# Roma

> District Court, E.D. New York · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308036

## Case

- **Full name:** Yvette Roma v. David Carmili, Physician, P.C., David Carmili
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308036

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting district courts’ discretion in awarding fees
- noting district courts’ discretion in awarding fees

## Opinion text

United States District Court
Eastern District of New York

-----------------------------------X

YVETTE ROMA,

Plaintiff,
ORDER

- against - No. 23-cv-4072 (KAM)

DAVID CARMILI, PHYSICIAN, P.C.,
DAVID CARMILI,

Defendants.

-----------------------------------X

Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge:

Pending before the Court is a motion for attorney’s fees and
costs filed by plaintiff Yvette Roma (“Plaintiff”) following
Plaintiff’s acceptance of Defendants’ offer of judgment pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to resolve her employment-
related claims against her previous employer, David Carmili,
Physician, P.C., and its principal David Carmili (together
“Defendants”). (See ECF No. 61.1) Plaintiff’s acceptance of
Defendants’ offer of judgment resolved all of Plaintiff’s claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law
(“NYLL”) for a judgment amount of $30,818, exclusive of fees and
costs.2 (ECF No. 58.) The Clerk of Court entered a final judgment

1 Pincites herein refer to the page numbers in the banner generated by CM/ECF.

2 Acceptances of offers of judgment under Rule 68(a) are not subject to judicial
review under Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir.
in the amount of $30,818 as to Plaintiff’s claims on June 30, 2025.
(ECF No. 60.)
The only remaining issue in this action is determination of
a reasonable fees and costs award to Plaintiff’s counsel.3 This

order is therefore limited to the scope of issues necessary to
resolve the instant motion, and the Court assumes familiarity with
the background of this action.4 For the reasons explained below,
the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel fees in the amount of
$17,669.60 and costs in the amount of $2,356.85.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Supreme Court has instructed that, in the interest of
judicial economy, “[t]he essential goal in shifting fees (to either
party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”
Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011). “[The] trial court has wide
discretion,” and “[t]he determination of fees should not result in
a second major litigation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted);
see also Millea v. Metro-North Railroad Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d
Cir. 2011) (noting district courts’ discretion in awarding fees).

2015). See Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 944 F.3d 395, 412 (2d Cir. 2019)
(“Cheeks should not be extended to apply to Rule 68(a) offers of judgment.”)

3 “Both the FLSA and [NYLL] allow for an award of reasonable attorney's fees.”
Santillan v. Henao, 822 F. Supp. 2d 284, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal
quotations omitted). Defendants do not dispute the Court’s authority to grant
fees and costs to Plaintiff’s counsel.

4 The Court’s December 18, 2024 Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying
in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss reviews at length the background of this
action. See Roma v. David Carmili, Physician, P.C., 761 F. Supp. 3d 481
(E.D.N.Y. 2024).
Courts have historically applied two methods to analyze the
reasonableness of attorney’s fees in FLSA cases: (i) the lodestar
method, and (ii) the percentage-of-recovery method. “Both [the

Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar
— the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number
of hours required by the case — creates a presumptively reasonable
fee.” Millea, 658 F.3d at 166 (internal quotations omitted). The
Second Circuit has instructed that the second method — a
percentage-of-recovery or proportionality analysis – “may be
relevant” only “in some cases.” Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc., 948 F.3d
593, 603 (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court
must consider the “degree of success obtained” as “the most
critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award.”
Fisher, 948 F.3d at 606 (internal quotations omitted).
I. The Lodestar Method
A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is the first of two figures required
to calculate the appropriate lodestar figure. “[C]onsiderations
concerning the quality of a prevailing party's counsel's
representation normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly
rate used to calculate the lodestar initially.” Millea, 658 F.3d
at 168 (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he burden is on the fee
applicant to produce satisfactory evidence — in addition to the
attorney's own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line
with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and
reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “The

presumptively reasonable fee boils down to what a reasonable,
paying client would be willing to pay, given that such a party
wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case
effectively.” Simmons v. New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d
170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Reasonable Hours
A reasonable number of hours worked is the second of two
figures required to calculate the appropriate lodestar figure.
“In determining how much attorney time should be compensated, the
court initially looks to the amount of time spent on each category
of tasks, as reflected in contemporaneous time records.” Gonzalez
v. Scalinatella, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 5, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “In
calculating reasonable hours, the essential consideration is

whether a reasonable attorney would have expended similar hours in
pursuit of the case.” Id. “If the court finds that some of the
time spent was not reasonably necessary to the outcome, it should
reduce the time for which compensation is awarded.” Id. “In
reducing a claim for time spent, the court may use a percentage
deduction as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee
application.” Id. at 30 (internal quotations omitted).
II. Limitations on Lodestar Adjustments
“A district court may adjust the lodestar when it does not
adequately take into account a factor that may properly be
considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Millea, 658 F.3d at

167 (internal quotations omitted). As discussed below, however,
the Second Circuit in Millea curtailed the discretion of judges to
make adjustments after the appropriate, presumptively reasonable
lodestar figure is calculated.
After the appropriate lodestar figure is calculated, “[a]
district court may adjust the lodestar when it does not adequately
take into account a factor that may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable fee,” but “such adjustments are
appropriate only in rare circumstances, because the lodestar
figure already includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors
constituting a reasonable attorney's fee.” Id. (citation
modified). Millea identified several impermissible lodestar

adjustments that courts must be careful to avoid. Specifically,
courts generally may not adjust the lodestar based on: (1) “the
novelty and complexity of a case ... because they are already
included in the lodestar calculation itself, being fully reflected
in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel”; (2) the
“public policy significance” of claims in a case; (3) time “spent
on claims wholly ineligible for fee-shifting”; (4) a finding that
the plaintiff’s success on a nonfrivolous claim was de minimis;
(5) “the quality of an attorney's performance” “because
considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party's
counsel's representation normally are reflected in the reasonable
hourly rate used to calculate the lodestar initially.” Id. at

167-68 (internal quotations omitted). Instead of adjusting the
lodestar amount after it is calculated, the Second Circuit
instructs that generally “such adjustments should be made when
calculating the original lodestar figure.” Id. at 168.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $43,385 in fees and $2,356.85 in
costs. (ECF No. 61 at 2.) Each is analyzed in turn.
I. Attorney’s Fees
The amount of fees Plaintiff’s counsel seeks significantly
exceeds Plaintiff’s recovery of $30,818 and would constitute
approximately 58.46% of the total recovery, exclusive of costs.
This disproportionality, however, is not a standalone basis to

reduce fees. Given that “the reasonableness of the fees does not
turn on any explicit percentage cap,” and “a fee may not be reduced
merely because the fee would be disproportionate to the financial
interest at stake in the litigation,”5 the Court will follow the

5 For example, in Fisher, the Second Circuit held that attorney’s fees and costs
of 92% of total recovery ($23,000 out of a total recovery of $25,000) was not
per se unreasonable. See Fisher, 948 F.3d at 606 (“While the original proposed
split of $23,000 to LLG and $2,000 to Fisher understandably gave the district
court pause, the reasonableness of the fees does not turn on any explicit
percentage cap.”)
presumptively reasonable lodestar figure. Fisher, 948 F.3d at
604, 606.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rates
“[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory

evidence — in addition to the attorney's own affidavits — that the
requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community
for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. “Courts
in the Eastern District of New York have recently awarded hourly
rates from $70 to $100 for legal support, $100 to $200 for junior
associates, $200 to $325 for senior associates, and $300 to $450
for partners in FLSA cases.” Rodriguez v. MRC Bakery Corp., 802
F. Supp. 3d 393, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (internal quotations omitted).
Given that Plaintiff’s counsel concedes that “Plaintiff recovered
approximately 15% of the damages sought,” (ECF No. 65 at 4),
Plaintiff’s limited degree of success supports an hourly rate at

the low end of the typical range for employment law attorneys in
this district.6
Accounting for the prevailing rates in this district as
described in Rodriguez and Plaintiff’s limited success in this

6 Moreover, the conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel was suboptimal and supports lower
hourly rates. For example, on June 14, 2024, the Court needed to warn
Plaintiff’s counsel of the possibility of monetary sanctions for “additional
violations of court orders.” See June 14, 2024 Docket Order (“Plaintiff's
counsel is warned that additional violations of court orders may result in
monetary sanctions.”)
action, the Court adjusts the hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel
as follows: The hourly rate for Roman Avshalumov, Esq., a senior
managing attorney with 15 years of experience, (see ECF No. 61-2

at 11), is reduced from $500 to $300. The hourly rate for James
O’Donnell, Esq., a managing attorney with nine years of experience,
(see ECF No. 61-2 at 2), is reduced from $400 to $300. The hourly
rate for Katelyn Schillaci, Esq., a junior associate with two years
of experience, (see ECF No. 61-2 at 5), is reduced from $250 to
$100. The hourly rate for Avraham Scher, Esq., a junior associate
no longer employed at the firm representing Plaintiff, (ECF No.
61-4), is reduced from $175 to $100. The hourly rate for Zubair
Tahir, Esq., a junior associate no longer employed at the firm
representing Plaintiff, (id.), is reduced from $175 to $100. The
hourly rate for paralegals is reduced from $100 to $70.
B. Reasonable Hours
Upon reviewing the billing entries provided by Plaintiff’s

counsel, (ECF No. 61-1), the Court identifies a number of duplicate
entries in which two attorneys participated in meetings and tasks
that likely required the services of only one attorney. For
example, Mr. Avshalumov’s June 1, 2023 billing entry is identical
to Mr. O’Donnell’s billing entry. Each billed 1.8 hours with the
following entry: “Meet w/ client, review / edit / finalize
complaint, file complaint / summons / cover sheet, NOA.” (ECF No.
61-1 at 1.) In another example, three different attorneys billed
for 30 minutes to review a two-page offer of judgment. (ECF No.
61-1 at 3.) Throughout the billing records, the Court identifies
numerous examples of identical entries for work that appears
duplicative and redundant. (See ECF No. 61-1.)

This Court joins other courts in finding that “[i]n lieu of
making minute adjustments to individual timekeeping entries, a
court may make across-the-board percentage cuts in the number of
hours claimed, as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee
application.” Lee v. Mani & Pedi Inc., No. 20-cv-10787 (JCM),
2022 WL 3645118, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2022) (collecting cases)
(internal quotations omitted). “To determine the percentage
deduction, a district court need not serve as a green-eyeshade
accountant, but may take into account its overall sense of a suit,
and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's
time.” Jianmin Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc., No. 16-cv-5633

(ARR) (JO), 2020 WL 4783399, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2020)
(citation modified). Moreover, the affirmation of Defendants’
counsel, Terry Heidecker, Esq., identifies numerous instances of
Plaintiff’s attorneys’ conduct that prolonged the litigation.
(ECF No. 62 ¶¶ 17-25.) For example, Plaintiff’s counsel requested
repeated opportunities to file an amended and second amended
complaint but failed to delete unviable FLSA and NYLL claims. (Id.
¶¶ 12, 16, 19, 24.) The repeated issues and delays in Plaintiff’s
filings resulted in the Court warning Plaintiff’s counsel “that
additional violations of court orders may result in monetary
sanctions.” See June 14, 2024 Docket Order.
Balancing the Plaintiff’s ultimately successful recovery

against numerous examples of duplicative work by Plaintiff’s
attorneys, the Court reduces the total hours billed by 20% “as a
practical means of trimming fat.” Lee, 2022 WL 3645118, at *13.
Applying the aforementioned calculations for reasonable hourly
rates and reasonable hours expended results in a reasonable
lodestar figure of $17,669.60 for attorney’s fees:
Reasonable
Reasonable
Hours Expended
Timekeeper Hourly Total
(after 20%
Rate
reduction)
Roman Avshalumov $300 35.92 $10,776
James O’Donnell $300 6.56 $1,968
Katelyn Schillaci $100 11.12 $1,112
Avraham Scher $100 28.24 $2,824
Zubair Tahir $100 1.44 $144
Paralegals $70 12.08 $845.60
Lodestar $17,669.60

II. Costs
The costs submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel, totaling
$2,356.85, are appropriate and consist of expected costs such as
filing fees, costs of attempted service, and transcript fees.’
(ECF No. 61-1 at 3.)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
counsel fees in the amount of $17,669.60 and costs in the amount
of $2,356.85.

So ordered.
ba \), -~
Dated: February 10, 2026 “) 4 9 ws tee
Brooklyn, New York Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York

’ Defendants’ opposition brief, (ECF No. 63), advances no specific argument
against the award of requested costs.
11

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11308036. Public record. Not legal advice.