# Cornwall

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · February 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308746

## Case

- **Full name:** Patrick Cornwall v. Delaware County, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308746

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding defendants were not liable for the non- medical denial of medical care because the DOC, not the medical provider defendants, were responsible for administering transportation that caused inmates to miss medical appointments
- finding that five written civilian complaints of similar misconduct were sufficient to show a pattern

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PATRICK CORNWALL
Plaintiff,
v.

DELAWARE COUNTY, et al. CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-2456
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF 89]

BAYLSON, J. February 13, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Patrick Cornwall (“Plaintiff”) alleges that, while incarcerated at George W. Hill
Correctional Facility (“GWH”), he was denied adequate medical care. Second Amended
Complaint ¶ 10–26 (“SAC,” ECF 58). Pursuant to these allegations, Plaintiff asserts
constitutional violations under § 1983 against Defendants GEO Group, Inc., Delaware County,
Jessica Wilson, Quetta Brown-Yarsia, Shalayah Malloy, and Carl Pierce (“GWH Defendants”).
Before the Court is GWH Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement (“Motion,” ECF 89, 89-
1) and Plaintiff’s Opposition (“Opp’n,” ECF 91). For the following reasons, the Motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following facts are undisputed. When Plaintiff entered the GWH facility, medical
staff recorded that he had epilepsy and seizures. Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF,” ECF
90) at ¶ 3. On May 15, 2019, the medical team confirmed Plaintiff was prescribed seizure
medications, including Luminal (phenobarbital). SUF ¶ 4. On June 4, 2019, Plaintiff missed a
dose of Luminal, and Defendant Malloy signed a refusal form. SUF ¶ 5. On June 6, 2019, a
non-party physician on the medical staff saw Plaintiff for follow-up after melanoma removal.
SUF ¶ 6.
On June 23, 2019, Plaintiff had a seizure after he did not take at least one dose of his
seizure medication. SUF ¶ 11. After the seizure, Defendant Jessica Wilson treated him for a

superficial head laceration. Id. Next, Defendant Quetta Brown-Yarsiah examined Plaintiff and
administered seizure medication. SUF ¶ 12. Neither documented any shoulder pain or
injury. SUF ¶¶ 11, 12.
On July 12, 2019, medical staff examined Plaintiff for inmate worker clearance, and there
was no notation of shoulder pain or injury. SUF ¶ 13. On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff was approved
for inmate work. Id.
On August 22, 2019, shoulder pain was recorded for the first time when Plaintiff reported
it to Defendant Dr. Carl Pierce, who referred Plaintiff to physical therapy. SUF ¶ 14. Plaintiff
did not submit any medical requests or notes about a shoulder injury before August 22,
2019. SUF ¶ 15.

Between September 4, 2019, and March 14, 2020, Plaintiff had at least 30 encounters
with various health care providers including with medical, physical therapy, psychiatry, dental,
and other departments for shoulder pain, seizures, chronic care, mental health complaints, mouth
sores, hearing loss, skin conditions, and other health concerns. SUF ¶¶ 16–49. In his deposition,
Plaintiff stated that he did not remember a time at GWH where he requested a doctor and they
refused to see him. Mot. Exh. C (ECF 89-5) at 47:10–48:1. Plaintiff stated “[t]hey always saw
you.” Id.
On September 11, 2019, Plaintiff refused to see medical because he stated he was
receiving physical therapy. SUF ¶ 17. On February 26, 2020, Plaintiff refused treatment and
medications and became angry because he was placed in SHU. SUF ¶ 43. On November 7,
2019, and again on January 23, 2020, medical performed x-rays of Plaintiff’s shoulder and found
no acute fracture, dislocation, or destructive bony process. SUF ¶¶ 27, 37. On February 14,
2020, medical went over the MRI results with Plaintiff, and the MRI showed several low-grade

partial thickness tears of the supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons, and medical stated that an
orthopedic consultation would be arranged. SUF ¶ 40. On or about March 14, 2020, Plaintiff
was discharged medically and discharged from the George W. Hill facility. SUF ¶ 50.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges the GWH Defendants have violated his Eighth Amendment rights
pursuant to the cause of action available in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). There is no dispute that the GWH
Defendants are state actors.

A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Show Individual Defendants Acted with Deliberate
Indifference
As a general matter, failure to provide adequate medical treatment violates the Eighth
Amendment only when it results from “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or
injury.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). To state a cognizable claim under § 1983,
the Plaintiff must allege “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials
that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d. Cir. 2003). See also Brown v. Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that a doctor exercising professional judgment does not violate a prisoner's
constitutional rights). It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s medical needs were serious. Mot. at 12.
Therefore, the only dispute is whether prison officials committed acts or omissions that indicate
a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need.
Acting with deliberate indifference means the actor consciously disregarded a serious risk

to the plaintiff’s health or safety. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298–99. “Deliberate indifference
requires more than negligence or medical malpractice.” Charleston v. Corizon Health, Inc., No.
CV 17-3039, 2018 WL 1757606, *11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2018) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). A “‘mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment’
. . . does not ‘support a claim of an eighth amendment violation.’” Pearson v. Prison Health
Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 543 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987)). To be found liable for deliberate indifference, an
official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994). Plaintiff does not need to go so far as to show “acts or omissions for the very

purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. The Third Circuit
has found deliberate indifference “where (1) prison authorities deny reasonable requests for
medical treatment, (2) knowledge of the need for medical care is accompanied by the intentional
refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, and (4)
prison authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for serious medical
needs.” Id. at 538. In general, where a Plaintiff complains of “inadequate medical care,” the
Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference “in situations where there was ‘objective
evidence that [a] plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’ and prison officials ignored that
evidence.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347).
Here, Plaintiff Cornwall argues that the denial of anti-seizure medication amounts to
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Opp’n at 7. Because each defendant played

a different role in treating Plaintiff, the Court will address Plaintiff’s claims against each of them
in turn. See, e.g., Pearson, 850 F.3d at 538.
a. Shalayah Malloy
The only evidence related to Defendant Shalayah Malloy is that she signed a refusal of
medication form on June 4, 2019, when prison records reflect that Plaintiff did not take his daily
dose of Luminal, a medication that treats his chronic seizures. SUF 5. There is no evidence in
the record that Ms. Malloy prevented Plaintiff from taking his medication, denied Plaintiff his
medication, or caused a delay in administering Plaintiff’s medication. The record only reflects
that she signed a document designed to record inmates’ refusal to take medication. In his
deposition, Plaintiff stated that he had “no idea” if he got medication for his seizures on June 4,

2019, and at no point does Plaintiff assert that Defendant Malloy prevented him from getting his
medication for non-medical reasons. Opp’n Ex. 1 at 24:5–7 (ECF 91-1). Plaintiff asserted that if
he had refused medication on June 4, 2019, the “correct protocol for refusal of medication would
have to be a sergeant would have to come down” and that “never happened,” thus Ms. Malloy
cannot “just sign that I refused.” Opp’n Ex. 1 at 22:4–9 (ECF 91-1). He did not say whether he
refused. When asked what happened with his medication on June 4, 2019, Plaintiff stated he had
“no recall of anything on June 4” (Id. at 22:17–18) and that he had “no idea” if he got medication
for his seizures that day (Id. at 24:5–7). Plaintiff advances no evidence that would allow a
reasonable juror to infer that Ms. Malloy caused him to miss a dose of his medication or
otherwise denied him medical care. Thus, there is no reasonable basis upon which a juror could
find that she knew of a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety and acted with deliberate
indifference to that risk. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Defendant Malloy.
b. Jessica Wilson

Defendant Jessica Wilson interacted with Plaintiff on June 23, 2019, after he experienced
a seizure in the afternoon. SUF 11. Defendant Wilson treated him for a superficial head
laceration caused by the seizure. Id. On the morning of June 23, 2029, Plaintiff did not take his
seizure medication. SUF 7; Opp’n SUF 7 (ECF 91 at 16). There is a dispute of fact as to
whether a non-party member of the medical staff denied Plaintiff his medication as punishment
for him cursing at her and calling her stupid. Opp’n Counter-Statement of Facts ¶ 5 (“CSF,”
ECF 91 at 20). However, nothing in the record suggests Ms. Wilson deprived Plaintiff of his
medication or denied him medical care in any way. There is no evidence that Ms. Wilson knew
he missed any doses of his medication, or had any reason to believe there was a serious risk to
his health that she was ignoring. Because Plaintiff advances no evidence that Ms. Wilson denied

him of his medication or refused to give him medical care with conscious disregard for any
serious risk to Plaintiff’s health, there is no reasonable basis upon which a juror could find that
she acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s needs. Accordingly, the Motion is
GRANTED as to Defendant Wilson.
c. Quetta Brown-Yarsia
Defendant Quetta Brown Yarsiah also interacted with Plaintiff on June 23, 2019, after he
experienced a seizure. SUF 12. After Plaintiff experienced the seizure and was treated for a
head laceration by Defendant Wilson, Defendant Brown Yarsiah, a nurse practitioner, gave him a
medical exam, reviewed his chart, and administered his medication. SUF 12. The record
contains no evidence that Ms. Brown Yarsiah denied him medical care in any way or prevented
him from taking his medication. Because Plaintiff has not advanced evidence that Defendant
Brown Yarsiah denied Plaintiff medical care or medication, or was otherwise aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm and ignored the risk, no reasonable juror could find she acted

with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to
Defendant Brown Yarsiah.
d. Carl Pierce
Defendant Dr. Carl Pierce interacted with Plaintiff on August 22, 2019. Plaintiff had a
chronic disease follow-up appointment with Defendant Pierce where Plaintiff complained about
shoulder pain. SUF 14. Defendant Pierce referred Plaintiff to physical therapy. Id. Plaintiff
does not advance any argument that Defendant Pierce acted with deliberate indifference and the
record does not contain any reference to Defendant Pierce denying Plaintiff medical care or
medication or otherwise consciously disregarding a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health. As such, no
reasonable juror could find Defendant Pierce acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs and the Motion is GRANTED as to Defendant Pierce.
B. Plaintiff’s Monell Claim Is Not Deficient as a Matter of Law
Delaware County and the GEO Group move for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s Monell
claim (Count II) on the grounds that Plaintiff has insufficient evidence to establish any
unconstitutional policy or practice resulted in a denial of medical care. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s testimony, combined with cases and articles containing other inmates’ complaints
about lack of medical care, are insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of
unconstitutional policy or practice or failure to train employees. Mot. at 22.
In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983. Municipal liability attaches,
however, only where the municipality itself causes a constitutional violation—a municipality is
not subject to respondeat superior or vicarious liability under § 1983. Id. at 694–95. This

holding has been extended to private corporations performing municipal functions. Natale v.
Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581–84 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Gannaway v.
Prime Care Medical, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2015). To sufficiently establish
Monell liability, a plaintiff must show that he suffered a constitutional deprivation resulting from
an official corporate policy or custom. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583–84. There are three
situations where acts of an employee may be deemed to be the result of a policy or custom to
satisfy Monell:
“The first is where the appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally
applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act complained of is simply an
implementation of that policy. The second [custom] occurs where no rule has been
announced as policy but federal law has been violated by an act of the policymaker
itself. Finally, a policy or custom may also exist where the policymaker has failed
to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to control the agents
of the government is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely
to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”
Id. at 584.
Here, Plaintiff asserts that he was denied medication because the GEO Group and
Delaware County had a practice or custom of keeping vital medications in a locked box on the
medication trolley, but the staff member wheeling the trolley did not have a key to the box.1

1 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff advanced an additional argument that he was denied medical care for his
shoulder injury. However, Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not “send any medical requests or notes to any staff
at George W. Hill about a shoulder injury until he informed Dr. Pierce on August 22, 2019.” SUF 15. The record
reflects that he received extensive treatment for his shoulder injury once he alerted medical staff to it. Further,
Plaintiff admitted that he was seen by medical staff for his shoulder injury, but staff did not give him the treatment
he preferred or believed he should receive. Mot. Exh. C at 48–49. Disagreements about Defendants’ determinations
that an injury does not need treatment does not establish a claim of deliberate indifference. See Durmer v.
Opp’n at 8. As factual support, Plaintiff cites his own testimony where he describes the lock box
system.2 Plaintiff stated in his deposition:
“It’s this whole procedure the jail had going on was that they would come and give
everyone medication but they had this lock box and every single time they say I’m
sorry I don’t have the key … but here’s your other medication. . . . I would take
trazodone [another medication]. It made me sleepy. They would come and give
me my nighttime phenobarbital. Half the time not come back and I’d have to call
the control unit and say are you going to send me down to get my medication or
not? Or they would call me sometimes 11, 12, or 1 o’clock in the morning because
they don’t have the key to open the box where my phenobarbital is in there? [sic]
That I’m sleeping in bed and then they’ll wake me, Cornwall you gotta go down to
nurse. And it’s freezing cold down there. . . . And I have to sit there like a dog in
that cell waiting for them to give me the medication . . . Almost every single day
they did that to me. . . . I think it’s just a terrible way that they had the key situation
with this lock box with my narcotics medication in it.”
Opp’n Exh. A at 30:7–31:15. The record also contains several instances where medical staff
recorded Plaintiff as refusing to take medication without his signature on the refusal line.
ECF 89-2 at GEO159, GEO161, GEO164. Further, there is a record of Plaintiff arguing with a
member of the medical staff and then not receiving his medication, but the parties dispute

O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) (“Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable
latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.”). The sufficiency of medical treatment cannot be the basis for a
claim of deliberate indifference if it is withing reasonable medical discretion. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850
F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because ‘mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment’ does not ‘support a
claim of an [E]ighth [A]mendment violation,’ when medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a
prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.” (internal citation omitted)).
Plaintiff appears to have abandoned his argument that medical care on his shoulder was delayed or denied
intentionally, and the Court dismisses this theory of Monell liability for the reasons stated above.

2 Plaintiff cites six cases where GWH inmates complain of lack of medical care. The Court finds these complaints
are not sufficiently similar to the pattern or custom alleged here to provide factual support. They are merely
examples that would support a general practice of denying medical care, if they were true. However, Plaintiff
himself stated that he did not remember a time at GWH where he requested a doctor and they refused to see him.
Mot. at 7, Exh. C at 47–48. Plaintiff stated “[t]hey always saw you.” Id.

Defendants argue the Court should disregard complaints filed by other inmates because other complaints, without
findings of liability, are mere allegations of misconduct and cannot form a factual basis to show practice or custom
that would lead to liability. However, Defendants do not cite controlling authority to support this assertion.
“[C]ourts in this circuit—including the court of appeals—have accepted similar numbers of incidents as evidence of
a pattern.” Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-4196, 2019 WL 4039575, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019)
(emphasis added); see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 969–70, 973 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that five
written civilian complaints of similar misconduct were sufficient to show a pattern). The Court finds the complaints
Plaintiff cited unavailing because they do not show a practice of withholding medication for non-medical reasons,
not because complaints of other inmates are insufficient to show a pattern or practice.
whether he refused or it was withheld as punishment. SUF 7; Opp’n Response to SUF 7; Opp’n
CSF 5. Taking Plaintiff’s statements as true, coupled with the record showing repeated instances
where medical staff recorded Plaintiff’s refusal to take medication, without his actual signature, a
reasonable jury could conclude that GEO Group and Delaware County had a custom, at

minimum, of delaying the administration of narcotic medications for non-medical reasons (not
being equipped with the key to access medication) and failing to properly document the
circumstances of the missed doses. A jury could find that the practice of keeping medication in a
locked box and failing to train medical personnel to administer the medication from the box
could result in the denial of medical care causing inmates to be “incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Based on his personal
knowledge, Plaintiff stated his medication was kept in the box always and “every single time” he
had to take additional measures to get his medication when medical staff were unable to open the
box. Absent undisputed facts to the contrary, the question of the veracity of Plaintiff’s account is
for the jury. A jury is permitted to find Monell liability if GEO Group and Delaware County

“turned a blind eye to an obviously inadequate practice that was likely to result in the violation
of constitutional rights” such that “policymaker[s] can reasonable be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need” of inmates to access their medication. Parkell v. Danberg,
833 F.3d 313, 338 (3d Cir. 2016). Plaintiff has created a factual issue regarding the adequacy of
GWH’s administration of medication policy. The record indicates that Delaware County and the
GEO Group were responsible for administering medication to inmates and there is a factual
dispute as to whether they had a policy and practice that denied or delayed the administration of
those medications for non-medical reasons, raising the risk of serious harm to the point of
deliberate indifference to it. Compare id. at 339 (finding defendants were not liable for the non-
medical denial of medical care because the DOC, not the medical provider defendants, were
responsible for administering transportation that caused inmates to miss medical appointments).
Resolution of whether the evidence supports the existence of this practice or custom is for the
jury and, therefore, the Motion is DENIED as to Count II against Delaware County and GEO

Group.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, GWH Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 89)
is granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order follows.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308746. Public record. Not legal advice.