine
whether such evidence should be excluded.

C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s state-law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress fails because he has not presented sufficient facts from which a jury
could infer that the Defendant’s conduct was extreme, outrageous or intentional. (Doc.

122, P. 8)
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has three elements: (1) the
conduct involved was “truly extreme and outrageous,” (2) the defendant either intended
to inflict, or knew there was a high probability he would cause, severe emotional distress,
and (3) the defendant actually caused severe emotional distress. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798

N.E.2d 75, 80 (Ill. 2003). To support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
the conduct “must go beyond all bounds of decency and be considered intolerable in a
civilized community.” Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir. 2001); Campbell v. A.C.
Equip. Servs. Corp., 610 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). Rose v Snell, 2026 WL 672775,
at *6 (S.D.Ill., 2026)
The Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois Supreme Court has noted three factors
used to evaluate the alleged outrageousness of a defendant's conduct: “First, the more

power or control the defendant has over the plaintiff, the more likely the conduct will be
deemed extreme.” McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d 78 (1988). “Second, and in conjunction
with the first consideration, courts must consider whether the defendant reasonably
believed its objective was legitimate.” Id. at 810. Finally, courts must consider whether
the defendant was aware the plaintiff was “peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress,
by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity.” Id. at 811. The Illinois

Supreme Court also provided the following guidance: “We do not mean to imply that
these considerations are exclusive, however, nor do we mean to imply that any or all of
these factors are necessarily critical to a cause of action for [IIED].” Id. Franciski v.
University of Chicago Hospitals, 338 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Circ. 2003).
The first factor weighs heavily in favor of the Plaintiff on the issue of

outrageousness. Defendant was placed in the position of gatekeeper and overseer and
was cloaked with the authority and responsibility to address inmate emergency calls. The
decision-making power over whether to respond to an emergency call is significant, and
more so given that Plaintiff, as an inmate, had no ability to summon help for himself
through any other means. By the record, Defendant was the sole arbiter of whether help

would be summoned or whether the board of lights simply cleared with no response.
Consideration of the second factor must take into account that Defendant’s testimony
that she would clear a light twice without responding and, on the third call, notify the
officer assigned to that wing. (Doc. 123-1, p. 18). Seemingly, delaying response until an
inmate makes three calls is a questionable objective, particularly when the inmate has no
apparent history of making unnecessary emergency calls. As to the third factor, there is

no evidence to which either party points to suggest that the Defendant was aware that
Plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress. However, there is evidence in
the record that could support a finding of susceptibility. Indeed, it may be that
Defendant’s knowledge that Plaintiff, who was repeatedly pushing the emergency call
button while confined in his cell and while he was without other means to communicate
his medical emergency, faced circumstances that did make him peculiarly susceptible to

emotional distress. Considering each of these factors separately and as part of the whole,
the Court believes Defendant’s conduct could be determined to be extreme and
outrageous.
The Defendant also asserts that there is no evidence of intent and, as Plaintiff’s
testimony shows, Plaintiff does not believe that Defendant set out to injure him. But

recklessness or reckless disregard of the risk may also suffice to sustain a claim for
infliction of emotional distress. If the Defendant knew that there was a high probability
that her conduct would cause severe emotional distress the scienter element of the claim
is satisfied. See Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 180 Ill.Dec. 307, 317, 607 N.E.2d 201
(Ill.1992), citing McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d at 86, 127 Ill.Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, citing

Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill.2d 85, 90, 4 Ill.Dec. 652, 360 N.E.2d 765 (Ill.1976). In an
attempt to give a workable description of “reckless”, the Seventh Circuit has determined
that “ . . . in civil cases at common law it is enough that the risk, besides being serious
and eminently avoidable, is obvious; it need not be known to the defendant.” Slade v.
Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2012).

It may well be that Defendant did not have the plan to harm Plaintiff as he
admitted, but that does not address the question of whether her conduct was reckless in
the sense that she knew that ignoring the repeated emergency calls from the Plaintiff
would cause him severe emotional distress. And, behaving obtusely or turning a blind
eye to repeated calls does not help her. She need not have known the exact nature of the
emergency or that Plaintiff was suffering from a heart attack. It is enough that she knew

she was disregarding the 30 minutes of Plaintiff’s emergency calls. Illumination of the light
corresponding to Plaintiff’s cell should alert an attendant that there is a risk of an urgent
and possibly harmful situation that might be mitigated simply by responding. Under
these circumstances, a jury could reasonably find Defendant liable for infliction of
emotional distress.

D. Qualified Immunity
Defendant makes a brief argument that she is shielded from liability or civil
damages by qualified immunity. (Doc. 122, P. 9) Defendant further asserts she is entitled

to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields
government officials from liability for civil damages when “their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Although qualified immunity
is an affirmative defense, once a defendant invokes it, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
argue that it should not apply. Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2020). On
summary judgment, this court must decide (1) whether the facts that plaintiff has shown

make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was
“clearly established” at the time. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); see also id.
at 236 (holding that courts may conduct these inquiries in either order).
Defendant claims that she is entitled to the protections of qualified immunity
“because she acted based on her understanding of the law” and, “based on the current
status of the law, she would not have known her actions subject her to liability.” (Doc.

122, P. 10) She goes on to argue she “acted promptly and reasonably” to the calls for help.
Id. Plaintiff argues to the contrary and points the Court to the case of Velez v. Johnson, 395
F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2005).
As noted earlier, Velez was in a cell with another inmate who held a razor to
Plaintiff’s neck and threatened to cut him. Velez pushed an emergency call button

repeatedly. Johnson, the correctional officer in charge of directing responses, did not
respond. He argued that he was unaware that the assault was occurring. Plaintiff here
argues that the Velez Court found “that the failure to adequately respond to an inmate
pushing the emergency call light was a violation of an inmate’s established constitutional
right to be free from an officer’s deliberate indifference.” (Doc. 123, P. 11) That is not

exactly what the Court said. Rather, it stated “we believe it is plainly the right to be free
from deliberate indifference to rape and assault. There can be no debate that this right was
clearly established at the time.” Velez at 736. (emphasis added).
In the end, that distinction does not matter because Plaintiff has met the second
requirement of qualified immunity analysis — that the constitutional right be clearly
established. Still, before liability will attach, “[t]he contours of that right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Velez at 736 citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, (1987) There is
no doubt that at the time of the occurrence in this matter the law had long-recognized
that because “officials have taken away virtually all of a prisoner's ability to protect
himself, the Constitution imposes on officials the duty to protect those in their charge.”
Id. at 735. In any event, there is ample evidence in the record to suggest that Defendant
“acted with “deliberate indifference”, ie., that [s]he was subjectively aware, but
disregarded, a serious risk to [Plaintiff's] health or safety." Id. at 735, citing Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1003, (2003).
Clearly, the facts that have been developed here may make out a case for a
violation of a constitutional right. As noted earlier, Defendant was charged with the duty
to respond to emergency calls for help. In fact, her duty to protect against safety and
health risks fell peculiarly within her role and corresponding obligations as a pod officer.
She might not have known that Plaintiff was having a cardiac event but, following the
reasoning in Velez, qualified immunity does not attach just because the Defendant here
was not aware of the nature of the emergency or did not fully appreciate the seriousness
of Plaintiff's condition. His only course of action to give himself any measure of self-
protection was to push the emergency call button. The record suggests that Defendant
15

may have ignored the calls for help. Had she responded, she may have learned the true
level of Plaintiff’s urgency.

Based on the facts available to the Court, Defendant does not enjoy qualified
immunity from this action.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 122) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2026

/s/ David W. Dugan
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308961. Public record. Not legal advice.