# Eberley

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · April 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304326

## Case

- **Full name:** Alexandra L. Eberley v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** April 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION

ALEXANDRA L. EBERLEY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 25-3051

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner
Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Alexandra L. Eberley, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Titles II and XVI
of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there
is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current applications for DIB and SSI on Augusts 16, 2022,
alleging an inability to work since March 8, 2018, due to epilepsy, posttraumatic stress disorder,
and anxiety. (Tr. 91, 238, 245). For DIB purposes, Plaintiff maintained insured status through
June 30, 2022. (Tr. 18, 254). An administrative video hearing was held on April 18, 2024, at which
Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 46-81).
By written decision dated July 11, 2024, the ALJ found that during the relevant time period,
Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 20). Specifically,
the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: seizures-epilepsy, adjustment
disorder with depression and anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and avoidant
personality traits. However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the

Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 20). The ALJ
found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
[P]erform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, no unprotected heights,
no moving mechanical parts, no open flames or deep water, no motor vehicles, no
sharp objects; not the sole caregiver for small children or infants; can understand,
remember and carry out simple, routine, repetitive tasks; respond to usual work
situations and routine work changes; is able to have only occasional social
interaction with the general public.

(Tr. 22). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work as
a hand packager, an industrial cleaner and a floor cleaner. (Tr. 38-39).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, who
denied that request on June 18, 2025. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (ECF
No. 2). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (ECF No. 6).
Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (ECF Nos. 12, 15).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are
presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
II. Applicable Law:
The Court reviews “the ALJ’s decision to deny disability insurance benefits de novo to
ensure that there was no legal error that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F. 3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it
adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154
(2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support
it. Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 2015). As long as there is substantial evidence
in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply

because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome,
or because the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477
(8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must
affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id.
It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari,
274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical
or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that her disability,
not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental
impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an
impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy
given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Only if the final
stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience
in light of her residual functional capacity. Id.
III. Discussion:

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. In making this claim, Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: A) The
ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence; B) The ALJ determination that
Plaintiff is able to perform medium work is not support by substantial evidence as it is entirely
incompatible with the current condition of Plaintiff’s mental state and chronic seizures; C) The
ALJ erred in the application of relevant C.F.R. Rules; and D) The ALJ erred in failing to evaluate
the combined effect of all of Plaintiff’s impairments. (ECF No. 12). Defendant argues the ALJ
properly considered all the evidence, and the decision is supported by substantial evidence. (ECF
No. 15).
RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of her
limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart,
390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also
factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.”
Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning
a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to
function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is
[also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s limitations and to determine how those
limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
In the present case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff maintained the RFC to perform at all
exertional levels of work with nonexertional limitations to include being limited to work that did

not involve the use of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts,
open flames, deep water, motor vehicles, sharp objects, or being the sole caregiver for small
children or infants. (Tr. 22). The ALJ further found Plaintiff could understand, remember and carry
out simple, routine, repetitive tasks; respond to usual work situations and routine work changes;
and was able to have occasional social interaction with the general public. Id. In making this RFC
determination, the ALJ found that the Seizure Disorder Medical Assessment completed by
Plaintiff’s treating neurologist, Dr. Harshad Ladha, on July 25, 2023, was partially persuasive. (Tr.
32-34, 913-918). The ALJ noted Dr. Ladha reported that Plaintiff experienced both generalized
tonic-clonic and myoclonic seizures with a frequency of 1-3 per week, that Plaintiff does not
always have a warning of an impending seizure, and that the seizures do not occur at a particular

time of the day. However, the ALJ did not include some of the limitations found in Dr. Ladha’s
assessment and failed to explain why these additional limitations were not included in the RFC.
Specifically, Dr. Ladha opined that Plaintiff’s seizures were likely to disrupt the work of co-
workers, that Plaintiff would need more supervision at work than an unimpaired worker, and that
Plaintiff was unable to take a bus alone. (Tr. 915). While the ALJ is not required to incorporate
every limitation from a medical opinion into the RFC, “once a medical opinion is found to be
persuasive, an ALJ must explain any inconsistencies between the limitations found in that opinion
and the ultimate RFC.” Harris v. Dudek, No. 4:23-CV-1705, 2025 WL 776516, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 10, 2025) (citations omitted). The record before the Court is inadequate to permit meaningful
review of the decision to omit Dr. Ladha’s opinion that Plaintiff's seizures were likely to disrupt
the work of co-workers, that Plaintiff would need more supervision at work than an unimpaired
worker, and that Plaintiff was unable to take a bus alone. On remand the ALJ should consider all
of the functional limitations in Dr. Ladha’s opinion and should either incorporate those limitations
into the RFC or explain why an excluded limitation was not adopted. Stafford v. Kijakazi, 2022
WL 350861 at *4 (W.D.Mo. Feb. 7, 2022) (Finding ALJ erred where the RFC deviated from an
opinion the ALJ found generally persuasive).
With this evidence, the ALJ should then re-evaluate Plaintiff's RFC and specifically list in
a hypothetical to a vocational expert any limitations that are indicated in the RFC assessment and
supported by the evidence.
IV. Conclusion:
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence, and therefore, the denial of benefits to the Plaintiff should be reversed and this matter
should be remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
DATED this Ist day of April 2026.

isi Aasat _Comatack
CHRISTY*COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304326. Public record. Not legal advice.