# Madaio

> District Court, S.D. Florida · March 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308760

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher J. Madaio v. United States of America
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308760

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that courts must read statutory provisions “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme” (cleaned up)
- discussing the general reference canon and recognizing that, “[o]f course, statutes may sometimes refer to an external source of law and fairly warn readers that they must abide that external source of law, later amendments and modifications included”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-20300-RAR

CHRISTOPHER J. MADAIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.
_____________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant United States of America’s Motion
to Dismiss (“MTD”), [ECF No. 51]. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff, Christopher J.
Madaio’s pro se “[Amended] Civil Action with Respect to Violations of the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980” (“Amended Complaint”), [ECF No. 19]. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant violated his rights “in seizing all [his] work product materials and other documents”
at Miami International Airport on July 11, 2024, which, he claims, entitles him to damages under
the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. Am. Compl. at 1 (cleaned up). After careful
review of the governing law, the record, the parties’ arguments, and being otherwise fully advised,
the MTD is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
Plaintiff describes himself as an experienced “published photographer,” one whose
“original photos” appeared in a photobook titled Il Ritrato Giovanile, which sold 500 copies. Am.
Compl. at 4. He says that “several articles [have been] published on himself” and that his work
has been featured in “many photo exhibitions,” both in the United States and abroad. Id. But
Plaintiff’s career has not unfolded without incident. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) discovered 691 images classified as child pornography on his personal computers. See
Madaio v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV-06-BE-00904, 2008 WL 11392887, at *2 (N.D.

Ala. Mar. 31, 2008). Two years later, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to possessing and knowingly
receiving material containing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and
2252A(a)(2)(A), and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. See id.; see also Am. Compl.
at 5.
Nearly two decades later, Plaintiff attempted to rebuild both his career and his finances.
By June 2023, he had returned to Alabama, where his “financial situation worsened” over the
following year. Am. Compl. at 5. In March 2024, he “was contacted by an entrepreneur,” Brandon
Bello, who “offer[ed] to purchase [the] exclusive rights to all [of Plaintiff’s] photos” with the aim
of publishing and selling two photobooks. Id. After several months of discussions, the two entered
into “a contractual agreement.” Id. at 6. Under that agreement, Plaintiff “would work for an

indeterminate time as an engineer at [ ] Bello’s biofuel plant near Yopal, Colombia,” while also
delivering his photographic archive—“all his personal/scanned photos[ ] taken over the past fifty-
five years”—to facilitate “a final selection of photos” and “setting out a suitable layout of the two
photobooks.” Id. To that end, Plaintiff traveled with “a separate USB flashdrive containing photo
and contractual info[rmation] pertaining to the proposed photobooks.” Id.
The trip did not unfold as planned. Plaintiff never made it beyond Bogotá Airport.
Colombian authorities allegedly “denied [him] entry to Colombia,” and he “was immediately
returned on the next available flight to Miami International Airport[.]” Id. Upon his arrival in
Miami on July 11, 2024, Plaintiff claims that “U.S. Customs officials and agents from the
Dep[artment] of Homeland Security proceed[ed] to seize indiscriminately all of [his] digital
media,” including materials he says were necessary “to complete his contractual obligations[.]”
Id. at 6–7. Plaintiff returned to Alabama by September 20, 2024; there, he was arrested and later
denied bond. See id. at 7. He alleges that, as a result of the “search and seizure, arrest, and

continual incarceration [without] bond[,]” he “cannot fulfill his contractual obligations as a
publisher/published photographer” and that it is “unlikely he[ ] [will] be able to work as such in
the future.” Id.
II. Screening
On July 7, 2025, the Court screened Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. See Order Screening Amended Complaint, [ECF No. 21]. Plaintiff cleared the Act’s
threshold requirements at the pleading stage. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa(a), (b). He alleged that a
government officer conducted a search or seizure tied to a criminal investigation. See id.; see also
Am. Compl. at 2 (asserting that DHS officer Kenny Silva’s “primary responsibility” was the
“search and seizure of all Plaintiff’s digital media at Miami International Airport on the 11th of

July, 2024”). The seized materials fell within the Act’s definition of “documentary materials,” as
Plaintiff said officials “seize[d] indiscriminately all of [his] digital media,” including a “selection”
of photographs “taken over . . . [fifty-five] years.” Id. at 6 (cleaned up); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000aa-7(a).
He also alleged that he possessed those materials “in connection with a purpose to
disseminate [them] to the public” through a photobook or similar medium affecting interstate or
foreign commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b). And the Amended Complaint tied that purpose to a
publishing arrangement, asserting that the “search and seizure . . . means [Plaintiff] cannot fulfill
his contractual obligations as a publisher/published photographer[,]” and that his ability to work
in that capacity was in doubt. Am. Compl. at 7; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b). The Court
therefore found that Plaintiff plausibly stated a claim against the United States under the Privacy
Protection Act. See generally Order Screening Amended Complaint.
III. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

The Government advances several grounds for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). To start, it invokes the Act’s suspect exception, arguing that “the [Act] does
not apply when the materials are seized from a criminal suspect and the materials relate to the
crime,” and that Plaintiff “fails to state a claim under the PPA because he is the criminal suspect
and the materials seized related to the crime.” MTD at 1–2 (referencing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa(a)(1),
(b)(1)). It emphasizes that agents discovered “suspected child sexual abuse material (CSAM)”
during the border search and that forensic review revealed “over one thousand (1,000) images of
suspected child pornography”—facts that it says establish probable cause and bring Plaintiff’s case
squarely within the exception. Id. at 4–5. The Government also stresses that the Act protects
“innocent third parties,” not individuals “suspected of committing the crime under investigation,”

and that Plaintiff’s status as a suspect forecloses relief. Id. at 7–8.
Further, the Government relies on the border exception, arguing that the statute expressly
does “not impair or affect the ability of a government official or employee . . . to conduct searches
and seizures at the borders,” and that Plaintiff admits the seizure occurred while he was reentering
the United States. Id. at 9–10 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5). It also characterizes Plaintiff’s
allegations of government orchestration as “vague and conclusory” and “implausible,” noting his
failure to plead supporting facts or raise such claims in his criminal case. Id. at 10–11. Finally,
the Government adds that most of Plaintiff’s seized devices were forfeited following Plaintiff’s
conviction, further undermining any viable claim under the Act. Id. at 9.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint,
and the plaintiff receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts
alleged. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a “judgment on the merits”
and is “presumed to operate as a dismissal with prejudice unless the district court specifies
otherwise.” Eiber Radiology, Inc. v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 673 F. App’x 925, 929 (11th
Cir. 2016) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001)).
A court considering a 12(b)(6) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the
complaint and attached exhibits—but may also consider documents referred to in the complaint

that are central to the claim and whose authenticity is undisputed. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons,
Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). While the court is required to accept as true all allegations
contained in the complaint, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) is not appropriate unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d
1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation omitted). And “determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th
1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
ANALYSIS
As explained herein, Plaintiff’s claim under the Privacy Protection Act is barred by the

Act’s “border exception,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5. Accordingly, the Court need not address the
Government’s remaining arguments.1
I. The Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq.
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (“PPA”) generally prohibits government officials, in
connection with a criminal investigation, from searching for or seizing certain materials held by a
person “reasonably believed” to intend to disseminate information to the public. 42 U.S.C. §

1 Alternatively, the Court grants the MTD by default. This District’s Local Rules required Plaintiff to “file
and serve an opposing memorandum of law no later than fourteen (14) days after service” of the MTD.
S.D. FLA. L.R. 7.1(c)(1). Defendant filed the MTD on January 23, 2026, meaning that Plaintiff’s Response
was due on February 6, 2026. On February 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file
a response—reflecting his awareness that the MTD had been filed against him—which the Court granted,
extending his deadline to March 4, 2026. See Motion for Extension of Time, [ECF No. 54]; see also
Omnibus Paperless Order, [ECF No. 55]. Though Plaintiff claimed not to have received the MTD,
Defendant certified that it sent the MTD to the same facility at which Plaintiff was confined when he filed
his Motion for Extension of Time. See MTD at 12; see also Motion for Extension of Time at 1. In any
event, although the Court granted his request for an extension, Plaintiff still failed to file his Response or
request additional time to do so, and, as Plaintiff further failed to file any Notice of Address Change on the
docket within seven days of an address change, the Court’s order was properly served. See generally
Docket; see also S.D. FLA. L.R. 11.1(g).
Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to oppose Defendant’s MTD “may be deemed sufficient cause for granting
the [MTD] by default.” S.D. FLA. L.R. 7.1(c)(1). At the very least, he has waived any objection thereto
and has abandoned his claims against Defendant. See Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v.
City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The . . . failure to brief and argue this issue during
the proceedings before the district court is grounds for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”);
Fawcett v. Carnival Corp., 682 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1112 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (recognizing that “[t]he failure to
respond to arguments regarding claims addressed in a motion to dismiss is sufficient basis to dismiss such
claims as abandoned or by default” (citations omitted)); see also Claiborne v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, No. 22-13676, 2024 WL 65398, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024) (recognizing that “pro se litigants are
nevertheless required to follow procedural rules” (citing Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir.
2007))). Nevertheless, the Court will adjudicate the MTD, mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status and “the
strong preference that cases be heard on their merits.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1342
(11th Cir. 2014).
2000aa. The Act provides that “a person aggrieved by a search for or seizure of materials in
violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action for damages for such search or
seizure . . . against the United States[,] which shall be liable for violations of this chapter by their
officers or employees while acting within the scope or under color of their office or

employment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(a)(1) (alterations added).
Congress enacted the Act to reinforce the First and Fourth Amendment interests implicated
when the government conducts a “search and seizure of evidence belonging to those not under
investigation.” Henriquez v. Ga. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 21-12567, 2023 WL 4624473, at *10
(11th Cir. July 19, 2023); see also id. (“The purpose behind the PPA, as set forth in the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary’s report, was to afford additional statutory protection to the First and
Fourth Amendment rights of the press and related groups.” (citing S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 4–5));
see also Times Publ’g Co. v. United States, No. 23-MC-0014, 2023 WL 7411463, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 22, 2023); Madaio v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV-06-BE-00904, 2008 WL
11392887, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008) (“The [PPA] was intended to discourage law

enforcement officers from targeting publishers simply because they often gathered ‘mere
evidence’ of crime.” (alteration added)).
The catalyst for the Act, according to legislative history, was the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), which upheld a search of a
newspaper’s offices despite the obvious First Amendment concerns presented. See S. Rep. No.
96-874, at 4–5. In so holding, the Court declined to impose any constitutional requirement under
the Fourth Amendment that law enforcement proceed by subpoena or provide advance notice
before searching the press. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567 (“[W]e decline to reinterpret the [Fourth]
Amendment to impose a general constitutional barrier against warrants to search newspaper
premises, to require resort to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand prior notice and hearing in
connection with the issuance of search warrants.”). The Act, therefore, reflects Congress’s
response by extending statutory free-speech protections in the search-and-seizure context where
the Constitution, as explained in Zurcher, does not.

The Act draws distinctions between two protected categories of materials subject to search
and seizure. It first safeguards “work product materials,” meaning those materials “prepared,
produced, authored, or created” “in anticipation of communicating such materials to the public”;
which are “possessed for the purposes of communicating such materials to the public”; and which
“include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of the person who prepared,
produced, authored, or created such material.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(b)(1)–(3). Separately, the
Act protects “documentary materials,” which it defines broadly to include “written or printed
materials, photographs, motion picture films, negatives, video tapes, audio tapes, and other” forms
of “mechanically, magnetically, or electronically recorded cards, tapes, or discs.” Id. § 2000aa-
7(a). Drawing a clear boundary, the Act provides that neither “work product materials” nor

“documentary materials” includes “contraband or the fruits of a crime or things otherwise
criminally possessed.” Id. § 2000aa-7(a)–(b). In this way, the Act protects both the process and
the inputs of public communication, while preserving the government’s authority to seize
inherently unlawful items.
Consistent with that framework, the Act channels law enforcement toward means less
intrusive than a traditional search and seizure—for instance, by use of a subpoena duces tecum for
certain protected materials. See id. § 2000aa(b)(3), (b)(4) (contemplating “subpoena duces tecum”
procedures as a default mechanism for producing “other documents”). But this prohibition isn’t
categorical. The Act permits searches or seizures in limited circumstances, including where: (1)
as for all protected materials, there is probable cause to believe that the possessor “has committed
or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials relate”;2 (2) as for all protected
materials, “immediate seizure is necessary to prevent” death or serious bodily injury; (3) as for
“other documents,” notice by subpoena would risk the “destruction, alteration, or concealment” of

the materials; or (4) as for “other documents,” the materials have not been produced despite a court
order enforcing a subpoena, and where either “all appellate remedies have been exhausted” or
further delay would “threaten the interests of justice.” Id. § 2000aa(a)–(b).
Of particular relevance to this case is another exception to the Act’s prohibitions—the
“border exception”—which reads as follows:
This chapter shall not impair or affect the ability of a government
officer or employee, pursuant to otherwise applicable law, to
conduct searches and seizures at the borders of, or at international
points of, entry into the United States in order to enforce the customs
laws of the United States.

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5.
The Court is unaware of any precedent, binding or otherwise, on the border exception’s
scope, and secondary sources seem to disagree on whether it applies to all border searches and
seizures or only those conducted to enforce customs laws. Compare, e.g., ANDREW B. SWERIN,
THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT, INFO. SECURITY & PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO FED & STATE LAW &
COMPLIANCE § 27:59 (speaking of the Act, “[t]his law explicitly does not apply in any way to
searches at any border of the United States” (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa-5)), with Cope et al.,

2 This exception contains its own caveat, such that even where the materials relate to the criminal offense,
an officer nevertheless “may not search for or seize such materials . . . if the offense to which the materials
relate consists of the receipt, possession, communication, or withholding of such materials or the
information contained therein.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1) (emphasis added). This caveat is
inapplicable where the offense falls under any one of the statutorily listed offense categories, such as
“national defense,” “classified information,” or “the sexual exploitation of children,” id. §§ 2000aa(a)(1),
(b)(1)—meaning that an officer can search for and seize the subject materials provided they satisfy the
suspect exception.
Digital Privacy at the U.S. Border: Protecting the Data on Your Devices and in the Cloud,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, at 29 n.47, Mar. 8, 2017,
https://www.eff.org/files/2017/03/10/digital-privacy-border-2017-guide3.10.17.pdf (“While the
statute exempts border searches for the purpose of enforcing the customs laws, it does not exempt

border searches for other purposes.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5)), and Scott Memmel, Crossing
Constitutional Boundaries: Searches and Seizures of Electronic Devices at U.S. Borders, 25
COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 49 (2020) (“EFF noted, however, that the exemption only applies to the
enforcement of customs laws, rather than exempting border searches for other purposes,
suggesting that the statute may still be a viable defense for journalists against warrantless searches
and seizures of their electronic devices at U.S. borders.” (citing Cope et al., supra)).
II. The Privacy Protection Act’s “Border Exception” Bars Plaintiff’s Claim
The parties dispute whether the Act’s border exception bars Plaintiff’s damages claim.
Plaintiff insists that the exception “do[es] not apply here” because, he says, the Government
planted “a ‘questionable’ photo . . . from a remote location on his smartphone, contact[ed]

Colombian officials beforehand to have [it] sent to Miami International without delay, and
alert[ed] U.S. Customs to be ready.”3 Am. Compl. at 8. The Government thereby “forc[ed] him
to Miami International, where the search and seizure by U.S. Customs couldn’t be avoided.” Id.
He thus maintains that he was “intentionally maneuvered into a situation, against his will, where
he would be deprived of the protections afforded to him under the [Fourth] Amendment to the U.S.

3 A plaintiff is not permitted to advance legal arguments in their complaint. But given Plaintiff’s pro se
status, the lack of a response, and the need to reach the merits, the Court will consider those facts that
Plaintiff says bear on whether the border exception applies to him. In doing so, the Court keeps in mind
that its review “is not limited to whatever legal pronouncements that [Plaintiff] makes,” Roberts v. McBrier,
No. 22-CV-0191, 2023 WL 11969956, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2023), and that it may only “exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of the factual circumstances involved,” Helms v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d 149, 150 (5th
Cir. 1966).
Constitution.” Id. at 9. The Government responds that these allegations are “implausible” and
that, regardless, the Act’s border exception “applies in this case.” MTD at 11. In its view, Plaintiff
voluntarily “le[ft] the country with criminal materials” and “return[ed] with those materials,”
placing him squarely within the exception. Id. The Government adds that it “must be able to

search persons and property attempting to enter—or reenter—the United States to ensure that the
person is not transporting visual depictions involving the sexual exploitation of minors.” Id.
These competing positions present a question no other court appears to have addressed:
What does it mean for a government officer to conduct a search or seizure “in order to enforce the
customs laws of the United States” under § 2000aa-5? Does the provision extend to all searches
and seizures at the border, or is it limited by whether the search is undertaken, intentionally or
otherwise, for a specific law-enforcement purpose? For the reasons that follow, the Court
concludes that the border exception bars Plaintiff’s claim.
To begin, some points are straightforward. No one disagrees that Plaintiff was subjected
to a “search” or “seizure” carried out by a “government officer or employee” within the meaning
of the Act. And Miami International Airport—where the materials4 were allegedly seized—

qualifies as an “international point[ ] of[ ] entry into the United States[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5.
The parties’ arguments, however, bring into focus the clause “in order to enforce the customs laws
of the United States”—and, in particular, the phrase “in order to enforce.” Plaintiff’s theory rests
on the Government’s alleged subjective motive in orchestrating his presence at the border, while
the Government’s view rests on its asserted law-enforcement purpose of the search. Therefore,

4 The Court assumes, and the parties do not dispute, that Plaintiff’s seized digital photographs constitute
“documentary materials” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(a), which explicitly lists
“photographs” as a form of “documentary materials.”
while neither party has framed the issue in these terms, resolving the meaning of that clause is
dispositive here.
To interpret the meaning of “in order to enforce the customs laws of the United States,”
the Court begins with the plain text. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“As

with any question of statutory interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain language of the
statute.” (citing Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004))); BellSouth
Telecomm’ns, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001) (“When
interpreting a statute, ‘it is axiomatic that a court must begin with the plain language of the
statute.’” (quoting United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000))). “And [courts]
interpret the words of a statute based on their meaning at the time of enactment.” Regions Bank v.
Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586
U.S. 105 (2019)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 7, at 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning they had
when the text was adopted.”).

At the outset, the Court observes that § 2000aa-5 likely does not sweep in all searches and
seizures at the border. If it did, the provision would end after “entry into the United States[.]” But
it does not. Instead, it continues, appearing to confine the exception to those searches and seizures
conducted “in order to enforce the customs laws of the United States.” Reading the provision to
cover all border activity would strip that limiting phrase of any work to do. And “[a]bsent clear
evidence that Congress intended this surplusage,” the Court “is ‘obligated to give effect, if
possible, to every word Congress used.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 128
(2018) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)).
Beginning with the phrase “in order to,” its ordinary meaning—both before and after
1980—is one that “express[es] purpose: so as to do or achieve” an “end or outcome.” OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (last visited Mar. 26, 2026), https://www.oed.com/dictionary/order_n?
tab=meaning_and_use#33290604 (collecting uses of the phrase “in order to” from 1609 to 1994);

see also Oilfield Equip. Mktg., Inc. v. New Tech Sys., Inc., No. MO-02-CA-183, 2005 WL
6258387, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2005) (recognizing that “in order to” means “for the purpose
of; as a means to” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 227 F. App’x 925 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, before
and after the Act’s enactment, “to enforce” was understood to mean “to compel obedience to.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (5th ed. 1979); see also Schnell v. State Farm Lloyds, 98 F.4th
150, 157 (5th Cir. 2024) (“To ‘enforce’ means ‘[t]o give force or effect to (a law, etc.); to compel
obedience to.’” (listing sources)). Taken together, the phrase “in order to enforce” denotes action
undertaken with the aim of giving effect to law—that is, conduct carried out for the purpose of
compelling compliance with the “customs laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5.
Nothing in this construction suggests that the Court must look at the searching officer’s

subjective motives. But Plaintiff sees it differently: he contends that the border exception cannot
apply in his case because the Government conducted a search at an international port of entry that
it knew it could not perform elsewhere, rendering any asserted border-related purpose pretextual.
But even if § 2000aa-5’s plain text supported Plaintiff’s reading, its broader context does not. See
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (recognizing that courts must read statutory provisions
“in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme” (cleaned up)).
The phrase “in order to” as written in § 2000aa-5 modifies the act of conducting “searches
and seizures”5—three words plainly drawn from the Fourth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. AMEND

5 It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that a qualifying phrase refers solely to its immediate
antecedent.” Nat'l Coal. For Students With Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283,
IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). Congress’s “choice to follow the
[Fourth] Amendment’s terminology is most naturally read as carrying the meaning of the
constitutional terms into the statute.” Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 358 (2000)

(Souter, J., concurring in part) (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945 (1988) (“By
employing the constitutional language, Congress apparently was focusing on the prohibition of
comparable conditions.”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here
Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of
centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”)). Given this express language,
combined with the events leading up to the Act’s enactment, the Court treats the Act as a
codification of traditional Fourth Amendment principles. See Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d
1350, 1359 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (Bright, J., concurring) (speaking of the Privacy Protection Act,

“[t]he language of the statute implies that the Act was intended to be a statutory extension of the
Fourth Amendment” (citation omitted)).
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s subjective motivation is not relevant to the
legality of a search or to whether a search has occurred. It is well settled that “the fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the
legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138

288 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Though not immediately preceding “in order to,” it is
nevertheless unambiguous that “to conduct searches and seizures” is the antecedent phrase that it modifies;
in other words, the border exception applies only to those searches and seizures conducted “in order to
enforce” the United States customs laws.
(1978); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 9.2(e) (5th ed. 2014) (stating that it “is irrelevant” whether the officers possessed
an uncommunicated intention to make a full-fledged arrest (footnotes omitted)). In short, the
Fourth Amendment adopts an objective framework: what matters is what the officer did, not what

the officer thought.
That objective framework is at its apex at the border. “Routine searches of the persons and
effects of entrants (at the border) are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or warrant.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)
(emphasis added). Indeed, “a secondary customs search following the initial inspection is proper
even absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Oluigbo-Bernards, 638
F. App’x 868, 871 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th
Cir. 1988)). To be sure, the legality of border searches is governed by a “reasonableness
requirement . . . which adjusts the strength of suspicion required for a particular search to the
intrusiveness of that search.” United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1984).

But that standard, too, is objective, and, relevantly, facts leading up to the search—besides that it
occurred at the border—usually do not play a role in the analysis. See United States v. Touset, 890
F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Ordinarily, searches at the border are reasonable without
suspicion ‘simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.’” (quoting United States v.
Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728 (11th Cir. 2010))).
This doctrinal backdrop governs the Court’s reading of “in order to,” which must be read
in light of what it modifies—conducting “searches and seizures.” In this light, Plaintiff’s effort to
inject subjectivity would narrow the constitutionally permitted scope of searches and seizures in a
way that § 2000aa-5 cannot bear. As explained, at the border, and elsewhere, the officer’s
subjective impressions do not determine whether a search or seizure is valid. Although “nothing
prevents Congress from enacting laws that provide greater protections” than the Constitution
requires, Touset, 890 F.3d at 1236—and the Act embodies that principle—§ 2000aa-5 contains no
indication that Congress intended to abandon the objective framework governing searches and

seizures.
The purpose of the Act’s border exception buttresses the Court’s conclusion, and “[courts]
must favor the ‘textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs’ the statute’s
purposes.” United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1256 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting SCALIA &
GARNER, § 4, at 63). The border exception is one of the Act’s several provisions in which
“Congress took pains to limit the [Privacy Protection] Act’s chilling effect on law enforcement.”
Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355 n.8. Plaintiff’s reading would have that effect. Officers at the border
have long relied on an objective reasonableness standard that permits searches regardless of any
quantum of suspicion or improper state of mind. The Court thus reads “in order to enforce” as an
objective, purpose-based limitation that covers only those searches and seizures that are

objectively undertaken to enforce the customs laws.
That conclusion raises the next question: what are “the customs laws of the United States”
within the meaning of § 2000aa-5? The Government contends that § 2000aa-5 bars Plaintiff’s
claim because, through the search and seizure, it was advancing its interest in ensuring that
someone was “not transporting” into the country “visual depictions involving the sexual
exploitation of minors.” MTD at 11. But based on Plaintiff’s well-pled allegations, to which the
Court must apply the exception, it remains unclear what DHS agents were looking for with any
specificity, other than that they seized all of Plaintiff’s “digital media.” Am. Compl. at 6–7. The
Government would nevertheless be correct if a search and seizure that is conducted to prevent a
person from transporting digital contraband, such as the depictions it describes, falls under the
“customs laws of the United States” within the meaning of the Act.
Again, the Court starts with the plain text. The Act does not define “customs laws of the
United States.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq. Although the phrase “customs laws of the United

States” appears across various statutes, Congress has defined the phrase merely twice within the
last twenty-six years. In 2000, Congress passed the Dog and Cat Protection Act, which introduced
a new section in the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibiting the importation, exportation, sale, manufacture,
offer for sale, transportation, and distribution in the United States of products made with dog and
cat fur. See 19 U.S.C. § 1308(b)(1). In that section, “customs laws of the United States” was
defined as “any other law or regulation enforced or administered by the United States Customs
Service.” Id. § 1308(a)(3). Eight years later, Congress enacted the Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act of 2008, which added a new subtitle to the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to imports
of softwood lumber. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1683–1683(g). That subtitle defines “customs laws of the
United States” as “any law or regulation enforced or administered by U.S. Customs and Border

Protection.” Id. § 1683(3). History can explain the difference between these two definitions.
Before 2003, the United States Customs Service was a bureau within the Department of the
Treasury; however, it was reorganized as the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security upon passage of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002.6 See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1502 (2002).

6 Before the U.S. Customs Service was reorganized, customs agents and immigration inspectors had distinct
roles and powers. As the Eighth Circuit once explained, immigration inspectors, acting under the
immigration laws, “[did] not have the authority to search bags, containers, or compartments too small to
conceal persons.” United States v. Popow, 821 F.2d 483, 487 (8th Cir. 1987). That authority instead
belonged to customs officers. But the two roles could overlap through formal designation: by “proper
delegations,” an immigration inspector could be designated to perform the duties of a customs inspector by
the Secretary of the Treasury, such that “any officer of the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury
Department . . . or any agent or other person authorized by law or designated by the Secretary of the
But § 2000aa-5 was enacted in 1980 and has not been amended since. What, then, can the
Court do with these later definitions? It is well settled that “later enacted laws . . . do not declare
the meaning of earlier law.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998); see
also id. at 269–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This later amendment can of course not cause [the

statute] to have meant, at the time of petitioner’s conviction, something different from what it then
said.”). Still, since those statutes use the same phrase—“customs laws of the United States”—
they at least bear on the analysis here. Under the rule of in pari materia, “a later act can . . . be
regarded as a legislative interpretation of [an] earlier act . . . in the sense that it aids in ascertaining
the meaning of the words as used in their contemporary setting” and “is therefore entitled to great
weight in resolving any ambiguities and doubts.” United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64–65
(1940). The rule “necessarily assumes that whenever Congress passes a new statute, it acts aware
of all previous statutes on the same subject[.]” Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243–44
(1972) (citing Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 541–52 (1954)); see also SCALIA
& GARNER, § 54, at 323 (“[W]hen a statute uses the very same terminology as an earlier statute—

especially in the very same field—it is reasonable to believe that the terminology bears a consistent
meaning.”). Here, in light of the 2002 agency reorganization, the only later statutory definition of
“customs laws of the United States” that bears on this question is 19 U.S.C. § 1308(a)(3), enacted
twenty years after the Act. That provision defines “customs laws” as “any other law or regulation
enforced or administered by the United States Customs Service.” 19 U.S.C. § 1308(a)(3).

Treasury to perform duties of an officer of the Customs Service” served as a customs inspector. Id. The
reverse was also true. A customs officer could be designated to act as an immigration inspector, meaning
“any employee . . . designated by the Attorney General . . . to perform the functions of an immigration
officer” served in that role. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18) (1982). So, while one person could wear
both hats through delegation, the baseline rule was clear that customs and immigration officers began as
separate authorities with different powers, and the two roles could only become interchangeable when
formal designation occurred.
Assuming arguendo that “customs laws of the United States” in § 2000aa-5 refers only to
laws or regulations enforced or administered by the now-defunct United States Customs Service,
the Court finds that it still applies and thus bars Plaintiff’s claim, provided that the object of the
search and seizure was the possible entry of digital contraband into the country.7 At the time of

the Act’s enactment, “[c]ustoms agents [were] authorized to prevent the importation
of . . . contraband into the United States.” United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th
Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971)
(“Customs officers characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned[;]
it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country.”);
United States v. Soria, 519 F.2d 1060, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Customs agents are charged with
preventing the importation of contraband into the United States. Congress has granted the agents
broad statutory authority to stop and search for contraband.” (citations omitted)).
Congress has rendered child sexual abuse material (“CSAM”) contraband by criminalizing
its importation, transportation, receipt, and possession. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A. Such
contraband falls squarely within the scope of customs enforcement,8 consistent with the historical

7 “At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts consider only the complaint and the reasonable inferences they
can draw from it.” Singleton v. Allen, 740 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1152 (N.D. Ala. 2024) (citations omitted).
Applying that standard, the Court finds that the seizure of Plaintiff’s digital media by DHS agents at an
international point of entry is best understood as serving a customs-law enforcement purpose. Plaintiff
alleges that (1) DHS agents conducted the search at an international port of entry; (2) they seized his phone
and other digital media; (3) the search was prompted by a “questionable photo” on his device, Am. Compl.
at 8; and (4) the seized images, in his view, would not be considered “child pornography” or “CSAM,” id.
at 9. Taken together, these allegations indicate that the seizure was directed at suspected illicit digital
material, i.e., contraband, within the scope of customs laws. An alternative inference—that DHS agents
acted as general-purpose criminal investigators pursuing a targeted matter unrelated to the entry of
contraband—is not supported by any plausible factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and thus
cannot be drawn at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
8 Customs law permits officers to “examine, inspect, and search . . . any . . . package or cargo” entering the
United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), and to seize “merchandise which is introduced or attempted to be
introduced into the United States contrary to law,” including merchandise that “is stolen, smuggled, or
clandestinely imported or introduced,” id. § 1595a(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A).
authority of customs officials. Notably, when the Act was passed, customs agents were permitted
to conduct searches to prevent the importation of obscene and pornographic materials. See Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 375–76 (construing 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)); see also id. at 376
(“[W]e have today held that Congress may constitutionally prevent the mails from being used for
distributing pornography.” (citing United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971))).9 Moreover, that

Plaintiff’s suspected contraband was in digital form certainly does not bring it outside the bounds
of the Act; “[i]f anything, the advent of sophisticated technological means for concealing
contraband only heightens the need of the government to search property at the border.” Touset,
890 F.3d at 1235; see also id. at 1231 (holding that “the Fourth Amendment does not require any
suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border” where an officer of the Customs
and Border Protection Agency inspected the defendant’s iPhones and camera); United States v.
Mendez, 103 F.4th 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 2024) (“The government’s interest in detecting child
pornography at the border is just as strong as its interest in intercepting firearms, narcotics, or any
other prohibited item.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir.

2019) (“The best example [of digital contraband] is child pornography.”).
The Court need not rely on the doctrine of in pari materia to resolve this case, as it would
be unworkable to limit § 2000aa-5’s reference to “customs laws of the United States” to those laws

9 It is true that, in Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Supreme Court “construe[d] [19 U.S.C.] § 1305(a) to
require intervals of no more than 14 days from seizure of the goods to the institution of judicial proceedings
for their forfeiture and no longer than 60 days from the filing of the action to final decision in the district
court.” 402 U.S. at 373. The Court imposed those limits to avoid First Amendment concerns that arise
when potentially protected expressive material is seized and not promptly adjudicated. See id.; see also
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965) (striking down a state film-licensing scheme that
required prior approval before exhibition and holding that there must be assurance that the censor will,
“within a brief period,” “either issue a license or go to court”). But this limitation announced in Thirty-
Seven Photographs does not extend to § 2000aa-5. The case governed the timing of forfeiture proceedings
for expressive materials in criminal cases to prevent prolonged suppression of speech. The Privacy
Protection Act, by contrast, creates a civil damages remedy—not a forfeiture scheme—and § 2000aa-5
simply defines when liability does not attach. So the First Amendment concerns that drove the outcome in
Thirty-Seven Photographs are not implicated in the same way here.
as they existed before the creation of Customs and Border Protection. What of all customs laws
enacted decades later? Nothing in the Act suggests that, by referring to “customs laws,” Congress
meant to fix those terms to a closed set of statutes. Rather, the phrase clearly references a body of
law, ostensibly enforced by the relevant agency, which supports a general reference reading.

Under the general reference doctrine, which is applied “[w]hen a statute adopts the general law on
a given subject, the reference is construed to mean that the law is as it reads thereafter at any given
time including amendments subsequent to the time of adoption.” Managed Care Advisory Grp.,
LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 1145, 1157 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Longmire v. Sea
Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342, 1352 (5th Cir. 1980)); New Prime Inc., 586 U.S. at 113 (discussing
the general reference canon and recognizing that, “[o]f course, statutes may sometimes refer to an
external source of law and fairly warn readers that they must abide that external source of law,
later amendments and modifications included”).
Read this way, § 2000aa-5 incorporates a body of customs law that evolves over time and
is enforced and construed as it exists at the time of application. See, e.g., El Encanto, Inc. v. Hatch

Chile Co., Inc., 825 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2016) (“The fact is that the plain language of [35
U.S.C.] § 24 doesn’t suggest that a reader must look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
they were back when the statute was enacted. To the contrary, as written the language suggests
that a reader may look to the rules as they are found on any given day, today included.”). This
reading is reinforced by the fact that, on the two occasions Congress has defined the phrase
“customs laws of the United States,” it has done so by reference to the agency charged with
enforcing those laws, rather than by providing any substantive description of them. And it is of
no moment that the United States Customs Service no longer exists. It has not disappeared; it has
been reorganized, and those same laws now operate within a new agency with expanded powers.
At the time of the Act’s enactment, Congress knew that it could later enlarge, limit, or modify the
enforcement powers of that agency. See Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 655 F.2d 1132, 1149, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (suggesting that Congress could
have altered the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s authority by passing new legislation);

Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1437 (9th Cir. 1989) (“It is fully within Congress’[s]
prerogative legislatively to alter the reach of the laws it passes . . . .”); First Gibraltar Bank, FSB
v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895, 901 (5th Cir. 1995) (“As part of its legislative powers, Congress
designates the scope of agency authority, and if Congress so chooses, it can subsequently restrict
or limit that delegation of power to the agency.”).
The general reference doctrine thus forecloses a reading of “customs laws of the United
States” that is fixed only to those laws in place at enactment. The Court instead treats the provision
as referring to those laws enforced or administered by the modern agency—Customs and Border
Protection.10 And this reading, the Court finds, fairly recognizes “the balance struck by Congress
between preserving the ability of government officials” to search the nation’s borders and

“protecting those engaged in the dissemination of information from government intrusion.”
Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355 n.8.

10 Legislative history may support a reading of § 2000aa-5 that limits “customs laws” to those governing
the interdiction of contraband or unlawful materials entering the country. See S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 13–14
(1980) (explaining that “the limitations on governmental search and seizure provided by this statute are not
to apply to searches at the borders or at international ports of entry into the United States pursuant to the
enforcement of the customs laws of the United States,” and that “these searches are generally of a routine,
nonintrusive nature and are designed to prohibit the introduction of contraband or unlawful materials into
the United States, and to facilitate the assessment and collection of duties and tariffs”). But reliance on
legislative history would cut against applying the general reference doctrine, which is compelled by the
text. The Court therefore does not consider legislative history. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns
of our legislators by which we are governed.”); cf. CRI-Leslie, LLC v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 882
F.3d 1026, 1033 (11th Cir. 2018) (“In a contest such as we have here, between clear statutory text and (even
compelling) evidence of sub- or extra-textual ‘intent,’ the former must prevail.”).
To summarize, the Court interprets “searches and seizures” conducted at the border “in
order to enforce the customs laws of the United States” to mean those searches and seizures that
are objectively undertaken to enforce the laws and regulations enforced and administered by
Customs and Border Protection.!! That reading compels dismissal of this case. Plaintiff
affirmatively alleges that “U.S. Customs officials and agents from the Dep[artment] of Homeland
Security proceeded to seize indiscriminately all of [his] digital media” at an international port of
entry. Am. Compl. at 6-7. Based on his allegations, that search was objectively undertaken to
serve a customs-law enforcement purpose. Because the Act’s creation of a civil right to damages
“shall not impair or affect the ability of a government officer or employee” to conduct such
searches, Plaintiffs claim is barred under § 2000aa-S.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, [ECF No. 51], is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, [ECF No.
19], is DISMISSED. All pending motions are DENIED as moot and all deadlines, if any, are
TERMINATED. This case is CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 26th day of March, 2026.

On A. RUIZ I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

To give effect to § 2000aa-5’s “in order to” clause as a meaningful limitation on “searches and seizures,”
the Court can envision searches undertaken to enforce laws unrelated to Customs and Border Protection’s
functions, such as searches conducted solely to obtain evidence of tax evasion, securities fraud, public
corruption, or other purely domestic offenses untethered to the entry of goods or persons into the United
States. Under the Court’s reading, such searches could not be subject to § 2000aa-5 because they would
not be objectively undertaken to enforce any law enforced or administered by Customs and Border
Protection.
Page 23 of 24

cc: Christopher J. Madaio
25435-001
Miami FDC
Federal Detention Center
Inmate Mail/Parcels
Post Office Box 019120
Miami, FL 33101
PRO SE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308760. Public record. Not legal advice.