# Fabian

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304540

## Case

- **Full name:** Rafael Fabian v. Drug Enforcement Administration
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304540

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating “[i]f discovery is incomplete, a district court is rarely justified in granting summary judgment”
- noting that exhaustion is determined by compliance with federal regulations
- reversing a district court’s pre-discovery grant of summary judgment because the pro se plaintiff asserted that he could, after having had the benefit of discovery, produce expert evidence to defeat summary judgment
- noting that incarcerated pro se plaintiffs’ “confinement [limit their] ability to conduct discovery in support of [their] claim[s]

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAFAEL FABIAN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-01533

v.
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
On September 10, 2024, pro se plaintiff Rafeal Fabian (“Fabian”) initiated this action
by filing a complaint against Defendant the Drug Enforcement Administration (the “DEA”).
(Doc. 1). On April 14, 2025, the DEA filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 16). On
December 10, 2025, Magistrate Judge Sean A. Camoni filed a report and recommendation
recommending that the Court grant the DEA’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 27). On
January 8, 2026, Fabian filed an objection to the report. (Doc. 30). On January 21, 2026, the
DEA filed a brief in opposition to Fabian’s objection. (Doc. 31). Based on the Court's review
of the relevant filings along with the report, Fabian’s objection is sustained, the Court declines
to adopt the report, and the DEA’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Fabian’s suit arises from a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request he made to
the DEA on February 28, 2022, and supplemented on March 28, 2022, and August 10, 2022,
seeking records “relating to case number 16-131 (Sl)(DLI) or (1) 16 Cr. 131 (DLI).” (Doc. 1,
¶ 4). On November 27, 2023, the DEA responded to Fabian’s FOIA request and informed
him that it would be withholding all records pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(A). (Doc. 17, ¶
3; Doc. 21, at 2). Under 28 C.F.R. § 16.8, a party requesting FOIA information could appeal
a denial of information to the Department of Justice Office of Information Policy (the “OIP”),
but the parties dispute whether Fabian filed such an appeal. (Doc. 17, ¶ 4; Doc. 21, at 2). The
DEA contends that there is no record of Fabian filing an appeal with the OIP. (Doc. 17, ¶ 4).
Fabian avers that a letter he allegedly sent the OIP dated December 27, 2023, constitutes an

appeal. (Doc. 21, at 2; Doc. 21-1). The DEA filed a motion for summary judgment on April
14, 2025, as their first responsive pleading. (Doc. 16).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“A district court may ‘designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for the disposition’ of certain matters pending before the court.” Brown v.
Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Within fourteen
days of being served a report and recommendation, “any party may serve and file written
objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party timely files objections, the district court is to conduct a de
novo review of the challenged portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings unless the objection
is “not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir.1984); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and
recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of
review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on
the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Rahman v.
Gartley, No. CV 3:23-363, 2024 WL 555894, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (citing United v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).
III.DISCUSSION
The DEA moves for summary judgment on the issue of administrative exhaustion.
(Doc. 16; Doc. 18). Judge Camoni determined that the DEA is entitled to summary judgment
because Fabian failed to establish that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing an
appeal with the OIP. (Doc. 27, at 5-12). According to Judge Camoni, to adequately

demonstrate that he filed an appeal, and thus exhaust his administrative remedies, Fabian
was required to submit a copy of the envelope he sent the OIP to the Court because under
federal regulations, to appeal a denial of a FOIA request by mail, the plaintiff must send a
letter in an envelope clearly marked “Freedom of Information Act Appeal” to the OIP and
the envelope must be “postmarked . . . within 90 days of the date of [the agency’s] response
to [the] request.” (Doc. 27, at 10). Fabian avers that he sufficiently presented evidence that he
filed an appeal because he presented a copy of the letter he allegedly sent the OIP along with
a sworn declaration declaring that he followed proper procedures when mailing his appeal.
(Doc. 30, at 2-3, 7-8). Fabian further contends that the relevant regulations do not require

proof of postmarking and do not require certified mail which would allow him to have easy
access to tracking information. (Doc. 30, at 3-5). Fabian also argues that the Court should
consider the fact that he is an incarcerated pro se plaintiff and thus has limited access to
postmarked envelopes and mail records. (Doc. 30, at 3-5). Fabian finally asserts that, under
the prison mailbox rule, his appeal should have been deemed filed the day he delivered it to
prison authorities for mailing. (Doc. 30, at 5-7).
As correctly noted by Judge Camoni, to file a suit based on a FOIA violation, a
plaintiff must first exhaust their administrative remedies. (Doc. 27, at 6); see Biear v. Att'y Gen.
United States, 905 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2018). The Court agrees with Judge Camoni that, in
order to have exhausted his administrative remedies, Fabian must have followed regulations
regarding appealing a FOIA decision and sent an appeal letter to the OIP with an envelope
post marked within ninety days of the DEA’s decision to deny his FIOA request. (Doc. 27,
at 9-10); see Biear, 905 F.3d at 156 (noting that exhaustion is determined by compliance with

federal regulations); see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.8 (a) (stating that an appeal sent by mail must be
post marked ninety days after a FOIA decision). The Court, however, disagrees with Judge
Camoni’s conclusion that Fabian presents insufficient evidence that he appealed his FOIA
denial to survive summary judgment at this stage. (Doc. 27, at 9-12).
The DEA filed its motion for summary judgment as its first responsive pleading and
before discovery. (Doc. 16). A defendant may move for summary judgment prior to discovery.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (b) (stating “a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any
time until 30 days after the close of all discovery”). However, “[w]hen a party moves for
summary judgment before the nonmoving party has had an opportunity to develop the record

through the discovery process, a court should exercise caution in granting a motion for
summary judgment.” Petersen v. Nat'l Flood Ins. Program, 200 F. Supp. 2d 499, 503 (E.D. Pa.
2002); see also Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (stating “[i]f discovery is
incomplete, a district court is rarely justified in granting summary judgment”). Courts should
deny motions for summary judgment as premature where the opposing party demonstrates
they could produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment if given the
opportunity to conduct discovery. See Wilson v. United States, 79 F.4th 312, 320 (3d Cir. 2023)
(reversing a district court’s pre-discovery grant of summary judgment because the pro se
plaintiff asserted that he could, after having had the benefit of discovery, produce expert

evidence to defeat summary judgment); see also Riley v. United States, No. 3:24-CV-02250, 2026
WL 526363, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2026) (denying a pre-discovery motion for summary
judgment as premature because a pro se plaintiff could produce evidence after discovery
supporting his claims).
In addition to being cautious about pre-discovery summary judgment, courts must also

be mindful of the unique difficulties incarcerated pro se litigants face when gathering evidence.
See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 503 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that incarcerated pro se
plaintiffs’ “confinement [limit their] ability to conduct discovery in support of [their] claim[s]);
see also Houser v. Beard, No. CIV.A. 10-0416, 2013 WL 3943510, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 30,
2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 10-0416, 2013 WL 4494373 (W.D. Pa.
Aug. 22, 2013) (stating “[a] court should consider a prisoner-litigant's inability to gather facts
relevant to the proof of his claim and should be sensitive to his discovery difficulties”). Thus,
the Court agrees with Fabian that requiring him to provide a post-marked envelope, pre-
discovery, in order to defeat summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion was in error. (Doc.

27, at 10; Doc. 30, at 3-5). Fabian produced what he contends is a copy of an appeal letter he
sent to the OIP dated December 27, 2023, and filed a declaration swearing that he sent it
within ninety days of the DEA’s decision to deny his FIOA request. (Doc. 21-1; Doc. 22). At
this early stage, the Court cannot conclude that Fabian would not be able to show he sent a
timely post-marked letter to the OIP. As such, summary judgment is premature. See Wilson,
79 F.4th at 320; see also Riley, 2026 WL 526363, at *2.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DECLINES to adopt the report (Doc. 27) and
SUSTAINS Fabian’s objection. (Doc. 30). The DEA’s motion for summary judgment is

DENIED without prejudice to its ability to re-raise the issue of administrative exhaustion
after discovery. (Doc. 16). The Court further ORDERS limited discovery on the issue of
administrative exhaustion to be completed within twenty-eight days of the accompanying
Order, or on or before Monday, March 30, 2026.
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: March 2, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304540. Public record. Not legal advice.