# State v. Myers

> Ohio Court of Appeals · April 10, 2026 · 2026 Ohio 1303

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308092

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** April 10, 2026
- **Citations:** 2026 Ohio 1303
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Hanseman
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

[Cite as State v. Myers, 2026-Ohio-1303.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2024-CA-58
Appellant :
: Trial Court Case No. 1993 CR 0066
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
DAVID LEE MYERS : Court)
:
Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION

...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 10, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is reversed in part and is affirmed in part. The judgment on the motion for leave to

file a motion for new trial is affirmed. The judgments on the motion for new trial and the

petition for postconviction relief are reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court with

instructions to enter judgments overruling the motion for new trial and denying the petition

for postconviction relief.

Costs to be paid as follows: 50% by appellant and 50% by appellee.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,

ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur.

OPINION
GREENE C.A. No. 2024-CA-58

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellant
NATALIE OLMSTEAD, CHRISTOPHER A. LAROCCO, and MAXWELL H. KING, Attorneys
for Appellee

HANSEMAN, J.

{¶ 1} In this death-penalty case, the State of Ohio appeals from judgments granting

David Lee Myers’ motion for leave to file a motion for new trial, his new trial motion, and his

petition for postconviction relief. According to the State, the trial court erred or abused its

discretion in several ways. Concerning the motion for leave to file a motion for new trial, the

State contends the trial court erred in concluding that Myers was unavoidably prevented

from discovering new DNA evidence, in holding the State to an unsupported standard of law,

and by considering the merits of the motion for new trial before granting the motion for leave.

{¶ 2} Regarding the new trial motion, the State argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by considering improper evidence that was not part of the grounds for a new trial.

Finally, concerning the petition for postconviction relief, the State contends the trial court

lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter and abused its discretion in granting the petition.

2
{¶ 3} After reviewing the record and for the reasons discussed below, we conclude

that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for leave to file a motion for new trial.

However, the court did abuse its discretion in granting a new trial because its decision was

based on unsound reasoning and it failed to apply correct legal principles. The court also

failed to follow statutory requirements with respect to the postconviction petition and

therefore lacked jurisdiction over it. Accordingly, the judgment granting Myers leave to file

the motion for new trial is affirmed. The judgments granting a new trial and granting the

petition for postconviction relief, however, are reversed and remanded with instructions to

enter judgments overruling the motion for new trial and denying the petition for

postconviction relief.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 4} The early history of this case is described as follows in our decision on Myers’

direct appeal, which was issued in February 1999:

On the evening of August 3, 1988, Amanda Maher and Glenn Smith

went to Five Points Tavern, in Xenia. Defendant, David Lee Myers, entered

the bar and began playing pool with Smith and Lee Weimer, a bartender.

During the course of the evening Glenn Smith had quite a bit to drink. Around

12:30-1:00 a.m. on August 4, 1988, Amanda Maher, Glenn Smith, and David

Myers left Five Points Tavern in Smith’s car and drove to another bar a short

distance away, the Roundtable.

When they arrived at the Roundtable, Amanda Maher went inside while

Glenn Smith and David Lee Myers argued in the parking lot outside. When

Smith and Myers entered the bar, Smith became rowdy and broke a glass,

prompting the barmaid to call police.

3
At approximately 1:13 a.m. Xenia Police Officers Savage and Rinehart

arrived at the Roundtable and arrested Glenn Smith for disorderly conduct.

Police gave Smith’s wallet to Amanda Maher to enable her to get home. David

Myers told Glenn Smith and Officer Savage that he would make sure Amanda

Maher got home. Officers Savage and Rinehart then transported Glenn Smith

to the Greene County Jail. Officer Rinehart resumed his normal patrol duties

at 1:23 a.m.

Amanda Maher and David Lee Myers searched both inside and outside

the Roundtable bar for the keys to Glenn Smith’s car, but couldn’t find them.

They then left together. Another patron, Charles Van Hoose, saw them walking

across the parking lot in the direction of Home Avenue. At approximately 1:30-

1:35 a.m., Officer Rinehart observed Amanda Maher and David Lee Myers

walking down Home Avenue, near the intersection with South Detroit Street.

At 2:10 a.m., David Lee Myers was seen by Lee Weimer, the bartender

at Five Points Tavern, and Brenda Osborne, one of the customers, getting into

his car, which was parked across the street from Five Points Tavern. At

approximately 2:15 a.m., Myers entered the Roundtable bar at last call and

ordered a drink. Myers immediately went to the restroom, and upon his return

sat down and began to talk with another customer, Don Hilderbran. When

Hilderbran asked Myers if he “got any,” Myers responded that he tried but “she”

wasn’t willing so he just dropped her off. Myers subsequently left the

Roundtable and went to Hilderbran’s house.

At around 3:00 a.m., Jennifer Berry and Julia Griffith were walking

through an old railroad bed area near Railroad Street in Xenia when they

4
discovered Amanda Maher, lying on the tracks and gasping for air. The area

is on a path that is a direct walking route between Five Points Tavern and the

Roundtable bar. Berry and Griffith ran home and called police.

At approximately 3:40 a.m., Xenia police officers, including Officers

Savage and Rinehart, arrived on the scene. They discovered Amanda Maher

lying on her back with the right side of her face turned upward. She was naked

but for a shirt that was pulled up around her neck. A railroad spike had been

driven into Amanda Maher’s head at the temple. She was gasping for air.

Amanda Maher’s injuries were so severe that Officer Savage didn’t recognize

her. Amanda Maher was just three hundred yards from where Officer Rinehart

had seen her and David Lee Myers walking together. Amanda Maher died

while being care flighted to Miami Valley Hospital.

Xenia Police quickly classified David Lee Myers as a suspect. When

questioned, Myers told police that Amanda Maher was at the Roundtable bar

looking for Glenn Smith’s car keys when he last saw her. Myers’ statement

conflicted with the observations of Officer Rinehart, who had seen Amanda

Maher and David Lee Myers walking together just three hundred yards from

the murder scene. When police confronted Myers with Officer Rinehart’s

observation, Myers had no response. Police then arrested David Lee Myers

and charged him with the murder of Amanda Maher.

An autopsy revealed that Amanda Maher had been strangled. Three

rocks had been pushed into her vaginal cavity. She had a laceration to her

forehead consistent with an attempt to drive the railroad spike into her skull at

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that location. Cause of death was severe head trauma from the railroad spike

that was driven through her head at the right temple.

A taping of Amanda Maher’s pubic area produced a foreign pubic hair.

Forensic testing, including microscopic and DNA analysis, indicated that Glenn

Smith and two other potential suspects, Gregg Grimes and Terry Rogers,

could not have been the donor of that hair. The foreign pubic hair was

microscopically similar in all respects to David Myers’ known pubic hair

standard. Further, Myers was included within the two percent of the Caucasian

population that could have been the donor of that hair. When police conducted

a search of Myers’ car, they discovered the wallets of Amanda Maher and

Glenn Smith underneath the front seat, concealed inside a glove.

After he was jailed on this murder charge Myers spoke with another

inmate, Clarence David Tincher. While the two men were discussing their past

sexual exploits, Myers stated that they couldn’t get him on a rape. Myers then

asked Tincher if he ever put three rocks up a girl. When Tincher replied no,

Myers stated that he had done that. A few days later when Tincher asked

Myers “why” a railroad spike, Myers responded, “because it was handy.” Myers

then told Tincher never to try and drive anything through a person’s forehead

because it won’t go, but it will go through the temple. When Myers made these

statements to Tincher the details of this crime, including the rocks that were in

the victim’s vagina, the forehead wound, and the temple location of the railroad

spike through her head, had not yet been made public by Xenia police.

On August 8, 1988, David Lee Myers was indicted on one count of

Aggravated Murder, R.C. 2903.01(B), with a death penalty specification that

6
the offense had been committed while Myers was committing aggravated

robbery, and that Myers was the principal offender in the aggravated murder.

R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). The case number assigned to this cause was 88-CR-251.

Following years of extensive pretrial litigation, the State dismissed this case

via a nolle prosequi on February 1, 1991.

Two years later, on February 4, 1993, David Lee Myers was reindicted

in case number 93-CR-66 on this same charge, with the same death penalty

specification. Once again there was extensive pretrial litigation. A jury trial

commenced on January 2, 1996. Myers’ defense at trial was that the evidence

was insufficient to prove that he was Amanda Maher’s killer. According to

Myers’ theory of the case, two other persons, Gregg Grimes and Terry Rogers,

were likely perpetrators of the crime.

On February 8, 1996, the jury found David Lee Myers guilty as charged.

The penalty phase of the proceedings began on February 20, 1996, following

which the jury concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the

mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, on February 23,

1996, the jury recommended that David Lee Myers be sentenced to death.

The trial court, after conducting its own independent review, reached the same

conclusion. Thus, on March 1, 1996, the trial court sentenced David Lee Myers

to death for the aggravated murder of Amanda Maher. The trial court also

imposed a sentence of ten to twenty-five years imprisonment for aggravated

robbery. On March 14, 1996, the trial court filed an amended sentencing entry

deleting the sentence for aggravated robbery.

State v. Myers, 1999 WL 94917, *1-3 (2d Dist. Feb. 12, 1999) (“Myers I”).

7
{¶ 5} In the direct appeal, Myers asserted twenty assignments of error, all of which

we overruled. In one instance, we did find error in the trial court’s admission of “other acts”

testimony from a prior alleged rape victim but found it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because the totality of direct and circumstantial evidence of Myers’ guilt was “overwhelming”

Id. at *7. Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirmed the judgment of the trial

court.

{¶ 6} Myers then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, raising 32 propositions of

law. After rejecting Myers’ arguments, the court affirmed the convictions and death sentence.

State v. Myers, 2002-Ohio-6658, ¶ 27 (“Myers II”). On one point, the court did disagree with

our opinion, finding that the “other acts” testimony was properly admitted. Id. at ¶ 101-106.

On December 31, 2002, the court denied Myers’ request for reconsideration. See State v.

Myers, 2002-Ohio-7367. The United States Supreme Court then denied certiorari in Myers

v. Ohio, 539 U.S. 906 (2003) (filed on June 2, 2003).

{¶ 7} While Myers’ direct appeal was pending in the Supreme Court of Ohio, he asked

the trial court in May 1999 to appoint postconviction counsel; the court did so in June 1999.

Counsel filed a postconviction petition in September 1999, a first amended petition later that

month, and a second amended petition in November 1999. In the petitions, Myers asserted

36 claims for relief. See State v. Myers, 2001 WL 929934 (2d Dist. Aug. 17, 2001) (“Myers

III”). After the trial court granted summary judgment to the State, Myers filed a notice of

appeal in April 2000.

{¶ 8} On appeal, Myers asserted five assignments of error, including that trial counsel

was ineffective. We noted that the petition was supported by the affidavit of William

Summers, Myers’ trial counsel, who claimed he rendered ineffective assistance of counsel

for several reasons, including: (1) he was unprepared for trial due to his involvement in other

8
significant cases the year before trial; (2) he became ill during trial; (3) he was unfamiliar

with DNA evidence; and (4) co-counsel entered the case shortly before trial when it was too

late to call a DNA expert. Id. at *2-5. The petition was also supported by affidavits of co-

counsel, Barry Wilford, former counsel, Dennis Pusateri (who had been Myers’ attorney from

1990 until mid-1993), and Christine Watson, Summers’ paralegal. All three criticized

Summers’ trial performance. In addition, Myers attached the affidavit of Kim Grimes (the ex-

wife of Gregg Grimes) and the affidavit of an investigator for the Ohio Public Defender’s

Office. Id. at *5-11, 14.

{¶ 9} In reviewing the matter, we considered all claims that Myers had presented in

the postconviction petition. We rejected them all on various grounds, including that they were

barred by res judicia, were unsupported by cogent evidence outside the appellate record,

should have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, or were not supported by substantive

grounds. Myers III at *11-25.

{¶ 10} After we affirmed the trial court’s postconviction decision, Myers appealed to

the Supreme Court of Ohio, but the court declined to accept the appeal. See State v. Myers,

2003-Ohio-259 (“Myers IV”) (issued on January 29, 2003). As noted above, the month

before, the Supreme Court of Ohio had rejected Myers’ claims in the direct appeal of the

murder judgment. See Myers II, 2002-Ohio-6658.

{¶ 11} On September 30, 2003, Myers filed an application with our court seeking to

reopen his direct appeal. State v. Myers, No. 1996 CA 0038 (2d Dist. Sept. 30, 2003)

(“Myers V”). After we denied the application on November 26, 2003, Myers again appealed

to the Supreme Court of Ohio on January 1, 2004. The court affirmed our judgment, finding

the application to reopen was time-barred because Myers did not file his application until

four years after his postconviction counsel had been appointed. The court also found Myers’

9
claims lacked merit. See State v. Myers, 2004-Ohio-3075, ¶ 4-8 (“Myers VI”). This decision

was issued on June 30, 2004, and Myers did not further appeal.

{¶ 12} In the meantime, Myers had begun federal habeas proceedings in federal

district court. On January 5, 2004, Myers filed an application for a stay of execution pending

filing of a habeas petition, notice of his intent to file a habeas petition, and a request for

appointed counsel. See Myers v. Bagley, No. 1:04-mc-00001-ALM-NMK (S.D.Ohio Jan. 5,

2004) (“Myers VII”). 1 On January 23, 2004, the district court stayed the execution and

appointed counsel for Myers. Subsequently, on May 21, 2004, Myers filed his first petition

for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was 166 pages long and contained 34 claims for

relief. The habeas case was quite active in 2004 and 2005, including the court’s approval in

June 2005 of Myers’ “proposed budget.” The case was also fairly active in 2006 and 2007,

when the court approved Myers’ filing of a “revised proposed budget” under seal in late May

2007.

{¶ 13} In 2008, a few filings were made (mainly concerning payment of attorney fees),

and in 2009, only one document was filed. Nothing more occurred in the habeas case until

early December 2010, when the court ordered Myers “to consult with CJA Budgeting

Attorney Robert Ranz in developing a budget and to file proposed budget, ex parte and

under seal” within 30 days of the court’s order. A second revised preliminary budget was

filed within the appropriate time in January 2011. Several filings occurred in 2011, although

nothing substantial, and the next docket entry did not occur for more than three years, when

a joint motion for a scheduling order was filed in January 2015.

1. Concerning the habeas case, we have reviewed the federal court docket, which is
available online on PACER. Under established authority, we may take judicial notice of
matters that are publicly available on the internet. E.g., Clark v. Beyoglides, 2021-Ohio-4588,
¶ 6, fn. 1 (2d Dist.). All references to dockets relating to Myers’ many pleadings have been
verified in this manner.

10
{¶ 14} During 2015, several events occurred, including the warden’s (Bagley’s)

refiling of the state record, the district court’s grant of permission to Myers to file an amended

habeas petition (which was filed in late August 2015), and the warden’s filing of appendices.

The amended habeas petition was 164 pages in length, also contained 34 claims, and was

quite similar to the 2004 petition. Although some filings were made in 2016 through 2018,

nothing of particular substance occurred other than the court’s denial in September 2017 of

Myers’ motion to file a second amended habeas petition. More than a year then passed,

then in October 2018, Myers filed a motion asking the court to appoint counsel, which the

court did in November 2018. Notably, Myers was represented by counsel throughout the

federal habeas case.

{¶ 15} No more filings occurred in the habeas case until March 29, 2019, when Myers’

counsel, Carolyn Wright, filed a motion to conduct DNA testing and to conduct discovery.

Ultimately, in February 2020, the district court granted Myers’ motion for leave to conduct

discovery. See Myers v. Bagley, 2020 WL 633317 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 11, 2020).

{¶ 16} On July 10, 2020, Myers filed a joint status report, which included a proposed

testing order. After the warden moved for a revised testing order, the court issued a revised

order on July 21, 2020. Nothing more of any substance occurred for nearly two years until

Myers filed a joint status report on June 28, 2022, which included the attachments “Exhibit

1 - Clement DNA Report, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Schiro DNA Report.” Myers VII, Joint Status Report

(S.D.Ohio June 28, 2022).

{¶ 17} Shortly before that filing in the habeas case, on June 21, 2022, Myers filed the

following pleadings in his common pleas court case: a petition for postconviction relief (the

“Relief Petition”) and a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial (“leave motion”), plus

appendices. In late April 2023, Myers filed amended pleadings concerning these matters,

11
again with appendices. After the State filed a response and Myers replied, a new judge was

assigned to the case. Then, on February 26, 2024, the court granted Myers leave to file the

motion for new trial, and Myers did so on February 28, together with an appendix.

{¶ 18} In July 2024, the court held combined hearings on both the Relief Petition and

motion for new trial. After hearing the evidence, the court granted the motion for new trial

and filed a separate judgment granting Myers’ Relief Petition. See Judgment Entry –

Granting Defendant’s Motion for New Trial (Aug. 6, 2024) (“New Trial Judgment”), and

Judgment Entry – Granting Petition for Postconviction Relief (Aug. 6, 2024) (“Relief Petition

Judgment”).

{¶ 19} The State then filed a notice for leave to appeal the grant of leave to file a

motion for new trial and for leave to appeal the grant of the new trial, as well as a notice of

appeal concerning the grant of the Relief Petition. We granted the state leave to appeal on

September 4, 2024, the parties filed briefs, and oral argument was held. The matter has now

been submitted for consideration.

{¶ 20} The State has asserted six assignments of error: one concerns the entry

granting the motion for leave to file a motion for new trial; one pertains to the judgment

granting a new trial; and four relate to the judgment granting the petition for postconviction

relief. We begin by considering the motion for leave.

II. Grant of Leave to File Motion for New Trial

{¶ 21} The State’s first assignment of error states:

The trial court abused its discretion in granting Defendant’s Motion for Leave.

{¶ 22} Under this assignment of error, the State presents three main arguments about

the grant of Myers’ motion for leave. The State claims the court abused its discretion: (1) in

concluding that Myers was unavoidably prevented from discovering new DNA evidence; (2)

12
by holding the State to an unsupported standard of law; and (3) by considering the merits of

the motion for new trial before granting the motion for leave.

{¶ 23} We consider these points separately, along with any associated arguments.

Before doing so, we outline legal standards that pertain to new trial motions and motions for

leave.

A. Relevant Standards

{¶ 24} As pertinent here, Crim.R. 33(A)(6) allows new trials to be granted where “new

evidence material to the defense is discovered which the defendant could not with

reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.” An additional requirement

is that the evidence must have materially affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.”

Crim.R. 33(B) requires such motions to be filed within 120 days after a jury verdict was

rendered. Clearly, Myers failed to meet this standard. However, defendants may file untimely

motions if they prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that they were unavoidably

prevented from discovering the evidence on which they must rely. Id.

{¶ 25} In the case of an untimely motion for new trial, a two-step process occurs, with

a motion for leave being filed first. If the court decides the burden has been met, the

defendant will then file the new trial motion. “When a defendant seeks leave to file a motion

for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(B), the trial court may not consider the merits of the proposed

motion for a new trial until after it grants the motion for leave.” State v. Hatton, 2022-Ohio-

3991, ¶ 30, citing State v. Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 41.

{¶ 26} “‘The “unavoidably prevented” requirement in Crim.R. 33(B) mirrors the

“unavoidably prevented” requirement in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1),’” the postconviction relief

statute. Bethel at ¶ 59, quoting State v. Barnes, 2018-Ohio-1585, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.). “To meet

this standard, courts in Ohio have . . . held that a defendant ordinarily must show that he

13
was unaware of the evidence he is relying on and that he could not have discovered the

evidence by exercising reasonable diligence.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing State v. Harrison, 2018-

Ohio-1396, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). “‘Unavoidable’ means ‘not avoidable’ or ‘inevitable.’” State v.

Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134, ¶ 24, quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.

2003). In this regard, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stressed that untimely parties “must

show that any delay in discovering the facts undergirding the petition was ‘incapable of being

avoided or evaded.’” Id., quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.

{¶ 27} Clear and convincing evidence has long been defined as “that measure or

degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the

extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and

which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts

sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus. “Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will

examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it

to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990), citing

Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1 (1887), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 28} Appellate courts review new trial decisions for abuse of discretion. Hatton,

2022-Ohio-3991, at ¶ 29. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is

unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34, citing

State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). “An abuse of discretion most often involves

an unreasonable decision that is not supported by a sound reasoning process.” State v.

McHenry, 2021-Ohio-3118, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community

Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). However, to the extent legal

14
questions are involved, de novo review applies. State v. Scott, 2025-Ohio-300, ¶ 14

(2d Dist.), citing State v. Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710, ¶ 47.

{¶ 29} With these standards in mind, we turn to the State’s first argument.

B. Whether Myers Was Unavoidably Prevented from Discovering New Evidence

{¶ 30} According to the State, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Myers

was unavoidably prevented from discovering new DNA evidence. The “new evidence” in

question pertains to DNA tests conducted on the railroad spike and the three rocks found in

the victim’s vagina. In its later decision on the merits of the new trial motion, the trial court

also mentioned two cigarette butts the State itself tested in 2024. See New Trial Judgment,

p. 2.

{¶ 31} As noted, Myers’ motion for leave was filed on June 21, 2022. The record

related to that motion and the Relief Petition is voluminous. About 20 months after that

motion was filed, the court issued a decision granting the motion for leave. At that time, the

court considered only the DNA evidence. See Judgment Entry – Granting Leave for

Defendant to File Motion for New Trial (Feb. 26, 2024) (“Leave Judgment”).

{¶ 32} In concluding that the leave motion should be granted, the court first found that

“[w]hile affidavits are not required until the merits of the motion are considered, the facts at

this stage of the process are unrebutted that the newly discovered evidence was not

available until 2021 at the earliest.” Id. at p. 9. The court further found that Myers “possessed

no knowledge of any exculpatory evidence until June 2021 when the first DNA report was

prepared.” Id.

{¶ 33} The court went on to find that Myers exercised diligence in attempting to

discover the “new” evidence because the DNA methods being used were not available in

1996; Myers tried to preserve evidence from 1999 onwards; and the “new” evidence only

15
became apparent in 2021 after Myers obtained a federal district court order for DNA testing.

Id. at p. 11. Finally, though the court acknowledged that the more advanced DNA tests “may

have been within the common knowledge of the counsel, defendants and the public,” it was

conjecture whether Myers “understood these advanced methods, their possible evidentiary

value, and when he might have known.” Id. at p. 12. The court further explained its reasoning

as follows:

First, the Defendant sought additional DNA testing in 1999; however, the trial

court denied the request. It does not appear prudent for the Defendant to have

repeatedly challenged the Court after it clearly denied the request in the first

instance. Second, the Defendant has been indigent since the earliest parts of

the prosecution of this case. If, as suggested by counsel, DNA costs fell in the

range of $5,000 to $50,000, then clearly the Defendant was financially

prevented from conducting the tests and discovering the evidence. (See

Defendant’s Exhibit 11). Third, the Defendant did not possess access to the

evidence items. After 1999 when DNA testing was denied by the trial court,

there was no further ability for the Defendant to independently discover the

existence of the male DNA and realize its potential evidentiary value. Fourth,

though only tangentially relevant, if the State could not locate evidence

concerning this offense until June 2022, in spite of the 1999 preservation order,

how can the Defendant be expected to know what evidence exists and whether

it has evidentiary value? (These recently discovered items had no evidentiary

value.)

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(Emphasis in original.) Id. at p. 12-13. The court, therefore, found that Myers was

unavoidably prevented from discovering the new evidence and granted the motion for leave

to file a motion for new trial. Id. at p. 13.

C. Being Unavoidably Prevented From Discovering Evidence and Reasonable Diligence

{¶ 34} As a preliminary point, the trial court’s analysis, as expressed, was based on

incorrect assumptions and standards. The trial court’s decision focused on the rejection of

Myers’ 1999 request for DNA testing, the alleged cost of testing, and its own conjecture that

Myers’ did not understand DNA advances, despite awareness by the general public and his

counsel. Yet Myers has been represented by counsel at all relevant times since first being

indicted in 1988, and “an attorney’s knowledge of facts is ordinarily imputed to the attorney’s

client.” State v. Carson, 2004-Ohio-2741, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). See also State v. Jackson, 2004-

Ohio-5103, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.) (“In exercising reasonable diligence, [defendant] should have filed

the motion for leave to file a motion for new trial as soon as he or his counsel gained

knowledge of the ground for a new trial.”)

{¶ 35} Without outlining exhaustive details on the many attorneys who have

represented Myers in his voluminous state and federal proceedings, we note that he has

been continuously represented by competent appointed and pro bono counsel. E.g.,

Myers I, 1999 WL 94917; Myers II, 2002-Ohio-6658; Myers VII, No. 1:04-mc-00001-ALM-

NMK (S.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2004). The point here is that we cannot find that Myers lacked the

ability to understand advances in DNA testing when he had substantial assistance from

many highly competent attorneys from 1996 to 2022, when his motion for leave was filed.

{¶ 36} The trial court noted the cost of DNA testing, as “suggested” by defense

counsel, and Myers’ indigence during most of the case. In the first place, the court cites only

Defendant’s Ex. 11 for its comment about funding. See Leave Judgment, p. 12. However,

17
this exhibit is simply Myers’ affidavit, in which he comments on his indigence as a basis for

being unavoidably prevented from timely filing his motion. Contrary to the trial court’s

implication, indigence is not a factor. A defendant’s “incarceration, without more, does not

amount to clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering

the evidence within the time limitations of Crim.R. 33(B).” State v. Peterson, 2020-Ohio-

4579, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Smith, 1998 WL 404458, *5 (2d Dist. Mar. 27, 1998).

Accord State v. Knowlton, 2024-Ohio-5869, ¶ 46 (11th Dist.). Implicit in this principle is that

many defendants are indigent or lack funds.

{¶ 37} The trial court also cited cases that were “similar” and “helpful” to its leave

decision. See Leave Judgment, p. 7-9, citing Hatton, 2022-Ohio-3991, Bethel, 2022-Ohio-

783, and State v. McNeal, 2022-Ohio-2703. In all these cases, the State suppressed

evidence favorable to the defendant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

See Hatton at ¶ 31-36; Bethel at ¶ 24-30; McNeal at ¶ 21-23. In Bethel, the prosecution had

suppressed a report implicating other parties in murders for which the defendant had been

convicted. Id. at ¶ 2, 14. The convictions occurred in 2003, and the defendant may have

discovered the report possibly in 2008, but the date of discovery was unclear. Id. at ¶ 14,

16, 18.

{¶ 38} In any event, the defendant in Bethel filed a second postconviction petition and

a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial in 2018, which were rejected by the trial and

appellate courts. The trial court reasoned the defendant was not unavoidably prevented from

discovering the evidence because his attorneys “could have uncovered the information by

talking to” witnesses they were aware of at trial. Id. at ¶ 1-3, 15, 22. Using similar reasoning,

the court of appeals found that “a ‘defendant cannot claim evidence was undiscoverable

18
simply because no one made efforts to obtain the evidence sooner.’” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting

State v. Bethel, 2020-Ohio-1343, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 39} The Supreme Court of Ohio held, however, that lower courts had placed a

burden on the defendant that was inconsistent with Brady. Specifically, the court noted that

“[a] defendant seeking to assert a Brady claim . . . is not required to show that he could not

have discovered suppressed evidence by exercising reasonable diligence.” Bethel, 2022-

Ohio-783, at ¶ 25, citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282-285 (1999). The court,

therefore held that “when a defendant seeks to assert a Brady claim in an untimely or

successive petition for postconviction relief, the defendant satisfies the ‘unavoidably

prevented’ requirement contained in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) by establishing that the

prosecution suppressed the evidence on which the defendant relies.” Id.

{¶ 40} Thus, in cases that do not involve Brady claims, defendants must still show

they exercised reasonable diligence with respect to untimely new trial motions and untimely

successive postconviction petitions. This, in fact, is the position that the Supreme Court of

Ohio has taken. See Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134, at ¶ 18 (clarifying that in the context of

R.C. 2953.21, the petitioner may make the required showing of being unavoidably prevented

“either by establishing a violation under Brady . . . or by demonstrating that he was previously

unaware of the evidence on which the petition relies and could not have discovered it by

exercising reasonable diligence”). Cases like Bethel, Hatton, and McNeal are not similar

because the defendants in those cases were not required to make a showing of reasonable

diligence.

{¶ 41} The case before us does not involve a Brady claim, so Myers still had the

burden to establish that he acted with reasonable diligence. Bethel is only relevant in that

the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the view of many appellate districts that defendants

19
must file a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial within a “reasonable time” after

discovering new evidence. The Supreme Court reasoned that because Crim.R. 33(B)

prescribes the circumstances under which defendants can seek new trials, trial courts

cannot add a requirement not mentioned in the rule. Bethel, 2020-Ohio-1343, at ¶ 51-57.

{¶ 42} On the issue of reasonable diligence, Myers knew in 1996 or before that the

foreign pubic hair found on the victim’s body had been consumed in testing and that no

further or advanced DNA analysis would be possible. In fact, the pubic hair was no longer

available even as of 1989, when it was last tested by Dr. Blake, because it was used up

during DNA testing. See 1996 Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 1681-1685, 1945-1948, 1985.2 As a

result, any developments in DNA technology would be irrelevant to this evidence. Myers was

also aware from the beginning of the case that the railroad spike that had been driven

through Amanda’s head and the rocks discovered in her vagina had been collected and

were available for testing. In fact, the spike and rocks were tested for sperm in 1988, and

Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) forensic scientist Michelle Yezzo found no

sperm on the rocks. Tr. 1590-1592. Myers did not request any additional testing between

1988 and 1996, nor did he ask for DNA testing of these items during that time. As the State

points out, the proper focus is the time of trial in 1996, not what occurred in 1988.

{¶ 43} “There is a material difference between being unaware of certain information

and being unavoidably prevented from discovering that information, even in the exercise of

due diligence.” State v. Warwick, 2002 WL 1585663, *3 (2d Dist. July 19, 2002). Accord

State v. Lenoir, 2016-Ohio-4981, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.); State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-4800, ¶ 48

(10th Dist.). “We have held that a defendant fails to demonstrate that he or she was

2. For ease of reading, we do not insert commas for references to transcript page numbers
over 999.

20
unavoidably prevented from discovering new evidence when he would have discovered that

information earlier had he or she exercised due diligence and some effort.” Lenoir at ¶ 24,

citing State v. Metcalf, 2015-Ohio-3507, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). Given that Myers was aware of the

existence of the rocks and the spike and given that he was represented by counsel at all

relevant times, the delay in seeking testing is troubling. Developments in technology were

well-known and accepted in courts long before Myers filed the federal court motion for testing

in 2019.

{¶ 44} Nonetheless, as noted, Bethel recently held that courts may not impose a

reasonable time limit for filing a motion for leave after discovering new evidence, which was

a practice courts in Ohio had formerly followed. Again, in this vein, the Ohio Supreme Court

reasoned that the language in Crim.R. 33(B) and the other Rules of Criminal Procedure lack

such a specific requirement. Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783, at ¶ 51-57. Although we believe the

delay in filing between 1996 and 2022 was clearly excessive, it appears that in reviewing a

motion for leave to move for a new trial, we can no longer consider a failure to file within a

reasonable time. In our opinion, there is a difference between failing to exercise diligence in

discovering new evidence and failing to file within a reasonable time after discovering it. Had

we been able to decide the case on this basis, and for the reasons discussed here and

below, we would have found that Myers failed to exercise reasonable diligence in

discovering new evidence. However, another decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio also

impacts our analysis.

{¶ 45} The trial court filed its decision in July 2024, when it did not have the benefit of

the December 2024 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710. In Grad,

the defendant was charged in 2008 with felonious assault and endangering his two-month-

old son after the child was discovered to have sustained multiple fractures. The child’s

21
mother was also charged, and she was convicted in 2009. Id. at ¶ 5, 8, fn. 1. The father’s

case ultimately was tried in late 2014, with the father arguing before trial that evolving

changes in science would indicate that the fractures were due to evidence of a metabolic

bone disorder rather than imposed fractures. Although the father was given money for

experts and had retained three, his attorney did not present an expert at trial; instead, he

only cross-examined the State’s expert. Id. at ¶ 8-13.

{¶ 46} The father was convicted and sentenced to 24 years in prison. After his

postconviction petition based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel was rejected, in

October 2021, he filed an motion for leave to file an untimely motion for new trial. The motion

was based on four studies done between 2016 and 2021 that allegedly contradicted the

doctor’s trial testimony. The father also included new information about the child’s family

medical history. Id. at ¶ 35-40. After the trial court denied the motion without a hearing, the

court of appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court then accepted the father’s appeal. Id. at

¶ 44-46.

{¶ 47} On appeal, the court reversed the lower court decisions and remanded the

case for a hearing on the motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. Grad, 2024-Ohio-

5710, at ¶ 82. In this regard, a few observations are in order. First, Grad was a plurality

opinion. Only two members of the court agreed with the lead opinion, one member concurred

in the judgment only, and three justices dissented. “A plurality opinion does not constitute

binding authority, but a court may rely on a plurality opinion if it finds the opinion to be

persuasive.” State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-2585, ¶ 19,

citing NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. Testa, 2017-Ohio-9118, ¶ 18. Accord In re Adoption of

J.R.I., 2023-Ohio-475, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.).

22
{¶ 48} Grad is not particularly persuasive. The lead opinion in Grad stated that “new

scientific evidence may constitute newly discovered evidence under Crim.R. 33(A)(6) and

(B). In particular, when scientific evidence provided substantial support for an element of a

crime at trial, a significant posttrial change in the state of scientific knowledge concerning

that trial evidence may constitute newly discovered evidence.” Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710, at

¶ 63. The lead opinion declined “to define the degree of change required in terms of a

‘quantum leap,’ or another term that focuses on how dramatically the change is perceived

by the scientific community.” Id. at ¶ 64, quoting State v. Butts, 2023-Ohio-2670, ¶ 70

(10th Dist.). This is not particularly helpful, since opinions can easily vary on how “significant”

a change may be.

{¶ 49} The lead opinion did “recognize that determining whether a change in scientific

evidence is significant when judging a motion for leave differs somewhat from the question

at the center of a motion for a new trial—which involves convincing the court that the new

evidence ‘discloses a strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted,’”

(Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 65, quoting Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505, at syllabus. Notably,

Grad involved only a motion for leave, not a new trial motion, which imposes a higher

standard, as the court stressed.

{¶ 50} The lead opinion further remarked that “[t]he significance question at the

motion-for-leave stage relates to the fact that a scientific study may be new, having been

published after trial, but the trial court should still consider the extent to which the evidence

would provide greater assistance defending against the indictment in a new trial than was

available to the defendant at trial. Requiring the change in scientific knowledge to be

significant such that it offers new evidence to support a stronger argument in defense of the

charges—so that a different outcome could be reached if a trial were held today—ensures

23
that a trial court need not grant leave for evidence of a recently published study that would

have only a de minimus impact in a new trial.” Grad at ¶ 65. A good amount of room exists

between “significant” and “de minimis,” which again could lead to somewhat subjective

decisions.

{¶ 51} The lead opinion also stressed that “[n]otably, at the motion-for-new-trial stage,

the defendant must clear a higher bar after the court first grants leave to file the new-trial

motion.” Grad, 2024-Ohio-571, at ¶ 66. Finally, the lead opinion stated that in assessing a

motion for leave:

[T]he growth of scientific knowledge must be considered in respect to the case

at issue. A court must first evince a clear understanding of what the new

scientific evidence shows. It must then compare that evidence to the level of

similar-subject scientific evidence available at the time of trial. In doing so, it

must query whether, if the trial were to occur today, the new evidence would

provide the defendant with a significantly stronger argument for his defense

such that it could have the effect of leading to a different outcome. If the answer

is yes, then the defendant has presented “clear and convincing proof that the

defendant was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon

which he must rely,” Crim.R. 33(B), and the motion for leave should be

granted.

Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710, at ¶ 64. The dissent did not agree to the use of this particular test,

and in fact disagreed with the lead opinion’s application of the concept of newly discovered

evidence in the case before it. Id. at ¶ 84-97 (Deters, J., dissenting).

{¶ 52} Nonetheless, for the sake of argument, we apply the test outlined by the

plurality opinion in Grad. In its leave decision, the trial court briefly summarized the results

24
of the DNA testing, which excluded Myers’ DNA from two items of evidence: one of the rocks

and the spike. Leave Judgment, p. 3-4. The court did not compare the “new evidence” to the

level of similar subject matter in 1996; instead, the court simply stated that the State failed

to submit any “opposing evidentiary matters.” Id. at p. 9.

{¶ 53} This ties into the State’s second point, which is that the trial court abused its

discretion by holding it to an unsupported standard of law. Although the court acknowledged

that affidavits are not required until a hearing is granted, the court found that “the facts . . .

are unrebutted that the newly discovered evidence was not available until 2021 at the

earliest.” Id. The State contends that it had no burden with regard to the motion for leave

and that it properly pointed out reasons why Myers was not unavoidably prevented from

discovering new evidence. We agree with the State on this point. “The sole question before

the trial court when considering whether to grant leave is whether the defendant has

established by clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented from

discovering the evidence on which he seeks to base the motion for a new trial.” Hatton,

2022-Ohio-3991, at ¶ 30. This is a “narrow, preliminary question.” Id. at ¶ 33. If the defendant

meets the burden, the court will grant the motion. Id. at ¶ 28. Thus, the State had no burden

to submit evidentiary materials in responding to the motion for leave. We note that

Crim.R. 33(A)(6) does allow the prosecuting attorney to produce rebuttal affidavits or

evidence at a new trial hearing, and the State did so here.

{¶ 54} Again, the trial court failed to discuss the state of similar subject matter at the

time of the original trial. Instead, it made only conclusory statements. As a reference point,

and for better understanding of the overall issues, we note the following points.

{¶ 55} DNA was discovered around 1953 by two scientists, an American and an

Englishman. The first international use of forensic DNA occurred in a rape case in which

25
4,000 men in a small town underwent DNA testing. This resulted in an English doctor

publishing a paper in a premier scientific journal in 1985, DNA Fingerprinting. The process

in question became known as RFLP DNA fingerprinting and was patented by a British

chemical company that had connections with the lab Cellmark. At the same time, a scientific

group in the United States was doing similar work and established the company Life Codes

in New York. Both Cellmark and Life Codes were commercial companies and used the same

basic RFLP typing in their DNA typing techniques. Tr. 1983, 1985-1988.

{¶ 56} RFLP stands for “Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism procedure,” and

the process was used by Cellmark in the case where the Supreme Court of Ohio first found

that “DNA evidence may be relevant evidence which will assist the trier of fact in determining

a fact in issue, and may be admissible.” State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d 490, syllabus and

493 (1992). The court further remarked in Pierce that “[a]lthough irrelevant for the

determination of admissibility under Ohio law, the theory and procedures used in DNA typing

are generally accepted within the scientific community.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 497.

{¶ 57} “DNA is the common abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid. DNA is the

‘fundamental natural material which determines the genetic characteristics of all life forms.’”

Id. at 492, quoting People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 961 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1989). “It is

responsible for determining individual human characteristics, such as hair color and eye

color which differentiate humans. Except for identical twins, no two individuals have the

same DNA.” Id.

{¶ 58} DNA is organized into chromosomes, which are present in pairs. Humans have

22 pairs of non-sex chromosomes and one pair of sex chromosomes. Wherever there is a

gene on one pair of chromosomes, a second gene also exists. Thus, there are two traits for

26
each gene, and one is inherited from each parent. The term “alleles” is another word used

to describe these inherited traits. Tr. 1911.

{¶ 59} When used in a forensic context, RFLP targets certain highly genetically

variable genes. Tr. 1915. For example, Pierce involved “the statistical frequency of the

occurrence of the same DNA composition in the black population. The statistical frequency

was obtained by using a formula based on standard probability theory. The formula involves

the multiplication of the individual probabilities for the occurrence of individual alleles (any

one of a series of two or more genes) within a DNA sample.” Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d at 499.

The disadvantage of the RFLP method is its requirement of a fairly large quantity of DNA

that is in very good condition and is not degraded. When DNA degrades, it gets chopped up

into smaller and smaller pieces. Tr. 1915-1917.

{¶ 60} At the time of trial, the other molecular biology procedure used to extract

genetic information from DNA was polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”). That DNA method

was used here, and the prosecution retained Dr. Blake to conduct PCR testing on the foreign

pubic hair found on the victim’s body. This technique uses small DNA pieces, generally on

the order of a small gene, which are copied many times and analyzed. During this process,

the foreign pubic hair sample was placed in a tube and dissolved with chemicals. The DNA

in the watery solution was washed and concentrated by filtering out large molecules, and

the remaining DNA was amplified by chemical reagents that caused the DQ alpha gene (the

gene being studied)—and no other genes—to be copied many times over. This was done

using a thermocycler, which goes up and down in temperature to create copies. The

amplified DQ alpha gene was flooded in a solution over the surface of nylon strips to which

DNA probes were permanently affixed. The alleles present in the amplified DNA found and

stuck to the DNA probe sequences they were associated with, and this result was detected

27
by a color change in the typing strip. The patterns of colored dots were then read to decide

the appropriate DQ alpha type that had been found. Tr. 1914, 1917, 1945-1950, 1954, 3298.

{¶ 61} Dr. Blake’s testing used the DQ alpha gene, which is a gene that has six

common alleles in the population. As indicated, each gene has two alleles or traits, and one

is inherited from each parent. Taking all two-by-two combinations of the six alleles results in

21 different genotypes or 21 different ways of combining the six alleles in a two-by-two

fashion. This permits populations to be divided into 21 different groups based upon the DQ

alpha gene. Tr. 1911, 1932. From this testing, Dr. Blake, as well as another prosecution

expert, concluded that Myers’ DQ alpha gene type, 1.3, 2, matched the gene type found on

the victim’s pubic hair. This did not mean that Myers committed the crime; it simply meant

that experts were not able to exclude him as the donor. Tr. 1938, 1967-1968, 1972, 2865-

2866, 3308, 3357.

{¶ 62} The trial testimony sheds light on why Myers must have been aware of DNA

evidence. In the first place, Myers was present during a very long trial where DNA was

discussed. A prior hearing on the admissibility of DNA analysis was held in Myers’ case in

1990, at which Dr. Blake also testified. According to Dr. Blake, the PCR process was first

described in scientific literature in 1985, and his lab was one of the first in the United States

to use it. Dr. Blake first used PCR in 1986 and had been using it continuously through the

time of the 1996 trial. Kits containing the reagents needed to do PCR analysis became

commercially available in February 1990 or 1991. Tr. 1921, 1994, 2038, 2055-2057.

{¶ 63} Myers’ own trial expert, Dr. Gerdes, had a PhD in microbial genetics and

bacterial pathogenesis, the predecessor of molecular biology. He had also completed a four-

year post-doctoral fellowship in the field of molecular biology as applied to virology and also

had testified about DNA admissibility at the 1990 hearing in Myers’ case. During the 1996

28
trial, Gerdes testified about advancements in DNA PCR testing, including his laboratory’s

use of an HLA gene called the DR beta gene, which had “over 50 different alleles, allele

types as opposed to DQ Alpha, which has seven or eight.” Tr. 2803, 2809, 2810-2811. In

addition, Gerdes discussed the exquisite sensitivity of PCR testing, which would have

allowed him to wipe a handkerchief on a surface where someone had coughed before and

be able to tell who had sat there, or at least be able to identify a type consistent with that

person. Tr. 2813.

{¶ 64} In view of the testimony, Myers and his counsel were aware of the possibility

of PCR testing of the rocks and railroad spike at the time of trial in 1996, or before, and were

further aware of testing such as the DR beta gene, which used significantly more alleles for

testing, leading to more precise identification. They were also aware that PCR testing was

so sensitive that it could detect “touch DNA.” It is true that newer techniques such as STR

and Y-STR testing were both unavailable prior to trial. In September 2006, the First District

Court of Appeals noted:

“The Y Chromosome is the DNA in the nucleus of a cell that is present only in

males.” C.J. Word, The Future of DNA Testing and Law Enforcement (2001),

Speech at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on DNA: Lessons From the

Past—Problems For the Future, in 67 Brooklyn L.Rev. (Fall 2001), 249, 251,

fn. 5. In 1995, the best available DNA test was unable to detect a male DNA

profile on a swab taken from a rape victim if no sperm was visible when the

swab was examined microscopically. See P. de Mazancourt, Y–STR as Proof

of Rape When Sperm Cells Cannot be Found (2002), Address Before the 13th

International Symposium on Human Identification. Current Y-Chromosome

Short Tandem Repeat (“Y-STR”) analysis now allows the development of DNA

29
profiles where no sperm is detectable microscopically. U.S. Department of

Justice (July 2002), Using DNA to Solve Cold Cases, at 5.

State v. Elliott, 2006-Ohio-4508, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.).

{¶ 65} In Elliot, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request

for DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71 et seq. The court reasoned that based on the underlying

facts of that case, a Y-STR test would be outcome determinative concerning the defendant’s

convictions of two counts of rape and two counts of aggravated burglary. Id. at ¶ 12-26. The

actual application for testing was made in September 2004, and the Ohio Innocence Project

subsequently entered an appearance as counsel for the defendant. Id. at ¶ 4.

{¶ 66} Before Elliot was decided, the Eighth District Court of Appeals rejected a

defendant’s claim that his rape convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.

Among other things, the court noted the State’s provision of “Y chromosome DNA testing

that matched” the defendant. State v. Braxton, 2006-Ohio-3008 (8th Dist.), ¶ 12. See also

State v. Wallace, 2006-Ohio-2735, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.) (finding gross sexual imposition

convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence). This was based on

evidence, including testimony about Y-STR testing, that was presented at the defendant’s

May 2005 trial. Id. at ¶ 4-18, 35. Between 2006 and 2011, more appellate districts, including

our own, discussed and recognized the use of Y-STR testing. E.g., State v. Emerick, 2007-

Ohio-1334, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Wilson, 2024-Ohio-

4712, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.); State v. Griffin, 2007-Ohio-4431, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.); State v. McCarley,

2008-Ohio-552, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.); State v. Bell, 2008-Ohio-3959, ¶ 41-42 (7th Dist.) (rejecting

defendant’s claim that Y-STR witness testimony was not based on reliable science); State

v. Warren, 2011-Ohio-4886, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.).

30
{¶ 67} In fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio itself stated in 2010 that “[s]ince 1998, DNA

testing has advanced so far that ‘a DNA profile may now be developed from items which

were previously unsuccessfully typed or potentially not attempted due to the compromised

or limited nature of the sample,’ according to one of the expert witnesses. The PCR DNA

testing used in this case in 1998 has been largely replaced by two newer technologies—

short tandem repeat (or STR) testing and Y-chromosome STR (or Y-STR) testing.” State v.

Prade, 2010-Ohio-1842, ¶ 20.

{¶ 68} In 2009, we noted a defendant’s assertion “that there have been several

advancements in DNA testing since his trial.” State v. Reynolds, 2009-Ohio-5532, ¶ 13-14,

17 (2d Dist.), overruled in part on other grounds by Wilson, 2024-Ohio-4712. The defendant

identified “three types of DNA testing that have been developed since his [September 2001]

trial, namely, Y-STR, mini-STR, and touch DNA. Y-STR testing allows DNA technicians to

differentiate between male and female DNA from a mixed source, and mini-STR and touch

DNA permit technicians to obtain a DNA profile from very small, degraded, and

compromised samples.” Id. at ¶ 10, 17. Given the wide availability of Y-STR testing in 2006,

one might question the trial court’s belief that the “new evidence” could not have been

discovered until 2021. However, as noted, filing within a reasonable time is not something

we are allowed to consider.

D. Improper Consideration of Merits of Motion for New Trial Before Granting Leave

{¶ 69} The State’s final argument in connection with the first assignment of error is

that Myers improperly inserted many references to the DNA results obtained from the rock

and the spike in his leave motion, and the trial court improperly focused on this in its decision

granting leave. As the State points out, and as we have just said, the narrow issue before a

trial court in considering whether to grant an untimely leave is whether the defendant was

31
unavoidably prevented from discovering the alleged newly discovered evidence; if that

barrier is surmounted and leave is granted, only then does the court consider whether a new

trial should be granted. Of course, some context is required as background, but the merits

of the new trial motion should not be the focus when considering the leave motion.

{¶ 70} Nonetheless, given the focus in Grad on comparing scientific methods to

methods available at the time of a defendant’s trial, we must conclude that regardless of the

errors in the trial court’s discussion, STR and Y-STR testing were not available at the time

of Myers’ trial. The additional problem with the analysis in Grad is that it reduces the burden

for obtaining leave to virtually nothing by using words like “support a stronger argument in

defense of the charges” so a different outcome “could” occur, and “de minimis” evidence

being what might prevent granting a motion for leave. Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710, at ¶ 64. These

words are vague, and there is a large difference between them, leaving courts to wonder

where the evidence in question might fit.

{¶ 71} The State also argues that Myers improperly tried to “bootstrap” evidence on

to the motion for leave as support, when the evidence was not new evidence (i.e., criticism

of forensic evidence used at trial, such as prior PCR testing on the foreign pubic hair,

methods used to identify the time of death, and so on). We consider these points, to the

extent necessary, when we discuss the trial court’s ruling on the new trial motion.

{¶ 72} In light of the preceding analysis, we overrule the State’s first assignment of

error.

III. Abuse of Discretion in Granting Motion for New Trial

{¶ 73} The State’s second assignment of error is as follows:

The trial court abused its discretion in granting Defendant’s Motion for New

Trial.

32
{¶ 74} Under this assignment of error, the State contends the trial court abused its

discretion in several ways when it granted Myers’ motion for new trial. Before considering

the State’s arguments, we outline the appropriate review standards.

A. Standards of Review

{¶ 75} The Supreme Court of Ohio has said that “[t]o warrant the granting of a motion

for a new trial in a criminal case, based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must

be shown that the new evidence (1) discloses a strong probability that it will change the

result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could

not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the trial, (4) is material to

the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative to former evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach

or contradict the former evidence.” State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505 (1947), syllabus,

approving and following State v. Lopa, 96 Ohio St. 410 (1917). We refer to the six factors

set forth in Petro as the “Petro factors”.

{¶ 76} We have interpreted Petro as not “establishing a per se rule excluding newly

discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial simply because that evidence is in the nature

of impeaching or contradicting evidence. The test is whether the newly discovered evidence

would create a strong probability of a different result at trial, or whether it is merely

impeaching or contradicting evidence that is insufficient to create a strong probability of a

different result.” (Citations omitted.) City of Dayton v. Martin, 43 Ohio App.3d 87, 90

(2d Dist. 1987). Accord State v. Harwell, 2023-Ohio-3657, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.). This is a “higher

bar” than is required for granting motions for leave. Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710, at ¶ 66. “‘[A] new

trial is an extraordinary measure and should be granted only when the evidence presented

weighs heavily in favor of the moving party.’” State v. Prade, 2018-Ohio-3551, ¶ 44

(9th Dist.), quoting State v. Gilcreast, 2003-Ohio-7177, ¶ 54 (9th Dist.). See also State v.

33
Prater, 2021-Ohio-3988, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Price, 2009-Ohio-480, ¶ 14

(8th Dist.).

{¶ 77} Decisions granting or denying motions for new trial are reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d at 76. Again, abuse of discretion most often means the

lower court decision was not based on a sound reasoning process. McHenry, 2021-Ohio-

3118, at ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing AAAA Ents., 50 Ohio St.3d at 157.

B. Other Forensic Evidence

{¶ 78} In its initial argument, the State makes two points. First, the State contends

the trial court went beyond its own entry granting a new trial, which limited consideration to

the DNA found on the rock and the spike. The State also argues the court abused its

discretion by considering forensic evidence other than the DNA evidence. This relates to the

fifth and sixth Petro factors, which require that the new evidence “is not merely cumulative

to former evidence” and “does not merely impeach or contradict the former evidence.” Petro,

148 Ohio St. at 505.

{¶ 79} In this regard, the State notes that Myers’ motion for leave was based only on

the DNA evidence (from the rock and the spike), and the court’s leave decision granted the

motion for leave only on that basis. According to the State, the trial court nonetheless

improperly considered more items in granting a new trial, including criticisms about other

forensic evidence presented at trial, such as analysis of the foreign pubic hair and using

gastric content to decide the time of death. These were matters relevant only to the

postconviction petition.

{¶ 80} Anticipating that the hearing would combine both motions, the State expected

testimony on forensic evidence other than the rock and the spike. The State accordingly filed

a pre-hearing liminal motion on this point. However, the trial court failed to rule on the liminal

34
motion. As a result, the State renewed its objection at beginning of the July 2024 hearing.

Rather than making a ruling at that point, the court told the State to “remind” it when Myers

presented evidence pertinent to the postconviction motion rather than the new trial motion.

The State did do so when Myers presented expert testimony on the other forensic issues.

See State’s Brief, p. 44-45; New Trial Tr. 402. According to the State, the trial court scolded

it when it renewed its objection, which revealed the court’s intent to improperly consider the

other forensic evidence in ruling on the new trial motion. State’s Brief, p. 48.

{¶ 81} The trial court did say at that point during the hearing that it would not hold

against the State any alleged “delay” in objecting. New Trial Tr. 402-405. In reality, however,

the State did not delay. It filed a liminal motion before the hearing, which the court never

ruled on. The State properly renewed its objection at the beginning of the hearing, and the

court declined to rule on it at the time. The State’s renewed objection also occurred when

Myers began to present testimony criticizing the testimony of the experts from his trial who

had testified about the foreign pubic hair, gastric contents of Amanda’s stomach, marks on

her neck, and the appearance of her eyes. See New Trial Tr. 402-495, 497-624, 638-700

(testimony of Maria Cuellar, Mark Taylor, and Katherine Maloney, who criticized trial

experts).

{¶ 82} The trial court began its decision regarding the new trial by stating that Myers’

motion was based on the DNA evidence from the railroad spike and one of the rocks found

in the vagina. New Trial Judgment, p. 2. The court acknowledged that new trial motions and

postconviction petitions are “independent claims with different procedures.” Id. at p. 4.

However, despite noting these points, the court expressed difficulty in discerning whether

testimony at the hearing applied to one particular motion, as opposed to the other. As a

result, the court concluded that the “testimony was regularly applicable to both claims and,

35
therefore, is considered in both contexts.” Id. at p. 5. Following these comments, the court

outlined expert criticism of the DQ Alpha testing of the foreign pubic hair, which was not

related to the new trial motion. Id. at p. 6-7, 12-14, 16.

{¶ 83} The trial court’s decision was not based on sound reasoning. We reviewed the

same evidence and had no trouble distinguishing between the testimony related to each

motion. For example, the entire testimony outlined in pages 12-14 of the court’s decision

relates solely to the review and criticism of Dr. Blake’s techniques and DNA analysis of the

pubic hair. This had nothing to do with the alleged “newly discovered” DNA evidence from

the rock and the spike. The court exacerbated its error by stating in its decision that the

expert witnesses at Myers’ trial, including those who had testified about the testing of the

foreign pubic hair, the gastric contents of the victim’s stomach, and the autopsy “likely would

have been unwilling to express their prior opinions” at a new trial. Id. at p. 27. This was pure

speculation.

{¶ 84} In further reviewing the trial court’s new trial order, we consider the court’s

discussion of each Petro factor and the parties’ positions, to the extent relevant. Before doing

so, we note that the court’s analysis began with an incorrect premise. In the court’s view,

the “crux” of the motion was whether one DNA method was reliable enough to undermine

another. New Trial Judgment, p. 19. The court went on to state, “More specifically, is the

Defendant’s newly discovered DNA evidence – which purportedly excludes the Defendant

from the crime scene – sufficiently reliable to undermine the integrity of the trial verdict?” Id.

The court then found, as a “short answer,” that the DNA advances were significant

improvements to the Alpha DQ test and exposed weaknesses in it. Id. Again, that had

nothing to do with the new trial motion.

36
{¶ 85} A number of other problems exist concerning these statements in the court’s

analysis. First, in deciding new trial motions, courts must consider all evidence from the prior

trial, not just one piece of evidence. Second, even if one accepts the absence of Myers’ DNA

on the rock and the spike as true (which remains to be seen, given the State’s challenge to

the results), this does not automatically “exclude” Myers from the crime scene. The analysis

of the court of appeals in Prade, 2018-Ohio-3551 (9th Dist.), is instructive. In Prade, the

defendant’s wife was shot several times in her minivan in 1997, and there was evidence of

a struggle. The killer left a severe bite mark on the underside of the wife’s upper left arm.

Because the wife, a doctor, was wearing a lab coat at the time, a section of her coat was

removed for DNA testing. During trial, evidence was presented from DNA experts and bite

mark identification experts, which included three dental experts. Id. at ¶ 16-17, 21.

{¶ 86} Before the original trial, PCR testing was used on three areas of the bite-mark

section. However, because the section was saturated with the wife’s blood, only a single

DNA profile was obtained, which was consistent with the wife’s DNA. Id. at ¶ 18. “New DNA

results that Mr. Prade obtained in 2012, more than 14 years after Dr. Prade’s murder, were

the catalyst behind his request for a new trial. The new tests were conducted using Y

chromosome short tandem repeat testing (‘Y-STR testing’) and, for the first time, male DNA

was discovered within an area of the bite mark section. Because Mr. Prade was definitively

excluded as the source of that male DNA, he argued that there was a strong probability the

new DNA evidence would result in a different verdict, if submitted to a jury.” Id. at ¶ 22.3

{¶ 87} Ultimately, after considering testimony about low amounts of DNA available to

be tested, possible contamination and degradation issues, and the evidence from the

3. Notably, the Y-STR testing in Prade began in 2010, which again shows that testing was
readily available long before Myers pursued it. Prade at ¶ 26. As previously indicated, this
type of testing was used and accepted even before Prade.

37
original trial, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court’s rejection of the new trial motion.

Id. at ¶ 23-44. The court found the defendant failed to show a strong possibility that the DNA

results would change the result if a new trial were ordered, noting that a “‘“slight possibility”’”

is insufficient. Id. at ¶ 41, quoting State v. Murley, 2009-Ohio-6393, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.), quoting

90 Ohio Jur.3d, Trial, § 665 (2009).

{¶ 88} Having first noted the incorrect premise upon which the trial court’s decision

was based, we now consider the court’s decision on the Petro factors, beginning, as the trial

court did, with the second and third factors.

C. Second and Third Petro Factors

{¶ 89} The second and third Petro factors ask whether the new evidence “has been

discovered since the trial” and “is such as could not in the exercise of due diligence have

been discovered before the trial.” Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505, at syllabus. The trial court found

that the second factor had been established because though the rock, the railroad spike,

and cigarette butts had been collected before trial, “touch” DNA testing did not exist at that

time. New Trial Judgment, p. 21. In addressing the “due diligence” factor, the trial court relied

on its prior analysis from its grant of leave for Myers to file a motion for new trial. Id.

{¶ 90} Petro refers to due diligence in the context of whether the new evidence could

have been discovered before trial. Petro was decided in 1947, well before the Rules of

Criminal Procedure were adopted in July 1973 and before scientists used DNA testing of

any kind. Indeed, DNA was not discovered until 1953. Where untimely motions for new trials

are involved and asserted scientific theories were not available at trial or have advanced

since trial, the issue of whether the evidence could have been discovered “before” trial is

irrelevant. Thus, Petro’s third factor is not helpful in this case. The factor could be relevant

where the defendant’s claim is based on testimony of a witness who did not testify at trial.

38
Such an inquiry would relate to whether the defendant knew about the witness’ identity and

failed to properly investigate.

{¶ 91} Likewise, in Petro, the “newly discovered evidence” claim was based on an

affidavit from a police officer who was present at the morgue when the coroner examined

the body. At that time, the coroner said the victim had been dead for about 60 hours, and

the officer put that time in his report. Petro, 148 Ohio St. at 507. The Supreme Court of Ohio

did not consider whether the defendant could have discovered and produced the evidence

at trial if he had exercised due diligence. The court’s decision was based solely on the fact

that the coroner had been thoroughly examined at trial about the time the victim had been

dead, and the officer’s testimony would “merely tend to impeach that of the coroner.” Id. at

509.

{¶ 92} Notably, on the same day Petro was issued, the court reversed the same

defendant’s murder conviction due to trial court errors. Those errors included “overruling

defendant’s motion requiring the prosecuting attorney to furnish him with a bill of particulars

and . . . overruling defendant’s objection to the conduct of the prosecuting attorney in his

closing argument to the jury.” State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 473, 502-503 (1947).

{¶ 93} Furthermore, the case Petro followed in its syllabus is of little assistance

because it fails to discuss due diligence or even when the alleged new evidence in question

was discovered. See Lopa, 96 Ohio St. 410. In that case, the Supreme Court of Ohio

reversed the grant of the defendant’s new trial motion because the affidavits the defendant

submitted were cumulative and impeaching the affiants would probably not have changed

the result of the trial. Another affidavit even involved a witness the defense had the ability to

cross-examine at trial. Id. at 411-412.

39
{¶ 94} The point here is not that Petro and Lopa should be discarded. Rather, these

decisions are brief, the discussion is sparse, and the due diligence factor is not helpful in

cases like the present one. The factor is relevant in certain situations, but not this one.

{¶ 95} Considering the elimination of a reasonable time limitation in Bethel and the

Grad plurality’s recognition that newly discovered evidence may be found in the wake of a

post-trial significant change in the state of scientific knowledge, one is left wondering what

due or reasonable diligence even means. If we were truly able to consider the point, we

might find that Myers failed to act with reasonable diligence, having waited so many years

after Y-STR testing became available. However, given the state of the law, we apparently

must presume he acted with reasonable diligence because Y-STR testing did not exist at

the time of trial.

D. Materiality

{¶ 96} Under the fourth Petro factor, the question is whether the alleged newly

discovered evidence is “material to the issues.” Petro, 148 Ohio St. at 505. Though Petro

established this factor, it did not discuss or define it.

{¶ 97} We have said that “[m]aterial evidence is evidence which goes to the

substantial matters in dispute or has a legitimate and effective influence or bearing on the

decision in the case.” State v. Taylor, 2011-Ohio-2563, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), citing Black’s Law

Dictionary (4th Ed. 1968). In the context of materiality, both parties and the trial court cite

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016), that

“[e]vidence qualifies as material when there is ‘“any reasonable likelihood”’ it could have

‘“affected the judgment of the jury.”’” Id. at 392, quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.

150, 154 (1972), quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959). However, this definition

40
is drawn from the application of materiality in the context of a claim that the state improperly

withheld evidence under Brady. Id. at 391. No such claim exists here.

{¶ 98} In Wearry, the court further remarked that for the defendant to prevail on his

Brady claim, he “need not show that he ‘more likely than not’ would have been acquitted had

the new evidence been admitted. . . . He must show only that the new evidence is sufficient

to ‘undermine confidence’ in the verdict.” Id. at 392, quoting Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 132

S.Ct. 629-631 (2012). The Brady standard involves a lesser burden than the standard

required to grant a new trial, which is “whether the newly discovered evidence would create

a strong probability of a different result at trial.” Martin, 43 Ohio App.3d at 90. See also Petro

at 505.

{¶ 99} This makes sense because defendants moving for new trials based on Brady

violations do not even need to show they acted with reasonable diligence. Bethel, 2022-

Ohio-783, at ¶ 25. See also id. at ¶ 19, quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995),

quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Brady requires only a

“‘“reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.”’”). There is a significant difference between a

“reasonable probability” and a “strong probability.” The case before us does not involve

Brady violations.

{¶ 100} Wearry has been cited in Ohio only a few times since it was decided in 2016.

In one case, the court found no Brady violation and rejected the defendant’s argument that

Wearry should apply in how the evidence was analyzed. The court instead applied “the

abuse of discretion standard for newly discovered evidence rather than the elevated

standard for a Brady violation,” which is de novo review. State v. Allen, 2016-Ohio-7045,

¶ 11, 20, fn. 3 (8th Dist.). In State v. Hill, 2019-Ohio-365 (1st Dist.), the First District Court of

41
Appeals held that the trial court should have held a hearing on the defendant’s motion for

leave due to the defendant’s Brady claim alleging a failure by the State to disclose a police

report. As we have observed here, the court noted the difference in the reasonable and

strong probability standards that apply based on whether a Brady claim is involved. Id. at

¶ 78-79. The First District employed a similar approach in State v. Campbell, 2019-Ohio-

3142, ¶ 43, 46 (1st Dist.).

{¶ 101} The two remaining cases citing Wearry are State v. Wilburn, 2023-Ohio-

4865, ¶ 34-43 (4th Dist.)—which was a direct appeal and did not involve a Brady violation—

and State v. Riley, 2017-Ohio-5819 (4th Dist.)—which involved a Brady claim alleging that

the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment evidence before the defendant pleaded

guilty. In Riley, the court of appeals found no merit to the defendant’s claims that he was

deprived of a fair trial or that his plea was involuntary. Id. at ¶ 13-30.

{¶ 102} In light of the above discussion, we find that the definition we have previously

used for materiality of evidence is appropriate, rather than the standard the trial court used.

{¶ 103} Turning to the new trial decision, the court did not discuss materiality in detail

after citing the standard it would use. Instead, although conceding that new DNA evidence

does not necessarily result in a new trial, the court found Myers was excluded as the source

of the new DNA evidence, which “would clearly have given the defense additional factual

support for the theory that another perpetrator was culpable.” New Trial Judgment, p. 23-24.

Again, this is not the standard.

{¶ 104} In responding, the State contends the court erred in concluding that the DNA

on the rock and the spike unequivocably excluded Myers as the source. In this regard, the

State stresses that the amount of DNA on the rock and the spike were insufficient to support

42
any conclusions, and that even if the amount were sufficient to draw conclusions, it did not

support a theory that another male committed the offense and that Myers was not present.

{¶ 105} The State further notes that no testing was able to identify the identity of the

people whose DNA was on these items or when it was deposited. The State emphasizes

that the items have been handled by multiple people and have been stored in multiple

locations over the past 40 years, and that DNA could have been deposited by persons not

associated with the murder. For the reasons stated below in connection with analysis of the

first Petro factor, we agree with the State’s position. We also disagree with the trial court for

the reasons explained below.

E. Cumulative or Impeaching Effect

{¶ 106} The fifth and six Petro factors, respectively, ask whether the new evidence

“is not merely cumulative to former evidence” and “does not merely impeach or contradict

the former evidence.” Petro, 148 Ohio St. at 505.

1. Cumulative Evidence

{¶ 107} In considering the issue of cumulative evidence, the trial court focused on the

DNA evidence only and found that it was not cumulative. New Trial Judgment, p. 24.

{¶ 108} “‘Cumulative evidence’ is additional evidence of the same kind to the same

point. Therefore, where evidence offered on a motion for new trial is merely additional upon

the same point upon which evidence was given by the party at the trial, such evidence will

be rejected as cumulative.” Kroger v. Ryan, 83 Ohio St. 299 (1911), syllabus.

{¶ 109} On this point, we agree with the trial court. The DNA evidence concerning the

rock and the spike is not cumulative because testing of these items did not occur before trial,

except that BCI lab analyst Michelle Yezzo analyzed the spike generally and analyzed the

43
rocks for semen, which she did not find. No further evidence regarding the presence of DNA

on these items was presented at trial. Tr. 1462, 1465, 1534, 1590, 1592.

2. Impeaching evidence

{¶ 110} In assessing whether the evidence presented by Myers constituted mere

impeachment evidence, the trial court found that the DNA evidence impeached the DQ

Alpha test results obtained from the foreign pubic hair found on the victim. The court

reasoned further that the new testing “could be considered to have more evidentiary weight

because new tests are performed at many more loci” than DQ Alpha, which used a single

loci. New Trial Judgment, p. 25.

{¶ 111} This analysis was incorrect. In Martin, which involved a new trial motion, we

stated:

While Petro stands for the proposition that newly discovered evidence that

merely impeaches or contradicts other evidence is not enough for a new trial,

we do not read Petro as establishing a per se rule excluding newly discovered

evidence as a basis for a new trial simply because that evidence is in the

nature of impeaching or contradicting evidence. The test is whether the newly

discovered evidence would create a strong probability of a different result at

trial, or whether it is merely impeaching or contradicting evidence that is

insufficient to create a strong probability of a different result.

(Emphasis in original.) Martin, 43 Ohio App.3d at 90.

{¶ 112} DNA evidence about the rock and the spike (the only issues for the new trial

motion) has nothing to do with analysis of a separate object, the foreign pubic hair.

Furthermore, the court’s view that the newly discovered DNA evidence might have greater

weight in a potential retrial than the DQ Alpha results for a separate and unrelated item is

44
different from concluding that the new DNA evidence would create a strong probability of a

different result. The court compared the DNA testing results of distinctly separate items,

which is not the appropriate analysis.

{¶ 113} The court’s analysis further indicates its belief that the new DNA evidence

impeached other aspects of the State’s case, but again, its analysis is both incomplete and

incorrect. The court began by stating that the “new DNA evidence establishes a strong

rebuttal to virtually every facet of the state’s case.” New Trial Judgment, p. 25. As an

example, the court noted the testimony of David Tincher, who testified about incriminating

statements Myers made in jail shortly after the murder. While conceding that the new

evidence did not directly impact this witness, the court posed what it called “crucial

questions” for Tincher, such as: “If Tincher is to be thought credible, how does he explain

the absence of DNA on the rock and the spike?” Id.

{¶ 114} This is a question that would never be asked of a fact witness like Tincher.

He was not an expert who had any knowledge of DNA; he was a lay factual witness simply

testifying about a conversation that occurred in jail while he and Myers were in the same

cellblock. See Evid.R. 701 (“If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’

testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences

which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear

understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue”). “The

distinction between lay and expert-witness opinion testimony is that lay testimony results

from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a

process of reasoning that only specialists in the field can master.” State v. Lavender, 2019-

Ohio-5352, ¶ 95 (1st Dist.), citing State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 297, fn. 2 (2001).

45
There may be situations where a lay witness can testify in an expert capacity; this is certainly

not one.

{¶ 115} Tincher’s testimony reveals that he was previously acquainted with Myers.

On August 19, 1988, a few weeks after the murder, Tincher spoke with Xenia Police

Department (“Xenia PD”) Detective Green, and related several things Myers said to him

while they were working out together in jail. According to Tincher, he and Myers were talking

about sexual things they had done with “girls,” and during that conversation, Myers said,

“They couldn’t get me on a rape.” Myers also asked Tincher if he had ever put three rocks

in a girl. When Tincher said no, Myers said, “Well, he had.” Tr. 1088 1178-1179, 1458, 1730,

1738-1739, 1742, 1746-1747.

{¶ 116} A few days after that conversation, Tincher asked Myers, “Why a spike?” He

asked about this because his curiosity was aroused. Myers responded, “Because it was

handy.” Tr. 1749. Tincher further testified, “After that, he [Myers] said, don’t ever try to drive

nothing through nobody’s forehead. He said, it won’t go, but he said it went through the

temple.” Tr. 1749-1750. Again, this was simply testimony about statements Myers made.

Tincher would have no ability, nor any obligation, to explain the absence of Myers’ DNA on

any objects at the crime scene.

{¶ 117} In considering the issue of impeachment, the court concluded that DNA

evidence about the rock and spike would strongly rebut virtually “every other facet” of the

State’s case. New Trial Judgment, p. 25. However, the court mentioned only a few

witnesses. As a preliminary point, the court’s statement is overbroad. The testimony of many

or most witnesses would be unaffected.

{¶ 118} The trial court referenced expert witnesses Larry Dehus and Richard Bisbing

(who had testified about the foreign pubic hair), as well as Dr. Michael Badin (who had

46
testified about gastric emptying). The court wondered how these experts would reconcile

their conclusions with the DNA evidence excluding Myers. New Trial Judgment, p. 25. These

matters, however, are unrelated. The testimony about gastric emptying at trial related to

determining the potential time of death, not to DNA or the spike or the rock. Tr. 1364, 2145,

2164, 2189-2197. Furthermore, Dehus and Bisbing examined the pubic hair microscopically;

they did no DNA analysis, and there was no indication they were qualified to express

opinions on DNA matters. Tr. 1705-1706, 1851-1854, 1858-1859, 2081-2082, 2092-2098.

{¶ 119} “An ‘expert witness’ is defined as one who is ‘qualified by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education to provide a scientific, technical, or other specialized

opinion about the evidence or a fact issue.’” State v. Fread, 2013-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14

(12th Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). Accord State v. Armstrong-

Carter, 2021-Ohio-1110, ¶ 88 (2d Dist.). Because Dehus and Bisbing were not qualified as

DNA experts, they would not be able to interpret or compare DNA results with their own

research. Likewise, Dr. Badin was not an expert on DNA. The trial court was incorrect that

DNA evidence would rebut the subject matter of their testimony.

{¶ 120} The trial court’s final specific mention of a witness was lay witness Nancy D.,

who testified about comments an “alternate suspect,” Terry Rogers, had made to her about

killing Amanda. The trial court believed the DNA evidence from the rock and spike would

“bolster Nancy’s credibility.” New Trial Judgment, p. 26. Nancy testified about a conversation

she had with Rogers in 1992, about four years after the murder, during which he made

remarks about helping to kill Amanda. Rogers also testified, though, and denied any

involvement in the murder or that he had made any such statements. There were also

substantial holes in Nancy’s testimony, as she recounted a claim that Rogers held the

victim’s mouth while Gregg Grimes, another “alternate suspect,” raped the victim. Tr. 2491,

47
2495-2499, 2504, 2507-2509. However, Nancy did not mention any rocks, and no evidence

of sperm or pubic hair, other than the foreign hair, was ever found.4

{¶ 121} It is true that other facts in a case may be used to support witness credibility

or deflect attacks on credibility. E.g., State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 374 (2000).

However, as we discuss below, the amount of DNA obtained from the rock and the spike

was too small to provide reliable results. Even if this were otherwise, no other alleged

contributors were ever linked to the rock or the spike. Rogers, Grimes, and several other

people provided both hair and blood samples to the State. Tr. 2499-2500. The record is

silent as to why their samples were not compared to the DNA on the rock. The record is also

silent about why, before the hearing, the DNA results for the samples from the rock and the

spike were not uploaded into CODIS, where actual alternate suspects could have been

located if they existed. CODIS is a national database which “contains DNA profiles of

convicted felons and crime scene evidence and is used as an investigative tool to identify

suspects by comparing DNA profiles.” United States v. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658, 660, fn. 1,

666 (D.Md. 2009).

{¶ 122} In any event, because the DNA contributors to the samples from the rock and

the spike are unknown, it is hard to see what relevance the DNA results of these samples

would have to Nancy’s testimony. If DNA consistent with Grimes or Rogers had been found,

that might have been different. We find the trial court’s “rebuttal remarks” inaccurate with

4. The defense team found a hair on Amanda’s shirt in 1995 while viewing evidence at the
police station, but the hair was never tested for DNA, nor did the defense ask for it to be so
tested. Tr. 1632, 1703-1706, 3159-3165. By that time, the shirt had been in evidence for
many years and had been examined a number of times—reinforcing the fact that additional
biological material can be deposited on evidence items. It is highly unlikely that this hair
would not have been discovered when the shirt came into evidence the first time.

48
respect to the witnesses identified by the court. Notably, the court failed to consider all the

testimony, which was the relevant method of analyzing the issue.

F. Strong Probability of Change in the Result

{¶ 123} The last factor the trial court considered was the first Petro factor, which is

whether the “newly discovered” evidence “discloses a strong probability that it will change

the result if a new trial is granted.” Petro, 148 Ohio St. at 505. The trial court found this to be

the case. New Trial Judgment, p. 26-28. However, the court’s legal analysis relied on

overbroad and incorrect legal assumptions and an incomplete comparison. In analyzing this

issue, we begin with the court’s first point that the new DNA evidence bolstered the credibility

of Myers’ claim that he was not at the scene of the crime.

1. New DNA Evidence and Myers’ Claim That He Was Not at the Scene

{¶ 124} The court first found that “the new evidence clearly supports the Defendant’s

trial defense that another committed the offense and that the Defendant was not present.

The DNA evidence makes this exponentially more credible.” Id. at p. 26. As we discuss

below, the new evidence fails to prove that Myers was not present at the crime scene. Even

if we accepted that the evidence was accurate, which we do not, all it established is that at

some unknown point, other unknown individuals’ DNA could have gotten on the rock and

the spike.

{¶ 125} Regarding the new DNA evidence’s capacity to connect someone to the

crime scene, several points are in order. In the first place, Amanda’s body was found in a

rocky, stony area down by an abandoned railroad, near the track or railroad bed. A path

went through the area, which many people had used as a shortcut for many years. Tr. 1609,

2926-2927, 3981. The railroad tracks were not operative at the time of the murder and were

being lifted. As a result, thousands of uprooted railroad spikes were littered up and down the

49
course of the railroad line. Spikes were also scattered around the scene where Amanda was

found; there was a rock bed where the tracks had been laid; and rocks were beside

Amanda’s face. Tr. 854, 875-876, 904, 1091-1092. Due to the amount of foot traffic in the

area, any number of people could have picked up or touched the railroad spike or rocks

before the murder.

{¶ 126} Male DNA could also have been deposited on the spike by officers at the

scene or by medical personnel who examined Amanda’s head, as well as the spike, at the

scene and by those who performed medical procedures there and on the way to the hospital.

Tr. 1040-1045, 2210, 3278. Amanda was treated at a local hospital before an attempt was

made to airlift her to another hospital, where she died during the flight. While at the local

hospital, personnel did various medical procedures, including placing an endotracheal tube,

IV drip, and leads for an electrocardiogram; ventilating and suctioning the tube; and taking

chest and x-rays of the body, including the head and skull. Tr. 1082-1083, 2164-2165, 2198,

3257, 3271, 3275.

{¶ 127} DNA could have also been deposited by other individuals who handled the

evidence. For example, during the autopsy, though forceps were used to remove the rocks

from the victim and gloves were worn, there is no indication that masks were also worn.

Tr. 1334. BCI agent Robert Setzer said that he, Dr. Mannarino, and others had handled the

spike. Setzer collected most of the physical evidence and did not wear a mask at any time.

Tr. 1462, 1551, 1562. And as with the hair found years later on Amanda’s shirt, biological

material can be deposited on evidence no matter how careful the procedures.

{¶ 128} DNA can be transferred onto objects by “primary transfer, secondary transfer,

or aerosolization.” State v. Dawson, 340 Conn. 136, 153-154 (2021). “Primary or ‘touch’

transfer occurs, for example, when one directly touches or picks up an object. Secondary

50
transfer occurs when, for example, person A bleeds onto a table and, subsequently, person

B walks by the table, accidentally brushes against it, and then sits in a chair. Person A’s

blood can potentially be on that chair via secondary transfer, although person A personally

never came into contact with the chair. Finally, skin cells can be deposited on an object

through aerosolization, which . . . occurs when, for example, a person speaks, breathes,

coughs, or sneezes on or near an item.” Id.

{¶ 129} As indicated at the trial here, testing can also contaminate DNA, and that did

occur, in fact, when Dr. Blake tested the foreign pubic hair found on the victim. Even at that

time, concerns about contamination were well-known in the forensic community. Tr. 2833,

2836, 2849. In fact, defense expert Dr. Gerdes testified that contamination and transference

of DNA can occur both at crime scenes and at laboratories even if the person collecting or

testing evidence is wearing gloves. Tr. 2814-2815. During the new trial hearing, experts also

noted that DNA can be transferred and can result in contamination quite easily. New Trial

Tr. 521-522. The presence of unknown male DNA on the spike and the rock does not make

Myers’ defense theory “exponentially more credible.” New Trial Judgment, p. 26.

2. New DNA Evidence and the State’s Circumstantial Evidence

{¶ 130} The trial court’s second point in its Petro analysis was that without DNA

evidence, the trial verdict was based only on circumstantial evidence, and the “new” DNA

evidence would directly contradict the State’s circumstantial evidence. New Trial Judgment,

p. 26. We disagree. First, the court could not eliminate evidence from the prior trial; it was

required to consider all the evidence from that trial. Second, the newly discovered DNA

evidence does not “contradict” the prior evidence; it is DNA evidence from items that do not

relate to the only other such evidence presented at trial—the results obtained from the

foreign pubic hair. As we have stressed, the new evidence does not implicate Myers’

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suggested alternate subjects. And finally, the trial court’s remarks about circumstantial

evidence are legally incorrect or, at the least, confusing.

{¶ 131} The court stated:

Second, without the new DNA evidence, the Defendant’s evidence was – like

the State’s evidence – circumstantial. The new DNA evidence would be

presented as direct evidence to contradict the State’s evidence. While direct

evidence and circumstantial evidence are a worthy basis upon which to base

a conviction (4 OJR-CR 409.01), the tactical argument that direct evidence is

more reliable (i.e., less susceptible to subjective bias and human

interpretation), is hard to refute.

New Trial Judgment, p. 26.

{¶ 132} Under Ohio law, “‘[p]roof of guilt may be made by circumstantial evidence as

well as by real evidence and direct or testimonial evidence, or any combination of these

three classes of evidence. All three classes have equal probative value, and circumstantial

evidence has no less value than the others.’” State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 151 (1998),

quoting 1A Wigmore, Evidence § 24 et. seq., at 944 (Tillers Rev.1983). See also State v.

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus (noting “[c]ircumstantial

evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value”). Accord State

v. Mobley, 2008-Ohio-4641, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.). “Furthermore, ‘direct evidence of a fact is not

required, and circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying, and persuasive than

direct evidence.’” Mobley at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 38 (1991).

That is not true in every case, obviously. In some situations, circumstantial evidence might

be more persuasive; in others, it might not.

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{¶ 133} Contrary to the trial court’s characterization, the State’s evidence at trial was

not merely circumstantial; direct evidence was also presented. “Direct evidence is where

someone actually sees something or hears something and can come into court and

positively state what he actually sees or hears and makes a statement in regard to it.” State

v. Corkran, 3 Ohio St.2d 125, 131 (1965) (approving jury instructions to that effect). Direct

evidence has also been defined as “‘evidence that is based on personal knowledge or

observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.’” State v.

Cornett, 2009-Ohio-3531, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004)

{¶ 134} An example is testimony of a witness who saw or heard a defendant do

something. E.g., State v. Hilleary, 2015-Ohio-2782, ¶ 21-22 (2d Dist.) (no direct evidence

existed that a witness saw defendant illegally dump tires, but circumstantial evidence

established his guilt). Direct evidence may also include a defendant’s own statements made

to others, given to the police, or stated at trial. E.g., State v. Pappas, 2001 WL 1597990, *5

(2d Dist. Dec. 14, 2001) (discussing that defendant’s testimony was the only “direct

evidence” presented at trial).

{¶ 135} Multiple witnesses testified at Myers’ trial about what they had directly heard

or seen or done. The subjects of their testimony included, but were not limited to, collection

of evidence from the crime scene and from Myers’ automobile; medical treatment rendered

at the scene and at the hospital; statements Myers made before and after the crime;

observations of Myers’ and Amanda’s actions the night of the crime; Amanda’s autopsy; and

photographic documentation of the investigation.

{¶ 136} “[C]ircumstantial evidence is defined as ‘[t]estimony not based on actual

personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from which

deductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be proved.’” Nicely, 39 Ohio

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St.3d at 150, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979). As an example, gunshot residue

test results may be circumstantial evidence that the person from whom the sample was

obtained shot a gun. State v. Carson, 2018-Ohio-271, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.). See also St. Paul Fire

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., 129 Ohio St. 401, 405, 408 (1935) (describing

experiments conducted about cause of fire as circumstantial); State v. Combs, 100 Ohio

App.3d 90, 101 (1st Dist. 1994) (blood tests and alcohol bottles may have been

circumstantial evidence of defendant’s intoxication); State v. Gibson, 2007-Ohio-3345, ¶ 7

(3d Dist.) (“DNA report for the blood droplets constitutes circumstantial evidence”). In any

event, whether DNA tests are circumstantial or direct evidence, the trial court was incorrect

when it said the DNA evidence contradicted the evidence at trial.

{¶ 137} As an additional matter, contrary to the trial court’s implication about the

greater validity of “direct” evidence such as scientific analysis, such evidence can involve

some degree of subjectivity. This was noted at the trial by both State and defense experts.

See Tr. 1573, 1578-1579 (Michelle Yezzo, BCI forensic scientist); Tr. 2145, 2262-2263

(Dr. Michael Badin, forensic pathologist); Tr. 2801, 2895-2896, 2917 (Dr. John Gerdes,

defense DNA expert); Tr. 3283, 3304-3305, 3316-3317 (Dr. Phillip Hartman, State rebuttal

DNA expert).

{¶ 138} Testimony at the new trial hearing also revealed some degree of subjectivity

as well. Labs use different analytical thresholds and different criteria for comparing DNA;

labs create their own standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) and guidelines; and expert

opinions can be affected by cognitive or contextual bias (e.g., when scientists let

investigative material they have read affect their opinions). See New Trial Tr. 23, 70, 72-77,

124, 127-128 (Megan Clement, defense forensic scientist); New Trial Tr. 40-241, 250, 266,

275, 298, 307 (George Shipiro, defense DNA expert); New Trial Tr. 402, 407-410, 418-419,

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424-425, 462-463 (Dr. Maria Cuellar, defense expert on forensic statistics); New Trial Tr.

638-639, 689 (Dr. Katherine Maloney, defense expert on forensic pathology); and New Trial

Tr. 746-748, 780, 811-812 (Lewis Maddox, State DNA expert).

{¶ 139} None of this means that scientific testing is any less valid than other types of

evidence. However, it can be so where, as here, the sample being tested is degraded or is

of extremely small quantity, or testing yields questionable results due to amplification of the

sample or lowering standards.

3. New DNA Evidence and the Credibility of the Defense’s Trial Witnesses

{¶ 140} Returning to the new trial decision, the trial court made a third point in

considering the last Petro factor. The trial court also found—without discussing specific

evidence from the trial—that Myers’ “newly discovered” evidence bolstered the testimony of

every defense witness who had attempted to convince the jury that other perpetrators had

motive and opportunity to commit the murder. The trial court stated that “[e]very defense

witness would certainly have been perceived as more credible, especially those who

established an alibi and those who indicated other possible perpetrators were seen in the

vicinity at the appropriate time.” New Trial Judgment, p. 27.

{¶ 141} The DNA evidence would not have bolstered anyone’s credibility. There was

no evidence that the alleged perpetrators’ DNA was on either the rock or the spike or that

the defense had tried to compare the DNA to that of the alleged perpetrators or anyone else.

We note that DNA samples from these individuals appear to exist, as their samples and

samples from others were listed on the evidence Myers asked the trial court to order

preserved in 1999, a request which the court granted. See Appendix to Relief Petition

(June 21, 2022), Ex. 16, Item #61 (items in possession of State). In 2020, a sample of the

blood of Glenn Smith, Amanda’s boyfriend, was provided to a private company for DNA

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testing, and a Y-STR profile was obtained. Appendix to Amended Motion for New Trial

(Feb. 28, 2024) (“2024 Appx.”), Ex. 4 (Supplemental DNA Case Report), p. 1, 3.

{¶ 142} Notably, Myers’ Relief Petition stated that the State was searching for oral,

vaginal, and rectal swabs recovered from the victim and that Myers was not waiving his right

to seek testing on these items. See David Lee Myers Petition to Vacate Death Sentence

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 (June 21, 2022), p. 59, fn. 18. One would

assume that if the DNA of alternate subjects had been lost or was unavailable for testing,

Myers would have mentioned this. As we said, Myers failed to raise the issue. A possibility

is that this evidence would “exclude” these others as well as Myers.

{¶ 143} Furthermore, the credibility of the testimony of fact witnesses would depend

on their own testimony about what they saw or heard, not on what experts might say on

unrelated matters. The “newly discovered” DNA evidence would also not affect the forensic

experts who testified about the pubic hair because most were not DNA experts, and the

presence or absence on DNA on different evidence would not impact their testimony. An

exception might be Dr. Blake, who conducted DNA analysis on the pubic hair for the State.

However, there is no indication in the record whether the doctor is still alive, given that the

trial occurred around 30 years ago. If he is no longer alive, the most that could be done on

retrial would be to read his former testimony at a new trial, in which case no further questions

could be asked. It is also impossible to conclude what the doctor might say on retrial about

DNA. The trial court’s conclusions regarding the probative weight of the new DNA evidence

were only speculation.

{¶ 144} The court did not discuss any specific defense witness. Myers presented the

following witnesses at trial: Sergeant Linkhart, who had been the chief investigating officer

on the case in 1990; Terry Rogers, one of the alleged alternate suspects; Gregg Grimes,

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another of the alternate suspects; Nancy D., an acquaintance of Rogers and Kim Grimes;

Enid T., whose daughter lived near the crime scene; Larry G., with whom Gregg Grimes’

wife, Kim, was staying with occasionally at the time of the murder; Deanna G., Larry’s wife;

Claude Lyons, a Greene County police lieutenant in charge of road patrol; Julia G., one of

two girls who discovered Amanda’s body; Tami P., an investigator who assisted Myers’

defense team; Dr. John Gerdes, a DNA expert; Debra B., who lived near the crime scene;

Pauline R. and her husband, Robert, who owned a bar and apartments in Xenia; Robert M.,

an orthopedic technologist; Detective Young, a Columbus police officer; John Bodovetz, a

private investigator for the defense; Jeff Moore, an attorney who had represented Myers;

and Freda C., Myers’ sister.

a. Linkhart

{¶ 145} At the time of the murder, then-Detective Linkhart was the investigating

officer for the burglary of Larry and Deanna’s house on Locust Street. He was the officer

who interviewed Gregg Grimes on August 4, 1988. Linkhart discussed the interview and

some later interactions with Grimes. Linkhart testified about his attempts to locate and serve

Kim Grimes with a subpoena, which were unsuccessful, and his limited contacts with Gregg

Grimes. Tr. 2479-2489. Linkhart’s testimony had nothing to do with DNA evidence or an

alibi, and we cannot see how further DNA evidence would impact Linkhart. Tr. 3026-3080.

b. Nancy

{¶ 146} Nancy D. testified about incriminating statements Terry Rogers allegedly

made to her four years after the crime, in which he implicated the involvement of himself and

Gregg Grimes in the crime. Nancy waited until the week before her January 29, 1996

testimony, i.e., more than seven years after the crime, before contacting the defense.

Tr. 2504-2529, 3138-3153. “New” DNA evidence would not bolster Nancy’s credibility

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because the DNA evidence did not connect either Rogers or Grimes with the crime. Nancy

would not be in a position to comment on scientific evidence.

c. Enid

{¶ 147} Enid testified that she was at her daughter’s home in the early morning hours

of August 4, 1988. Enid’s daughter lived on the corner of West and Locust Streets, which

was near the field and railroad tracks where Amanda was murdered. According to Enid,

between 12:15 and 12:30 a.m., she saw a black man walk down the street, smoke a

cigarette, and then walk across the field. Enid did not know the man. Tr. 2530-2534. This

testimony is generally irrelevant, other than to indicate that Gregg Grimes, an African

American male, may have been in the vicinity at that time. However, that point is essentially

undisputed, as Grimes himself indicated that he was in the area of West and Locust Streets

a number of times that night. The house where his ex-wife, Kim, was staying with friends

was on Locust Street; Grimes entered the house the night of the murder and destroyed

property while Kim and the other occupants were not there. Grimes also hid across the street

from that house to wait for Kim to come back. Tr. 909, 1139-1140, 2656, 2752-2753.

{¶ 148} If Enid’s testimony were intended to support some sort of “alibi” defense, her

observations occurred at least an hour before Officer Rinehart saw Myers and Amanda

walking together on Home Avenue. See Tr. 878, 877-880, 892-897. Officer Rinehart had

been dispatched to the Roundtable bar concerning the matter involving Glenn Smith,

Amanda’s boyfriend. After Smith was arrested, Rinehart left Roundtable and followed Officer

Savage, who was transporting Smith to jail. After Savage got to the jail, Rinehart returned to

the area of Roundtable. He then saw Myers and Amanda at 1:35 a.m. at the latest, but more

likely 1:30 a.m., walking in a northwesterly direction, which would have been towards the

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railroad area. When Reinhart saw them, they were about 300 yards from where Amanda

was murdered.

{¶ 149} The trial testimony also indicates that during the timeframe discussed in

Enid’s testimony, Myers, Amanda, and Smith were still at Five Points Tavern; they had not

even yet arrived at Roundtable. Enid’s testimony would have had no relevance to an “alibi.”

d. Larry and Deanna

{¶ 150} Larry G., lived on Locust Street with his wife Deanna and their children. His

home is the one that Grimes entered and trashed the night of the murder. The house faced

the field where Amanda’s body was found. Larry’s testimony was confined to the events

surrounding Grimes’ harassment of Kim and Grimes’ damaging the property. DNA evidence

would have no impact on Larry’s credibility, and he offered nothing regarding any purported

alibi. Tr. 2535-2591. Larry’s wife, Deanna, testified about the same subjects. Tr. 2952-2608.

e. Lyons

{¶ 151} The defense also presented testimony from Claude Lyons, a lieutenant in

charge of the road patrol who had a limited role in the murder investigation. Lyons testified

about a newspaper article in which he had commented about police dogs from Beavercreek

being at the crime scene. However, he had little recollection about that. Tr. 2611-2620. Any

new DNA evidence would have no impact on his credibility or an alibi.

f. Julia

{¶ 152} Defense witness Julia G. was one of the two teenage girls who discovered

Amanda’s body around 3:00 a.m. when they were walking through the railroad track area to

go home. Julia testified about the events of that evening leading up to discovering the body

and then running home to call the police. Tr. 2621-2631. Her testimony would be unaffected

by new DNA testimony and is also irrelevant to any potential alibi.

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g. Tami

{¶ 153} Defense witness Tami P. was a private investigator who worked for Myers’

defense team during the pendency of Myers’ first murder case. The subjects of her testimony

included interviewing Julia; observing an injury to Myers’ ring finger when she visited the jail

a few weeks or so after the murder; and seeing an index card from the jail at some point that

listed a wallet and money for Glenn Smith, which was contrary to testimony that Smith had

left his wallet with Amanda. Tr. 2633-2650. None of Tami’s testimony had to do with an alibi,

and DNA evidence would have no bearing on her credibility.

h. Gregg Grimes

{¶ 154} The next defense witness was Gregg Grimes, one of the “alternate suspects.”

During his testimony, Grimes admitted that he had lied to the police in implicating Terry

Rogers in two home invasions on Locust Street the night of the murder (one at Larry’s house

and another at a nearby house on Locust Street called “Animal House”). Grimes also

admitted he had lied to the police about the description of a man he had seen driving a car

into the crime scene area before the police arrived and about the man and a girl arguing;

the description of the man did not match that of Myers. In that statement, Grimes had also

told the police that he had seen the man slam the girl against the car and then leave. At trial,

Grimes further testified that after he had trashed Larry’s house, he hid outside, waiting for

Kim to return. He saw a headlight that he thought was the police looking for him because of

the break-in and the aggravated burglary he had committed that night. However, it was not

the police. A car came to the railroad area, stopped, and turned its ignition and lights off.

Grimes saw someone get out of the car, but he did not give the description that he gave the

police; he actually could not describe the person; instead, he had lied and made up the

description. However, Grimes stated at trial that a photo of Myers’ car looked like the car he

60
had seen, though Grimes had never seen a photo of that car. The person got out of the car,

and Grimes thought the person was urinating. The person then got back in the car, peeled

out, and went back down West Street. Tr. 2694-2699, 2704-2705, 2724-2725, 2751-2758.

{¶ 155} According to Grimes, he was curious after the car left, so he walked down

the tracks, where he saw a woman’s body and heard moaning. He did not touch her, but got

scared and panicked, as he had just committed two burglaries that night (at Larry’s and at

the Animal House), had been in the railroad area that night, was a black person, and had

been prosecuted by the Greene County prosecutors a number of times. At Larry’s house,

he had also left a note to his wife, threatening her. The police arrested Grimes the next

morning. He was wearing the same clothing he had worn all night. When Grimes was taken

in for questioning, he was not concerned about the burglaries; he was concerned about

being questioned about the woman on the tracks. As a result, he lied about Rogers’

involvement in the burglary of Larry’s residence. This was because though Rogers was

Grimes’ cousin, they did not hang out together, and Rogers had a reputation of being a pretty

rough person. Grimes believed that he would be blamed for the burglary, so he thought he

had better find someone to blame who could possibly have committed it—Rogers. For the

same reason, Grimes lied about the description of the man he had seen. Tr. 2745, 2758-

2770.

{¶ 156} During questioning, Grimes was asked about telling his ex-wife, Kim, whom

he had a pattern of stalking and harassing, that he had killed Amanda. He told Detective

Linkhart that he had said that to control his ex-wife and keep her in line. Grimes admitted at

trial that he had made such a statement to his ex-wife and that he may have said it in anger.

Grimes denied any involvement in the crime. Tr. 2777-2778, 3041-3042, 3072-3073.

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{¶ 157} Grimes’ testimony did not involve Myers’ alibi, and in fact, Myers did not

specifically rely on an alibi at trial. Instead, his defense was that he had left Amanda at the

Roundtable and that alternate suspects, Grimes and Rogers, had committed the murder.

The new DNA evidence would be relevant to Grimes if it implicated him or at least was

unable to exclude him. However, that did not happen.

{¶ 158} The exclusion of Myers’ DNA from the rock and the spike, even if credited,

does not automatically exclude him from the crime scene. And, of course, Grimes was not

included as a contributor to the DNA on the spike and rock. In addition, the police took all

the clothing Grimes had worn during all the events on August 3 and 4 when he was arrested

the morning of August 4. When tested, Grimes’ clothing showed no evidence of blood.

Tr. 1100, 1601, 2672.

i. Dr. Gerdes

{¶ 159} Dr. Gerdes testified as a DNA expert. The primary purpose of his testimony

was to discuss DNA technology, contamination in testing, and Dr. Blake’s analysis of the

foreign pubic hair. Dr. Gerdes criticized Dr. Blake for using too many cycles to amplify a

small amount of DNA, which increased the effect of a contaminant and caused the results

to be scientifically unreliable, the same criticisms made at the new trial hearing. Tr. 2801-

2922, and more particularly, 2821-2823, 2832. See also New Trial Tr. 528-530, 546, 549-

550, 588. Gerdes’ testimony covered only DNA testing and results concerning the hair and

had no relation to other items. His testimony certainly did not relate to any alibi.

j. Deb

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308092. Public record. Not legal advice.