# Vialet

> District Court, D. Maryland · March 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304584

## Case

- **Full name:** Destiney Vialet v. Howard County Department of Social Services, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** March 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DESTINEY VIALET, *
*
Plaintiff, *
*
v. * Civ. No. MJM-24-2551
*
HOWARD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF *
SOCIAL SERVICES, et al., *
*
Defendants. *
* * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Self-represented plaintiff Destiney Vialet (“Plaintiff”) filed this civil action against
Howard County Department of Social Services (the “Department”) and several officials and
employees of the Department (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging violations of constitutional
rights arising from the removal of minor children from her home and placement of the children in
foster care. See ECF 1 (Compl.) & 8 (Am. Compl). Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, ECF 11, and Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion, ECF 14. No hearing
is necessary to resolve the motion. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For reasons explained below,
the motion is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff alleges that the Department and several past and present employees of the
Department inappropriately removed and sheltered one-year-old A.V. and one-month-old J.M.,
two children of Plaintiff and her husband (“Mosley”), from their home in September 2021. See

1 The facts outlined in this part are drawn from allegations in the Amended Complaint. See ECF 8.
Because the Amended Complaint contains inconsistent paragraph numbering, citations to that document
include references to paragraph numbers for numbered paragraphs and page numbers when referenced
paragraphs are unnumbered.
generally ECF 8 (“Am. Compl.”). The removal was conducted after Mosley’s mother, Ms.
Jackson, made at least two referrals to the Department, reporting domestic violence and child abuse
in August and September of 2021. Id. ¶¶ 17–19. The children were committed to the Department’s
care after a trial. Id. at 10–11.

Defendant Blair Grooms began making child wellness checks at Plaintiff’s home in July
2021, shortly after J.M.’s birth. Id. ¶ 17. In response to reports of suspected abuse that included
exposure to domestic violence, Grooms entered into safety plans with Plaintiff that included trips
to a hospital to check A.V. and J.M. for skeletal fractures and an agreement that the children’s
father, Mosley, would stay away from the home. Id. ¶¶ 18–20. Plaintiff signed the plan reluctantly.
Id. ¶ 20.
On September 3, 2021, Grooms, with defendant Jenifer Levy, came to Plaintiff’s home. Id.
at 8–9. Grooms asked Plaintiff about J.M.’s condition because his leg was shaking and also asked
about whether Mosley had been at the home. Id. at 9. Plaintiff responded that J.M.’s leg shaking
was normal and that Mosley had not been in the home. Id.

Grooms and Levy left and then returned three hours later with a written authorization for
removal of A.V. and J.M. that was signed by defendant Michael Demidenko, Assistant Director
of the Department. Id. Plaintiff was distressed and initially refused to comply. Id. However, after
Grooms informed Plaintiff that Grooms had the right to remove the children and Plaintiff’s refusal
would result in police getting involved, Plaintiff complied and packed a bag of clothes, diaper, and
food for the children. Id. at 9–10. Grooms and Levy then took Plaintiff’s children to Howard
County General Hospital. Id. at 9.
On September 7, 2021, a Maryland juvenile court conducted a shelter care hearing, and the
judge ruled that A.V. and J.M. would remain in the Department’s custody until trial. Id. at 10.
Shortly before the shelter care hearing, defendants Shandra Parks, Susan Glorios, Pamela Scalio,
Levy, and Grooms attended a meeting with Plaintiff, Mosley, and Mosley’s mother, Ms. Jackson.
At the meeting, Grooms and Parks explained that although Plaintiff and Mosley demonstrated a
bond with their children, the Department remained concerned about a previous child welfare case

involving Plaintiff and Mosley, in addition to the multiple phone calls the Department received
regarding the current situation. Id. Plaintiff and Mosley were cleared of the previous child welfare
case. Id. On September 20, 2021, Grooms contacted Plaintiff to inform her that a follow-up X-ray
of J.M. revealed 15 healing fractures. Id. Grooms asked Plaintiff if she knew what could have
caused the fractures, and she replied, “No.” Id.
About two months later, there was a trial where “J.M.’s X-ray results along with other
allegations” were presented to the court by the Department and Ms. Jackson, Mosley’s mother. Id.
at 10–11. The Amended Complaint states that the Department and Ms. Jackson made false
allegations, including allegations that (1) Mosley abused A.V.; (2) A.V. was underweight and fed
only by Jackson; (3) T.M. was injured by Plaintiff and Mosley at the age of three months, and the

parents did not have custody or visitation with T.M.; (4) Mosley smoked marijuana in the presence
of the children; and (5) Plaintiff would let J.M. cry all day long and refused to cooperate with the
Department to protect Mosley. Id. at 11. Grooms submitted multiple exhibits to the court and
presented a verified dependency petition that was approved by the individual Defendants claiming
that Plaintiff and Mosley had abused their children. Id. ¶ 38. According to Plaintiff, Defendants’
allegations resulted in her children being placed in the foster care system, which limited her to
visitation with her children. Id. at 11. After never missing a visit, completing training, taking other
steps towards reunification and enrolling into school, Plaintiff and Mosley now have their children
full time. Id. at 11.
On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in this civil action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants alleging perjury, fabrication of evidence, suppression of
exculpatory evidence, supervisor liability, and failure to obtain a warrant for the removal of A.V.
and J.M. See ECF 8. The Amended Complaint names as Defendants the Department, Demidenko,

Glorios, Scalio, Grooms, Levy, Parks, and two other Department employees, Kathy Jackson and
Emmett Woodard.2 Id. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting various pleading defects
and governmental immunities from suit. See ECF 11. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the
motion, ECF 14, and a “Proposed Order to Amended Complaint,” ECF 13. In the latter filing,
Plaintiff “recognizes the deficiencies in her First Amended Complaint as Defendants point out”
and “[c]onsequently, … seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to cure these defects.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough factual
allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). A complaint need not include “detailed
factual allegations,” but it must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a

2 Kathy Jackson is listed as a defendant in the caption and in Paragraph 11 of the Amended
Complaint, but the pleading does not appear to include any allegations against her or about her role in the
facts of the case. The Court infers that she is a different person than the “Ms. Jackson” identified as
Mosley’s mother because Kathy Jackson is alleged to be employed by the Department, Am. Compl. ¶ 11,
while, in the original Complaint, Mosley’s mother is alleged to have lived in Illinois between February
2021 and June 2021, when she moved in with Plaintiff and Mosley after experiencing homelessness out of
state, Compl. ¶ 20.
Emmett Woodard is identified as a defendant in Paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint but is
not listed as a defendant in the caption, and the pleading does not appear to include any allegations against
him or about his role in the facts of the case.
cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . .
recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Furthermore, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for

imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby,
574 U.S. 10, 10 (2014) (per curiam). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).
When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must take the factual allegations in the complaint
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d
206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016). At the same time, “a court is not required to accept legal conclusions
drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
The pleadings of a pro se party must be construed liberally. See, e.g., Sause v. Bauer, 585

U.S. 957, 960 (2018). This requirement does not permit a district court, however, “to ignore a clear
failure to allege facts in the complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.”
Griffin v. Maximus Inc., 641 F. Supp. 3d 251, 254 (W.D.N.C. 2022), aff’d, No. 22-2259, 2023 WL
3119813 (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 2023). When interpreting such a complaint, a district court is tasked
with determining “what the words in the complaint mean,” rather than “discern[ing] the
unexpressed intent of the plaintiff.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006).
III. ANALYSIS

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of state
law, subjects a person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of federal
rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged
violation was committed by a ‘person acting under the color of state law.’” Gaines v. Baltimore
Police Dep’t, 657 F. Supp. 3d 708, 748 (D. Md. 2023) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988)). Liability under § 1983 attaches only upon personal participation by a defendant in a
constitutional violation. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (dismissing
claim for willful denial of medical care when plaintiff was unable to show that the official charged
acted personally in the deprivation of rights); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“[L]iability is personal, based upon each defendant’s own constitutional violations.”).
A. Count 1
Count 1 alleges that Defendants violated a “clearly established due process right to not be
subjected to false accusations[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Specifically, Count 1 alleges that Defendants,
individually and collectively, submitted fabricated or misleading evidence to the juvenile court
and suppressed exculpatory evidence, which led to the Department being granted custody of

Plaintiff’s children. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory statements that do
not allow this Court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” ECF 11-1 at 7. Moreover, Defendants argue, state social workers are
absolutely immune from suit for this type of claim. Id. (citing Vosburg v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 884
F.2d 133, 134 (4th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff states in her opposition that Grooms “falsely stated under
penalty of perjury” that the injury suffered by J.M. is not easily explained absent child abuse and
neglect and that there “there is substantial risk that the children will suffer serious physical harm.”
ECF 14 at 5.
Count 1, even construed liberally, fails to state a plausible claim for relief. A complaint
must be sufficiently detailed such that a defendant has fair notice of the basis of plaintiff’s claim.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 55. Here, Count 1’s references to the “fabrication” and “suppression” of
evidence are not accompanied by any specifics as to what information was fabricated or

suppressed. Therefore, Count 1’s reliance upon conclusory allegations of “fabrication” and
“suppression” does not suffice to state a claim.
The Amended Complaint does provide a list of allegations made by the “department and
Mosley’s mother Jackson” that Plaintiff contends were false, which includes statements like
“Mosley abused A.V.”; “A.V. was underweight”; and “Mosley smoked marijuana in the presence
of our children.” See Am. Compl. at 11. But Plaintiff does not differentiate between statements
made by Mosley’s mother and “the department,” nor does she identify which individual defendants
made which statements. Acts taken by Mosley’s mother are not actionable under § 1983 because
she is not alleged to be “acting under color of state law.” Gaines, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 748
(quoting West, 487 U.S. at 48). In short, Plaintiff’s allegations do not allow the court “to draw the

reasonable inference that [any] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 55.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s core allegation here, that “false allegations [resulted] in [her] babies
being placed in foster care,” Am. Compl. at 11, are also appropriately dismissed under the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from considering not
only issues raised and decided in the state courts, but also issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’
with the issues that were before the state court.” Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “A federal claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court
judgment if the relief sought may be granted only on the federal court’s finding that the state court
determined the issues before it erroneously.” Inkel v. Connecticut Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 421 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 522 (D. Conn. 2006) (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)
(plurality op.)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim that Department personnel “submitted false evidence and thereby

obtained unwarranted orders of [] custody over the children are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the
juvenile court proceedings themselves.” Id. Plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to second-
guess the state court’s factual and credibility findings. A complaint seeking “to recover on a theory
that the defendants made false statements during state litigation […] is ‘precisely what Rooker-
Feldman prohibits.’” Kasprzyk v. Axiom Fin. LLC, 811 F. App’x 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted); but see Foster v. Fisher, 694 F. App’x 887, 888 (4th Cir. 2017) (agreeing with the district
court that plaintiff failed to articulate how alleged perjury amounted to a viable claim under § 1983
and declining to address the district court’s application of Rooker-Feldman). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
claim relating to the submission of false testimony or information to state court are subject to
dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds.3

B. Count 2
Count 2 alleges that defendants Demidenko, Scalio and Glorios acted with deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by adopting a policy or practice “to present false
and misleading evidence to the juvenile court in dependency cases” and had a “duty to …
implement and follow policies … which … provide the protections guaranteed … [by] the United
States Constitution[.]” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–43. Defendants argue that Count 2 is “so vague and
unsupported” that it fails to state claim. ECF 11-1 at 8. Further, Defendants also argue that Count
2 is barred by immunity to the extent it is a repackaging of Count 1, and it fails to state a claim

3 Because Plaintiff’s pleading is defective with respect to Count 1, the Court need not address
Defendants’ immunity arguments.
because government officials may not be liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff’s response is difficult to discern. She
appears to argue that the defendants in supervisory roles either approved “the alleged conduct” or
failed to appropriately train their employees. See ECF 14 at 12.

As Judge Grimm stated in Anderson v. Warden, Civ. No. PWG-14-216, 2014 WL 2916882
(D. Md. June 25, 2014):
Vicarious liability based on respondeat superior generally is
inapplicable to § 1983 actions. See Love–Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d
766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under §
1983); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 927–99 (4th Cir. 1977);
see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Liability of supervisory officials is not based on ordinary principles
of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on “a recognition that
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’
misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries
they inflict on those committed to their care.” Baynard v. Malone,
268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d
368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)).
To establish a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983, a
claim must be supported with evidence that: (1) the supervisor had
actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged
in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s
response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the
supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th
Cir. 1994). Defendant’s administrative responsibilities are
insufficient to confer supervisory culpability.
2014 WL 2916882 at *2–3.
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting Demidenko, Scalio and Glorios knew
and then disregarded risks that subordinates routinely presented false and misleading evidence to
the juvenile court in dependency cases. Plaintiff’s claim is vague and unsupported by factual
allegations of any routine conduct by Defendants. Though the Court must construe pro se
complaint liberally, see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9–10 (1980), it cannot disregard a clear failure
to allege facts setting forth a cognizable claim. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th
Cir. 2012). “Since Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts supporting [her] vague claims,” Hollis v.
Amazon Sortation, Civ. No. BAH-24-1870, 2025 WL 1920809, at *3 (D. Md. July 10, 2025),

Count 2 must be dismissed.
C. Count 3
Count 3 alleges that Defendants “knew, or had reason to know that it was, and is, the
regularly established custom, usage, and or practice of DSS employees to obtain a warrant for the
removal of each child.” Am. Compl. ¶ 45. Defendants argue that Plaintiff alleges no facts from
which it can be inferred that the Department’s custom, usage, or practice is to obtain a warrant
prior to placing a child in emergency shelter care. ECF 11-1 at 8. To the extent Count 3 is based
upon a Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, Defendants
argue that claim must fail because (1) Plaintiff consented to the Department’s entry and removal
of her children; and (2) the social workers who were on scene, Grooms and Levy, are entitled to

qualified immunity. Plaintiff, relying on cases from the Ninth Circuit, argues that social workers
can remove a child from a parent’s custody without a warrant only in narrow circumstances and
whether exigent circumstances existed is a question of fact for a jury. ECF 14 at 6–7.
In its entirety, Count 3 reads as follows:
44. Vialet is informed to believe and thereon that at all times relevant
herein, there existed a clearly established due process right to not be
subjected to a violation of those rights and warrantless seizures. In
fact, Defendants, and each of them had the affirmative and self-
evident duty to make sure that parent rights were not violated.
45. On information and belief, I allege that Assistant Director
Demidenko, Glorious, Scalio, Grooms, Levy, Jackson, and Parks
knew, or had a reason to know that it was, and is, the regularly
established custom, usage, and or practice of DSS employees to
obtain a warrant for the removal of each child.
Am. Compl. 44–45.
Defendants are correct that the Amended Complaint does not allege any facts to support
Plaintiff’s assertion that the Department had a “custom, usage, or practice” to obtain a warrant
before placing a child in emergency shelter care. The Amended Complaint generally alleges that

Defendants followed Maryland law regarding Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) proceedings,
which does not require a warrant before temporarily removing a child if an authorized state
representative believes that the child is in serious immediate danger. See generally In re: O.P., 235
A.3d 40 (Md. 2020); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-709(c). Accordingly, any claim based on the
Department’s alleged “custom, usage, and or practice” fails.4
If Count 3 is based on any contention that Grooms and Levy’s warrantless removal of the
children violated the Fourth Amendment, this claim fails for two reasons: Plaintiff’s lack of
standing and Defendants’ qualified immunity.
First, the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are “personal rights,” which “may be
enforced … only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and

seizure.” Feller v. Feller, Civ. No. TDC-18-0108, 2020 WL 1322946, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 20,
2020) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)) (citation modified). “Children are not
property. Thus, the right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of their persons belongs to the
children themselves, not their parents.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff, who is suing on her own behalf,
lacks standing to assert any Fourth Amendment claim for an unreasonable seizure that her children
may have.

4 If Plaintiff’s claim is based on the contention that the Department had an custom or practice that
caused the individual defendants to violate her federal rights, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978), that claim fails because Plaintiff alleges (albeit without factual support) that the Department’s
custom or practice is to obtain a warrant before removing a child and also alleges that Defendants failed to
obtain a warrant before removing her children.
Second, Grooms and Levy are entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified
immunity “bars § 1983 actions against government officials in their individual capacities ‘unless
(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct
was clearly established at the time.’” Barrett v. Pae Gov’t Servs., Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 428 (4th Cir.

2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018)). Only one of these questions must be
resolved in favor of the official for qualified immunity to apply. So, “even if a court finds or
assumes that a government official violated an individual’s constitutional rights, the official is
entitled to immunity so long as the official did not violate clearly established law.” Id. at 429.
“[T]he clearly established right must be defined with specificity[]” and not “at a high level of
generality.” City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes,
584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018)).
“To determine if the right in question was clearly established,” courts in the Fourth Circuit
“first look to cases from the Supreme Court, [the Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals, or the highest
court of the state in which the action arose.” Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d

89, 98 (4th Cir. 2017). “In the absence of ‘directly on-point, binding authority,’ courts may also
consider whether ’the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a
consensus of persuasive authority.’” Id. (quoting Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543
(4th Cir. 2017)).
Here, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint raise no dispute that Grooms and Levy
followed Maryland law, which permits the temporary removal of a child when the state believes
the child is in serious immediate danger. See Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-709(c). Instead,
Plaintiff complains that Grooms and Levy’s determination (and consequently, the Department’s
and juvenile court’s determination) that Plaintiff’s children needed assistance was wrong or
unjustified. The Supreme Court of Maryland has recognized that the law governing CINA
proceedings “must accommodate both a vital constitutional and human right with the State’s
special responsibility for the welfare of children.” In re: O.P., 470 Md. at 234. The Amended
Complaint does not contain allegations from which it could be inferred that Grooms and Levy

violated Plaintiff’s clearly established rights in the execution of their duties. Nor does her
opposition cite to any case law in this Circuit that clearly established any right Grooms and Levy
violated. Accordingly, Grooms and Levy are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim asserted
in Count 3.
IV. ORDER
Accordingly, it is by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland hereby
ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 11) is GRANTED;
2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice;
3. Plaintiff SHALL FILE no later than April 1, 2026, any motion for leave to amend that
complies with the requirements of Local Rule 103.6 (D. Md. Dec. 2025), or notice that
Plaintiff does not seek leave to amend;
4. The Clerk SHALL SEND a copy of this Memorandum Order to Plaintiff and counsel

for Defendants.
It is so ORDERED this 11th day of March, 2026.

Matthew J. Maddox
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304584. Public record. Not legal advice.