# Rotolo

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · April 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11307967

## Case

- **Full name:** Lance Rotolo v. Energy Erectors, Inc. et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11307967

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that workers loading and unloading cargo on airplanes were transportation workers

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LANCE ROTOLO CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 25-2213

ENERGY ERECTORS, INC. ET AL. SECTION “H”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. 10).
For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lance Rotolo worked as a safety coordinator for Defendants
Mastec North America, Inc. (“Mastec”) and Energy Erectors, Inc. (“EEI”) from
October 2024 until he was terminated in August 2025. Plaintiff alleges that he
consistently worked in excess of 40 hours per week during his employment with
Defendants, but he was not paid overtime. He further alleges that he was
terminated in retaliation for raising concerns regarding overtime pay. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants Mastec, EEI, and his supervisor Miguel Gonzalez
violated his rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Defendants have moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to a mutual arbitration agreement that he executed in connection
1
with his employment with Defendants (“the Arbitration Agreement”). Plaintiff
opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD
The question of arbitrability is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., which broadly applies to any written provision in
“a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction.”1 A two-step analysis governs whether parties should be
compelled to arbitrate a dispute.2 The Court must first determine whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.3 This determination involves two
separate inquiries: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between
the parties, and, if so, (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope
of that agreement.4 Both inquiries are generally guided by ordinary principles
of state contract law.5 The strong federal policy favoring arbitration applies
“when addressing ambiguities regarding whether a question falls within an
arbitration agreement’s scope,” but it does not apply “when determining
whether a valid agreement exists.”6 If the Court finds the parties agreed to
arbitrate, it must then proceed to the second step of the analysis and consider
whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims non-arbitrable.7

1 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
2 JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 2007).
3 Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2004).
4 Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008).
5 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
6 Sherer, 548 F.3d at 381.
7 Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 2002).
2
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The parties do not dispute that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate
and that Plaintiff’s claims fall within the Arbitration Agreement’s scope.
Rather, Plaintiff opposes arbitration on two grounds: (1) Defendants are not
parties to the Arbitration Agreement; and (2) Plaintiff is exempt from
arbitration under the FAA’s transportation worker exemption. This Court will
consider each argument in turn
A. The Arbitration Agreement Binds Defendants
Plaintiff argues that Mastec and EEI cannot enforce the Arbitration
Agreement where they are not expressly identified therein and where they
have denied that Plaintiff has an employment relationship with MasTec, Inc.,
the only entity named in the Agreement. He further argues that Defendants
have failed to identify any theory by which they, as non-signatories, can enforce
the Arbitration Agreement. The Court finds these arguments to be unavailing
in light of the plain terms of the Agreement.
“[T]he question of ‘[w]ho is actually bound by an arbitration agreement
is [ultimately] a function of the intent of the parties, as expressed in the terms
of the agreement.’”8 Here, the Arbitration Agreement expressly states that it
“is between Employee and MasTec, Inc., including all MasTec, Inc. subsidiaries
(the “Company”).”9 Only Plaintiff signed the agreement, however, the
agreement states that “BY ISSUANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE
COMPANY AGREES TO BE BOUND TO ITS TERMS WITHOUT ANY

8 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 522, 530–
31 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 355 (5th
Cir. 2003)).
9 Doc. 10-2.
3
REQUIREMENT TO SIGN THIS AGREEMENT.”10 Accordingly, by the
Agreement’s plain terms, both Plaintiff and Defendants, who are subsidiaries
of MasTec, Inc., agreed to be bound by the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff has
not cited to any case law supporting his theory that EEI and Mastec cannot
enforce the Agreement because they are not specifically identified therein.
Further, the Agreement expressly binds Defendants, and therefore, they are
not non-signatories as Plaintiff suggests. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Defendants are parties to the Arbitration Agreement and can enforce its
terms.11
B. FAA Transportation Worker Exemption
Next, Plaintiff argues that he is exempt from arbitration under Section
1 of the FAA, which provides that the FAA does not “apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”12 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the residual clause to exempt only contracts of employment of
transportation workers.13 The Court has defined “a transportation worker” as
one who is “actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of . . . goods across borders via

10 Doc. 10-2. In addition, “[t]he FAA does not expressly impose a signature
requirement.” Soni v. Solera Holdings, L.L.C., No. 21-10428, 2022 WL 1402046, at *4 (5th
Cir. May 4, 2022); see Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.
2005) (“[N]o signature is needed to satisfy the FAA’s written agreement requirement.”).
11 See Carrillo v. ROICOM USA, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1062 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
(holding that an arbitration agreement “binds ROICOM as an affiliated company of
ReadyOne” where the agreement defined “‘Company’ as ReadyOne as well as ‘affiliates or
related companies’ of ReadyOne”); Siefke v. Toyota Motor N. Am., Inc., No. 4:25-CV-406, 2025
WL 3461549, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2025) (holding CAS could compel arbitration where
terms of use expressly provided that “Toyota and its affiliates—including CAS—can compel
any dispute” to arbitration).
12 9 U.S.C. § 1.
13 Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
4
the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.”14 “To decide whether a worker
falls within Section 1’s residual category, the Supreme Court has instructed
that courts” to first identify the relevant “class of workers” to which the
plaintiff belongs and then determine “whether that class of workers is engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce.”15 An exempt worker “must at least play a
direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders.”16 The Court
has advised that the inquiry should focus on the work performed by the
employee rather than the industry of the employer.17
Plaintiff argues that his work with Defendants qualifies him as a
transportation worker. Plaintiff contends that as a Safety Coordinator, he
traveled between job sites across several states. As part of his job, he was
tasked with ensuring that the worksites were fully stocked with necessary
supplies, such as PPE. In doing so, he ordered supplies, received the ordered
goods, and then transported them across state lines in his vehicle to the
worksites he visited. Plaintiff argues that because he both initiated the flow of
goods in interstate commerce and transported those goods himself across state
lines, he is in the class of workers exempted by Section 1 of the FAA.
Defendants, on the other hand, cast Plaintiff’s work duties in a different
light. They argue that his primary duty was to conduct safety inspections at
their electric substation and construction sites and ensure that their
contractors were following safety protocols. They argue that his delivery of

14 Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246, 256 (2024) (quoting
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 458 (2022)).
15 George v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. CV 4:24-CV-1063-SDJ, 2025 WL 3143598,
at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025) (quoting Saxon, 596 U.S. at 455).
16 Bissonnette, 601 U.S. at 56 (internal quotations omitted).
17 Saxon, 596 U.S. at 455.
5
safety equipment when he visited worksites was incidental to his position and
was more in line with delivering the tools needed for a job. They point out that
Defendants are not in the business of selling PPE, and Plaintiff was therefore
not delivering to customers.
The Court finds that Plaintiff takes too broad a view of the
transportation worker exemption. The Supreme Court has advised that
Section 1 be afforded a narrow construction.18 While it is true that Plaintiff
moved goods across state borders, the Court cannot say that he played a direct
and necessary role in interstate commerce, like a railroad employee or
seaman.19 Plaintiff is in a class of workers who transports safety equipment
across state lines to their employer’s worksites. The goods are then used at
those worksites and do not continue to move through commerce. In Southwest
Airlines Co. v. Saxon, the Supreme Court found that workers “who load cargo
on and off airplanes” are transportation workers under Section 1 of the FAA.20
In so holding, the Court considered the employees involvement with the cargo
as it moved through interstate commerce and took into consideration “the
overall processes of the movement of goods.”21 Here, Plaintiff orders goods on

18 Bissonnette, 601 U.S. at 256.
19 See Rojas v. TK Commc'ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he exclusionary
clause of § 1 of the Arbitration Act should be narrowly construed to apply to employment
contracts of seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers actually engaged in the
movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad
workers are.”) (quoting Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995);
George, 2025 WL 3143598, at *3 (“[T]he residual provision is restricted to a transportation
worker who performs work analogous to that of seamen and railroad employees, whose
occupations are centered on the transport of goods in interstate or foreign commerce.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
20 Saxon, 596 U.S. at 459.
21 Wolford v. United Coal Co. LLC, 764 F. Supp. 3d 329, 338 (W.D. Va. 2025).
6
Defendants’ behalf for use by other employees of Defendants, transports those
goods to the employees, and they are utilized by the employees and cease to
reenter commerce. Under these facts, Defendants’ employees are the end
consumers of the goods, and Plaintiff is therefore not playing a role in the “free
flow of goods across borders.”22 Plaintiff’s work is easily distinguishable from
the cases in which courts found workers exempt. There, the workers were
actively involved in the transportation of merchandise, cargo, or people across
state lines.23 This Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s work was more
in line with transporting tools and supplies, which other courts have found
insufficient to qualify as a transportation worker under Section 1 of the FAA.24

22 Bissonnette, 601 U.S. at 256; see Immediato v. Postmates, Inc., 54 F.4th 67, 78 (1st
Cir. 2022) (“[T]he interstate movement terminated when the goods arrived at local
restaurants and grocery stores.”); Lopez v. Cintas Corp., 47 F.4th 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2022)
(“Once the goods arrived at the Houston warehouse and were unloaded, anyone interacting
with those goods was no longer engaged in interstate commerce.”).
23 See Saxon, 596 U.S. at 459 (holding that workers loading and unloading cargo on
airplanes were transportation workers); Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 916
(9th Cir. 2020) (holding that last leg delivery drivers were transportation workers despite not
crossing state lines where they complete the delivery of goods that Amazon has shipped
across state lines); Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 26 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[L]ast-
mile delivery workers who haul goods on the final legs of interstate journeys are
transportation workers ‘engaged in . . . interstate commerce,’ regardless of whether the
workers themselves physically cross state lines.”).
24 See Wolford, 764 F. Supp. 3d at 341 (“But Wolford’s crossing of the state line with
tools needed for his shift is not the same thing as an electrician delivering out-of-state light
fixtures to consumers. The repair parts and protective equipment are not goods to be
delivered to the purchasers of defendants’ coal products. They are incidental to his work as
an electrician ensuring the machinery is in working order.”); Reed v. LTN Glob. Commc’ns,
Inc., No. 1:24-CV-03649-JRR, 2025 WL 2653196, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2025) (holding that
Audio Specialist was not a transportation worker when he transported his own equipment
across state lines).

7
Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff does not belong to a class of
transportation workers and is not exempt from arbitration under section 1 of
the FAA.
Plaintiff has not set forth any other arguments against compelling
arbitration of this matter. Accordingly, the Court finds arbitration is
appropriate where the parties had an Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiffs claims
fall within the Agreement’s scope, and Plaintiff has not identified any federal
statute or policy rendering the claims non-arbitrable. Defendant has asked the
Court to stay this matter pending arbitration. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, the
Court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”
Accordingly, this matter must be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration
proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED, and this matter is
STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending arbitration.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 2nd day of April, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11307967. Public record. Not legal advice.