# Purdle

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308672

## Case

- **Full name:** Kencey Purdle v. Micah Grimes, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308672

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that objective prong of deliberate indifference analysis “easily satisfied” with respect to risk posed by Covid- 19 in prison environment
- noting that plaintiff continuing to engage in protected activity was an “irrelevant circumstance” to First Amendment retaliation analysis
- noting that threat may be sufficient to deter protected activity
- stating that “to give rise to liability, the retaliatory harassment need not be extreme.”
- finding that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KENCEY PURDLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-01044-GCS
)
MICAH GRIMES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Kencey Purdle, an individual in custody in the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
deprivations of his constitutional rights related to a hunger strike and COVID-19
conditions while housed in Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”) in 2021. Pending
before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) filed by Defendants
Micah Grimes, Bryan Perdue,1 Matthew McCarthy, and Seth Slunaker. (Doc. 63). Plaintiff
opposes the motion. (Doc. 66). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the
Motion in part and DENIES the Motion in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit for monetary damages on May 18, 2022. (Doc. 1).2

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the docket to reflect the correct spelling of
Defendant Perdue’s name.

2 On April 14, 2024, upon a motion from Plaintiff, the Court substituted Matthew
McCarthy for John Doe 1 and Seth Slunaker for John Doe 2. (Doc. 41).
Plaintiff alleges that in late February 2021, he requested protective custody from Internal
Affairs staff at Lawrence due to threats of physical harm from other inmates. (Doc. 1, p.

6). When Internal Affairs failed to respond to his request, Plaintiff declared a hunger
strike on March 3, 2021, and was moved from 2A to the hunger strike unit in 5B. Id. After
three or four days, Plaintiff was informed by Defendant Officer Grimes he would be
returned to his original housing unit in 2A. Id. Plaintiff refused to return to 2A, reiterating
his request for protective custody. Id.
Rather than placing Plaintiff in protective custody, he was moved to 8C, which

was designated as the COVID-19 quarantine unit. (Doc. 1, p. 6). At 8C, Plaintiff was forced
to cell with an inmate who displayed COVID-19 symptoms and who had informed staff
that he was sick with the virus. Id. When Plaintiff objected to this placement, Defendant
Sergeant Perdue told him he could either enter the cell or be placed in disciplinary
segregation. Id. at p. 6-7. Plaintiff was ultimately forced into the cell with the symptomatic

inmate. Id. at p. 7.
Defendant Lieutenant McCarthy, as the cluster lieutenant in charge of 5B, had the
authority to make housing decisions and was responsible for ordering Plaintiff's
placement in 8C. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Defendants Perdue and Slunaker were present when
Plaintiff was forced into the cell despite his cellmate’s obvious illness. Id. A few days after

being placed in 8C, Plaintiff declared another hunger strike to escape the dangerous
conditions. Id. at p. 7.
Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19 on March 12, 2021. He experienced
symptoms including headache and loss of appetite, recovering after approximately one

week. (Doc. 1, p. 7). After Plaintiff recovered from COVID-19, he was moved to 1B and
was eventually transferred to Centralia Correctional Center on August 4, 2021. Id.
On July 21, 2022, the Court conducted a preliminary review of the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1952A. (Doc. 13). Based on the above allegations, the Court
allowed Plaintiff to proceed on the following claims:
Count 1: First Amendment claim against Grimes, McCarthy, Perdue, and
Slunaker for placing Plaintiff in the COVID-19 quarantine unit in
retaliation for him refusing housing in unit 2A, going on a hunger
strike to object to prison officials’ failure to take action on his
request for protective custody, and complaining this his request
for protective custody was being ignored.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Grimes, McCarthy, Perdue, and
Slunaker for subjecting Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement by placing him in the COVID-19 quarantine unit.
(Doc. 13, p. 2-3).
On September 28, 2023, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. (Doc. 49). The case proceeded
to merits discovery. On December 5, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 63). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. (Doc. 66). Accordingly, the
issue of summary judgment is now ripe for the Court’s review.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).
Plaintiff arrived at Lawrence on April 26, 2019. See (Doc. 63-1, p. 10; Doc. 63-2). By
March 2021, he was living in the 2-House, A-Wing of Lawrence, also known as “2A.”

(Doc. 63-1, p. 16-17; Doc. 63-2).
On March 3, 2021, Plaintiff approached correctional staff in Internal Affairs and
requested placement in protective custody. (Doc. 63-1, p. 11, 13-14). The next day, in fear
of his life without protective custody, Plaintiff initiated a hunger strike. (Doc. 63-1, p. 15-
16; Doc. 63-2; Doc. 63-3, p. 1). Plaintiff was thus moved to the hunger strike unit in 5-
House, B-Wing (“5B”). (Doc. 63-1, p. 17; Doc. 63-2). Prior to this placement, Internal

Affairs personnel visited Plaintiff in 2A to discuss his protective custody request. (Doc.
63-1, p. 29-30).
In the hunger strike unit, Plaintiff received identical food service and maintained
the same access to toilet and shower facilities as in 2A, but he was housed in a single cell
rather than a double occupancy cell. (Doc. 63-1, p. 17-18). On March 4, 2021, Plaintiff

ended his hunger strike. Id. at p. 18-19; (Doc. 63-3, p. 1). Following the termination of his
hunger strike on March 4, 2021, Plaintiff was scheduled for return to his original cell in
2A. (Doc. 63-1, p. 19-20). Plaintiff told Defendant Grimes he could not return to his
original cell. (Doc. 63-1, p. 19). Defendant Grimes said he would talk with his superiors.
Id. On March 5, 2021, instead of being moved back to 2A, Plaintiff was moved from 5B to

the C-Wing of the 8-House (“8C”). (Doc. 63-1, p. 19-20; 33-34; Doc. 63-2). Plaintiff believes
Matthew McCarthy, serving as lieutenant, possessed decision-making authority
regarding Plaintiff’s housing placement due to his supervisory position. (Doc. 63-1, p. 30-
33). Plaintiff does not recall if he had personal communication with McCarthy. Id. at p.
31-32.
When Plaintiff arrived at the 8-House, Defendant Perdue was stationed there.

(Doc. 63-1, p. 35.). He asked Defendant Perdue if it was a Covid-19 quarantine unit. Id.
Defendant Perdue told him that it was. Id. at p. 36. Plaintiff explained to Defendant
Perdue he did not have Covid-19, and he should not be going into the quarantine unit.
Id. Perdue informed Plaintiff that due to Covid-19 restrictions, Plaintiff could either be
housed in the quarantine unit or go to segregated housing. Id. Plaintiff entered the
quarantine unit accompanied by Defendant Slunaker, who was the active officer at that

time. Id. at p. 38-39.
Inside the unit, Plaintiff observed that his cellmate exhibited COVID symptoms.
(Doc. 63-1, p. 39). The cellmate told Plaintiff and Defendant Slunaker he was sick, and
Plaintiff couldn’t be in the unit with him. Id. at p. 21, 39. Plaintiff subsequently declared
a second hunger strike, resulting in his return to the hunger strike unit. (Doc. 63-1, p. 23-

24, 38; Doc. 63-2; Doc. 63-3, p. 3-6). On March 12, 2021, Plaintiff tested positive for COVID
while housed in 5B and was transferred to the B-Wing of 6-House. (Doc. 63-1, p. 25; Doc.
63-2). Plaintiff experienced COVID-related symptoms including headache and loss of
appetite, with him recovering from these symptoms in approximately one week. (Doc.
63-1, p. 26). Following his recovery, Plaintiff was moved from 6B to a new cell and,

ultimately, he was transferred out of Lawrence. (Doc. 63-1, p. 26-27; Doc. 63-2).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and affidavits “show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c); Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 997
(7th Cir. 2021) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). The movant

bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 8
F.4th 557, 567 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The
Court must consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving
factual disputes in favor of the non-movant. See Fletcher v. Doig, 145 F.4th 756, 764 (7th
Cir. 2025) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). See also Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association

Int'l, 5 F.4th 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2021) (stating that “we are not required to draw every
conceivable inference from the record . . . but ‘only those inferences that are reasonable.’”)
(internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also appropriate if a plaintiff cannot
make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. While
the Court may not “weigh evidence or engage in factfinding [,]” it must determine if a

genuine issue remains for trial. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply
rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific evidence
that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof at trial.
See Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004,

1012 (7th Cir. 2018). No issue remains for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . . . if the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250 (citations omitted). Accord Smith v. City of Janesville, 40 F.4th
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2022); Doxtator v. O'Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 860 (7th Cir. 2022). In other
words, “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” DiPerna v.

Chicago School of Professional Psychology, 893 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal
citation omitted). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (finding that “[t]he mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”).
Instead, the non-moving party must present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the
[summary judgment] motion.” Burton v. Kohn L. Firm, S.C., 934 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir.

2019) (internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
A. Personal Involvement
Defendant McCarthy argues he cannot be liable for any alleged violations of

Plaintiff’s rights because he was not personally involved in any of the conduct that gave
rise to the alleged violations and because Section 1983 does not create a system of
vicarious liability. (Doc. 63, p. 6).

A government official is responsible under Section 1983 for conduct in which they
are personally involved. See Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017).
“Personal involvement in a subordinate's constitutional violation requires supervisors to
know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for
fear of what they might see.” Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 494 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation omitted).
Defendant McCarthy argues he is named as a defendant in this case “only because
of his supervisory role” and points to the fact Plaintiff did not speak with Defendant

McCarthy directly to support his conclusion. (Doc. 63, p. 6). He further alleges “no
evidence can show that [Defendant] McCarthy was involved in the placement of Purdle.”
Id. The Court disagrees. As noted above, Section 1983 does not require personal
interaction between an inmate and a prison official for liability to attach to the official.
What Section 1983 requires is personal involvement. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
McCarthy was the lieutenant in charge when Plaintiff ended his first hunger strike and

told Defendant Grimes that he would not return to House 2A. (Doc. 63-1, p. 19, 30-31).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant McCarthy made, or at least approved of, the decision to
transfer Plaintiff to a Covid-19 quarantine unit because lower-ranking guards cannot
move prisoners without authorization and because Defendant McCarthy was in charge
at the time of this request. (Doc. 63-1, p. 31). Plaintiff also recalled that the guards,

including Defendant McCarthy, met before moving Plaintiff to the Covid quarantine unit.
(Doc. 63-1, p. 31-32). When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as
they must be at the summary judgment stage, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant McCarthy was personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.

B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims.
(Doc. 63, p. 14-15). “Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Leiser v. Kloth,
933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). The test for whether qualified immunity

applies has two prongs: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury, demonstrate that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional
right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged
misconduct. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Defendants argue that neither Count I nor Count II involves a clearly established
constitutional condition of confinement. (Doc. 63, p. 15). Notably, they do not make any

argument as to the first prong of the qualified immunity test. (Doc. 63, p. 15-16). For the
reasons that follow, the Court finds that qualified immunity applies to Plaintiff’s claim
that Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in a hunger strike, but not to the other
retaliatory grounds alleged under Count 1, and that qualified immunity does not apply
to Count 2.

i. Count 1
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity on Count 1 because
going on a hunger strike is not a clearly established protected activity under the First
Amendment. (Doc. 63, p. 15). The preliminary review in this case listed three grounds of
retaliation: i) Plaintiff going on a hunger strike over officials’ failure to act on Plaintiff’s

request for protective custody; ii) Plaintiff refusing housing in Unit 2A; and iii) Plaintiff
complaining that his request for protective custody was being ignored. (Doc. 13, p. 3). In
their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that the first of these grounds is
not protected under the First Amendment. (Doc. 63, p. 15). They make no such claim with
respect to Plaintiff refusing housing or complaining about the handling of his request for
protective custody. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have waived any claim

to qualified immunity with respect to these allegedly retaliatory grounds.
On the other hand, Plaintiff concedes that there is not a constitutionally protected
right to engage in a hunger strike. (Doc. 66, p. 1). Thus, the Court finds that qualified
immunity shields Defendants from the claim that they retaliated against Plaintiff for
going on a hunger strike.
ii. Count 2

Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no case
law that clearly establishes that contracting Covid-19 is an unconstitutional condition of
confinement. (Doc. 63, p. 15). However, that is not what Plaintiff alleges. Rather, Count II
alleges that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement
“by placing him in the COVID-19 quarantine unit.” (Doc. 13, p. 2). The alleged

constitutional violation was not that Plaintiff contracted COVID-19, it was that he was
exposed to an infectious disease, which is a clearly established condition of confinement
which requires a remedy under the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment protects against deliberate indifference to prisoners’
“serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 33 (1993). In Helling, the Supreme Court had “great difficulty agreeing that prison
authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to an inmate's current health problems but
may ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness
and needless suffering the next week or month or year.” 509 U.S. at 33. It went on to note
that exposing inmates to infectious diseases was “one of the prison conditions for which
the Eighth Amendment required a remedy.” Id. This is precisely the condition of

detention to which Defendants exposed Plaintiff.
Defendants cite several cases in support of their position that their conduct did not
violate a clearly established constitutional right. All of them can be distinguished from
this case. In McGee v. Pontow, for instance, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a
case where the plaintiff was required to work on a prison wing where there were Covid-
positive prisoners “twice a day, for only five to seven minutes at a time, while masked,

gloved, and able to clean himself.” No. 23-1487, 2023 WL 7381450, *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 8,
2023). That is an entirely different situation from the position in which Defendants placed
Plaintiff.
The other cases to which Defendants cite are also not helpful. One case did not
address qualified immunity. See, e.g., Shipp v. Lobenstein . No. 21-cv-167-JDP, 2024 WL

4264354, at *11 n.2 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2024) (stating that “[b]ecause I am dismissing
Shipp's claims on the merits, I need not consider defendants’ qualified immunity
arguments.”). Defendants also cited Coates v. Arndt, No. 20-C-1344, 2020 WL 6801884
(E.D. Wisc. Nov. 18, 2020), which concerned a plaintiff who contracted Covid-19 after
moving from one prison unit to another. However, “[t]here [was] no allegation that

Coates’ cellmate was infected, nor that Captain Arndt knew that any of the inmates on
Unit 17 had COVID-19.” Id. at *1. The case of Earl v. McDermott, No. 23-CV-1017-PP, 2024
WL 1012920 (E.D. Wisc. Mar. 8, 2024), is also similar. In Earl, the plaintiff “[did] not allege
that he had contact with any Unit 11 or Unit 9 incarcerated persons who tested positive
for COVID-19 or who were roomed in cells with people who did. Nor does he allege that
he ever contacted any defendant about symptoms he was experiencing or concerns that

he had.” Id. at *6. Plaintiff has alleged his cellmate was infected and Defendants knew
that the cellmate was infected – it is self-evident the cellmate was housed on the
quarantine because he was infected.
Finally, Defendants rely on Housley v. Plasse to show that qualified immunity
should apply where prison officials attempt to follow Covid policies. That case is also not
helpful. In Housley, the court found that “[i]t is clearly established that prison officials

may not ‘be deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious,
communicable disease’ under the Eighth Amendment.” 688 F. Supp. 3d 830, 836-837
(2023) (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 33). It went on to explain that “[a]lthough COVID-19
was a new virus, the duty to protect inmates from needless exposure to a serious illness
‘need not be litigated and then established disease by disease[.]’” Id. (citing Estate of Clark

v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 2017)).
While the District Court found that qualified immunity applied to the Housley
defendants because they were not on notice that their particular conduct -- failing to
provide masks, cleaning supplies, testing, or adequate treatment of COVID-19 symptoms
-- violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, 688 F. Supp. 3d at 837, that is not so in the

case before this Court. Defendants must have known that putting Plaintiff, who had not
tested positive for COVID-19, in a quarantine cell with an inmate who had tested positive
for COVID-19 would expose Plaintiff to a serious communicable disease. Nor have
Defendants provided evidence to show that it was official policy to house quarantined
and healthy inmates in the same cell. The Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have
recognized a prisoner’s right not to be exposed to serious communicable diseases for

decades. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33; Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2007)
(collecting cases). Defendants cannot claim qualified immunity for exposing Plaintiff to
COVID-19.
C. Merits of the Claims
i. Count 1
Plaintiff must show three things to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim:

(1) that he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) that he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) that
the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants' decision
to take retaliatory action. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation omitted). As noted above, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with

respect to Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for engaging in a hunger strike. Accordingly, the
Court finds as moot Defendants’ argument that engaging in a hunger strike is not
protected speech. Defendants make no argument that the other grounds for retaliation
were not protected speech. The Court finds that Defendants have waived any such
arguments.
1. Severity of Deprivation

The first issue before the Court is the severity of the alleged deprivation that
Plaintiff suffered. As with the arguments on protected speech, Defendants focus
exclusively on whether placing Plaintiff in a quarantine cell with an infected inmate
deterred Plaintiff from engaging in a hunger strike. (Doc. 63, p. 9). This argument is moot.
However, because analysis of the severity of a deprivation applies equally to the other

grounds for retaliation in this case, the Court will address the issue.
A deprivation is severe enough to amount to retaliation under the First
Amendment where it “would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in protected activity.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878 (7th Cir. 2011)). A deprivation need not result
in harm, nor must it be extreme, to deter protected activity. See, e.g., Douglas, 964 F.3d at

649 (noting that threat may be sufficient to deter protected activity); Massey v. Johnson,
457 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that “to give rise to liability, the retaliatory
harassment need not be extreme.”).
Defendants claim that because Plaintiff’s Covid symptoms were “minimal,” they
would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected

activity. (Doc. 63, p. 9). They are incorrect on at least two grounds. First, the question is
not what harm Plaintiff suffered, it is whether the alleged deprivation – moving Plaintiff
into a quarantine cell with a person who was infected with Covid-19 – would deter
protected activity. A realistic threat can chill First Amendment rights. See Hodgkins ex rel.
Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1056 (7th Cir. 2004). Here, a reasonable jury could find

that deliberately exposing an inmate to Covid-19, and thus to the potential harms that
Covid-19 could cause, would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in protected activity.3
Second, Plaintiff explained during his deposition that he suffered from memory

problems in the year after he contracted Covid-19. (Doc. 63-1, p. 39). Covid-19 has been
linked to cognitive problems even after other symptoms have resolved.4 Thus, even if the
severity of the symptoms that Plaintiff suffered were the central issue in the severity of
the alleged deprivation, there would be a genuine dispute of material fact that would
preclude summary judgment on the matter.
2. Motivating Factor

The second question before the Court is whether Plaintiff’s protected activity was
at least a motivating factor in the alleged retaliation against him. A plaintiff need only
show that retaliation was a motivating factor, not the motivating factor, for the underlying
conduct. See Byrd v. Smith, No. 24-2663, 2025 WL 3645147, *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025) (citing
Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 719-720 (7th Cir. 2006)). Where a plaintiff asserts a

retaliatory motive and a defendant merely asserts a non-retaliatory motive, summary
judgment is not appropriate. See, e.g., Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 810-811 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that summary judgment was inappropriate where record was “swearing
contest” as to alleged retaliatory motive).

3 The fact that Plaintiff was not deterred from engaging in protected activity is not
relevant. See, e.g., Reeves, 964 F.3d at 646-647 (noting that plaintiff continuing to engage in
protected activity was an “irrelevant circumstance” to First Amendment retaliation
analysis).

4 See, e.g., Hampshire et al., Cognition and Memory after Covid-19 in a Large Community
Sample, 390 NEW ENG. J. MED. 806 (2024).
Defendants claim that none of them knew that Plaintiff had requested protective
custody, and so the request could not have motivated their conduct. (Doc. 63, p. 10-11).

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants Perdue or Slunaker
knew about his requests for custody. They are entitled to summary judgment on Count
1. However, the record shows a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants
Grimes and McCarthy knew about Plaintiff’s request. At his deposition, Plaintiff
explained that he told Defendant Grimes he could not return to his cell in Unit C, and he
had requested protective custody. (Doc. 63-1, p. 19). Defendant Grimes left and spoke to

his superiors. When he returned, he said that “they” had decided that he would be moved
to the Covid-19 quarantine unit. Id. at p. 19-20. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff
spoke with Defendant Grimes about his refusal to return to his cell in Unit C. (Doc. 63, p.
3). A reasonable jury could conclude, based on the record, that Defendant Grimes knew
of Plaintiff’s request for protective custody and that, as Plaintiff alleges, he told Defendant

McCarthy about the request before Plaintiff was moved to the quarantine unit. This
genuine dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment for Defendants Grimes
and McCarthy on Count 1.
ii. Count 2
The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on prison officials to ‘provide humane

conditions of confinement.’” Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To prevail on an Eight Amendment conditions
of confinement claim, a plaintiff must make two showings: “first, an objective
showing that the conditions are sufficiently serious—i.e., that they deny the inmate the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, creating an excessive risk to the inmate's
health and safety—and second, a subjective showing of a defendant's culpable state of

mind.” Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotation
omitted). Defendants have not shown that no reasonable jury could find that the first
prong of the test is satisfied.
A reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious
condition. Defendants argue the Covid-19 pandemic was not an “objectively serious”
condition because Plaintiff suffered only mild Covid-19 symptoms. (Doc. 63, p. 12-13).

First, and as noted above, the deprivation at issue in this case is exposing Plaintiff to
Covid-19.
Covid-19 hospitalized and killed millions of people in the United States and
around the world. It was also the third-leading cause of death in the United States in 2020
and 2021.5 It is simply not plausible that exposing an inmate to a dangerous and

infectious disease cannot satisfy the deliberate indifference standard as a matter of law.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 840 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that objective prong
of deliberate indifference analysis “easily satisfied” with respect to risk posed by Covid-
19 in prison environment); Housley, 688 F. Supp. 3d. at 836. A reasonable jury could
conclude that the risk of exposure to Covid-19 satisfies the first prong of deliberate

indifference.

5 National Institutes of Health, “COVID-19 was third leading cause of death in the
United States in both 2020 and 2021,” July 5, 2022, https://www.nih.gov/news-
events/news-releases/covid-19-was-third-leading-cause-death-united-states-both-2020-
2021.
Defendants next make a series of arguments that they lacked actual knowledge of
various facts related to Plaintiff’s detention in the quarantine unit, which precludes any

finding that they acted with deliberate indifference. The Court will address each
Defendant in turn.
The Court turns first to Defendant Grimes. Plaintiff’s allegation against Defendant
Grimes is that he told the other Defendants about Plaintiff’s request not to be returned to
2-House after the end of his first hunger strike. (Doc. 63-1, p. 31). Plaintiff does not allege
that Defendant Grimes knew that Plaintiff would be moved to the Covid-19 quarantine

unit or that he was a part of the decision to send Plaintiff there. Further, Plaintiff notes
that Defendant Grimes was a correctional officer, not a sergeant or lieutenant, and thus,
he could not make the decision to send Plaintiff to any specific housing unit. Plaintiff has
not shown that Defendant Grimes knew about the risk that Plaintiff would be exposed to
Covid-19 or that he acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. The Court finds that

Defendant Grimes is entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.
The Court turns next to Defendant Perdue. Defendant Perdue claims that, because
he did not have actual knowledge that Plaintiff’s eventual cellmate in the Covid-19
quarantine unit had Covid-19, and because he lacked the authority to reassign Plaintiff
to a different cell, he could not have acted with deliberate indifference. Defendant Perdue

was at the entrance to the quarantine unit when Plaintiff arrived there and confirmed to
Plaintiff that the unit was for inmates who had Covid-19. (Doc. 63, p. 13; Doc. 63-1, p. 35-
36). It seems evident that a reasonable jury could infer that a guard working on a Covid-
19 quarantine unit knew, or should have known, that the inmates housed there had
Covid-19. As for knowledge, Defendant Perdue appears to assert that his only options,
when faced with an inmate who was going into quarantine when he was not infected,

were to expose that inmate to an infectious disease or reassign him to a different housing
unit. (Doc. 63, p. 13). A reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Perdue could have
taken other steps, such as contacting a supervisor or confirming whether Plaintiff had
Covid-19. A reasonable jury could further conclude that failing to take those steps, and
instead threatening to send Plaintiff to segregated housing, (Doc. 63-1, p. 36). constitutes
deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Defendant Perdue is not entitled to summary

judgment on Count 2.
Defendant Slunaker is not entitled to summary judgment on Count 2, either.
Defendant Slunaker took Plaintiff into the quarantine unit and put him in a cell with a
Covid-positive inmate. (Doc. 63, p. 13; Doc. 63-1, p. 38). Defendant Slunaker argues that
because Plaintiff did not exhibit symptoms of Covid-19 when he was put into a cell in the

quarantine unit, Defendant Slunaker cannot have acted with deliberate indifference. The
Court disagrees. Defendant Slunaker was present when Plaintiff protested going into a
quarantine cell. The inmate in that cell, who had Covid-19, told Defendant Slunaker not
to put Plaintiff into the cell with him because he was sick and Plaintiff would get sick.
(Doc. 63-1, p. 38). A reasonable jury could conclude from those facts that Defendant

Slunaker acted with deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Defendant Slunaker is not
entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.
Finally, Defendant McCarthy is not entitled to summary judgment on Count 2. As
discussed above in the section on personal involvement, Plaintiff has pointed to facts that,
viewed in the light most favorable to him, could support a finding that Defendant
McCarthy either ordered Plaintiff's transfer to a quarantine cell or knew of and condoned
the transfer. Defendant McCarthy has not disputed that he was the lieutenant in
command when the transfer occurred, nor has he indicated that the decision might have
been taken by somebody else. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant McCarthy is
not entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court grants summary judgment to all
Defendants on Count 1 as it pertains to alleged retaliation for Plaintiff engaging ina
hunger strike and to Defendants Perdue and Slunaker as to retaliation for Plaintiff's
request for protective custody. Count 1 will continue as to the other Defendants on
retaliation for requesting protective custody. The Court grants summary judgment to
Defendant Grimes on Count 2. Count 2 will continue against the other Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 30, 2026. G bert C Piaitally signed by

GILBERTC.SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308672. Public record. Not legal advice.