# Hearold Lacy v. Department of Homeland Security

> Merit Systems Protection Board · April 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11307082

## Case

- **Court:** Merit Systems Protection Board
- **Decided:** April 8, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

HEAROLD LACY SR., DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, CH-0752-24-0103-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: April 8, 2026
SECURITY,
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Stacie Shah , Esquire, and Christopher Forasiepi , Esquire, Dallas, Texas,
for the appellant.

Shaun C. Southworth , Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Laura J. Carroll , Esquire, South Burlington, Vermont, for the agency.

Colleen Ann Crane , Esquire, Camp Springs, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman
James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed his removal. On petition for review, he argues that the agency did not

1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

prove its absence without leave (AWOL) and failure to follow instructions
charges, and he proved his affirmative defenses of disability discrimination and
reprisal for engaging in protected equal employment opportunity activity.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section
1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition
for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find that the agency proved
specifications 1-18 of its AWOL charge but did not prove specifications 19-23,
we AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
The appellant joined the agency in 2005, most recently serving as a
GS-1801-11 Supervisory Immigration Services Officer from 2017 until his
removal in 2023. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 24, Tab 44 at 109-10. The
agency removed him for (1) AWOL, (2) failure to follow instructions, and
(3) failure to safeguard sensitive government property. IAF, Tab 8 at 24-30,
92-98. We note that the last of these charges concerned the appellant’s failure to
secure U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services sensitive stamps, a security ink
pad, and a dry seal. Id. at 97. We further note that the deciding official indicated
that this charge, alone, would have warranted the appellant’s removal, especially
3

considering the agency’s reprimand of the appellant for similar misconduct just a
few months earlier. Id. at 24-27, 215.
The administrative judge sustained each of the charges, less some
specifications, and the penalty. IAF, Tab 51, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-22, 31-38.
She also found the appellant’s affirmative defenses unavailing. ID at 22-31. On
review, the appellant presents arguments about the first two charges and his
affirmative defenses, but none specific to the third charge underlying his removal,
i.e., the one the agency deemed as warranting the appellant’s removal on its own.
In any event, we do not find that any of the arguments the appellant has presented
on review warrant a different result. As detailed below, we merely modify the
initial decision to clarify which of the agency’s AWOL allegations were proven
and which were not.
For purposes of background to the AWOL charge, the appellant’s office
chair collapsed on June 3, 2022, injuring his knees. IAF, Tab 8 at 64-66.
Treating clinicians diagnosed him with an aggravation of pre-existing
patellofemoral joint osteoarthritis. Id. at 65-66. The appellant did not return to
work until August 22, 2022. IAF, Tab 33 at 53.
The agency’s AWOL charge consisted of 23 specifications, each
concerning an individual workday between June 8, 2022, and August 2, 2022. Id.
at 92-94. The Board has generally stated that to prove a charge of AWOL, an
agency must show that the appellant was absent, and that his absence was not
authorized, or that his request for leave was properly denied. Wilson v. Small
Business Administration, 2024 MSPB 3, ¶ 7. The charge cannot be sustained if
the appellant provided administratively acceptable evidence to the agency
showing that he was incapacitated for the performance of his duties due to illness
or injury during his absence. See Atchley v. Department of the Army, 46 M.S.P.R.
297, 301 (1990).
After his injury, the appellant informed his supervisor, the Branch Chief of
the Customer Service Unit, on June 13, 2022, that he was off work due to a
4

medical condition and was waiting to see an orthopedic specialist. IAF, Tab 31
at 9. His supervisor replied later that day expressing concern that he had not been
to work since June 3 even though his June 7, 2022 medical note released him to
return to work. Id. at 4 (citing IAF, Tab 8 at 53). She instructed him to put in
leave requests for June 6-14. Id. She stated that he would need to use his own
leave until his Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) claim was
accepted. Id. Because his absences exceeded 3 days, she explained that he would
need to submit a doctor’s note to use sick leave. Id.
The administrative judge determined that only one of the appellant’s
medical notes, the July 27, 2022 note from his orthopedic specialist, addressed
whether he should be excused from work. IAF, Tab 51, Initial Decision (ID)
at 9-10 (citing IAF, Tab 8 at 180). That note stated, in relevant part, that “[t]his
patient should be excused from attending work until 8/22/2022. Due to
orthopedic reasons.” IAF, Tab 8 at 180. The administrative judge interpreted
this note to mean that the appellant’s absences between July 27 and August 22,
2022, should be excused but those that occurred before July 27, 2022, were not
excused. ID at 10.
The appellant alleges on review that this finding was not supported by his
medical documentation because his medical “opinions . . . indicated that [he]
required accommodations and, at times, complete excusal from duty because of
his bilateral knee pain and osteoarthritis.” Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
at 7. We disagree with the appellant that more than one of his medical opinions
addressed whether his absence from work should be excused. The administrative
judge correctly identified the only medical note in evidence addressing the topic.
By its express terms, the July 27, 2022 note from his provider, who
specializes in orthopedic surgery, excused the appellant’s absences until
August 22, 2022. IAF, Tab 8 at 180. It was silent on whether his absences
should have been excused retroactively. This provider had issued him another
note 2 days earlier. The July 25, 2022 note stated that the appellant “can return to
5

work with restrictions of desk work, sedentary duty . . . once he has a stable,
ergonomic chair available that is approved for his weight.” Id. at 179. The
provider issued a similar note on June 27, 2022. Id. at 48. Given that these notes
indicated that the appellant could return to work if he was assigned desk work and
allowed to use an ergonomic chair, we agree with the administrative judge that
the July 27, 2022 note did not excuse his absences from work from before that
date.
The appellant also alleges that the agency’s failure to grant him OWCP
leave violated federal law and the agency’s own policies. 2 PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9.
The Board has held that an adverse action based on a charge of AWOL cannot be
sustained if OWCP determines that “the employee was entitled to compensation
benefits as a result of a work-related injury for the entire time period charged as
AWOL.” Parkinson v. U.S. Postal Service, 55 M.S.P.R. 552, 554 (1992)
(citations omitted).
On June 29 and 30, 2022, the appellant informed the agency that his
workers’ compensation claim had been approved and that he had been granted
45 days of continuation of pay (COP). 3 IAF, Tab 31 at 96, 104. His supervisor
replied on July 1, 2022, stating that the appellant had provided no documentation
that he was eligible for COP. Id. at 113. In a September 1, 2022 letter, OWCP
informed the appellant that the agency “should continue the claimant’s pay
without interruption for up to 45 days.” 4 IAF, Tab 8 at 60. OWCP denied the

2
The appellant did not identify any applicable agency policies, and we did not locate
any in the record. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9.
3
For most employees who sustain a traumatic injury, the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act provides that the employer must continue the employee’s regular pay
during any periods of resulting disability, up to a maximum of 45 calendar days. This is
called continuation of pay, or COP. 20 C.F.R. § 10.200(a).
4
COP would have entitled the appellant to up to 45 days of pay starting on the first day
disability began following the date of injury. 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.200(a); 10.215(b). The
appellant’s next scheduled date of work after the June 3, 2022 injury was June 6, 2022.
IAF, Tab 33 at 19, Tab 44, Hearing Transcript (June 25, 2024) at 125 (testimony of the
appellant). Forty-five days after this date was July 20, 2022.
6

appellant’s claim on October 20, 2022, finding that he had not established that he
sustained an injury as defined by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. Id.
at 196-200. In the denial, OWCP informed him that the agency would “charge
any previously paid Continuation of Pay to your sick and/or annual leave balance
or declare it an overpayment.” Id. at 197. The appellant appealed, and the
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board (ECAB) issued a July 5, 2023 decision
in which it reversed the prior denial and found that he sustained a work-related
injury on June 3, 2022. Id. at 63-66. However, ECAB did not substantively
address COP in the reversal decision, beyond stating that “[o]n return of the case
record, the Office must address the claimant’s wage loss claim.” Id. at 66. The
record does not indicate how OWCP addressed this claim.
The administrative judge did not make explicit findings on whether
individual AWOL specifications were sustained. ID at 4-16. Therefore, we do so
here. First, we address specifications 1-18, which covered the appellant’s
absences between June 8 and July 26, 2022. IAF, Tab 8 at 92-93. The appellant
has provided no evidence to justify his absences during this period, and his
medical documentation indicated that he was able to return to work. Id. at 48, 53,
179. Therefore, we find that specifications 1-18 are sustained. Second, we
address specifications 19-23, which covered his absences between July 27 and
August 2, 2022. Id. at 93-94. The administrative judge implied that the July 27,
2022 medical note was sufficient to prove that the appellant was not medically
cleared to attend work between July 27 and August 22, 2022. Id. at 180; ID at 13.
We explicitly make this finding and further find that specifications 19 -23 are not
sustained. See Valenzuela v. Department of the Army, 107 M.S.P.R. 549, ¶ 9
(2007) (holding that an AWOL charge will not be sustained if an appellant
presents administratively acceptable evidence showing that he was incapacitated
for duty during the relevant time period if the employee has sufficient sick leave
7

to cover the period of absence). 5 Based on these findings, we concur with the
administrative judge’s determination that the agency proved its AWOL charge.
ID at 16; see, e.g., Stein v. U.S. Postal Service, 57 M.S.P.R. 434, 438 (1993)
(finding that proof of only one specification supporting a charge is sufficient to
sustain the charge). 6
Once again, the AWOL charge was just one of three charges underlying the
appellant’s removal. We agree with the administrative judge’s decision to sustain
each, and we find no reason to further discuss any other aspect of the initial
decision. The appellant’s removal is sustained.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

5
The record shows that the appellant had sufficient sick leave to cover his absences on
July 27, July 28, July 29, August 1, and August 2, 2022, which were the dates covered
by specifications 19-23. IAF, Tab 8 at 93-94, 111.
6
Even if OWCP had awarded the appellant maximum COP benefits, we would still
sustain the AWOL charge. Because COP can only be awarded up to 45 calendar days,
the appellant would have been entitled to COP at most between June 6, 2022, and
July 20, 2022 (specifications 1-15). 20 C.F.R. § 10.200(a); IAF, Tab 8 at 92-93; see
supra n.4. As discussed above, the agency proved that the appellant was AWOL on
July 21 (specification 16), July 22 (specification 17), and July 26, 2022 (specification
18). The agency only needed to prove one of these specifications to prove the charge.
See Stein, 57 M.S.P.R. at 438.
7
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
8

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
9

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
10

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your

8
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
11

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
12

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11307082. Public record. Not legal advice.