# Shabazz

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304671

## Case

- **Full name:** Malik Shabazz v. Debbie Isaacs, Dennis Larson, Rob Jeffreys, and Illinois Dept. of Corrections
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MALIK SHABAZZ, #R53189, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-03005-SMY
)
DEBBIE ISAACS, 1 )
DENNIS LARSON, )
ROB JEFFREYS, and )
ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, Chief District Judge:
This matter is before the Court for consideration of two motions for summary judgment for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies filed by Defendants Dennis Larson, M.D. (Doc. 71) and
Debbie Isaacs (Doc. 74). For the following reasons, Defendant Larson’s motion will be
GRANTED, and Defendant Isaacs’s motion will be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Malik Shabazz, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
and the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act). The Complaint (Doc. 1) and First Amended Complaint
(Doc. 7) were dismissed without prejudice for violating Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and
18-21. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) on October 20, 2023.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights at Big Muddy
River Correctional Center (BMRCC) and Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence). (Doc. 14).

1 The Clerk’s Office will be DIRECTED to UPDATE the docket sheet to correct the spelling of “Debbie Isaacs” as
reflected in the case caption and Answer at Doc. 33.
The Court severed improperly joined claims arising at BMRCC (Counts 3, 6, 7) and at Lawrence
(Counts 8-18) into separate cases, see Doc. 17, and screened all remaining claims (Counts 1, 2, 4,
5) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, see Doc. 18.
In support of Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, Plaintiff alleges he is a wheelchair-bound inmate, who

suffers from partial paralysis caused by old gunshot wounds. (Doc. 14, p. 13). He was denied
adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations at BMRCC from July 2021 until July 2022.
Id. Isaacs refused to issue him a permit for extra showers even though he suffered frequent bouts
of incontinence, and denied his request for a special mattress to alleviate pain associated with his
lingering injuries. Id. Larson regularly met with Plaintiff at BMRCC to discuss his medical issues
but refused to issue him a permit for extra showers or a special mattress. Id. In February 2022,
Plaintiff developed severe swelling in his lower left leg, and Larson would not examine, test, or
treat him. Id. When he filed grievances about the matter, Larson retaliated against him. Id.
The following claims survived screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A:
Count 1: ADA/Rehab Act claim against IDOC and Jeffreys (official capacity) for
denying Plaintiff’s shower permit in 2021-22.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Isaacs and Larson for denying Plaintiff a
shower permit and a therapeutic mattress permit in 2021-22.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment claim against Larson for denying Plaintiff medical
treatment for extreme swelling in his legs in February 2022.

(Doc. 18). The First Amendment retaliation claim (Count 5) against Larson was dismissed. Id.
In their Answers to the Second Amended Complaint, all defendants raised an affirmative
defense based on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Docs. 31, 33).
IDOC and Jeffreys later withdrew their affirmative defense in connection with the ADA/Rehab
Act claim in Count 1, see Docs. 50 and 54, and Larson and Isaacs moved for summary judgment
based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust remedies for Counts 2 and 3, see Docs. 71 and 74.
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Isaacs moves for summary judgment on Count 2 (Doc. 74), and Larson seeks summary
judgment on Counts 2 and 3 (Doc. 71). Both defendants argue that Plaintiff knew how to use the
grievance process and filed grievances regularly. Id. Isaacs asserts that she is neither named nor

identified in the four grievances that Plaintiff submitted to the ARB to complain about the lack of
shower access (i.e., Grievances #60-12-21, #80-12-21, #81-12-21, and #08-22-11) and no other
grievances address claims against her. (Doc. 75). Larson asserts Plaintiff submitted no grievances
about the doctor’s denial of a special mattress permit; submitted one grievance addressing his
denial of a permit for extra showers that was never appealed to the Administrative Review Board
(ARB)/Director (i.e., Grievance #84-6-22); and submitted four grievances addressing the denial of
treatment for swelling in his legs in February 2022 that were not appealed to the ARB/Director
(i.e., Grievances #42-2-221, #121-3-221, #106-4-22, and #54-5-22). (Doc. 72).
Plaintiff does not challenge any proposed findings of fact presented by Defendants. As for
Count 2, Plaintiff contends that Debbie Isaacs served as the ADA Coordinator and Health Care

Unit (HCU) Administrator, so all grievances he filed about a special mattress and extra showers
directly and indirectly involved her. (Doc. 79). He also alleges he filed “several” grievances about
his ADA accommodations that were lost or misplaced. (Docs. 78, 79). Because he was not in
“control [of] institutional functions,” Plaintiff asks the Court not to fault him for the missing
grievances. Id.
As for Count 3, Plaintiff asserts he exhausted his swollen leg claim to the extent he could
do so by mailing responses to the ARB. Id. Plaintiff included these grievances with the Second
Amended Complaint and states he received the institution-level response(s) more than a month
after each was denied, making an appeal to the ARB/Director late. (Doc. 14).
Isaacs filed a Reply (Doc. 80) without requesting leave of the Court to do so, in violation
of the Initial Scheduling Order (Doc. 34).2 Plaintiff filed three Replies (Docs. 94, 95, and 96),3 in
violation of the Court’s Order (Doc. 92) denying his motion for leave to reply. Because all four
Replies (Docs. 80, 94, 95, and 96) are unauthorized, the Court will not consider them.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The following material facts are taken from pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and answers to interrogatories and are considered undisputed for purposes of the pending motions:
Plaintiff’s claims arose during his incarceration at Big Muddy River Correctional Center.
(Doc. 14, pp. 2, 13-14). At the time, Debbie Isaacs served as BMRCC’s Health Care Unit (HCU)
Administrator and ADA Coordinator. Dr. Larson served as the prison physician. Id.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: Plaintiff suffers from partial paralysis
caused by old gunshot wounds and requires the use of a wheelchair. See Docs. 14, 17, and 18. Dr.
Larson knew Plaintiff was incontinent but would not issue a permit for extra showers. (Doc. 18,
pp. 2, 4). Plaintiff was frequently forced to sit in soiled clothing. Dr. Larson was also aware

Plaintiff suffered from ongoing pain stemming from his old gunshot wounds but would not issue
him a permit for a special mattress, resulting in additional unnecessary pain. In February 2022,
Plaintiff developed severe swelling in his left leg, but Dr. Larson refused to examine, test, or treat
him, causing the condition to worsen. Id.
At the time, BMRCC had a grievance procedure, and Plaintiff utilized it to present facts
relating to his claims against Isaacs and Dr. Larson. (FOF 13, Doc. 72; FOF 8, Doc. 75) (citing
Doc. 14, p. 11). Plaintiff’s grievance records contain nine (9) grievances pertaining to the claims

2 The Initial Scheduling Order provides that “any party wishing to file a reply brief shall, within three (3) days of
service of the response, file a motion for leave. . . . Any reply briefs filed in violation of these requirements shall
stricken and will not be considered.” (Doc. 34, p. 4).
3 Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 93) to the Order (Doc. 87) for supplemental briefing on Perttu was timely filed.
against these defendants in Counts 2 and 3. The grievances are summarized below consistent with
Defendants’ unopposed Findings of Fact (Docs. 72, 75).
Count 2
Grievance 1: #60-12-21 (December 8, 2021)

Plaintiff submitted a grievance on December 8, 2021 to complain about his placement in
restrictive housing two days earlier without a therapeutic mattress or access to ADA showers.
(Doc. 72-4, ¶ 8a; Doc. 75-2, pp. 8-15). The mattress caused severe pain, and the lack of shower
access caused him to sit in soiled clothing for days. His request for a crisis team was ignored.
This grievance was marked and expedited as an emergency on December 10, 2021. Following
review of the matter, a grievance officer determined that ADA accommodations were made and
all other complaints were unsubstantiated. The grievance officer recommended denying the
grievance as moot. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) concurred on May 3, 2022. Plaintiff
signed the Offender’s Appeal to the Director on May 9, 2022. The ARB determined that all ADA
requirements were met, and the Director concurred on May 24, 2022. Id.

Grievance 2: #81-12-21 (December 9, 2021)
Plaintiff submitted a grievance on December 9, 2021. (Doc. 72-4, ¶ 8c). He described his
conversation with Lieutenant McCarthy about the 4-day denial of a shower. Plaintiff also
described additional accidents caused by his incontinence from December 5-9, 2021, and
complained about wearing soiled clothing and sleeping on soiled bed linens. Id. An unnamed
officer told him clean linens were not available and there was “nothing he could do.” Id. Plaintiff
made complaints to several named personnel at BMRCC, but they ignored him. Id.
This grievance was marked and expedited as an emergency. Isaacs and Lt. McCarthy
reviewed it and indicated ADA individuals in restrictive housing are taken to the receiving unit for
an accommodating shower and logs of shower activities indicate Plaintiff was offered showers on
December 6 and 7, 2021. The grievance officer recommended denying the grievance. The CAO
concurred. (Ex. A, p. 24). Plaintiff signed the Offender’s Appeal on May 16, 2022. Id.
Grievance 3: #80-12-21 (December 10, 2021)

Plaintiff submitted a grievance on December 10, 2021, in which he also complained about
his placement in restrictive housing without adequate shower access on December 6, 2021.
(Doc. 72-4, ¶ 8b). He reported the shower in the segregated area was not ADA accessible for
wheelchairs and his “issues have been raised to every type of staff available” at BMRCC. Id. The
grievance was marked and expedited as an emergency. Following review of the matter, a
grievance officer recommended denying the grievance, and the CAO concurred. (Id. at Ex. A, p.
29). Plaintiff signed the Offender’s Appeal to the Director on May 16, 2022. Id.
The ARB consolidated Grievances #81-12-21 and 80-12-21 on June 10, 2022 and returned
both to Plaintiff, noting they did not meet DR 504. Id. at 23. Plaintiff lacked further redress
because the issues in Grievance #60-12-21 were resolved following a hearing on May 24, 2022,

when the ARB determined that all ADA accommodations were met and the Director concurred.
(Ex. B, Bates 14).
Grievance 4: #08-22-11 (July 28, 2022)
Plaintiff submitted Grievance #08-22-11 on July 28, 2022 to complain of excessive force
used by BMRCC staff while escorting him to restrictive housing on July 24, 2022. (Doc. 72-4,
¶ 8d). He described wearing soiled underwear without shower access or medical treatment from
July 24-27, 2022. Id. Plaintiff indicated staff were aware of and ignored his condition. Id.
Plaintiff marked the grievance as an emergency, but the CAO deemed it a non-emergency on
August 2, 2022. Id. The ARB found Plaintiff’s allegations of staff misconduct were
unsubstantiated and denied the grievance on July 13, 2023. Id.
Grievance 5: #84-6-22 (June 11, 2022)
Plaintiff submitted Grievance #84-6-22 on June 11, 2022. (Doc. 72, Ex. B, 271). Plaintiff

explained that he needed a permit for extra showers due to his incontinence. Id. He had one at his
prior facility and “complained to [the] Doctor for months about [the] issue but to no avail.” Id. at
272. The grievance was marked and expedited as an emergency. Id. at 271. The grievance officer
indicated Plaintiff needed to write to “health care” to have a new permit issued, as his permit
expired on June 1, 2022. Id. at 270. On this basis, the grievance officer recommended denying
the grievance, and the CAO concurred. Id. Plaintiff did not sign the Offender’s Appeal to the
Director, and Grievance #84-6-22 was not contained in Plaintiff’s ARB records. (See Ex. A, 1-4).
According to the same response, Plaintiff transferred from BMRCC to Lawrence on July 27, 2022.
(Doc. 72, Ex. B, 270).
Count 3

Grievance 1: #42-2-221 (February 1, 2022)
Plaintiff submitted Grievance #42-2-221 on February 1, 2022 to address his request for
pain medication for his neck and left leg. (Doc. 72, Ex. B, p. 277). The Counselor indicated
Plaintiff was seen by a licensed provider to determine medications and care plans and received all
medications ordered. Id. A grievance officer did not review the grievance. Id. Plaintiff included
this grievance with the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14, p. 30).
Grievance 2: #121-3-221 (March 12, 2022)
Plaintiff submitted Grievance #121-3-221 on March 12, 2022, alleging Dr. Larson refused
to renew his pain medication. (Doc. 72, Ex. B, p. 278-288). The grievance was marked and
expedited as an emergency. The grievance officer recommended that it be deemed moot due to
Plaintiff’s transfer from BMRCC, but noted Plaintiff could forward the grievance to the ARB for
review. Id. at 286. Plaintiff’s ARB records do not include this grievance. (See Ex. A, 1-4).
Plaintiff attached it to his Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14, pp. 38-39).

Grievance 3: #106-4-221 (April 13, 2022)
Plaintiff submitted Grievance #106-4-221 to address Dr. Larson’s treatment of excessive
swelling in his left leg on April 13, 2022. (Doc. 72, Ex. B, 291-92). The grievance was marked
and expedited as an emergency. Id. The grievance officer recommended denying it as moot, based
on Plaintiff’s transfer to Lawrence. Id. at 290. The grievance officer indicated Plaintiff could
forward it to the ARB for review, but the grievance was not included in his ARB records. (See
Ex. A, 1-4). Plaintiff attached it to his Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14, pp. 36-37).
Grievance 4: #54-5-22 (May 4, 2022)
Plaintiff submitted Grievance #54-5-22 to report Dr. Larson’s failure to follow the
recommendation of an outside specialist when treating his left leg on May 4, 2022. (Doc. 72, Ex.

B, 295-96). The grievance was marked and expedited as an emergency. It contains two responses
dated two months apart from different BMRCC grievance officers. Id. at 293-94. The first
recommended denying it as moot based on Plaintiff’s transfer to Lawrence. Id. at 294. The second
recommended denying it as being outside of the 60-day timeframe. Id. at 293. The CAO concurred
with the decision(s). Id. Plaintiff did not sign the Offender’s Appeal. Id. This grievance was not
contained in Plaintiff’s ARB records, see Ex. A, 1-4, but Plaintiff attached it to his Second
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14, pp. 34-35).
DISCUSSION
Legal Standards
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Any doubt about the

existence of a genuine issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, i.e., the prisoner.
Lawrence v. Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). Generally, the district court’s role
on summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or judge witness credibility.
The district court’s approach to factual disputes is different when presented with a motion
for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. In Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir.
2008), the Seventh Circuit instructed district courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve
contested issues of fact concerning exhaustion. More recently, the Supreme Court partially
overruled Pavey in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 464 (June 18, 2025) when it held that
exhaustion disputes must be reserved for a jury if contested facts on exhaustion are intertwined
with factual disputes on the merits of a claim. Thus, when the district court is presented with a

motion for summary judgment on exhaustion with material facts in dispute, it must consider
whether intertwinement between exhaustion and the merits requires a jury trial. Here, the Court
finds no intertwinement between factual disputes on exhaustion and the merits of claims covered
by the Seventh Amendment.4 See Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires a prisoner to exhaust all
available administrative remedies before bringing a suit in federal court. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740.

4 The Supreme Court decided Perttu while the summary judgment motions were pending, so the Court requested
supplemental briefing that addresses the impact of Perttu on the motions. The parties filed Supplemental Briefs. See
Docs. 87-89, 93. After considering them, the Court finds no Perttu issue. This case involves a single ADA/Rehab Act
claim and two Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Larson was
dismissed at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and Plaintiff did not replead the claim. In addition, this defendant
played no role in reviewing grievances. Questions about exhaustion can be resolved without addressing questions
about the merits of the surviving claims.
To properly exhaust, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time,
the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the administrative process has
failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024. “The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative

defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.” Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903
(7th Cir. 2011); Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015).
The Illinois Administrative Code sets forth the grievance process for inmates in the custody
of the Illinois Department of Corrections. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017). The
standard grievance procedure requires an inmate to file his grievance with a counselor within 60
days of the incident, occurrence, or problem giving rise to the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.810(a). If the grievance is not resolved informally through the counselor, the grievance must
be submitted in writing to a grievance officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations
in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) within 2 months after receiving the written
grievance, when reasonably feasible. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO then provides

the inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id. If the inmate is not satisfied with the
CAO’s response, he may file an appeal with the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) within 30 days of the CAO’s decision. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The
inmate must attach copies of responses from the grievance officer and CAO to his appeal. Id. The
ARB considers the matter and submits a written report of its findings and recommendations to the
Director, who makes a final determination within 6 months of receipt of the matter, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.850(d), (e).
A separate procedure is available for inmates facing an emergency. The inmate can submit
his emergency grievance directly to the CAO. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. If the warden
determines that the grievance presents an emergency, the grievance is expedited for processing as
directed. Id. If the CAO finds no emergency, the grievance is denied as a non-emergency and
must be resubmitted in accordance with the standard grievance procedure outlined above. 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c).

An inmate grieving one of the following issues shall submit a grievance directly to the
ARB for processing under § 504.850: (1) protective custody; (2) involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication; (3) disciplinary proceedings at another facility; and (4) issues other than
property or medical that pertain to another facility. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.870(a)(1)-(4).
Analysis
Defendant Isaacs
The question on summary judgment is whether any properly exhausted grievances for
Count 2 put prison officials on notice of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claims against Isaacs where Plaintiff did not specifically name her in his grievances. The PLRA
requires prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a suit in federal

court, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), but it does not impose a “name all defendants” requirement. Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217 (2007). The purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is to alert
the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought and invite corrective action.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). In keeping with this purpose, a grievance
must contain “enough information about who caused the grievance or problem so that a prison can
properly investigate and resolve grievances.” Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948 (7th Cir. 2024).
When considering the sufficiency of the content, courts look to state law for guidance.
Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2020). Under Illinois law, a grievance must
provide factual details about each aspect of the offender’s complaint. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.810(c). This includes a description of what happened, when it happened, where it occurred,
and who is the subject or otherwise involved in the complaint. Id. If available, the offender must
also include the name of each individual involved. If not available, the offender should provide as
much descriptive information as possible. Id.

In this case, the parties identify four grievances addressing the claims against Isaacs in
Count 2: Grievances #60-12-21, #80-12-21, #81-12-21, and #08-22-11. All four pertain to the
denial of Plaintiff’s shower access and his resulting exposure to soiled clothing. Grievance #60-
12-21 also describes the denial of a special mattress and Plaintiff’s resulting pain. Because
Grievance #60-12-21 addresses both issues in Count 2, the Court will consider whether it exhausts
remedies against Isaacs.
Grievance #60-12-21 specifically addresses Plaintiff’s request for “Medical Treatment”
and “ADA Disability Accommodation.”5 (Doc. 75-2, p. 10). Plaintiff complains about his lack
of access to a special mattress and ADA showers in restrictive housing. (Doc. 72-4, ¶ 8a).
According to the grievance, Plaintiff’s mattress caused severe pain, and the lack of shower access

caused him to sit in soiled clothing for days at a time. Id. It is undisputed that this grievance was
properly filed at each level of the grievance process “in the place, and at the time, the prison’s
administrative rules require.” See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025. It was also denied on the merits.
Isaacs argues this grievance does not serve to exhaust the constitutional claims against her
because Plaintiff did not explicitly name her or adequately describe her. At all times relevant to
this action, Isaacs served as BMRCC’s HCU Administrator and ADA Coordinator. (Doc. 14, pp.
2, 13-14). BMRCC routed all medical grievances to the HCU Administrator for a response and
routed all ADA grievances to the ADA Coordinator for a response. (See, e.g., Doc. 79, pp. 3-4,

5 IDOC and Director Jeffreys did not move for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his claims
under the ADA/Rehab Act in Count 1, so this claim will proceed against them. (Docs. 50, 54).
Ex. B). Given her dual role, Isaacs processed the medical and ADA grievances. The grievance
officer who responded to Grievance #60-12-21 acknowledged this, stating the “allegations were
reviewed by Health Care Unit Administrator/ADA Coordinator Debbie Isaacs. . . .” (Doc. 75-2,
p. 8). The grievance officer went on to explain that Isaacs investigated the issues described in this

grievance, determined that ADA individuals were provided ADA accommodated showers in
“Receiving,” and concluded the records contain “[n]o documentation to substantiate [Plaintiff’s]
other complaints.”6 Id.
Given the undisputed facts, the fact that Plaintiff did not provide Isaacs’s first and last name
or describe her in detail is not fatal to the issue of exhaustion. See, e.g., Arce v. Wexford Health
Services, No. 18-cv-1348-SMY-GCS, 2019 WL 6702692, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2019) (grievance
describing inadequate medical care deemed sufficient to exhaust claim against treating doctor and
nurse practitioner who were not named in grievance). This grievance served to exhaust the
constitutional claims against Issacs in Count 2, and Plaintiff did not need to file a new, additional,
or separate grievance against Isaacs for the ongoing deprivation of a mattress and showers at

BMRCC. Barrow v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 14-cv-800-NJR-DGW, 2015 WL
5010104, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2014) (“[A] previously submitted grievance will suffice to
exhaust for future events so long as the prisoner remained in the same situation”).
Additionally, Plaintiff was not required to identify the constitutional source of his claims
in the grievance. See Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002) (grievant need not
articulate legal theories). Although Plaintiff cannot rely on a grievance that focuses only on ADA
disability accommodations to exhaust an Eighth Amendment claim, see McDaniel v. Syed, 115

6 This response is similar to the grievance officer’s responses for Grievance #80-12-21 (see Doc. 75-1, p. 7) and
Grievance #81-12-21 (see Doc. 75-1, p. 2), in which HCU Administrator/ADA Coordinator Isaacs is identified as the
person who reviewed the issues therein.
F.4th 805, 825 (7th Cir. 2024), he was careful to identify his grievance as both a complaint about
his medical care and his request for accommodations. The grievance officer’s response recognized
that the grievance covered both issues. (Doc. 75-2, p. 8) (characterizing “Nature of Grievance” as
“Medical Treatment,” “ADA Accommodation,” and “Emergency Review”). Isaacs was also the

individual who handled both types of complaints.
In sum, Grievance #60-12-21 exhausts Plaintiff’s administrative remedies for the Eighth
Amendment claim in Count 2 against Isaacs for the mattress and shower issues.7 Therefore,
Isaacs’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 74) will be denied.
Defendant Dr. Larson
Turning to the claims against Dr. Larson, the question on summary judgment is whether
Plaintiff exhausted his available administrative remedies for his Eighth Amendment mattress and
shower access claims in Count 2 and his medical treatment claim involving leg pain and swelling
in Count 3. Dr. Larson points to no grievances filed about the mattress request in Count 2, one
grievance filed about Dr. Larson’s denial of his shower access in Count 2 (Grievance #84-6-22),

and four grievances submitted about Dr. Larson’s inadequate treatment of leg swelling in Count 3
(Grievances #42-2-221, #121-3-221, #106-4-22, and #54-5-22). Plaintiff’s ARB records include
no appeals of these grievances with the ARB/Director.
Plaintiff transferred from BMRCC to Lawrence while his grievances were pending. When
he eventually received institutional responses for Grievance #84-6-22 addressing Count 2 and
Grievances #42-2-221, #121-3-221, #106-4-22, and #54-5-22 addressing Count 3, Plaintiff claims
it was too late to timely appeal each decision to the ARB/Director. Plaintiff also claims he

7 Because Grievance #60-12-21 served to exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies for Count 2 against this
defendant, the Court need not address the other three grievances that focus only on shower access (i.e., Grievances
#80-12-21, #81-12-21, and #08-22-11).
submitted “several” other grievances about his mattress and shower claim in Count 2 that went
missing, and asks the Court not to fault him for these missing grievances. (See Doc. 78, pp. 1-4).
In short, Plaintiff argues administrative remedies were unavailable to him due to his prison
transfer, slow grievance responses, and missing grievances.

The PLRA “does not demand the impossible… [r]emedies that are genuinely unavailable
or nonexistent need not be exhausted.” Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2016). An
inmate must exhaust “those, but only those, grievance procedures that are capable of use to obtain
some relief for the action complained of.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (citation
omitted).
In Ross, the United States Supreme Court described three situations when administrative
remedies are unavailable and exhaustion is not required. Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44. First, a
grievance process is rendered unavailable if the administrative scheme is “so opaque that it
becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id. Second, an administrative remedies process
is rendered unavailable when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a

grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 644. Third, an
administrative remedies process becomes unavailable when the administrative procedures serve as
a “simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to
aggrieved inmates.” Id. at 643. The unavailability exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement must be narrowly construed. Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 2022).
The unavailability exception does not apply here. As for the mattress claim in Count 2, the
undisputed facts demonstrate that the grievance process was available. Plaintiff exhausted
Grievance #60-12-21 addressing the mattress issue in Count 2 against Isaacs. However, neither
party argues this grievance or any others exhausted the mattress claim against Dr. Larson. The
grievance does not name or describe him, and Dr. Larson played no role in reviewing or addressing
this or any other grievance about the mattress issue. As such, Dr. Larson’s request for summary
judgment on the mattress claim in Count 2 will be granted.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff transferred to Lawrence while the shower access claim in

Count 2 (Grievance #84-6-22) and inadequate medical treatment claim in Count 3
(Grievances #42-2-221, #121-3-221, #106-4-22, and #54-5-22) were still under review. Plaintiff
eventually received responses, but maintains his appeals to the ARB/Director would have been
late. A prisoner’s remedies are unavailable when he follows each step of the grievance process
and can do nothing more. Pyles, 829 F.3d at 865 (7th Cir. 2016). In this case, Plaintiff could
appeal each grievance decision to the ARB/Director even after he transferred facilities. However,
Plaintiff has provided no evidence of his efforts to appeal, and the ARB has no record of any
attempts. By all indications, Plaintiff assumed an appeal would be fruitless, abandoned the
grievance process, and filed suit in federal court instead.
Even when there are no remaining administrative remedies left, a prisoner’s grievance will

be deemed unexhausted if he simply stops following the steps in the grievance process. Pozo, 286
F.3d at 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff abandoned the grievance process for Grievance #84-
6-22 addressing Count 2 and Grievances #42-2-221, #121-3-221, #106-4-22, and #54-5-22
addressing Count 3. Thus, Dr. Larson is entitled to summary judgment on the shower access claim
in Count 2 and the leg swelling claim in Count 3.
Plaintiff’s affidavit represents an attempt to create material factual disputes on summary
judgment where none exist. (Docs. 78, 79). He attests that “several” grievances were filed at
BMRCC about his mattress claim and shower access claim in Count 2, but went missing. (Doc.
78, pp. 1-4). He included a grievance vaguely mentioning “several” unidentified grievances and
complaining they were never addressed at BMRCC. His reference to “several” additional
grievances is too vague to create a genuine factual dispute about exhaustion; he offers no
information about specific dates he prepared and filed each grievance, the contents of each
grievance, who was identified therein, where he submitted each grievance, whether he checked the

status of each one, etc. Therefore, Plaintiff’s affidavit does not help him overcome summary
judgment as to Dr. Larson. See Adusummilli v. Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 1998); see
also James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 317 (7th Cir. 2020) (summary judgment cannot be defeated
through submission of affidavit containing conclusory allegations that contradict plain admissions
in prior depositions or other sworn testimony).
DISPOSITION
The Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Dennis Larson, M.D. (Doc. 71) is
GRANTED, and COUNTS 2 and 3 against this defendant are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Debbie Isaacs (Doc. 74) is DENIED;
COUNT 2 will proceed against this defendant.

Now that the issue of exhaustion is resolved, the following claims will proceed to the
merits: COUNT 1 against Defendants Illinois Department of Corrections and Rob Jeffreys, and
COUNT 2 (mattress and shower access claim) against Defendant Isaacs. The Court will enter
a separate Scheduling and Discovery Order lifting the stay on discovery and providing further
instructions and deadlines for litigation of these claims.
Because no other claims remain pending against Dennis Larson, M.D., the Clerk’s
Office is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Dennis Larson, M.D. as a defendant in CM/ECF.
Judgment as to Dennis Larson, M.D., shall enter accordingly at the close of this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 24, 2026 s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304671. Public record. Not legal advice.