# Huckabee

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308788

## Case

- **Full name:** John Huckabee v. Anthony Wills, Taylor (T.A.C.T. C/O), Heather Young, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., John Doe (T.A.C.T. C/O), B. Lloyd, C/O Baker, C/O Chandler, C/O Campbell, C/O Kitchen, Sandy L. Walker, Anthony B. Jones, C/O Hagene, C/O Dame, C/O Hoppenrath, C/O Hutson, B. Harriman, C/O Ridings, C/O Miller, Reva Engelage, Latoya Hughes, and John Doe 2 (Wexford Nurse)
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JOHN HUCKABEE, #M15075, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-00685-SMY
)
ANTHONY WILLS, )
TAYLOR (T.A.C.T. C/O), )
HEATHER YOUNG, )
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )
JOHN DOE (T.A.C.T. C/O), B. LLOYD, )
C/O BAKER, C/O CHANDLER, )
C/O CAMPBELL, C/O KITCHEN, )
SANDY L. WALKER, )
ANTHONY B. JONES, C/O HAGENE, )
C/O DAME, C/O HOPPENRATH, )
C/O HUTSON, B. HARRIMAN, )
C/O RIDINGS, C/O MILLER, )
REVA ENGELAGE, LATOYA HUGHES, )
and JOHN DOE 2 (Wexford Nurse), )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff John Huckabee, Jr. is a former inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”). After his release on parole, he filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights during his incarceration at Menard Correctional
Center. He claims he was subjected to excessive force, denied medical attention, and housed in
an unsanitary cell (Doc. 1). He seeks monetary damages (Doc. 1, p. 15).
Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this action. (Doc. 2).
Because Plaintiff was no longer incarcerated at the time he filed this case, his claims are not subject
to threshold review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. However, because he seeks IFP status, the Court
must review his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (e)(2).
A federal district court may allow an indigent plaintiff to proceed without prepayment of
fees based on an affidavit identifying the movant’s assets and demonstrating their inability to pay
the fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Here, based upon Plaintiff’s affidavit (Doc. 2), the Court is

satisfied that he is indigent. But the inquiry does not end there; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires
careful threshold scrutiny of a Complaint filed by an IFP plaintiff.
A court may deny a qualified plaintiff leave to file IFP and dismiss the case if the action is
clearly frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or is a claim for money damages against an
immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The test for determining if an action is frivolous
or without merit is whether the plaintiff can make a rational argument on the law or facts in support
of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241,
1247 (7th Cir. 1983).
An action fails to state a claim if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court

will deny leave to proceed IFP if it finds the case lacks merit under the criteria set forth in
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Lucien v. Roegner, 682 F.2d 625, 626 (7th Cir. 1982).
The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff and his
cellmate had a minor fight on December 26, 2024 in cell 9-19 at Menard (Doc. 1, p. 9). Unknown
correctional officers sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray. Two John Doe T.A.C.T. Officers
handcuffed Plaintiff and took him down the stairs.1 They rammed Plaintiff against a steel door
and one John Doe choked him and dragged him downstairs. They arrived outside the East Cell

1 Plaintiff lists only one John Doe T.A.C.T. Officer as a defendant (Doc. 1, p. 8), but his narrative alleges that two or
more unknown T.A.C.T. Officers assaulted him (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10).
House where another unknown officer joined the two John Does, and all three officers punched
Plaintiff in his head, neck, and ribs. They switched his handcuffs to the back and shackled his
ankles (Doc. 1, p. 10). Two John Doe T.A.C.T. Officers took Plaintiff to the Healthcare Unit,
choking and dragging him on the way.

Inside the examining room, Defendant Taylor and an unknown T.A.C.T. officer rammed
Plaintiff’s forehead, nose, and mouth into the concrete wall, causing him to bleed profusely, while
Defendant Lt. B. Lloyd and Defendant John Doe 2 (a male nurse) watched. Plaintiff begged Lloyd
and John Doe 2 to stop the beating, but they refused and laughed at him. Neither the John Doe 2
nurse nor the other defendants reported Plaintiff’s injuries (Doc. 1, p. 10). Defendant B. Harriman
also watched one of the beatings but did not intervene or get medical help (Doc. 1, p. 13).
Plaintiff’s injuries included a fractured shoulder, fractured skull, loose teeth, broken nose, and
nerve, vision, and lung damage (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).
Three officers took Plaintiff to the North 2, 6th floor segregation unit (Doc. 1, p. 10). They
manhandled Plaintiff and told him they could kill him and get away with murder.

Defendant Baker, the officer in charge of 2 Gallery, took Plaintiff to visit mental health.
Plaintiff showed his injuries to the unknown mental health worker and told her about the attack.
Despite saying she would report the matter to Internal Affairs for investigation, she failed to do so
and did nothing when Plaintiff asked for medical care (Doc. 1, p. 11). Baker made fun of the large
lump on Plaintiff’s forehead and refused Plaintiff’s request for medical care, saying the nurse
didn’t want to see him. Baker refused to disclose the nurse’s name.
On the way back to Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff asked Defendant Officers Chandler and
Campbell to help him get medical attention, but they did nothing.2 Plaintiff spent the next 21 days

2 Plaintiff alleges Chandler and Campbell know the name of an unknown T.A.C.T. officer who was present on
December 26, 2024 (Doc. 1, p. 11).
in his cell coughing up blood and in so much pain that he couldn’t get out of bed for two weeks.
He received no medical care and had no way to report the attack (Doc. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff informed
Defendants Kitchen, Hoppenrath, Dame, Miller, Hutson, Chandler, Hagene, Campbell, Ridings,
Jones, Wills, and Walker about the attack, but they refused to obtain medical care for him (Doc.

1, pp. 11-12). Defendant Nurse Engelage denied him medical attention (Doc. 1, p. 13).
From December 26, 2024 to March 14, 2025, Plaintiff was held in a cell covered with black
mold and friable asbestos, infested with insects, contaminated with rotten food, and lacking
running water (Doc. 1, p. 11). Officers refused to give Plaintiff cleaning supplies.3 Plaintiff signed
up for sick call several times during this period, but nurses didn’t believe he was attacked by the
officers and refused to help him (Doc. 1, p. 12).
Plaintiff filed Grievance No. K4-0125-0463 over the excessive force incident. Defendants
Nurse Reva Engelage, Counselor Heather Young, and Warden Wills reviewed the grievance but
refused to help Plaintiff (Doc. 1, p. 12). An investigation was begun on January 29, 2025 but no
results were reported to Plaintiff. Plaintiff wrote several times to Wills but got no response.

Defendant IDOC Director Hughes read Plaintiff’s grievance but took no action.
Plaintiff was released from IDOC custody on March 14, 2025 (Doc. 1, p. 12).
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in this
pro se action:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against the John Doe
(T.A.C.T. Officer) and Taylor for beating Plaintiff on December 26,
2024, and against Lloyd, John Doe 2 (nurse), and Harriman for
failing to intervene to stop the beating.

3 Plaintiff submitted several exhibits to his Complaint (Doc. 7), including a January 27, 2025 grievance reciting that
Plaintiff informed Defendants Baker, Hutson, Chandler, and Kitchen of the unsanitary cell conditions but they failed
to give him cleaning supplies (Doc. 7, pp. 1-2), and a February 16, 2025 grievance stating he notified Defendants
Young, Engelage, Kitchen, Hagene, Baker, Hutson, Miller, Hoppenrath, Dame, Jones, and Wills of the conditions
(Doc. 7, pp. 6-7).
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim against all defendants for failing to provide or obtain medical
care for Plaintiff for the injuries he suffered from the beating on
December 26, 2024.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against all defendants for housing
Plaintiff in an unsanitary cell from December 26, 2024 to March 14,
2025.

Count 4: Claim against all defendants for failing to investigate the alleged
excessive force incident of December 26, 2024 or discipline the
officers involved.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading
standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is
plausible on its face.”).
Discussion
Count 1
“Correctional officers violate the Eighth Amendment when they use force not in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34 (2010). Plaintiff’s allegations against the John Doe (T.A.C.T. Officer) and Taylor
state a viable excessive force claim for the alleged attacks on December 26, 2024. Plaintiff also
states a claim against Defendants Lloyd, Harriman, and the John Doe 2 nurse for allegedly
watching the beating and failing to intervene. See Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir.
2005).
Count 1 will proceed against the John Doe (T.A.C.T. Officer), Taylor, Lloyd, Harriman,
and the John Doe 2 nurse. However, Plaintiff must identify the John Doe Defendants so they may
be served with notice of the lawsuit.
Count 2
Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must
plead facts suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and (2)
the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. An objectively serious
condition includes a condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, or which
involves chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
A guard who uses excessive force on a prisoner has “a duty of prompt attention to any medical
need to which the beating might give rise[.]” Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference against the
John Doe (T.A.C.T. Officer), Taylor, Lloyd, Harriman, the John Doe 2 nurse, Baker, Kitchen,
Hoppenrath, Dame, Miller, Hutson, Chandler, Hagene, Campbell, Ridings, Jones, Wills, Walker,

and Engelage. However, he fails to state a claim in Count 2 against Young, Hughes, and Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”).
Plaintiff alleges Counselor Young and Director Hughes reviewed his grievances over the
alleged attack and his need for medical care, but does not claim they had personal involvement in
the events or that he communicated with them outside the grievance process to seek medical
attention. To be held liable in a § 1983 action, a defendant must have been personally responsible
for a constitutional violation. An official who merely reviews a grievance or appeal cannot be
liable for the conduct forming the basis of the grievance. Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th
Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Young and Hughes will be dismissed from Count 2 without prejudice.
Defendant Wexford is a corporation that employed medical providers at the prison when
Plaintiff’s claims arose. A corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had
a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. Woodward v. Corr.
Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc.,

300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though it were a municipal
entity in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff does not allege he was denied medical care due to a Wexford
policy or practice. Therefore, Wexford will be dismissed without prejudice from Count 2.
Count 3
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for unsanitary conditions of confinement, Plaintiff
must plead facts suggesting he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,”
creating an excessive risk to his health or safety (the objective element). Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). He must also sufficiently
plead the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the
inmate, despite the defendant’s knowledge of the bad conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842.

For a defendant to be personally liable under § 1983, the individual “must have caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810
(7th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded an Eighth Amendment claim against the individuals he
allegedly told about the unsanitary and unsafe cell conditions and who took no action. Thus, Count
3 will proceed against Wills, Young, Baker, Chandler, Kitchen, Jones, Hagene, Dame,
Hoppenrath, Hutson, Miller, and Engelage. However, Defendants Taylor, Wexford, John Doe
(T.A.C.T. C/O), Lloyd, Campbell, Walker, Harriman, Ridings, Hughes, and John Doe 2 (Nurse)
will be dismissed without prejudice from Count 3.
Count 4
Prison officials incur no liability under § 1983 if they fail or refuse to investigate a
prisoner’s complaints or grievances. See Watson v. Dodd, No. 16-CV-1217-NJR, 2017 WL
120951, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2017); Wilkins v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr. No. 8-cv-732-JPG, 2009

WL 1904414, at *9 (S.D. Ill. July 1, 2009). Count 4 will therefore be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff raises claims against some defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their individual
capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068,
1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the official capacity claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Unknown/John/Jane Doe Defendants
Plaintiff is responsible for securing information aimed at identifying the
Unknown/John/Jane Doe Defendants, in accordance with the John/Jane Doe Identification Order

that will be entered separately. Once the names of the unknown defendants are obtained, Plaintiff
must file a motion to substitute the newly identified defendants in place of the generic designations
in the case caption and throughout the Complaint. Defendant Wills, as Warden of Menard
Correctional Center, will remain as a defendant in his official capacity for the purpose of
responding to Plaintiff’s requests for information regarding the identity of the Unknown
Defendants.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 9) seeks to remove the undersigned from presiding over this case.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge should recuse herself in two situations: (1) recusal is mandatory
in any proceeding in which the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a); and (2) recusal is expected when any of the five statutorily prescribed criteria can be
shown to exist, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)-(5). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate either basis. Nor has
he sufficiently alleged bias or prejudice to justify recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144. The required

merit review Plaintiff seeks has been completed as reflected herein.
Disposition
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. The Motion to Recuse (Doc.
9) is DENIED.
The Complaint states colorable claims in Count 1 against the John Doe (T.A.C.T. Officer),
Taylor, Lloyd, Harriman, and the John Doe 2 nurse; in Count 2 against the John Doe (T.A.C.T.
Officer), Taylor, Lloyd, Harriman, the John Doe 2 nurse, Baker, Kitchen, Hoppenrath, Dame,
Miller, Hutson, Chandler, Hagene, Campbell, Ridings, Jones, Wills, Walker, and Engelage; and in
Count 3 against Wills, Young, Baker, Chandler, Kitchen, Jones, Hagene, Dame, Hoppenrath,
Hutson, Miller, and Engelage. Count 4, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Latoya Hughes are

DISMISSED from the action without prejudice.
The Clerk shall prepare for Anthony Wills (individual and official capacity), Taylor
(T.A.C.T. C/O) Heather Young, B. Lloyd, C/O Baker, C/O Chandler, C/O Campbell, C/O Kitchen,
Sandy L. Walker, Anthony B. Jones, C/O Hagene, C/O Dame, C/O Hoppenrath, C/O Hutson, B.
Harriman, C/O Ridings, C/O Miller, and Reva Engelage: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and
Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to
sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the
date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the
Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the
extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 30, 2026
s/ Staci M. Yandle_____
STACI M. YANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve
them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants will enter an
appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date
of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days
or more. When Defendants have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order
containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308788. Public record. Not legal advice.