# Jasper

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11305748

## Case

- **Full name:** Allison Bridget Jasper v. Plaquemines Parish Government, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11305748

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the non-movant may not rest upon their own allegations in showing a genuine fact issue for trial
- rejecting plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for similar reasons
- holding that newly added state law claims raised for first time in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were not properly before the Court since “a party cannot use a motion for summary judgment to raise new claims”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALLISON BRIDGET JASPER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-401
PLAQUEMINES PARISH SECTION “B” (3)
GOVERNMENT, ET AL
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are defendant Plaquemines Parish Government’s (“PPG”) Motion for
Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14), plaintiff Allison Bridget Jasper’s (“Jasper”) Opposition (Rec.
Doc. 15), and PPG’s Reply (Rec. Doc. 16). Also before the Court are Jasper’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26), PPG’s Opposition (Rec. Doc. 31), and Jasper’s Reply (Rec.
Doc. 32). For the following reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14) on Jasper’s
federal claims be GRANTED and that Jasper’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26) on
her federal claims be DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that remaining state law claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, by declining supplemental jurisdiction over same. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367 (c)(3) (stating that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); see also Parker
& Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Our general rule
is to dismiss state law claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.”).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2020, PPG’s financial resources were strained by the COVID-19 pandemic. Rec. Doc.
14-2 at 1. Facing a backlog of $3,029,522 in outstanding state court judgments and the need to
address the operational expenses of parish government, in October 2020, PPG passed Ordinance
20-105 which instituted a program called the Judgment Settlement Process (“JSP”) to pay and
resolve judgments against it. Id. The program allows claimants to receive a quicker payout if they
accept a 50% reduction of the value of their judgment against PPG. Rec. Doc. 14-4 at 2. A claimant

can choose to opt out of the JSP and instead insist on full payment of their judgments; however,
PPG will prioritize claimants who participate in the JSP while still acknowledging the existence
of the debt owed to claimants who choose not to participate. Rec. Doc. 14-2.
On April 13, 2022, the 25th Judicial District Court rendered a judgment against PPG in
favor of Jasper in the amount of $782,237.29. Rec. Doc. 14-2 at 2. PPG invited Jasper to participate
in the JSP in order to expedite the payment of her judgment. Id. Jasper has declined this offer
repeatedly. Id. Jasper states that she has outstanding medical bills in excess of $250,000.000 and
is contracted to give her attorneys no less than 40% of the judgment award pursuant to a
contingency fee agreement. Rec. Doc. 1 at 5. Because of these facts, Jasper states that accepting
the JSP offer is an impossibility because the amount she would be entitled to under the JSP is

significantly less than her litigation expenses and the mechanics liens she has on the award. Id.
Jasper also states that the Parish has not specified a timeframe for when the balance of her
judgment would be paid. Id. She claims that “[i]t is only recently that [she] learnt that her wait was
in vain and that she had zero chance of getting paid unless she participated in the Judgment
Settlement Process.” Id. at 6. She further claims that PPG has a policy and practice of paying only
those claimants that participate in the JSP. Id. at 6–7. However, as discussed during oral argument
held on March 26, 2026, plaintiff’s judgment does not expire or become uncollectible, subject
perhaps only to certification under state law every 10 years.
PPG states that JSP participants have been paid for the calendar years 2022–2025,
diminishing the number of outstanding judgment creditors since 2020 from 36 to 11. Rec. Doc.
14-2 at 2.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jasper sued PPG on February 26, 2025. Rec. Doc. 1. She alleges that PPG’s policy “is to
have people participate in the Judgement Settlement Process or not pay them at all.” Id. at 6. She
notes that she has not been paid and that she has “zero chance” of being paid unless she becomes
a JSP participant. Id. She brings several claims against PPG and unnamed government defendants,
including taking her property without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment; inflicting
cruel and unusual punishment for refusing to pay the state court judgment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; subjecting her to disparate treatment by refusing to pay non-JSP participants in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; a “color of law” claim pursuant to Section 1983; a civil
conspiracy claim against PPG and unnamed government employees; negligence in their handling
of the JSP process; tortious conduct for violating a duty to pay her. Id. at 9–27. She also requests

punitive damages and expenses of litigation and attorneys’ fees. Id.
On February 12, 2026, the parties attended a scheduling conference to discuss ongoing
legal issues and prepare for trial. Rec. Doc. 23. Pursuant to that pretrial conference, the Court
ordered Jasper to file a cross motion for summary judgment addressing only her federal
constitutional issues rather than her state law claims. Id. Defendants were ordered to respond to
Jasper’s motion for summary judgment, as well as to attach to their opposition affidavits
addressing (1) settled claims, if any, that are paid without being subjected to the JSP and (2) all
payments, if any, to non-participants of the JSP since the effective day of the ordinance
establishing that program. Id. The Court also ordered the parties to attend an oral argument about
the cross motions for summary judgment on March 11, 2026, which the Court later moved to
March 26, 2026. Id; see also Rec. Doc. 30. Jasper has filed her motion for summary judgment.
Rec. Dc. 26. PPG has responded and attached to its response the requested affidavits. See Rec.
Doc. 31.

At the oral argument, the Court asked plaintiff’s counsel to distinguish several cases
identified as applicable here, including the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in
Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, 99-0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/99), 742 So.2d 55, in which
the court found no Equal Protection violation in a school board program that established a
hierarchy or priority system for the payment of state court tort judgments because of insufficient
funding; and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Ariyan v. Sewarage & Water Board of New Orleans,
29 F.4th 226 (5th Cir. 2022), in which the court, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Folsom v.
City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883), held that a government entity’s failure to timely pay a
state court judgment does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. Plaintiff’s counsel argued
that the challenged discounts in Cooper were in increments of five or ten percent and that claimants

had the option to choose by how much they wanted to discount their state court judgment, as
opposed to the categorical fifty percent reduction challenged in the above-captioned matter.
Plaintiff’s counsel also attempted to distinguish the above-captioned matter from Ariyan by aruing
that the ordinance creating the JSP is “completely silent” as to creditors who do not opt in and
provides no mechanism or plan that would make payment foreseeable to that class of claimants.
Plaintiff’s counsel also acknowledged during oral argument that no summary judgment
evidence was introduced supporting Jasper’s causes of action or disputing PPG’s arguments. When
confronted with PPG’s affidavits, plaintiff’s counsel could not contest the information contained
therein or show that such information was fasle. Plaintiff’s counsel also conceded that Jasper’s
Eighth Amendment claim should have been framed as a First Amendment retaliation claim
and argued that the basis for that claim was that PPG was in effect punishing claimants who
exercised their First Amendment rights by refusing to pay them without participating in the JSP.
During their argument, defense counsel highlighted that Jasper is seeking to expand the

litigation by adding federal claims that were not included in her complaint. Defense counsel also
argued that the point of amendment had passed and that Jasper had not shown good cause for filing
an amended complaint. Further, defense counsel continued to highlight that Jasper had not
introduced any evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
In response to whether PPG could have considered other payment plans, defense counsel
stated that there was no evidence in the record about this topic, n o r a n y suggestion that
PPG chose not to accept more reasonable alternatives. Counsel added that Ordinance
20-105 is silent about the COVID-19 pandemic and that the reasons justifying the JSP continue
to be financial inability to pay full value of claims in relevant years after the pandemic’s end.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers,
and admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Material in support or opposition of a
motion for summary judgment may be considered if it is “capable of being ‘presented in a form
that would be admissible in evidence.’” LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d

530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Courts view all
facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but “refrain from making
credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008).
Where the movant bears the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact” using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point
to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994).
Should the movant meet its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must show by
“competent summary judgment evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey, 16
F.3d at 618. Accordingly, conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient to avoid summary
judgment. Bargher v. White, 928 F.3d 439, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2019). Additionally, “conclusory
allegations, denials, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, speculation, and legalistic
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for
trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). There is no genuine issue of

material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no
reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, thus entitling the moving party to
judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
B. Analysis
i. PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment
It should be noted at the outset that there are no genuine disputes of material fact. Jasper
has not introduced into the record any evidence in support of her claims or to create a material
factual dispute. As established at the February 2026 pretrial conference and March 2026 oral
argument, Jasper had not engaged in any discovery in furtherance of her claims against PPG.
Jasper raises the following claims: (1) an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment; (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (3)
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Rec. Doc. 1. The Court can
immediately dispose of Jasper’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment applies to

punishments, and typically punishments inflicted pursuant to the criminal process. See, e.g.,
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664–668 (1977). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part
test for determining whether a legislative act constitutes punishment: (1) whether the intention of
the legislature was to impose punishment and, if not (2) whether the statutory scheme is so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it ‘civil.’” Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). Jasper posits in her complaint that “requiring her to give up half the face
value of her judgment as well as waive statutory additions is a form of punishment subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards” but does not develop this argument in her
opposition to PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in her own Motion for Summary
Judgment. See Rec. Docs. 15, 26. In fact, Further, the Eighth Amendment claim does not relate to

a First Amendment violation. As such, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment in seeking
dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim is GRANTED.
Jasper further claims a deprivation of property, in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
because of PPG’s refusal to pay her money pursuant to the state court judgment she received.
Rec. Doc. 1 at 9. She clarifies that PPG deliberately withheld all payments to force her to
relinquish half the value of her state court judgment, rather than for neutral reasons. Rec. Doc.
15 at 5. But Jasper does not provide evidence counter to PPG's financial instability. She
conclusively states that whether PPG’s actions were “rational, arbitrary, or coercive presents a
classic factual dispute” but does not develop that argument with evidentiary support. Id.
Moreover, Jasper’s arguments are foreclosed by existing precedent. Over a century ago,
the Supreme Court decided a similar case in Folsom v. City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883).
In that case, relators who had obtained state court judgments against the City of New Orleans were
prevented from collecting on their judgments because of a new state constitution which restricted

New Orleans’ ability to impose taxes and limited funds to the city’s existing expenses. 109 U.S.
at 287. In rejecting the relators’ Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court held that
though the relators’ state court judgments were property, they “cannot be said to be deprived of
them so long as they continue an existing liability against the city” rather than an immediate right
to payment. Id. at 289. That principle has been consistently maintained in subsequent decisions,
see, e.g., Minton v. St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a
school board’s failure to timely pay plaintiff’s judgment is not a denial of due process because
Folsom recognized that “the property right created by a judgment against a government entity is not
a right to payment at a particular time” but merely recognition of existing debt); see also Ariyan,
Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2022) (rejecting

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for similar reasons). Similarly, while Jasper has an
outstanding and valid state court judgment, she does not have a right to force PPG to
immediately pay that judgment, but only for PPG to continue to recognize its existing debt to
her—which it has. As such, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Jasper’s Fifth Amendment
claim is GRANTED.
Jasper also appears to assert Equal Protection claims in violation of the Fouteenth
Amendment. Rec. Doc. 1. She challenges the classification that the Ordinance creates between
persons who participate in the JSP, and receive payment, and those who refuse to participate in the
JSP, and do not receive any payment or a payment schedule. Id. at 6, 27. She argues that her claim

is not about delay but instead intentional discrimination. Rec. Doc. 15 at 5. However, in opposing
PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Jasper has not identified a suspect class or explained
whether the JSP or its administration infringes upon a fundamental right. Id. As such, the
appropriate standard for reviewing discriminatory conduct is “rational basis review” which is more
deferential to government classifications. See, e.g., Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, 99-

0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/99), 742 So. 2d 55.
Jasper acknowledges that rational basis review applies, see Rec. Doc. 15 at 5, but states
that rational basis does not permit summary judgment where “evidence supports a finding of
intentional and disparate treatment lacking a legitimate governmental justification.” Id. However,
there is no factual or legal support for a finding of “intentional and disparate treatment lacking a
legitimate governmental justification.” She relies on an allegation that she was treated differently
without legitimate justification. But merely pointing to allegations is not sufficient in opposing
summary judgment. See, e.g., Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 85 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial;
however, the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings to make such a showing.”).

She has not introduced evidence—and therefore has not created a genuine dispute of material
fact—that PPG’s enactment of the Ordinance and reliance on classifications between participants
and non-participants in the program, is not rationally related to its fiscal goals .
In fact, the program challenged here is like the one in Cooper v. Orleans Parish School
Board, 99-0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/99), 742 So. 2d 55, in which the court denied plaintiffs’ Equal
Protection challenge to the Orleans Parish School Board’s program to delay payments to certain
state court judgment creditors because of insufficient funding. That court noted that legislation “is
presumed to be valid, and will be sustained as long as the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 742 So. 3d at 59. The Cooper court held that it
could not “say that there is no rational basis for the discount categorizations related to legitimate
government objectives.” Id. at 62. Subsequent decisions have continually relied on Cooper in
rejecting challenges wherein plaintiff demands a quicker payout of their state court judgment. See,
e.g., Bennett v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV.A 03-912, 2004 WL 60316, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 9.

2004) (applying Cooper in stating that the City of New Orleans had a rational basis for paying
federal court judgments before state court judgments); see also Davis v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,
No. CIV.A 04-3511, 2005 WL 2037369 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2005) (applying Cooper in rejecting
plaintiff’s assertion that the school board’s refusal to pay negotiated settlement amount unless
plaintiff agrees to a substantial reduction of the negotiated amount violated the Equal Protection
Clause). Given these precedents, Jasper’s Equal Protection claim is unavailing.
Jasper argues that reliance on Cooper is “misplaced” because there was evidence
showing that the defendant municipality had insufficient funds to satisfy state tort
judgments. Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 14. However, PPG's position is based on un-rebutted relevant
evidentiary support. See Rec. Docs. 14-3 thru 4 and 31-1 thru 3. No support is offered to “negate

every conceivable basis which might support” the Ordinance. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas
Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 225 (5th Cir. 2019). Though rational basis is “fact
intensive,” it “places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the government, [but] plaintiffs may
nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”
Id. at 225. Jasper has not shown such evidence outside of her general allegations. See, e.g., Triple
Tee Golf, 85 F.3d at 261 (noting that the non-movant may not rest upon their own allegations in
showing a genuine fact issue for trial).
Per above-noted evidentiary support for reducing a backlog of outstanding state court
judgment and meet the operational needs of the parish, the Court finds that PPG’s means of doing

so—the JSP program—at the very least satisfies rational basis review. Plaintiff has not shown
that PPG’s current program is irrational or unconstitutionally discriminatory, a s
explained by Ordinance 20-105 and PPG’s affidavits establishing why settlements are
treated differently than state court judgments as well as differential treatment between
participants and non-participants, see Rec. Docs. 31-1; 31-2, .

For the reasons provided, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Jasper’s Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claim is GRANTED.
ii. Jasper’s Motion for Summary Judgment
At best, rather than addressing the claims in the complaint, Jasper basically seeks
summary judgment on claims that were not raised in the complaint, including (1) a First
Amendment claim for denial of access to court or for retaliation for exercising her right;1 (2) a
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim based on distinction between judgment
creditors who choose not to participate in the JSP and claimants who settle with PPG without
obtaining a judgment; (3) any Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based on
infringement of her First Amendment rights; (4) a claim for unconstitutional vagueness; and (5)

a separation of powers claim that the Ordinance usurps judicial power because it prevents the
courts from providing enforceable judgments. See Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 3, 8, 16, 19, and 22.
Despite Jaspers arguments to the contrary, see Rec. Doc. 32, none of these claims were
included in her complaint. Jasper argues that PPG had notice of these claims because the parties

1 Jasper mentions the First Amendment once in her complaint and does not put any party on notice about the specific
claim being asserted.
participated in a pretrial conference wherein the Court “explicitly identified, explored, and
expanded upon the legal and factual issues that now form the basis of [Jasper’s] Motion for
Summary Judgment.” Rec. Doc. 32 at 4. Jasper continues that “the Court ordered cross-motions
for summary judgment on these very issues.” But to the extent that Jasper argues that the Court

expanded her legal claims and directed her to file a summary judgment motion on new claims, she
is mistaken. In its Minute Entry for the pretrial conference, the Court “instructed the parties that
the legal issues will be focused on plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims and not related state law
claims.” Rec. Doc. 23. That was not an invitation to expand the legal issues under consideration,
but to get full briefing on the federal constitutional claims that Jasper had already introduced.
PPG argues that the newly asserted claims should be dismissed. Rec. Doc. 31 at 5. In
support, it cites case law, including Grant v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, No. CV 22-66, 2024
WL 4216041 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2024), which held that a represented plaintiff, failing to move
earlier to amend her complaint to assert new causes of action, forfeited the newly raised claims.
Jasper responds that she should be allowed to amend her complaint and reurge her motion. Rec.

Doc. 32 at 9. She cites Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 996 F. Supp. 2d 450. 458 (M.D. La.
2014), which held that under Fifth Circuit precedent, a “district court should construe [a newly
raised] claim as a motion to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a).” Lewis, however, cited Riley
v.Sch. Bd. Union Par., 379 F. App’x 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2010), which recognizes that construing a
newly added claim as a motion to amend is “particularly true where, as here, the litigant is pro se
and has not yet made any amendments to her complaint.” Other courts within this circuit have
recognized that courts have discretion to decline to consider a claim first asserted in a motion for
summary judgment. See, e.g., Garza v. City of La Porte, 160 F. Supp. 3d 986, 993 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
(holding that newly added state law claims raised for first time in plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment were not properly before the Court since “a party cannot use a motion for summary
judgment to raise new claims”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings “shall be
freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15 “evinces a bias in favor of

granting leave to amend.” Matter of Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1996). However,
the decision to grant leave to amend is within the decision of the district court and is not automatic.
Id. In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the court may consider factors such as undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of
amendment. Id. at 314–15. In determining undue delay, a court may look to “whether the movant
has explained the delay, and whether the movant knew the facts underlying the amended complaint
at the time the complaint was filed.” Id. at 315–16.
Jasper argues that she should be allowed to amend her complaint because “there has been
no prior request to amend, no bad faith, and the proposed amendment is not futile, as it would

clarify and expand factual allegations already discussed in the pretrial conference.” Rec. Doc. 32
at 10. Notably, Jasper does not address another basis upon which a court can deny a motion for
leave to amend: undue inexcusable delay. As stated, when rejecting a request for leave to amend,
a court can consider whether a movant has explained its delay in moving and whether the movant
knew of the facts underlying its amended complaint at the time its original complaint was filed.
Matter of Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d at 315–16. The facts of this case remain as they were when
Jasper first filed her complaint on February 26, 2025. Rec. Doc. 1. Jasper has known that
amendment to pleadings were due no later than July 3, 2025. Rec. Doc. 11. Oral argument was
held on March 26, 2026, and Jasper requested leave to file an amended complaint only three days
prior. Rec. Docs. 30, 32. Because Jasper is represented and has had ample time to file an amended
complaint, but has not, her late request to do so constitutes undue delay and will be rejected.
Moreover, and notwithstanding our wishes for a fairer result, it would be futile to allow the
amendment in view of express authorities cited above that rejected similar attacks on

governmental efforts to achieve reasonable balance between fiscal responsibilities to maintain
operations and yet achieve satisfaction, albeit partially, with valid claims against it.
The lateness and futility of newly asserted federal claims require denial of plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment over such claims. As noted earlier, supplemental jurisdiction
over remaining state law claims is rejected, leading to dismissal without prejudice of the state
based claims.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of March 2026

_______________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11305748. Public record. Not legal advice.