# GIBBS

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304725

## Case

- **Full name:** Henry Gibbs Jr. v. Officer Hinds, C.O. 6-2 Officer in R.H.U. Sued in His Individual and Official Capacity; and Officer Bullers, C.O. 2-10 Shift in R.H.U. Sued in His Individual and Official Capacity
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304725

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE
HENRY GIBBS JR.., )
)
Plaintiff ) 1:25-CV-00095-RAL
)
vs. ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO
) Chief United States Magistrate Judge
OFFICER HINDS, C.O. 6-2 OFFICER )
IN R.H.U. SUED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; and ) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
OFFICER BULLERS, C.O. 2-10 SHIFT )
IN R.H.U. SUED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL )
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ) RE: ECF NO. 17
Defendants )

Defendants Hinds and Bullers have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 17. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.!
I. Relevant Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff Henry Gibbs Jr. (“Gibbs”) is a former inmate of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at its State Correctional Institution in Forest
County (“SCI-Forest”).2, He commenced this pro se civil rights action in the Court of
Common Pleas of Forest County against SCI-Forest Corrections Officers Hinds and
Bullers. ECF No. 1-1 (Complaint). Defendants removed the action to this Court
based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Gibbs later filed

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge as authorized by
28 U.S.C. § 636.
2 Gibbs has been paroled and currently lists his address as at a halfway house in Coalport,
Pennsylvania.

an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13), which remains the operative pleading before
the Court.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants forced him to be
handcuffed in a kneeling position with his hands behind his back despite their
knowledge that doing so placed damaging pressure on his injured left knee and
despite their having the option to restrain his hands in front of his body in a standing
position. The Amended Complaint asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and
unusual punishment, Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection
claims, and a state law negligence claim against each Defendant in his individual and
official capacities. As relief, the Amended Complaint seeks compensatory and
punitive damages from each Defendant.
In support of their motion to dismiss, the Defendants argue that (1) Gibbs’
claims against the Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment: (2) Gibbs’ state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity; (3) the
Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support a procedural or
substantive due process claim, and (4) the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts
sufficient to state an equal protection claim. See ECF No. 18 (Defendants’ Brief).
Their brief includes no argument challenging the sufficiency of Gibbs’ Eighth
Amendment claim. See id. Gibbs has filed a brief in opposition to the motion. ECF
No. 21.

I. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (8d Cir.
1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true
all factual allegations of the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003). In making
its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the
plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present
factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-86 (8d ed. 2004)).
Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it
fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
at 570.
While a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations to survive a
motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. Jd. at 555. A
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (citing
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept
inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts alleged in the
complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor must the court accept
legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;

McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to
dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations of the pleading at issue as
true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported
conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka uv.
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).
Finally, because Gibbs is proceeding pro se, his Complaint will be held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read his pro se pleading to
state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite his failure
to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence
construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555
(3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be unartfully drawn and should
be read “with a measure of tolerance”). But “any pleading must still contain sufficient
factual allegations that, when accepted as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd,
826 Fed. Appx. 227 (8d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
III. Factual Allegations and Claims
For the purposes of the Defendants’ motion, the Court accepts as true the
following factual allegations of the Amended Complaint. From September 24, 2025

until October 7, 2025, Gibbs was housed in the SCI-Forest RHU or its “KC” unit for
non-disciplinary reasons. ECF No. 13, § 1. At that time, Gibbs was 73 years old and
weighed 270 pounds. Id., 4§ 13, 15. Prior to his placement in the RHU, a physical
therapist who had treated Gibbs advised him that he needed a left knee joint
replacement, and that this surgery was the only viable option to address his knee
pain. Id., § 2.
Inmates in the RHU were subject to periodic searches of their cells during
which the inmate would step out of his cell. During such searches and movement of
the inmate for shower calls, prison policy required that the inmate be restrained
before exiting his cell. Jd., 3. The prison policy specified that the preferred method
of restraint was to handcuff the inmate with his hands placed together behind his
back with palms facing outward. Id., § 4. This preferred method of restraint required
the inmate to kneel and place his entire body weight on his knees while extending his
hands through the cell door wicket for placement of the handcuffs. Id., § 6(A).
Alternatively, policy authorized restraint by means of a restraint belt. This method
involved cuffing the inmate’s hands together in front his body where the cuffs are
attached to the restraint belt. This method does not require the inmate to kneel. Id.,
4 4. Gibbs asked to be restrained in front of his body using a restraint belt. Gibbs
informed Hinds that his left knee was injured and that he needed to be handcuffed
without kneeling to prevent further knee damage. IJd., § 11. Gibbs also advised
Bullers on several occasions that his left knee could not support his body weight. Jd.,
{ 24. Despite his request and pleas, Gibbs was required to kneel for handcuffing

behind his back for shower calls and cell searches conducted between September 24,
2025, and October 7, 2025. Requiring Gibbs to kneel on these occasions caused
further injury to his knee joint, which caused him to have “an obvious limp that will
likely last a lifetime.” Jd. § 12. Gibbs witnessed Hinds handcuff another inmate
using the alternative method when he was escorted from his cell.
Gibbs’ Amended Complaint does not include separate counts. Although it
includes various legal terms, many appear inapplicable to its factual allegations.
Construing the Amended Complaint’s allegations liberally, the Court has identified
the following claims:
1. An Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement/cruel-and-unusual
punishment claim against both named Defendants;
2. Astate law negligence claim against both named Defendants;
3. A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against both named
Defendants; and
4. A Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against both named
Defendants.
IV. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants’ motion raises four grounds for dismissal: (1) the Eleventh
Amendment bars any claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their
official capacities; (2) sovereign immunity bars any claim for negligence against
Defendants; (3) the Amended Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment
claim for violation of Gibbs’ procedural or substantive due process rights; and (4) the
Amended Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim
because it does not allege facts sufficient to support a finding that Defendants’

handcuffing of another inmate using the alternative method was done intentionally
and with no rational basis.
V. Discussion
A. All claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official
capacities will be dismissed.
Gibbs asserts his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
authorizes an action in federal court to remedy a violation of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States “by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Gibbs’ Amended Complaint seeks
compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants in their respective official
and individual capacities. To the extent he seeks money damages against the
Defendants in their official capacities, his claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, which proscribes actions for money damages in the federal courts
against states, their agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. See
Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City
Bad. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S, 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity). The DOC is an agency
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and, as such, it and its agents and employees
acting in their official capacities are immune from monetary damages. See Brown v.
Smith, 2019 WL 2411749 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019). Gibbs’ claims for monetary relief

3 Defendants’ motion requests dismissal of the Amended Complaint in its entirety. See ECF No. 17,
p. 3. Their brief, however, raises no challenge to the legal sufficiency of Gibbs’ Eighth Amendment
om. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of this

against the Defendants in their official capacities will therefore be dismissed with
prejudice.4
B. Gibbs has abandoned any negligence claim under Pennsylvania law.
Gibbs’ Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants had a duty to protect
Gibbs from “all hurt, harm, and danger” and that Defendants failed this duty by not
using any preventative measures to ensure Gibbs’ health and safety. See ECF No. 13
{{ 10, 12, 23, 25. Defendants and the Court liberally construed this allegation as
asserting a negligence claim.5 In his brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion,
however, Gibbs disclaims any intent to assert a negligence claim. He states that he
“never used the word negligence in [his] Amended Complaint.” ECF No. 21 □ 3.
Therefore, to the extent the Amended Complaint can be construed as raising a state
law negligence claim, the Court finds that Gibbs has expressly abandoned the claim.

4 The Amended Complaint does not seek injunctive or prospective declarative relief against the
Defendants in their official capacities. Such relief is not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted). In any event, Gibbs’
release from SCI-Forest makes such relief unavailable against the Defendants.
5 In addition, Gibbs’ original Complaint expressly asserted “negligence” as a theory of liability. See
ECF No. 1-1, { 1.
8 Furthermore, under the facts alleged in this case, any negligence claim would be barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity shields state officials, including DOC officials
acting within the scope of their duties, from most state law tort claims brought in federal court unless
the immunity has been specifically waived by the General Assembly. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310; Brown v.
State Corr. Inst.-Albion, 2023 WL 11645842, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, 2024 WL 1363752 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2024). The Pennsylvania General Assembly “has
waived sovereign immunity for claims of negligence” in nine narrowly defined categories of conduct,
none of which applies here. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522(b).

C. Gibbs’ allegations fail to support that Defendants violated his
procedural or substantive due process rights.
A court’s examination of procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a two-step analysis. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). First, the court must determine whether the state has
interfered with an existing protected liberty or property interest. Kentucky Dept. of
Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citing Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at
571). A liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from either of
two sources: the Due Process Clause itself or from state or federal law. See Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). Second, and if and only if a plaintiff establishes the
existence of a protected interest, the court must then examine whether the procedures
attendant upon the deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Jd., at 471.
“To rise to the level of a liberty interest, the right alleged must confer ‘freedom
from restraint which... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
848 F.3d 549, 559 (8d Cir. 2017) (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d
Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in Griffin). “As long as the conditions or degree of confinement
to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not
otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself
subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Montayne
v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
Here, Gibbs cannot meet the first element of establishing a protected liberty
interest. The types of protected liberty interests are not unlimited. The interest must

rise to more than an abstract need or desire and must be based on more than a
unilateral hope. See Brown v. Beard, 2011 WL 1085890, at *19 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21,
2011). Rather, an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court
announced a new rule for determining whether a prisoner had a protected liberty
interest created under statute or regulation by shifting the focus of inquiry from the
specific language of the law or regulation to whether the deprivation suffered by the
prisoner imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (19985).
Placement in restraints for a short period of time is not an atypical and
significant hardship for a prisoner. Courts have repeatedly held that placement in
restraints for similar or longer periods does not implicate a liberty interest. See Key
uv. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083, 1085, 1087 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of
procedural due process claim where prisoner was placed in handcuffs chained to leg
shackles for 24 hours); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1574, 1576-77 (11th Cir.
1991) (no procedural due process claim where prisoner was placed in four-point
restraints and his mouth taped shut for 28.5 hours), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1208
(1992); Shand v. Chapdelaine, 2018 WL 279980, at *2-4 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2018)
(dismissing procedural due process claim where prisoner placed in “handcuffs, leg
irons, and a tether chain connecting his hands to his legs” for three days); Grady v.

10

Holmes, 2007 WL 2507395, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2007) (placement in restraint
chair for 44 hours did not constitute procedural due process violation).
The absence of a liberty interest also dooms Gibbs’ substantive due process
claim because a protected property or liberty interest is also an essential element of
a substantive due process claim. See Roberts v. Mentzer, 382 Fed. Appx. 158, 166 (3d
Cir. 2010). Accordingly, Gibbs’ procedural and substantive due process claims will be
dismissed.
D. Equal Protection
To state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, an inmate must
allege facts to support an inference of purposeful discrimination. See Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). This
requires more than demonstrating discriminatory impact. See Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977). Discriminatory purpose
implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action at least in part
because of, not merely despite, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. An inmate must allege facts specific to his own case that
would support an inference that unlawful considerations played a part in the adverse
decision. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
Gibbs alleges that “I witnessed inmate Chris Miller handcuffed from the front
when he was escorted from his cell.” ECF No. 13 § 17. Gibbs provides no further
factual allegations beyond this statement. This allegation alone does not support
purposeful discrimination against Gibbs. A single instance where another inmate

11

was restrained using a restraint belt is insufficient to support a plausible inference
that Gibbs was refused this restraint method for legally impermissible reasons.
Gibbs’ equal protection claim will therefore be dismissed.’
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. The motion
will be granted as to (1) all claims for monetary relief against the Defendants in their
official capacities, (2) Gibbs’ negligence claim (to the extent the Amended Complaint
can be construed as raising this claim), (3) Gibbs’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural
and substantive due process claims, and (4) Gibbs’ Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim. Gibbs’ official capacity claims and negligence claim will be
dismissed with prejudice because any attempt to amend as to these claims would be
futile. Gibbs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims will
be dismissed without prejudice. Gibbs may file a second amended complaint to cure
the deficiencies of these claims within 20 days of the Court’s accompanying order.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied to the extent it requests dismissal
of Gibbs’ Eighth Amendment claim.

7 In his original Complaint, Gibbs alleged that “on certain days, between 9-24-24 and 10-7-24, while I
was in the RHU, I witnessed both Defendants escort inmate Chris Miller [] out of his cell while being
handcuffed from the front: inmate Miller is a white inmate around my age, and because inmate Chris
Miller is white and I am black, I am alleging that I was also denied equal protection of the law...” ECF
No. 1-1 § 9. Gibbs’ Amended Complaint omits these allegations. Because the Amended Complaint
supersedes the prior Complaint, the Court does not construe the Amended Complaint as raising a race
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Like a claim under § 1983, “[t]o prevail on a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1981, the plaintiff must present evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory intent, as that
section reaches only purposeful discrimination.” Taylor v. City of St. Louis, 702 F.2d 695, 697 (8th Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (citing General Building Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)).

12

DATED this 24th day of March, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

RICHARD A. A Lt
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304725. Public record. Not legal advice.