# Brown

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · April 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11305703

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Brown v. Peters, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MICHAEL BROWN, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-1454
)
PETERS, et al., )
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Illinois River Correctional Center
(“Illinois River”), filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. (Doc. 11). The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and
through such process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if
warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court
accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. See Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient,
however. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff files suit against Dietary Managers Brian Peters and Cory Willis, Dietary
Supervisors Gregory Wilcoxen, Stacy Harminson, Tyson Reneau, Daniel Smithers, and Blanco,
Grievance Officer Lynette Boughan, Counselor Hubbard, Chaplain Tammy Thousand, and
Assistant Warden of Programs Sarah Arnett.
Plaintiff does not name Harmon and Knowles as Defendants in his Amended Complaint.
Therefore, Defendants Harmon and Knowles are dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff states he has been a practicing Hebrew Israelite since 2004. As a practicing
Hebrew Israelite, Plaintiff is required to abstain from consuming yeast or leaven for seven days

during Passover and to remove all food items containing yeast or leaven from his dwelling.
At Illinois River, inmates are required to submit a request to the Chaplain at least 45 days
prior to a religious celebration. Plaintiff alleges he submitted a request to Defendant Chaplain
Thousand to participate in the Passover celebration from April 12-19, 2025. The day before
Passover began, Plaintiff received notice from the Chaplain approving his request and instructing
him to report to Dietary at sundown the following night.
During Passover on April 12-19, 2025, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Chaplain Thousand,
Assistant Warden of Programs Arnett, and Dietary Managers Peters and Willis did not provide
him with Passover meals and intentionally discriminated against him. Plaintiff alleges the Jewish
inmates and Hebrew Israelite inmates were separated into two groups in the Dietary. The Jewish

inmates received commercially prepared Passover meals, but Plaintiff and the other Hebrew
Israelite inmates received meals containing yeast or leaven, which is forbidden to be consumed for
Passover. Plaintiff alleges he suffered mental and physical harm because he was unable to fulfill
the tenets of his religious beliefs and unable to receive nutrients from his meals.
During the first night of Passover on April 12, 2025, Plaintiff was served two breaded
chicken patties, coleslaw, potato salad, beets, and four packets of saltine crackers. Plaintiff alleges
the chicken patties and crackers contained yeast or leaven. Plaintiff alleges he immediately notified
Defendant Dietary Supervisor Wilcoxen that his meal contained yeast or leaven. Plaintiff also
asked Defendant Wilcoxen why the Jewish inmates received Passover meals, but the Hebrew
Israelite inmates had not. Defendant Wilcoxen allegedly told Plaintiff that Muslims get better
treatment and walked away.
During the second night of Passover on April 13, 2025, Plaintiff was served baked chicken,
two pieces of cornbread, mashed potatoes, greens, applesauce, and four packets of saltine crackers.

Plaintiff alleges the cornbread and crackers contained yeast or leaven. Plaintiff alleges he told
Defendant Dietary Supervisors Wilcoxen, Harminson, Reneau, and Blanco that his meal contained
yeast or leaven, which is forbidden during Passover. Defendant Blanco allegedly told Plaintiff that
he “did not have to eat it if he did not like it.” (Doc. 11 at p. 14).
On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff received two turkey burgers, plain rotini noodles, cabbage, and
an apple. On April 15, 2025, Plaintiff received two slices of lunchmeat, a slice of cheese, potato
salad, and a veggie salad. On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff received a sloppy Joe, tater tots, mixed
vegetables, and gelatin. On April 17, 2025, Plaintiff received two breaded chicken patties
(containing yeast/leaven), two cooked potatoes, broccoli, and pudding. On April 18, 2025, Plaintiff
received spaghetti with meat sauce, Florentine vegetables, salad, and an apple. On April 19, 2025,

Plaintiff received four tamales, chili, rice, cooked carrots, and pudding.
Plaintiff filed multiple grievances regarding the meals he was served during Passover. (See
Doc. 1-2). In response to Plaintiff’s grievances, Defendant Counselor Hubbard stated he
interviewed Dietary, and the chicken patties did not contain yeast or leaven. Although crackers
were given with the meals, they did not have to be eaten. Defendant Hubbard also indicated that
Plaintiff was not on the Jewish Passover list, and Jewish inmates receive the yeast/leaven-free
Passover meals. Defendant Grievance Officer Boughan responded that the company that made the
commercially prepared Passover meals was a certified and reputable company. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Boughan’s response did not address his grievance. Defendant Boughn recommended
denying Plaintiff’s grievances.
ANALYSIS
I. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

Individuals in custody have a First Amendment right to reasonable opportunities to practice
their religion, subject to the legitimate penological concerns of the prison. Maddox v. Love, 655
F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2011); Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009). The Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from imposing a “substantial burden” on
a “central religious belief or practice.” Isby-Israel v. Lemmon, No. 13-172, 2016 WL 3072177, at
*4 (S.D. Ind. June 1, 2016) (internal quotation omitted). “[A] substantial burden on the free
exercise of religion . . . is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously
motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a
person’s religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.” Id.
(quoting Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2008)). Denying an inmate access to a

diet that is required by his religion places a substantial burden on the inmate’s free exercise rights.
Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 2016).
Based on his allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment against Defendants Chaplain Thousand,
Assistant Warden of Programs Arnett, Dietary Managers Peters and Willis, and Dietary
Supervisors Wilcoxen, Harminson, Reneau, and Blanco based on the alleged denial of meals
without yeast or leaven in compliance with his Hebrew Israelite faith during Passover on April 12-
19, 2025.
II. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause forbids a state to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “All equal protection claims . .
. are based on the principle that, under ‘like circumstances and conditions,’ people must be treated

alike, unless there is a rational reason for treating them differently.” LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill.
of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To state an equal protection
claim, a plaintiff must establish that a state actor treated him differently from others similarly
situated because of his membership in a particular class and that the state actor did so purposefully.
DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d
409 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976)). Discriminatory
purpose “implies that the decision[-]maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment
and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects on
the identifiable group.” Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges the Jewish inmates at Illinois River were served commercially prepared

Passover meals without yeast or leaven, but Plaintiff and the other Hebrew Israelite inmates
received meals that contained yeast or leaven during Passover on April 12-19, 2025. Based on his
allegations, Plaintiff is permitted to proceed on a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Chaplain Thousand, Assistant Warden of Programs
Arnett, Dietary Managers Peters and Willis, and Dietary Supervisors Wilcoxen, Harminson,
Reneau, and Blanco.
III. RLUIPA and IRFRA
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), and the Illinois Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“IRFRA”), 775 ILCS 35, et seq. Under RLUIPA, officials may not
substantially burden an individual’s religious exercise unless there is a compelling government
interest at stake. RLUIPA provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition
of the burden on that person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Sovereign immunity shields state officials from monetary damages in
their official capacity. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011). RLUIPA allows for
declaratory and injunctive relief, but not compensatory damages, and may be asserted against
defendants in their official, but not individual capacities. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451
(7th Cir. 2012).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim under RLUIPA and IRFRA
against Defendants Chaplain Thousand and Assistant Warden of Programs Arnett, in their official
capacities, as they appear to be the proper Defendants who would be responsible for ensuring any
injunctive relief was carried out. See Oliver. Harner, No. 14-CV-315-NJR-DGW, 2016 WL
1117084, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2016) (“[T]he proper defendants are those who are responsible
for ensuring that any injunctive relief is carried out.”).
IV. Defendants Boughan, Hubbard, and Smithers
While Plaintiff is critical of how his grievances were handled, this is not enough to plead
personal liability under § 1983 against Defendants Grievance Officer Boughan and Counselor
Hubbard. “[T]he alleged mishandling of [Plaintiff’s] grievances by persons who otherwise did not
cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950,
953 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff named Dietary Supervisor Daniel Smithers as a Defendant, but he did not include
any allegations in his Amended Complaint to demonstrate how he was personally involved in any

constitutional deprivation. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983
creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does
not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).
Defendants Boughan, Hubbard, and Smithers are dismissed without prejudice for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff may proceed on a claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against
Defendants Thousand, Sarah Arnett, Brian Peters, Cory Willis, Gregory Wilcoxen, Stacy

Harminson, Tyson Reneau, and Blanco, in their individual capacities, and a claim under RLUIPA
and IRFRA against Defendants Thousand and Sarah Arnett, in their official capacities. Additional
claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court’s discretion on motion by a
party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) The Clerk is directed to ADD Sarah Arnett (Assistant Warden of Programs), Stacy
Harminson (Dietary Supervisor), and Blanco (Dietary Supervisor) as Defendants.
3) Defendants Harmon, Knowles, Smithers, Boughan, and Hubbard are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants Harmon,
Knowles, Smithers, Boughan, and Hubbard.
4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until
counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants notice and an

opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an
appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
5) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service. If
Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver
is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals
Service on Defendants and will require Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
6) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the
waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues
and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court
does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore,
no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not filed an answer
or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a
scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
7) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom
Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendants’ current work
address, or, if not known, Defendants’ forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained only by
the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel has

filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any
motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to
Defendants’ counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk.
However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and
responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses
directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned
unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin
until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order,
which will explain the discovery process in more detail.
9) Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s

place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.
10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing
address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.
11) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request.
12) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release
medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to defense counsel. The
Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act.
13) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this
Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

ENTERED: 4/6/2026
s/ Michael M. Mihm
Michael M. Mihm
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11305703. Public record. Not legal advice.