# Binion

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · March 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308679

## Case

- **Full name:** Hydres Binion v. Teri Vandergriff
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** March 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308679

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the “twice-deferential standard” that applies to habeas claims based on Jackson

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

HYDRES BINION, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
)
v. ) Case No. 4:23-CV-00056-SPM
)
TERI VANDERGRIFF, )
)
Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Missouri state prisoner Hydres Binion
(“Petitioner”) for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 6. The parties
have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). ECF No. 10. For the following reasons, the petition will be denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the facts of Petitioner’s case as follows:
The State charged [Petitioner] with one count of statutory sodomy in the
first degree arising out of an incident that occurred in March 2014, when numerous
family members stayed overnight at the home of [Petitioner] and Victim’s
grandmother. Victim was ten years old. Victim, Victim’s cousin, and [Petitioner]
slept fully-clothed on a pallet in the kitchen. The other family members slept in the
bedrooms. The State charged that [Petitioner] inappropriately touched Victim
during the night.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, Victim testified that he was
asleep and woke up to [Petitioner] touching him with his hand. Victim testified that
[Petitioner] touched his genitals under his clothes, making skin-to-skin contact.
[Petitioner] squeezed Victim from behind in a bear hug, moving against him.
Victim testified that [Petitioner] said nothing during the touching, and that
[Petitioner] was “[s]till asleep.” [Petitioner] testified that he only remembered
going to sleep and waking up the next morning. [Petitioner]’s theory of defense at
trial was that because he was sleeping when the criminal conduct allegedly
occurred, he could not have consciously committed the offense.
The jury found [Petitioner] guilty of the charged offense. At the sentencing
hearing, the trial court noted it received the sentencing assessment report (“SAR”)
and “a number of impassionate letters” on behalf of [Petitioner]. The State informed
the trial court that the sentencing range for first-degree statutory sodomy was ten to
thirty years or life in prison due to the Victim’s age. The State recommended
eighteen years in prison given the nature of the offense and [Petitioner]’s prior
convictions. Trial counsel requested probation. Trial counsel discussed the
mitigating context of [Petitioner]’s prior convictions, none of which were for sexual
abuse involving children, and directed the trial court’s attention to details in some
of the letters from friends and family on [Petitioner]’s behalf, including a letter from
his employer affirming his long-term employment. Trial counsel emphasized
[Petitioner]’s significant work history, and noted that [Petitioner] was a grandfather
to twenty-four grandchildren with no prior allegations of him touching any
children, has been a good provider for his family, and has a great deal of family
support. [Petitioner] denied ever touching or harming a child. [Petitioner] further
explained that when many family members stay over, they sleep on pallets together,
and nothing like this had ever happened.

Resp’t Ex. I, at 2-3.1 The trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty years in prison. Id. at 3.
Petitioner is an inmate at the Farmington Correctional Center. ECF No. 6, at 1.
In his direct appeal, Petitioner raised the sole claim that the trial court abused its discretion
in overruling his motion in limine and prohibiting him from testifying on a limited basis about the
age of the victim in Petitioner’s prior conviction. Resp’t Ex. C, at 6. On May 24, 2016, the Missouri
Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court. Resp’t Ex. E, at 1-6.
In his amended motion for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15,
Petitioner asserted two claims: (1) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on
direct appeal that the trial court erred in overruling Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal
at the close of all of the evidence because the evidence was insufficient to support Petitioner’s

1 This document contains multiple sets of page numbers. The Court refers to the pagination in the
lower right-hand corner.
Additional facts relevant to Petitioner’s specific claims will be set forth in the discussion
section below.
conviction of statutory sodomy in the first degree; and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing call two character witnesses at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing who could have testified
about Petitioner’s good character and family ties. Resp’t Ex. F, at 31-55. The state post-conviction
motion court denied all of these claims without an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 61-64. The Missouri

Court of Appeals also denied the claims on the merits. Resp’t Ex. I, at 1-14.
In the instant petition, Petitioner asserts three grounds for relief: (1) the state post-
conviction motion court erred in denying Petitioner’s Rule 19.15 motion without an evidentiary
hearing; (2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal that the
trial court erred in overruling Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the
evidence because the evidence was insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction of statutory
sodomy in the first degree; and (3) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call character
witnesses at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing who could have testified about Petitioner’s behalf.
ECF No. 6.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, a federal court
may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim “(1) resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State
court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner has the “the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedents “if the
state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s]
cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme

Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see also Brown v. Payton,
544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly
established federal law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably
to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08; see also Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “Finally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings only if it is shown that
the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Jones
v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Ground One: Post-Conviction Motion Court Error

In Ground One, Petitioner claims that the post-conviction motion court erred in denying
his Rule 19.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing. However, it is well-settled that “the
Constitution does not guarantee the existence of state post-conviction proceedings.” Bell-Bey v.
Roper, 499 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987)).
As such, “an infirmity in a state post-conviction proceeding does not raise a constitutional issue
cognizable in a federal habeas [application].” Id. (quoting Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314,
317 (8th Cir. 1990)). Petitioner’s claim in Ground One is not cognizable for purposes of habeas
review because it is based on an alleged error in post-conviction proceedings. Whether the motion
court ought to have held a motion hearing is purely a matter of state law. As a result, Ground One
will be denied.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel at both the appellate and trial levels as
additional grounds for relief.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). To show ineffective assistance
of counsel, a petitioner must show both that his “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that
“the deficient performance prejudiced [his] defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Paulson
v. Newton Corr. Facility, 773 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014). To show deficient performance,
Petitioner must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and Petitioner bears a
heavy burden in overcoming “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. To show prejudice, Petitioner must show
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
Where, as here, an ineffective assistance claim has been addressed by the state court, this
Court must bear in mind that “[t]aken together, AEDPA and Strickland establish a ‘doubly
deferential standard’ of review.” Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 201 (2011)). In the context of a habeas claim, it is not sufficient
for a petitioner to “show that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were being
analyzed in the first instance.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002). “Rather, he must show
that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable
manner.” Id. at 699.
1. Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert
on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal at
the close of all the evidence. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction of sodomy in the first degree under § RSMo 566.062 because the state failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s charged actions were (1) voluntary, and (2)
done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person.
In his amended motion for post-conviction relief, Petitioner pointed to some evidence
adduced at trial that he was asleep at the time he was alleged to have committed the criminal acts
at issue. He points to Victim’s comments that Petitioner said nothing while touching victim and
that Petitioner was “[s]till asleep.” Resp’t Ex. F, at 33. Petitioner also testified at trial that he only

remembered going to sleep and waking up the next morning, and was asleep during the time of the
alleged act. Resp’t Ex. A, at 426-27.
“[T]he Due Process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis
in original); accord Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012); Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7
(2011). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. State law determines the specific elements
of the crimes. See Fenske v. Thalacker, 60 F.3d 478, 480 (8th Cir. 1995).

The Supreme Court has noted that “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas
proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson,
566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012). First, in the direct appeal, the state appellate court must defer to the
jury’s conclusions about the evidence presented at trial. Id. Second, on habeas review, “a federal
court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge
simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do
so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Cavazos, 565 U.S.
at 2). See also Parker, 567 U.S. at 43 (discussing the “twice-deferential standard” that applies to
habeas claims based on Jackson).
Here, after citing the applicable standards of review, the Missouri Court of Appeals found

that, because the claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence would not have been
meritorious, appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to pursue the claim on appeal.
In considering the merit of the underlying claim regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the
Missouri Court of Appeals considered the definitions of “voluntary act” and “deviant sexual
intercourse” under Missouri law, and correctly noted that the Due Process clause requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the charged crime for an accused
to be convicted. Resp’t Ex. I, at 7-8 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 562.011.1, 566.011.1-2, 566.010(1),
562.011.2 & State v. Voss, 488 S.W.3d 97, 110 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) & Ballew v. Aiello, 422
S.W.2d 396, 399 (Mo. App. Spr. 1967). The state court also identified the appropriate Jackson
standards, and explained:
Here, the jury heard testimony from both Victim and [Petitioner]. The jury was free
to disbelieve and disregard [Petitioner]’s testimony that he was was [sic] asleep
during the charged act. See [State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011)];
see also Ballew, 422 S.W.2d at 399[ ]. Moreover, a jury reasonably could have
found that Victim did not know the state of [Petitioner]’s consciousness and only
speculated that [Petitioner] was asleep. The jury also heard Victim testify that he
was asleep during the alleged conduct but, in response to questioning, Victim
clarified that in fact he had woken up to [Petitioner] touching him. The jury further
reasonably could have disbelieved [Petitioner]’s testimony that he was asleep and
did not remember touching Victim’s penis and butt and moving against him in a
humping motion. See Nash, 339 S.W.3d at 509. Lastly, on the element of whether
the sodomy was done for the purpose of sexual gratification, the jury was free to
infer the requisite intent from the sexual nature of the act itself. See [State v.
Holmes, 626 S.W.3d 339, 342 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)] (internal quotation omitted)
(noting that “[i]n assessing whether a defendant touched another ‘for the purpose
of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person,’ a jury may infer intent
from the surrounding circumstances or from ‘the sexual nature of the act itself.’”).
In light of the applicable standard of review and our deference to the jury’s
assessment of the evidence at trial, we are persuaded that the jury reasonably could
have found from the State’s evidence that [Petitioner] consciously, voluntarily and
knowingly committed the acts as charged for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
his sexual desire. See id. at 341–42 (citing Nash, 339 S.W.3d at 509).

Resp’t Ex. I, at 9-10. The Missouri Court of Appeals accurately reviewed the evidence in light of
the elements of the crime charged and articulated its reasons for concluding that a reasonable juror
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner acted voluntarily and for sexual
gratification. Furthermore, it is not the role of this Court to second-guess the state court’s
determination about a question of Missouri law. See Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th
Cir. 2012) (“We do not second-guess the decision of a Missouri state court on Missouri law.”).
Under the very deferential standards the Court must apply at this stage, the Court cannot find that
the state court’s determination about the sufficiency of the evidence was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
Furthermore, after reviewing the record, under the “twice-deferential” standard this Court
must apply, the Court cannot say that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively
unreasonable. The state court’s discussion of the facts that were presented to the jury is well
supported by the record, which shows that both Petitioner and Victim testified and the jury was

well-positioned to make determinations about their relative credibility. For example, Petitioner
emphatically denied on the stand that the acts, to which Victim had previously testified in detail,
took place at all. See, e.g., Resp’t Ex. A, at 430, 455, 331-35. The Court cannot say that the state
court’s conclusion, based on this evidence, was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts.
The state court, after identifying the appropriate Strickland standards, reasonably found
Petitioner could not establish the first prong of Strickland (deficient performance) because counsel
chose not to pursue a claim on appeal that would not be meritorious. See, e.g., Link v. Luebbers,
469 F.3d 1197, 1205 (8th Cir. 2006) (“When appellate counsel competently asserts some claims
on a defendant’s behalf, it is difficult to sustain a[n] ineffective assistance claim based on

allegations that counsel was deficient for failing to assert some other claims. Because one of
appellate counsel’s important duties is to focus on those arguments that are most likely to succeed,
counsel will not be held to be ineffective for failure to raise every conceivable issue. Generally,
only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of
effective assistance of counsel be overcome.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
See also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (“[A]ppellate counsel who files a merits brief
need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them
in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.”) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745
(1983)). The Court finds nothing in the record to suggest that this claim was clearly stronger than
the one appellate counsel chose to present.
For this and the above reasons, the Court will deny relief under Ground 2.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call
character witnesses to testify at his sentencing hearing.
In his briefing for state post-conviction relief, Petitioner identified two witnesses who could
have testified on his behalf: Don Hopkins, the son of Petitioner’s former girlfriend (who is also
Victim’s grandmother); and Sharon Warren, the mother of four of Petitioner’s children. Resp’t Ex.
G, at 17-19.2 According to Petitioner, Ms. Warren would have testified that “none of their four
children can believe [Petitioner] did what the jury has convicted him of doing” and that he was a
good father to her children. Id. at 12-13. As for Mr. Hopkins, Petitioner alleged that he would have
testified that: “[Petitioner] is a good man, and that he cannot believe that the incident occurred in
the manner in which his mother, Jacqueline Vincent, and sister, Tanya Vincent, reported”; “the

morning after the alleged incident, his mother called him and told him that [Petitioner] had raped
[Victim]” and that “later, his mother changed her story”; “[Petitioner] would never hurt anyone,
especially not a child”; “his son was the other little boy sleeping on the pallet on the kitchen floor
with [Petitioner] on the night of the incident”; and “he has no idea how anyone could believe or
think that [Victim] even knew or understood what happened since he suffers from very debilitating
mental disabilities.” Id. at 12; Resp’t Ex. F, at 53-54. Petitioner argued that these witnesses were

2 Petitioner does not name the specific witnesses in his amended petition (ECF No. 6). However, because he appealed
post-conviction claims to the Missouri Court of Appeals pertaining to trial counsel’s failure to call Sharon Warren and
Don Hopkins at the sentencing hearing—and because Respondent has interpreted Ms. Warren and Mr. Hopkins to be
the witnesses at issue, and Petitioner has not contradicted this interpretation—the Court will treat these individuals as
the witnesses in Petitioner’s claim.
both available and willing to testify, and there is a reasonable probability that their testimonies
would have caused the trial court to impose a lesser sentence.
In its post-conviction opinion, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that Petitioner failed
to satisfy the two prongs of Strickland. First, it noted that where, as here, “the motion court also

serves as the sentencing court, the motion court’s ruling as to the impact of character witnesses is
virtually unchallengeable.” Resp’t Ex. I at 11 (citing Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 771 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2020)) (emphasis in original). It then continued:
[T]he motion court determined that additional evidence from character witnesses
would not have mitigated the sentence. The record of the sentencing hearing
demonstrates that, prior to imposing sentence, the trial court received and
considered many impassioned letters submitted by [Petitioner]’s friends, family,
and employer on behalf of his good character, family background, and work history.
To the extent Warren and Hopkins would have testified regarding [Petitioner]’s
character, such testimony would have been similar to the character evidence
presented at the sentencing hearing. Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to
call witnesses to provide cumulative evidence. The trial court also considered
[Petitioner]’s prior convictions, probation violations, as well as the nature of the
charged criminal conduct and Victim’s age. Viewing the complete record, we are
not persuaded that [Petitioner] has overcome the presumption that trial counsel
acted reasonably in not calling Warren or Hopkins to testify at the sentencing
hearing, nor has [Petitioner] demonstrated error in the motion court’s virtually
unchallengeable ruling as to the potential impact of their testimonies on his
sentence.

Moreover, the record conclusively refutes [Petitioner]’s claim that there is a
reasonable probability he would have received a lesser sentence had trial counsel
called Warren and Hopkins. [Petitioner] alleges Warren would have testified that
none of her and [Petitioner]’s children could believe that [Petitioner] sodomized
Victim. [Petitioner] alleges Hopkins would have testified that he could not believe
the incident occurred because his mother first said [Petitioner] raped Victim and
then changed her story and, further, Victim was not believable because he suffered
from mental disabilities. The nature of the claimed testimony shows that neither
witness would have provided admissible character evidence at [Petitioner]’s
sentencing hearing. Instead, the testimony of both witnesses would have focused
on the issue of [Petitioner]’s guilt of the charged offense. Testimony regarding a
defendant’s guilt or innocence is admissible during the guilt phase of trial but is not
relevant to a defendant’s good character for purposes of sentencing. We cannot hold
trial counsel to be ineffective for failing to call witnesses at a sentencing hearing
whose testimony would not have provided admissible character evidence.
Resp’t Ex. I at 11-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to or an objectively
unreasonable application of Strickland. The court properly articulated the Strickland standard.
Resp’t Ex. I at 5-6. Specifically, with regard to the first Strickland prong (deficient performance),
it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to find that Petitioner’s counsel did not act
contrary to what a reasonably competent attorney would do in a similar situation. Relying on state
law, the state court determined that the proposed testimony by these two witnesses had limited
evidentiary value—both because it may have constituted cumulative evidence in light of the
numerous letters considered by the trial court and because it concerns Petitioner’s guilt or
innocence in an inappropriate phase of the proceedings for such evidence.
Nor was the state court’s finding that Petitioner was not prejudiced unreasonable, as
Petitioner failed to establish that Ms. Warren’s and Mr. Hopkins’s testimony would have changed
Petitioner’s sentence. The state court’s reasoning has factual support in the record. In explaining
Petitioner’s sentence, the trial court noted: (1) Petitioner’s “mixed” track record on probation,
which included at least one revocation; and (2) Petitioner’s criminal history, which included “the
prior offense not of [a] child, but is still—it is a disturbing background along with the abuse of
alcohol.” Resp’t Ex. A, at 507. Neither Ms. Warren’s nor Mr. Hopkins’ proposed testimony
touches on Petitioner’s history with the criminal justice system, which the trial court identified as

a primary motivating factor in the sentence. Furthermore, the trial court continued:
And we’re in a posture here where -- and I respect, you know, that you --
you’re saying you didn’t do it and you have never done anything like that and, you
know, I understand that, but the evidence was presented and the jury found
otherwise in this instance.
…
And you do have a lot of support. I understand. I have got a very big stack
of letters and very impassioned on behalf of various people and that is impressive.
So it is disturbing that we’re here, but we are here.

Id. at 507-08. The trial court specifically noted that it made its sentencing determination despite
the copious character evidence it received in the form of letters from Petitioner’s community, and
noted the limited relevance of testimony pertaining to Petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the charged
offense at the sentencing phase. As these are primarily the topics to which Ms. Warren and Mr.
Hopkins would have spoken, the state court was not unreasonable in finding that Petitioner failed
to establish a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence had they
testified.
Furthermore, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 63 (1991). “Because the
admission or exclusion of evidence is primarily a question of state law, an evidentiary
determination rarely gives rise to a federal question reviewable in a habeas petition.” King v.
Roper, 2005 WL 1518291, at *15 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2005) (citing Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188,
1190-91 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also Parker v. Bowersox, 94 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1996) (“A state
court’s evidentiary rulings can form the basis for federal habeas relief under the due process clause
only when they were so conspicuously prejudicial or of such magnitude as to fatally infect the trial
and deprive the defendant of due process.”). Accordingly, trial counsel cannot be ineffective for

failing to call witnesses whose testimony may not have been admissible or may have lacked
meaningful evidentiary value. See Whitby v. Lewis, 2018 WL 4184365, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31,
2018). For this and the above reasons, the Court will deny relief on Ground Three.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2253, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a 28
U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit judge or district judge issues a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To grant such a certificate, the judge must find that the
Petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2).
“A substantial showing is a showing that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court
could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox v. Norris, 133
F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Court finds that Petitioner has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, so the Court will not issue a certificate
of appealability. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF Nos. 1, 6) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue because
Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional right.
28 US.C. § 2253.
ej 0
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of March, 2026.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308679. Public record. Not legal advice.