# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304234

## Case

- **Full name:** George Gilbert Hill, III v. Warden Shelbie Smith
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE GILBERT HILL, III, CASE NO. 4:25-cv-1408

Petitioner, DISTRICT JUDGE
J. PHILIP CALABRESE
vs.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WARDEN SHELBIE SMITH, JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

Respondent.
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

George Gilbert Hill, III, filed a pro se Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1. Hill is currently in custody at the Belmont
Correctional Institution serving a sentence of imprisonment of 15 years to life
imposed by the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas in State v. Hill, Case
No. 20cr757. The Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local
Rule 72.2 for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation. For the
following reasons, I recommend that the Court deny Hill’s petition.
Summary of underlying facts
In habeas corpus proceedings brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, factual
determinations made by state courts are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1). “This presumption also applies to the factual findings that [a] state
appellate court makes on its review of the state trial record.” Johnson v. Bell,
525 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). The petitioner has the burden of rebutting
that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Seventh Appellate District

summarized the facts underlying Hill’s conviction following his trial as follows:
{¶2} Appellant and J.M. were in a relationship, and
Appellant was living in J.M.’s house. During their
relationship, multiple friends of J.M. observed she
had various injuries that caused them to be
concerned for her safety. One friend, E.E., testified
that she regularly observed bruises on J.M. E.E.
testified that J.M. also had black eyes on several
occasions, which J.M. attempted to cover with
makeup and dark sunglasses. E.E. testified that the
last time she saw J.M. alive, she noticed an injury
that particularly concerned her, “it was a bruise and
it was on the whole side of her face from up here all
the way down like (indicating). She got real nervous
and she wouldn’t look me in the eyes.” (Trial Tr., p.
513.)

{¶3} J.M.’s best friend, D.C., testified that sometime
after J.M. began dating Appellant, she noticed a
change in her behavior. “She stopped coming around
as much. I had asked her to go out and she would,
like, make up excuses. They actually – he would
come out a lot, too, with us, and then it just stopped.”
(Trial Tr., p. 553) The few times J.M. would stop at
her house, D.C. believed she had “snuck out” and did
not want Appellant to know she was there. Similar
to E.E., D.C. saw various injuries on J.M. and often
noticed J.M. wearing sunglasses, even when indoors.

{¶4} Two incidents stood out to D.C. Once she
observed a significant bruise from the victim’s
buttocks down her entire leg. Although J.M.
conceded that Appellant caused the injury when he
pushed her down a set of porch stairs, she refused to
allow D.C. to photograph the injury. On another
occasion, J.M. and Appellant appeared at D.C.’s
house party. J.M. hugged her and teared up. D.C.
asked her what was wrong, but Appellant had
noticed the encounter and announced that it was
time to leave. D.C. testified that “[t]hey went
upstairs. He was very angry. So I followed. And she
kind of turned around to, like, say she wanted to stay
and he kind of took her by the hair and pushed her.”
(Trial Tr., p. 559)

{¶5} On May 31, 202[0], Appellant and J.M. went to
the Steel Valley Bar and Grill, an establishment
that they regularly visited. Appellant originally told
law enforcement that they left the bar at 2:00 a.m.
because J.M. got into a fight with the bartender. He
later changed his story after videos showed they
were at home around 11:00 p.m. He then claimed
they argued once they arrived home about J.M.’s
fight with the bartender. He said she was highly
intoxicated, and videotaped J.M. stumbling around
the house as evidence. He said she consumed six or
seven long island iced tea drinks while at the bar.
However, the bartender, C.T., testified that she did
not argue with J.M. on that night or any other. In
fact, C.T. described J.M. as quiet and reserved, and
said she only spoke to two people. C.T. testified that
J.M. never ordered long island iced teas but
regularly ordered Tito’s with Sprite. D.C. confirmed
that this is what J.M. typically drank.

{¶6} Appellant conceded to law enforcement that he
and J.M. “got into it” that night. (Trial Tr., p. 402.)
However, officers were unclear whether he meant
they engaged in a physical or verbal altercation.
Regardless, Appellant told them that at some point,
J.M. stumbled in the bathroom, fell, and hit her head
on the toilet. He gave her a towel for the blood and
asked if she wanted to go to the hospital, but she
declined.

{¶7} Detective Greg Stepuk testified Appellant told
him that the morning after the incident:

[H]e woke up, saw that she was in distress,
snoring real loudly, is how he was saying it.
She wouldn’t wake up. He was trying to rouse
her. She wouldn’t wake up. He did describe
something with -- and I believe Attorney Wise
brought this up -- with the spoon. He was
explaining how he was trying to help her
breathe or whatever, putting this or prying into
her mouth or something along those lines. This
happened before he called 911, or that probably
happened within an hour before 911 was
notified.

(Trial Tr., p. 403.)

{¶8} Appellant admitted to the responding officers
that, despite J.M.’s apparent dire condition, he
waited one to two hours before he called 911. In
explanation, he claimed that his phone could not
make outgoing calls and he was forced to charge
J.M.’s phone in order to use it for the 911 call. The
officers found this explanation odd, noting that a
cellular phone charges fairly quickly, and can be
used after minimal charging. Appellant also claimed
that J.M. did not want to go to the hospital the night
before, so he was reluctant to call for help in order to
honor her wishes. Also, prior to calling 911,
Appellant called D.C. four or five times. Appellant
claims that he made the call to 911 an hour or two
after he woke up.

{¶9} Sydney Livermore, an EMT, responded to the
dispatch call. She assumed that the incident
involved a drug overdose due to J.M.’s age and the
information provided as to her condition. Once she
saw J.M., Livermore changed her mind, because
“you couldn’t move her limbs. She was seizing so she
was very rigid, and she was nonresponsive to any
stimuli.” (Trial Tr., p. 294.) Appellant, who was
“fairly relaxed,” provided limited information to
Livermore’s questions, which surprised her. Based
on her experiences, most people attempt to give as
much information as they are able following the
need for emergency help. Livermore did not detect
any odor of alcohol coming from J.M. She noticed
J.M. had a gash and bloody, matted hair on the back
of her head. When she removed J.M. from the bed,
the fitted sheet came off and she noticed the
mattress was soaked in blood.

{¶10} Officer Jamison Diglaw of the Boardman
Police Department testified that he asked Appellant
to see his phone multiple times, but Appellant never
gave him the phone. He also testified that he asked
to photograph areas in the house, but Appellant
“declined any -- allowing me to do any type of
photography or collect any evidence.” (Trial Tr., p.
318) He also noted that Appellant seemed reluctant
to provide much information.

{¶11} Around 7:25 a.m., shortly after J.M. arrived at
the hospital, nurses obtained a blood sample, then a
urine sample around 8:40 a.m. Neither of these
contained a meaningful level of alcohol, showing she
had consumed approximately one-half of an
alcoholic beverage. The only drugs found in her
system were administered by hospital staff.

{¶12} While the officers were still at the scene,
someone from St. Elizabeth’s hospital called and
asked for police personnel to document certain
injuries they discovered on J.M.’s body. Dispatch
sent Officer Daniel Baker of the Boardman Police
Department to the hospital. The nurses positioned
J.M.’s body to allow Officer Baker to photograph the
injuries of concern. Officer Baker testified that he
followed the lead of the nurses. He documented what
they told him to and did not decide, himself, which
areas of J.M.’s body to photograph.

{¶13} At some point after J.M. was taken to the
hospital, D.C. awoke and found she had missed calls
placed with J.M.’s phone. Concerned, she called
J.M., but Appellant answered. He calmly informed
her that J.M. was in a coma at the hospital. D.C.
hung up and immediately called J.M.’s family,
where she learned of J.M.’s grim condition. J.M. was
not expected to survive, and even if she did, would
undoubtedly reside in a nursing facility the
remainder of her life.
{¶14} J.M. did not survive. Dr. Joseph Felo
performed an autopsy and determined the manner
of death was homicide. On [J.M.]’s head, alone, he
discovered trauma associated with three distinct
injuries: one to the left side of her head, one to the
back of her head, and one to the right of her head.
He found nineteen bruises to the trunk area, but
could not give a definitive count as to her extremities
because in several areas the bruises were clustered.
Some of these appeared new, and others appeared to
be older and healing. He performed a drug and
alcohol test using a blood sample and found no drugs
were in the sample but it had an ethanol level of
.012, about one-half of an alcoholic beverage. He
testified that six or seven long island iced tea drinks
would take approximately twenty-four hours to
dissipate for purposes of alcohol testing. Hence, it
was impossible she consumed the drinks Appellant
alleged she had on the night of the incident, which
was less than ten hours before the blood sample was
taken.

{¶15} On December 10, 2020, Appellant was indicted
on one count of murder, an unclassified felony in
violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), (D), R.C. 2929.02(B);
one count of murder, an unclassified felony in
violation of R.C 2903.02(B), (D); one count of
felonious assault, a felony of the second degree in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), (D)(1)(a); and one
count of domestic violence, a felony of the fourth
degree in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), (D)(3).

{¶16} At trial, the state presented testimony from
several witnesses, notably the responding officers
(EMT Livermore, Officer Diglaw, Officer Baker, Det.
Stepuk), the emergency room doctor (Dr. Chad
Donley), the coroner (Dr. Felo), the bartender (C.T.)
and J.M.’s friends (E.E. and D.C.). Dr. Anthony
Pizon (toxicology expert) and J.M.’s father were
witnesses called by Appellant. Following trial, the
jury convicted Appellant on all counts as charged in
the indictment.
{¶17} On June 6, 2022, the trial court filed its
sentencing entry. The court determined that all four
counts merged for purposes of sentencing and the
state elected to proceed on count two, murder. The
court imposed fifteen years to life of imprisonment
with credit for 473 days served.

State v. Hill, 2024-Ohio-1543, 2024 WL 1718027, at *1–3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
Procedural background
After the trial court entered judgment, Hill filed a notice of appeal. Doc.
9-1, at 45. In his supporting brief, Hill raised five assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law and to the
prejudice of Appellant by failing to provide a fair
cross section representative of the community
from the jury pool resulting in a violation of
Appellant’s right to a jury free from racial bias
and to be tried by a cross section of the
community and by his peers.

2. The trial court erred as a matter of law and to the
prejudice of Appellant by permitting Appellee to
introduce impermissible prior bad acts evidence
over objection from Appellant contrary to Rule
404(b) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.

3. The trial court denied Appellant due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment due to the fact
that his convictions for murder, felonious assault
and domestic violence were against the manifest
weight of the evidence and the jury’s verdict was
inconsistent with the evidence and testimony
presented at trial.

4. The trial court erred as a matter of law and to the
prejudice of Appellant by admitting into evidence
duplicative and gruesome photographs of the
victim over objection from counsel.

5. Appellant’s sentence is unconstitutional
pursuant to Reagan Tokes law, R.C. 2967.271, as
it violates the seperation of powers doctrine and
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
and Ohio Constitutions.1

Doc. 9-1, at 50–51. In March 2024, the Ohio court of appeals affirmed the trial
court. Hill, 2024 WL 1718027.
Hill later filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. Doc. 9-
1, at 135–36. In his memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Hill raised four
propositions of law:
1. The trial court and the Seventh District Court of
Appeals erred as a matter of law and to the prejudice
of Appellant by failing to provide a fair cross section
representative of the community from the jury pool
resulting in a violation of Appellant’s right to a jury
free from racial bias and to be tried by a cross section
of the community and by his peers.

2. The trial court and the Seventh District Court of
Appeals erred as a matter of law and to the prejudice
of Appellant by permitting Appellee to introduce
impermissible prior bad acts evidence over objection
from Appellant contrary to Rule 404(b) of the Ohio
Rules of Evidence.

3. The trial court and the Seventh District Court of
Appeals denied Appellant due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment due to the fact his
convictions for murder, felonious assault and
domestic violence were against the manifest weight
of the evidence and the jury’s verdict was
inconsistent with the evidence and testimony
presented at trial.

4. The trial court and the Seventh District Court of
Appeals erred as a matter of law and to the prejudice
of Appellant by admitting into evidence duplicative

1 Unless noted, Hill’s assignments of error, propositions of law, and
grounds for relief are reproduced as written.
and gruesome photographs of the victim over
objection from counsel.

Doc. 9-1, at 141–42. On June 25, 2024, the Ohio Supreme Court declined under
Rule 7.08(B)(4) of its rules of practice to accept jurisdiction. Id. at 196.
Federal habeas proceedings
Hill filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 18, 2025. Doc. 1,
at 17; see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988) (holding that an
imprisoned petitioner’s petition is deemed filed when he places it in his prison’s
mailing system). He raises the following four grounds for relief:
GROUND ONE: The trial court denied Petitioner
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment due
to the fact his convictions for murder, felonious
assault and domestic violence were against the
manifest weight of the evidence and the jury’s
verdict was inconsistent with evidence and
testimony presented at trial.

GROUND TWO: The trial court erred as a matter of
law to the prejudice of Petitioner by permitting
Appellee to introduce impermissable prior bad acts
evidence over objection from Petitioner contrary to
Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.

GROUND THREE: The trial court erred as a matter
of law and the prejudice of petitioner by failing to
provide a fair cross section representative of the
community from the jury pool resulting in a violation
of Petitioner’s right to a jury free from racial bias
and to be tried by a cross section of the community
and by his peers.
GROUND FOUR: The trial court erred as a matter
of law and to the prejudice of the Petitioner by
admitting into evidence duplicative and gruesome
photographs of the victim over objection from
Petitioner.

Doc. 1, at 8–14. The Warden filed a return. Doc. 9. Hill did not file a traverse.2
Legal Standard
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA or “the 1996 Act”), habeas petitioners
must meet certain procedural requirements to have their claims reviewed in
federal court. Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 430 (6th
Cir. 2006). “Procedural barriers, such as statutes of limitations and rules
concerning procedural default and exhaustion of remedies, operate to limit
access to review on the merits of a constitutional claim.” Daniels v. United
States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001). Although procedural default is sometimes
confused with exhaustion, exhaustion and procedural default are distinct
concepts. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006). Failure to

2 After the Court denied Hill’s Motion to expand the record, the Court
received Hill’s reply brief to that motion, Doc. 15. I have reviewed this brief,
but the arguments Hill presents in it do not change the Court’s ruling on the
motion to expand. To the extent that Hill presents argument in this brief that
are responsive to the Respondent’s Return of Writ, see, e.g., Doc. 15, at 6, I have
considered these arguments as a traverse when evaluating the petition.
Finally, to the extent that Hill attempts to raise an actual innocence claim in
this filing, Doc. 15, at 5, 12–13, he did not do so in his petition. See Tyler v.
Mitchell, 416 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2000) (claims raised for the first time in a
traverse are improper). Moreover, there is no stand-alone actual innocence
claim in federal habeas. See Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 854 (6th Cir. 2007)
(stand-alone actual-innocence claims are not cognizable in habeas).
exhaust applies when state remedies are “still available at the time of the
federal petition.” Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982)).
But when “state court remedies are no longer available to a petitioner because

he or she failed to use them within the required time period, procedural default
and not exhaustion bars federal court review.” Id.
Exhaustion
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the
petitioner has exhausted all available remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A); Robinson v. Horton, 950 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 2020). To

exhaust his remedies, a state defendant with federal constitutional claims
must “fairly presen[t]” those claims to the state courts before raising them in
a federal habeas corpus action. Robinson, 950 F.3d at 343 (quoting Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)); see also Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 798
(6th Cir. 2006). A constitutional claim for relief must be presented to the state’s
highest court to satisfy the fair presentation requirement. See O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845–48 (1999); Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 345 (6th

Cir. 2003). And a habeas petitioner must “present[] both the factual and legal
basis for [the] claims to the state courts.” Hanna v. Ishee, 694 F.3d 596, 606
(6th Cir. 2012). This means that the “‘petitioner must present his claim to the
state courts as a federal constitutional issue—not merely as an issue arising
under state law.’” Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (quoting Koontz v. Glossa, 731
F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1984)). “‘[G]eneral allegations of the denial of rights to
a “fair trial” and “due process” do not “fairly present claims” that specific
constitutional rights were violated.’” Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 418 (6th Cir.
2017) (quoting Slaughter v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224, 236 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Procedural default
Procedural default may occur in two ways. Williams, 460 F.3d at 806.
First, a petitioner procedurally defaults a claim by failing “to comply with state
procedural rules in presenting [the] claim to the appropriate state court.” Id.
In Maupin v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit directed courts to consider four factors
when determining whether a claim is barred on habeas corpus review because

a petitioner failed to comply with a state procedural rule: whether: (1) there is
a state procedural rule applicable to the petitioner’s claim and whether the
petitioner failed to comply with that rule; (2) the state court enforced the
procedural rule; (3) the state procedural rule is an adequate and independent
state ground on which the state can foreclose review of the federal
constitutional claim; and (4) the petitioner can demonstrate cause for failing to
follow the rule and actual prejudice by the alleged constitutional error. 785

F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (“If, due to the
petitioner’s failure to comply with the procedural rule, the state court declines
to reach the merits of the issue, and the state procedural rule is an independent
and adequate grounds for precluding relief, the claim is procedurally
defaulted.”) (citing Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138).
Second, “a petitioner may procedurally default a claim by failing to raise
a claim in state court and pursue that claim through the state’s ‘ordinary
appellate review procedures.’” Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (quoting O’Sullivan,

526 U.S. at 848); see Woolbright v. Crews, 791 F.3d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“When a petitioner has failed to fairly present … claims to the state courts
and no state remedy remains, [the] claims are considered to be procedurally
defaulted.”) (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161–62 (1996)). While
the exhaustion requirement is technically satisfied in this circumstance
because state remedies are no longer available to the petitioner, see Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991), a petitioner’s failure to have the federal
claims considered in the state courts constitutes a procedural default of those
claims that bars federal court review, Williams, 460 F.3d at 806.
To overcome a procedural bar, a petitioner must show “cause for the
default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,”
or show that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will result if the
petitioner’s claims are not considered. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Merits review
If a state’s courts adjudicated the merits of a claim, a habeas petitioner
may obtain habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, if the petitioner can establish
one of two predicates. To establish the first predicate, the petitioner “must
identify a ‘clearly established’ principle of ‘Federal law’ that” has been
established by a holding of the Supreme Court. Fields v. Jordan, 86 F.4th 218,
231 (6th Cir. 2023) (en banc); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The petitioner must
then show that the state court’s adjudication “was contrary to,” or “involved an
unreasonable application of” that “clearly established” precedent. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1); see Fields, 86 F.4th at 232.
To establish the second predicate, the petitioner must show that the
state’s court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the
[United States Supreme] Court on a question of law or” based on “a set of
materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13
(2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from th[e] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle
to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]n ‘unreasonable application

of’” the Court’s holdings is one that is “‘objectively unreasonable,’ not merely
wrong; even ‘clear error’ will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419
(2014) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)).
“[A] ‘clearly established’ principle of ‘Federal law’” refers to the
“holdings,” not “dicta,” of the Supreme Court’s decisions. Fields, 86 F.4th at
231 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and Woodall, 572 U.S. at 419). A state court
need not cite Supreme Court precedent or reflect an “awareness” of Supreme
Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court
decision contradicts” such precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see

Lopez v. Wilson, 426 F.3d 339, 358 (6th Cir. 2005). If the Supreme Court has
not addressed the petitioner’s specific claims, a reviewing district court cannot
find that a state court acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, Supreme
Court precedent or clearly established federal law. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.
70, 77 (2006); see White, 572 U.S. at 426 (“Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy
for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this Court’s

precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license
federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”).
In determining whether the state court’s decision involved an
unreasonable application of law, the Court uses an objective standard.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks
merit precludes federal habeas review so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)); see also Bray v. Andrews, 640 F.3d 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2011). “[A] state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented
in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-
minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.
Discussion
1. Hill’s first ground for relief is not cognizable in part and otherwise
meritless.

In his first ground for relief, Hill asserts that he was denied due process
because his convictions “were against the manifest weight of the evidence and
the jury’s verdict was inconsistent with evidence and testimony presented at
trial.” Doc. 1, at 8. As an initial matter, manifest-weight-of-the-evidence claims
are state-law issues that are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.3 See
Johnson v. Havener, 534 F.2d 1232, 1234 (6th Cir. 1976). To the extent,
therefore, that Hill presents a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument, his
claim is not cognizable in this forum.
Hill presented his manifest-weight claim to the Ohio Supreme Court and
the Ohio Court of appeals. See Doc. 9-1, at 50, 141. The Sixth Circuit has held

that a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence claim presented on direct review to an
Ohio court of appeals can suffice to preserve an insufficient-evidence

3 A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence claim presents an issue of state law.
Under Ohio law, “[w]eight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the
greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the
issue rather than the other.’... When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of
a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the
factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” State v. Thompson, 678
N.E.2d 541, 546–47 (Ohio 1997) (citations omitted). But a federal habeas court
can’t “reweigh the evidence or redetermine the credibility of the witnesses
whose demeanor has been observed by the trial court” because, in habeas
proceedings, “[i]t is the province of the factfinder to weigh the probative value
of the evidence and resolve any conflicts in testimony.” Matthews v.
Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
argument. Nash v. Eberlin, 258 F. App’x. 761, 765 (6th Cir. 2007) (“the
determination by the Ohio Court of Appeals that the conviction was supported
by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily implies a finding that there

was sufficient evidence”). So Hill’s first ground can fairly be construed to
include a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). This “standard ‘gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Davis v. Lafler, 658
F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In
applying the standard, the court defers to the trier-of-fact’s determination.
Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). The court does “not reweigh
the evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute [its]

judgment for that of the [fact-finder].” Id.; see also Matthews, 319 F.3d at 788.
“Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction, and it is
not necessary for the evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 992 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see also Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 449
(6th Cir. 2007) (“circumstantial evidence is entitled to equal weight as direct
evidence”).
On federal habeas review, an additional layer of deference applies.

Brown, 567 F.3d at 205; see Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012).
First, the Court defers “to the trier-of-fact’s verdict, as contemplated by
Jackson.” Davis, 658 F.3d at 531. And second, the Court defers under the 1996
Act to the state court’s “consideration of the trier-of-fact’s verdict.” Id. So even
if this Court would conclude in the first instance that a rational trier-of-fact
could not have found Hill guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court “must

still defer to the state appellate court’s sufficiency determination as long as it
is not unreasonable.” Brown, 567 F.3d at 205; see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d
707, 710 (6th Cir. 2009). This doubly deferential “standard erects ‘a nearly
insurmountable hurdle’ for petitioners who ... seek habeas relief on sufficiency-
of-the-evidence grounds.” Keys v. Booker, 798 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Davis, 658 F.3d at 534)).
With these principles in mind, it bears remembering that when reciting

the factual history of Hill’s case, the court of appeals noted that Hill and J.M.
lived together and were in a relationship. Hill, 2024 WL 1718027, at *1.
“During their relationship,” several of J.M’s friends “observed she had various
injuries that caused them to be concerned for her safety.” Id. These injuries
included “a bruise and it was on the whole side of her face.” Id. They also
included a “bruise from [J.M.’s] buttocks down her entire leg,” which she
“conceded that [Hill] caused … when he pushed her down a set of porch stairs.”
Id. And a friend witnessed an incident at a party in which Hill grabbed J.M.
by her hair and pushed her. Id.

As to the night in question, Hill first said that he and J.M. stayed at a
bar until 2:00 a.m. and that J.M. consumed six or seven Long Island iced teas.
Id. But this wasn’t true. Video evidence later established that they left the bar
at 11:00 p.m. Id. And the bartender did not serve J.M. even one Long Island
iced tea. Id. Indeed, later testing of J.M. showed that she had consumed about
half of one alcoholic drink. Id. at *2.

Hill admitted that after arriving home that night, he and J.M. “got into
it.” Id. He claimed that J.M. fell while intoxicated and hit her head. Id. But the
evidence showed that she was not intoxicated. Id. So Hill’s explanation was
false. According to Hill, when he woke up the next morning, he observed that
J.M. “was in distress, snoring real loudly,” and couldn’t be roused. Id. Even so,
Hill waited an hour or two before call 911. Id. And this delay was allegedly
occasioned by the fact that he needed to charge J.M’s phone for an unusually

long period of time. Id. Once emergency services arrived, Hill’s demeanor was
surprising. Id. He was relaxed and rather unhelpful. Id.
An autopsy revealed multiple injuries. Id. at *3. On J.M’s head, the
medical examiner found three distinct injuries: one to the left side of her head,
one to the back of her head, and one to the right side of her head. Id. He also
found nineteen bruises to J.M.s trunk area, but could not give a definitive
count as to her extremities because in several areas the bruises were clustered.
Id. Some of these appeared new, and others appeared to be older and healing.
Id.

With this background in mind, here’s what the Ohio court of appeals
said about Hill’s weight and sufficiency argument:
{¶36} Appellant contends the jury heard inconsistent
evidence about whether the victim had alcohol in her
system at the time of her death, which if true would
support his defense. Appellant says he took videos of
J.M. stumbling around the house for the purpose of
confronting her the next day about her drinking and
her drunken behavior. Appellant also takes issue
with the lack of a thorough investigation,
particularly since the authorities failed to test
evidence of possible drug use in the house.

{¶37} The state responds that the blood alcohol
testing completed at the hospital and again during
the autopsy showed the equivalent of less than one
alcoholic beverage was in J.M.’s system. Further,
there was evidence that J.M. suffered three distinct
injuries to her head (on the left, right, and back),
thirty-one bruises/blunt trauma injuries, and
contusions to her chest. Medical testimony showed
that injuries of this nature could not be caused based
on Appellant’s theory that the victim fell once and
hit her head on the toilet. The state also emphasizes
Appellant’s dilatory conduct after discovering the
extent of J.M.’s condition.

{¶38} Weight of the evidence concerns “the
inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the
issue rather than the other.” (Emphasis deleted.)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997). It is not a question of
mathematics, but depends on the effect of the
evidence in inducing belief. Id. Weight of the
evidence involves the state’s burden of persuasion.
Id. at 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Cook, J. concurring). The
appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses, and determines whether, in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State
v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954
N.E.2d 596, ¶ 220, citing Thompkins, at 387, 678
N.E.2d 541. This discretionary power of the
appellate court to reverse a conviction is to be
exercised only in the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id.

{¶39} “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier
of the facts.” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67,
2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 118, quoting
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212
(1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of
fact is in the best position to weigh the evidence and
judge the witnesses’ credibility by observing their
gestures, voice inflections, and demeanor. Seasons
Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461
N.E.2d 1273 (1984). The jurors are free to believe
some, all, or none of each witness’ testimony and
they may separate the credible parts of the
testimony from the incredible parts. State v.
Barnhart, 7th Dist. No. 09 JE 15, 2010-Ohio-3282, ¶
42, citing State v. Mastel, 26 Ohio St.2d 170, 176, 270
N.E.2d 650 (1971). When there are two fairly
reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting
versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable,
we will not choose which one is more credible. State
v. Gore, 131 Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125
(7th Dist.1999).

{¶40} Beginning with the expert testimony, the state
offered testimony from Dr. Chad Donley, the
emergency room physician who treated J.M., and Dr.
Felo, who performed the autopsy. The state also
presented physical evidence in the form of blood
alcohol testing results completed by the hospital
shortly after J.M. arrived (both blood test and urine
test) and a blood test completed during Dr. Felo’s
autopsy. To counter this, Appellant offered
testimony from Dr. Anthony Pizon, chief of the
division of medical toxicology at the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center. However, this testimony
was not based on separate testing, but was based on
information provided by Appellant. Hence, the
matter became a credibility issue for the jury.

{¶41} Dr. Pizon conceded at trial that he did not
evaluate J.M. nor complete any independent testing,
forcing him to rely on statements made by
Appellant. Dr. Pizon testified that “[t]he picture
painted for me sounds like a chronic alcoholic.”
(Trial Tr., p. 698.) However, he also stated that “if
she is not a chronic alcoholic there is no way that she
consumed that much alcohol” and that “drinking
that much and not being a chronic alcoholic are
incompatible.” (Trial Tr., p. 699-700.)

{¶42} Dr. Felo contradicted Appellant’s claim that
J.M. was a chronic alcoholic through testing of her
liver, which revealed no conditions associated with
alcoholism. It was noted that her liver was healthy
enough to be donated for a transplant. Dr. Pizon
conceded that in looking at her medical information,
“[t]here wasn’t anything that, I don’t think, stood out
to me as the stigmata of an alcoholic.” (Trial Tr., p.
702.)

{¶43} As to the three videos taken by Appellant of
J.M. stumbling around the house the night before,
Det. Stepuk testified that the videos did show J.M.
stumbling, but did not indicate if it was due to
intoxication or the result of head trauma. Dr. Pizon,
Appellant’s own expert, testified that it appeared to
him that J.M. was slowly dying when those videos
were taken.

{¶44} Even more significant than the alcohol testing,
a reasonable jury could also have found that the
pattern and extent of the injuries J.M. suffered were
caused by intentional acts. The record contains
evidence of inconsistent statements made by
Appellant of the events on the night of the incident.
The record contains unrebutted evidence there was
clearly a disturbance in the home that night.
Officers found a broken mirror, broken knickknacks,
and significant damage to the bedroom door. This
provides evidence that a physical encounter took
place.

{¶45} Appellant also has no explanation for the
number of bruises on J.M.’s body, both fresh and
healing. These do not support his story J.M.
sustained a single fall. Dr. Felo testified that
“[t]ypically you would need trauma to separate areas
to cause [the injuries suffered by the victim] unless
you were saying a rollover car crash or something
like that, it would be uncommon that injury to the
head would cause that injury to the chest as well.”
(Trial Tr., p. 381) The autopsy revealed J.M.
sustained a plethora of bruises, abrasions, swelling,
and internal bleeding inconsistent with a single fall.

{¶46} In addition, Appellant’s conduct was not what
would be expected under the circumstances. The
record established that he waited at least an hour or
two before calling for help despite J.M.’s serious
condition, claiming that he needed to charge her
phone before making the 911 call, and that she said
(the previous evening) she did not want to go to the
hospital. It is clear from the first responder’s
testimony that J.M. clearly required medical
assistance. Once emergency help arrived,
Appellant’s demeanor was both more calm, and less
forthcoming, than witnesses would have expected.

{¶47} Appellant also complains that the
investigation was incomplete, as possible drug
evidence found in the house was not tested. The only
drugs found in J.M.’s system were administered at
the hospital, and Appellant told police at the scene
that drugs were not involved. Even if there were
drugs in the house, it is equally plausible they
belonged to Appellant. Unlike J.M., Appellant was
not drug tested the day of the incident. Regardless,
there was a plethora of evidence as to J.M.’s cause of
death, none of it drug-related.

{¶48} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of
error is without merit and is overruled.

Hill, 2024 WL 1718027, at *7–9.

Given the above, Hill’s argument doesn’t leave the starting gate. He had
a history of physically abusing J.M. During the night in question, he was alone
with her. He lied about how long he was alone with her and her state of
intoxication. And Hill waited a suspiciously long period of time before calling
911. Further, Hill’s explanation for how J.M. sustained her injuries was
unsupported by the facts. These facts together are sufficient to support Hill’s
conviction. Cf. Johnson, 200 F.3d at 991 (recounting that “Johnson is the last
person known to have seen [his victim] alive” and that “[h]e was angry with
her just after he saw her”).
Against all of the above, Hill does almost nothing to overcome the double
deference this Court owes to the court of appeals adjudication. Instead, he
merely offers the unexplained, conclusory assertions that:
• The trial court gave inconsistent testimony about [a] statement
petitioner gave to detective

• Trial court[’]s evidence and witness testimony was conflicting, vague,
uncertain, and fragmentary

• the witness’s testimony [was] self-serving4

• There is zero direct or physical evidence tying petitioner to the crime

4 In his petition, Hill says that “None of the witness’s testimony is self-
serving.” Hill presumably means that the witness’s testimony was self-serving.
• Inconsistent toxicology and drug screen results
Doc. 1, at 8.
None of these assertions show that the evidence was constitutionally
insufficient. For starters, the fact that any witness provided testimony that
was inconsistent, either internally or with the testimony of other witnesses, is
of no moment. James v. Corrigan, 85 F.4th 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2023)
(“inconsistent testimony is a matter of credibility, not sufficiency”). This Court
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, not in the
light most favorable to Hill. Johnson, 200 F.3d at 991. Inconsistencies can
happen in any trial and it is the jury’s role—not this Court’s—to sift through
those inconsistencies. James, 85 F.4th at 397. The same is true of testimony

that is conflicting, vague, uncertain, or fragmentary. See Samatar v. Clarridge,
225 F. App’x 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2007) (“in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence claim, we must defer to the trier of fact with respect to issues of
conflicting testimony, weight of the evidence, and the credibility of witnesses”).
Further, whether a witness’s testimony—and Hill doesn’t bother to
explain to whom he refers—was self-serving is matter for the jury to consider.

While the allegedly self-serving nature of testimony might be fodder for cross-
examination or closing argument, the fact that testimony might be self-serving
does not make the evidence constitutionally insufficient. And it is simply
irrelevant that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence alone can support guilt. Johnson, 200 F.3d at 992.
Finally, like any other evidence, whether toxicology and drug screen results
were inconsistent—and Hill offers no basis to evaluate whether they were—is

of no moment. The jury, not this Court, resolves evidentiary inconsistencies.
Hill’s first ground for relief is not cognizable in part and otherwise
meritless.
2. Hill’s second and fourth grounds for relief are not cognizable.

In his second ground for relief, Hill argues that the trial court violated
Ohio rule of evidence 404(B) by allowing the State to present evidence of prior
bad acts. Doc. 1, at 10. Hill does not cite or rely on any principal of federal law
to support this ground. He raised this issue before Ohio’s courts purely as a
matter of state law. See Doc. 9-1, at 62–66, 149–52.
In his fourth ground, Hill asserts that the trial court erred by admitting
“duplicative and gru[e]some photographs of the victim over” Hill’s objection.
Doc. 1, at 14. As with his second ground, Hill does not cite or rely on any
principal of federal law. Hill raised this issue before Ohio’s courts, arguing that

the admission of the referenced evidence violated Ohio rule of evidence 403.
Doc. 9-1, at 74–76, 157–58.
The problem for Hill with regard to these two grounds is that state law
issues are not cognizable in habeas. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990);
Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 853 (6th Cir. 2007). Rather, this Court “is
limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States alleged violations of state laws or rules.” Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).
It’s true, as Hill states, Doc. 15, at 6–7, that “[w]hen an evidentiary

ruling is so egregious that it results in a denial of fundamental fairness, [the
ruling] may violate due process and thus warrant habeas relief.” Bugh v.
Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003). But to rise to the level of a due
process violation, a state-court evidentiary ruling must “offend[] some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.” Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996), in turn quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
Hill, however, does not argue in his petition—and did not argue before
the Ohio courts—that the errors he claims offended a fundamental principle of
justice. See Doc. 1, at 10, 14; Doc. 9-1, at 149–52, 157–58. In his reply to his
Motion to expand the record, Hill says that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
“rise to the level of due process violations.” Doc. 15, at 6. But Hill has not

explained how in his case this occurred. He has therefore not made any
argument that would cause the Court to conclude that these grounds for relief
are cognizable for purposes of this federal habeas petition.
Hill’s second and fourth grounds for relief are not cognizable.
3. Hill’s third ground for relief fails on the merits.
In his third ground for relief, Hill argues that the trial court erred when
it failed to “provide a fair cross section represen[t]ative of the community from

the jury pool.” Doc. 1, at 12. Hill raised this issue before the Ohio Supreme
Court and the Ohio court of appeals. The latter Court rejected the argument:
{¶19} Appellant argues that the jury voir dire in this
matter excluded a distinctive portion of the
community, as no African American jurors were
included. Appellant contends that this is
particularly problematic as he is of African
American descent and accused of killing a white
woman.

{¶20} The state responds that when the issue was
raised, the trial court summoned the assistant jury
commissioner, who testified that the normal
procedure to obtain a jury pool was followed in this
case. The court requested that thirty potential jurors
appear, and the commissioner sent thirty
consecutively-numbered potential jurors to the
courtroom. This process is a “blind” one – the
commissioner would have no knowledge of any
potential juror’s race or ethnicity.

{¶21} The racial makeup of a jury pool is contested
through use of a “Batson” challenge, which has its
genesis from United States Supreme Court law.

The Ohio Supreme Court has set out the steps
for analyzing a race-based challenge pursuant
to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct.
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), as follows:

First, the opponent of the peremptory strike
must make a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. Second, if the trial court finds
that the opponent has fulfilled this
requirement, then the proponent of the strike
must come forward with a racially neutral
explanation for the strike. * * * The
‘explanation need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause.’ [Batson, 476
U.S.] at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.

Third, if the proponent puts forward a racially
neutral explanation, the trial court must
decide, on the basis of all the circumstances,
whether the opponent has proved purposeful
racial discrimination. * * * The burden of
persuasion is on the opponent of the strike.
(Internal citations omitted.)

State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 255-256, 2002-
Ohio-796, 762 N.E.2d 940; State v. Moore, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 22 MA 0013, 2023-Ohio-1000, ¶ 14,
appeal not allowed, 170 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2023-Ohio-
2407, 212 N.E.3d 951.

{¶22} “An appellate court will not reverse the trial
court’s decision of no discrimination unless it is
clearly erroneous.” Moore at ¶ 15, citing State v.
Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583, 589 N.E.2d 1310
(1992).

{¶23} In this case, the Batson challenge did not arise
from any attempt by the state to strike potential
jurors. Instead, defense counsel raised a Batson
challenge when the potential jurors entered the
courtroom and counsel became aware no African
Americans were included within the group. The trial
court called Michele Caputo, assistant jury
commissioner, to address the issue. Caputo
explained to the court that while not typical,
occasionally a jury pool will lack diversity. She
explained that in the normal process, 500 summons
are sent out to county citizens blindly, without any
knowledge of their race or ethnicity. When a bailiff
requests a jury, the bailiff will ask to be sent a
specific number of potential jurors, in this case
thirty. The jury commission office selects the first
thirty potential jurors in sequential and numeric
order, again having no knowledge of their race or
ethnicity. She stated that the process used for this
case was the procedure normally used to generate a
random group, and the fact that no African
Americans were included is mere happenstance.
Throughout this entire process, individual potential
jurors are simply referenced as numbers until they
appear in the courtroom.

{¶24} Again, the defense’s objection was made to the
jury pool before either party had begun voir dire.
While this does not involve a typical Batson
scenario, the same law applies. Beginning with the
first prong of the Batson test, Appellant complains
that despite being a large and distinctive group
within the community, no African Americans were
included among the potential jurors. The United
States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial “contemplates
a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527,
95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975).

{¶25} While this is the ideal scenario, Ohio law
provides:

[N]o requirement that petit juries actually
chosen must mirror the community and reflect
the various distinctive groups in the
population. Defendants are not entitled to a
jury of any particular composition, but the jury
wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from
which juries are drawn must not
systematically exclude distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail to be reasonably
representative thereof.

State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 117, 723 N.E.2d
1054, 1073 (2000), citing Taylor, supra, at 527.
While the ideal situation is to have every jury pool
reflect the diversity of the community, so long as the
group at issue was not excluded based on race,
Appellant does not properly raise a Batson
challenge.
{¶26} As to the second prong, Appellant contends no
reason was given as to why two people were excused
from the jury pool. However, not only is Appellant
unable to link the absence of these two individuals
to some kind of systematic exclusion, it was defense
counsel who stated on the record that those
individuals were excused simply because they failed
to appear. There is no way to determine their race.
Regardless, the assistant jury commissioner
provided a race neutral explanation for the racial
makeup of this jury pool. “The challenge is defeated
so long as discriminatory intent is not inherent in
the explanation.” State v. Nixon, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-020428, 2003-Ohio-3384, ¶ 19, citing Purkett
v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131
L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). There is nothing inherently
discriminatory in a random process where the race
of any potential juror is unknown until they appear
in the courtroom.

{¶27} As to the third Batson prong, Appellant argues
that it is impossible for any defendant to satisfy. We
recently held that “underrepresentation or lack of
representation of a group on a single jury does not
constitute systematic exclusion.” State v. Haywood,
7th Dist. Columbiana No. 21 CO 0035, 2023-Ohio-
1121, ¶ 44; citing State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272,
2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 113; State v.
McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 444, 700 N.E.2d 596
(1988). Thus, a defendant must show some indicia of
exclusion before merely alleging
underrepresentation or lack of representation.
Appellant had no evidence to support an indicia of
purposeful race-based discrimination.

{¶28} Because the assistant jury commissioner
provided a race neutral reason for the racial makeup
of the jury pool, and the lack of diversity in a single
jury, alone, does not provide evidence of systematic
exclusion, Appellant’s first assignment of error is
without merit and is overruled.

Hill, 2024 WL 1718027, at *4–5.
Hill’s ground three claim fails at the threshold because he ignores the
court of appeals’ decision and his burden. He makes no argument that the court
of appeals’ decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of

relevant Supreme Court precedent. See Doc. 1, at 12; see also 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1). And he makes no argument that the court of appeals’ decision
involved an “unreasonable application of the facts.” See Doc. 1, at 12; see also
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). These requirements in Section 2254(d) are notably not
mere suggestions that a court can simply ignore. See Blackmon v. Booker, 696
F.3d 536, 557 (6th Cir. 2012) (chiding a district court for “ignor[ing] the myriad

of limitations that § 2254(d)(1) imposed on its review”). Rather, section 2254(d)
places “a heavy burden for a petitioner to overcome.” Tibbetts v. Bradshaw, 633
F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2011).
Rather than trying to meet his burden Hill simply recites three factual
assertions. By merely reciting three factual assertions, Hill fails to overcome
the deference this Court owes to the court of appeals’ decision. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d).

But even if Hill had attempted to carry his burden, the result would be
the same. Hill identifies no Supreme Court decision that the court of appeals
misapplied. And he identifies no precedent that would support the idea that a
venire from which a particular jury is chosen must have a particular
composition. Rather, the relevant rule, which the Ohio Supreme Court cited
and applied, Hill, 2024 WL 1718027, at *4–5, is that “venires from which juries
are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative therefor.’” United
States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 879–80 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). Hill does not explain how—or claim
that—the court of appeals misapplied this rule.
Moreover, presenting a prima facie case of underrepresentation of a
particular group in jury selection, requires a criminal defendant to show three
predicates:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
“distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-
selection process.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Had he tried to show in his
petition that he attempted to carry this burden before Ohio’s courts, Hill would
fail. As the Ohio court of appeals noted, the trial court’s assistant jury
commissioner testified that African-Americans were not systematically
excluded from jury pools. Hill, 2024 WL 1718027, at *4. Indeed, she said that
it was atypical for a jury pool to “lack diversity.” Id. Hill points to nothing to
rebut this testimony.
Further, the assistant jury commissioner explained that the selection
process involved “blindly” issuing 500 summonses “without any knowledge of
the[] race or ethnicity” of the summoned citizens. Id. Hill also offers nothing to
rebut this testimony.
Given the unrebutted testimony on which the court of appeals relied,

Hill cannot show either the second or third Duren predicates. Hill’s third
ground thus fails on the merits.
Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court should deny Hill’s petition.

Dated: March 11, 2026
/s/James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2019).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11304234. Public record. Not legal advice.