# Harpel

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299728

## Case

- **Full name:** Rebecca Harpel, et al. v. NSG Glass North America, Inc., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299728

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining a litigant may not “have its cake and eat it too”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

REBECCA HARPEL, et al., CASE NO. 3:24 CV 1370

Plaintiffs,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

NSG GLASS NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court in this putative Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective
action is a Motion to Compel Discovery brought by Plaintiffs Rebecca Harpel, Lakesha McNary,
and Marquis Short.1 (Doc. 44); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Defendants opposed (Doc. 45), and, in
accordance with the Court’s November 19, 2025, non-document Order, the Motion is fully
decisional. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’
Motion to Compel Discovery is granted in part and denied in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of alleged labor rights violations at Defendants’ various production
facilities throughout Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio. See Doc. 13. Defendants’ production
facilities are part of the “world’s leading suppliers of glass and glazing systems” and employ
“several thousand” hourly workers like Plaintiffs. Id. at 6–7. Plaintiffs performed varying roles at
Defendants’ facilities across the region, ranging from a “quality lab technician” tasked with

1. In addition to the collective FLSA claim, Plaintiffs seek to pursue various state law claims as a
class pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 23. (Doc. 13, at 40–47).
“inspecting coating of glass for defects” to a “materials handler” tasked with “retrieving orders
from [a] warehouse” and “taking raw materials to the production line.” Id. at 10.
Despite these varying roles, Plaintiffs claim entitlement to proceed as a collective under
FLSA, alleging they are “similarly situated” with respect to all non-exempt hourly employees of
Defendants, as “all were subjected to and injured by Defendants’ unlawful practice of failing to

pay overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek, and all
have the same claims against Defendants for unpaid overtime compensation.” Id. at 32. On
Plaintiffs’ account, Defendants failed to properly compensate for overtime worked due either to
(1) a rounding system that undercounted Plaintiffs’ total hours worked or (2) the decision to not
include certain incentive and bonus payments in Plaintiffs’ “regular rate of pay” which, in turn, is
used to determine the hourly overtime rate owed. (Doc. 44, at 9).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In advance of the initial Case Management Conference, the Parties indicated a desire to
proceed with discovery targeted towards Plaintiffs’ anticipated motion for court-facilitated notice

of their FLSA collective action. See Doc. 35. The Court agreed and originally granted the parties
120 days to conduct discovery specifically related to the issue of whether Plaintiffs were “similarly
situated” to those workers they sought to proceed on behalf of. See Doc. 36; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
The Court twice extended the deadline to conduct such discovery, granting the parties roughly four
months in addition to the original 120 days. Just 20 days prior to the second amended discovery
deadline, Plaintiffs notified the Court of an apparently intractable discovery dispute between the
Parties. See Doc. 39.
In their Notice of Discovery Dispute, Plaintiffs identified multiple categories of
information Defendants refused to produce, including payroll and timekeeping data for potential
opt-in plaintiffs, contact information for the same, and information pertaining to Defendants’
organizational structure. See, e.g., id. at 6–7, 10–11, 18–19. On November 19, 2025, the Court
conducted a discovery dispute conference to address these and other areas of conflict. At this
conference, the Court granted the parties leave to file motions to compel discovery and issued
multiple initial rulings on the record. First, the Court ruled Plaintiffs were entitled at this stage to

discovery regarding Defendants’ corporate structure, including “what entity owns each plant, who
owns that entity, who owns that entity . . . all the way up.” (Doc. 43, at 9). The Court explained
Plaintiffs were entitled to see Defendants’ “corporate and ownership structure from filings or
organizational charts.” Id. Second, the Court determined Plaintiffs were not presently entitled to
discovery addressing past “complaints, administrative actions, audits, [or] court actions” regarding
Defendants’ wage and timekeeping policies. Id. at 12. Third, the Court ordered Defendants to
produce unredacted employee handbooks for the plants at which Plaintiffs and potential opt-in
plaintiffs worked. Id. at 15–16. Fourth, the Court ordered both Parties to produce all data in an
Excel spreadsheet or in another form “readily formattable into an Excel spreadsheet.” Id. at 25.

Finally, the Court ordered both Parties to produce supplemental discovery responses by December
5, 2025, in light of its orders and guidance offered on the record. See id. at 23.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Unlike a class action under Federal Civil Rule 23, a FLSA collective action “is more
accurately described as a kind of mass action, in which aggrieved workers act as a collective of
individual plaintiffs with individual cases.” Canaday v. Anthem Cos., Inc., 9 F.4th 392, 397 (6th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2018)). In
order to proceed as a collective, the plaintiffs who opt in must demonstrate to the Court they are
each “in fact ‘similarly situated’ to the original plaintiffs.” Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training
Ctr., LLC, 68 F.4th 1003, 1009 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
Prior to reaching a conclusive determination regarding whether the final opt-in plaintiffs
are, in fact, similarly situated, the Court retains discretion to facilitate notice of the putative
collective action to potential opt-in plaintiffs. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S.

165, 169 (1989). Tendering such notice to other employees of the pending putative collective
action serves the goal of “efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact
arising from the same alleged” illegal employment practice. Id. at 170. To obtain notice, the
plaintiffs must preliminarily demonstrate by a “strong likelihood”—“a showing greater than the
one necessary to create a genuine issue of fact, but less than the one necessary to show a
preponderance [of the evidence]”—they are similarly situated to the employees to whom notice
will be sent. Clark, 68 F.4th at 1011.
In determining whether employees are “similarly situated” under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
courts consider “(1) the factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, (2) the

different defenses to which the plaintiffs may be subject, and (3) the degree of fairness and
procedural impact of certifying the action as a collective action.” Pierce v. Wyndham Vacation
Resorts, Inc., 922 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Demonstrating a single, unified
FLSA violation is not required for plaintiffs proceeding collectively to be similarly situated.
O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 585 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other
grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016). Rather, where the plaintiffs can
demonstrate their claims are “unified by common theories of [the] defendants’ statutory violations,
even if the proofs of these theories are inevitably individualized and distinct,” the plaintiffs will be
similarly situated with other employees. Id. “In general, employees are similarly situated when
they perform the same tasks and are subject to the same policies.” Arble v. East Ohio Gas Co.,
2025 WL 3063235, at *2 (N.D. Ohio) (citing Clark, 68 F.4th at 1011).
Discovery of some scope and duration is often necessary to determine whether plaintiffs
meet their burden under Clark, though courts ought to “expedite their decision to the extent
practicable” and “waste no time in adjudicating” the notice determination. 68 F.4th at 1011. Thus,

while Federal Civil Rule 26’s mandate that any non-privileged, relevant, and proportional material
is discoverable as a default matter may facially permit expansive discovery related to the notice
inquiry, many courts within the Sixth Circuit require pre-notice discovery be “narrowly tailored.”2
E.g., Cordell v. Sugar Creek Packing Co., 691 F. Supp. 3d 838, 847 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (quoting
McElroy v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 2023 WL 4904065, at *9 (N.D. Ohio)). Though the Court does not
explicitly adopt such a “narrowly tailored” standard here, it is ever cognizant of the risk that overly
expansive discovery at this stage may serve “to create satellite litigation” and “delay resolution in
a time-sensitive matter.” McCall v. Soft-Lite LLC, 2023 WL 4904023, at *6 (N.D. Ohio).
DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs Harpel, McNary, and Short timely filed their Motion to Compel Discovery
targeting largely the same categories of information identified in their initial Notice. Specifically,
Plaintiffs seek: (1) timekeeping and payroll data for all potential opt-in plaintiffs; (2) contact and
identifying information for potential opt-in plaintiffs, i.e., the “FLSA Class List;” (3) business
records pertaining to time rounding and regular rate of pay policies and practices; (4) detailed
information regarding Defendants’ organizational structure; and (5) responses to outstanding
requests for admission. See Doc. 44, at 2. However, Plaintiffs do not offer significant substantive

2. Like Clark’s adoption of the “strong likelihood” standard, this “narrowly tailored” standard
governing the proper scope of discovery is plucked from the preliminary injunction context. See
Cordell, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 848.
argument with their third category of information, and the portion of their brief addressing what
specific classes of information to which they are entitled contains only four subsections,
corresponding to the other four categories of information sought. See id., at 10–16 (primarily
offering substantive argument as to the “collective-wide timekeeping and corresponding pay data,”
the “FLSA class list,” information pertaining to “corporate structure,” and, finally, the outstanding

“requests for admission” (capitalization altered)). Thus, the Court will similarly place its emphasis
on these four categories of information identified by Plaintiffs, particularly where the Parties agree
Defendants have already produced “complete and unredacted copies” of their employee handbooks
for the relevant facilities and Plaintiffs do not explain whether such handbooks lack the desired
payroll and timekeeping policies. Id. at 8.
Defendants generally counter that the information sought is outside the proper scope of
discovery at this preliminary stage. Specifically, they claim “[t]he information Defendants have
produced is more than sufficient for Plaintiffs to make their similarly situated argument.” (Doc.
45, at 6). In fact, Defendants go as far as to suggest Plaintiffs seek the above categories of

information not to effectively prosecute the case at hand, but instead to “drum up more litigation
against Defendants.” Id. at 13; see id. at 6. The Court considers each contested category of
information in turn.
Potential Opt-In Payroll & Timekeeping Data
Plaintiffs first assert a right to obtain “collective-wide payroll and timekeeping data,”
specifically the “raw clock in/out data in Microsoft Excel format,” the “rounded/ adjusted times
from which Plaintiffs’ compensable hours were recorded,” the “policies governing [the] same,”
and “payroll data in Microsoft Excel format for the same scope of workers.” (Doc. 44, at 10–11).
At this time, Defendants have produced payroll data in Microsoft Excel format for the opt-in
Plaintiffs only.3 Id. at 8. The group of potential opt-in plaintiffs, which the present Plaintiffs refer
to as the “Putative FLSA Collective,” for whom Plaintiffs seek discovery of this timekeeping and
payroll information is undoubtedly broad. Plaintiffs define this group as:
All current and former hourly manufacturing, production, and/or floor workers of
Defendants from August 9, 2021 (i.e., three (3) years preceding filing of the
Complaint on August 9, 2024) and continuing through the present whose payroll
records reflect that they worked forty (40) or more hours in any workweek at any
of Defendants’ facilities and who, during any one workweek, (1) were not paid for
all minutes or hours recorded in Defendants’ timekeeping system due to any time
editing and/or time rounding, and/or (2) received a productivity incentive payment,
or other non-discretionary bonus, that was not included in the regular rate of pay
when Defendants calculated overtime compensation.

Id. at 9. On Plaintiffs’ account, the payroll and timekeeping information sought is, if not strictly
necessary at this stage of the proceedings, then at least “highly relevant” to the Clark inquiry, as
the data will demonstrate whether potential opt-ins “were not paid for all work hours/minutes prior
to the scheduled ‘start’ and after the scheduled ‘end’ times of their shifts” as well as whether
“certain bonuses/ incentive payments were non-discretionary” and thus subject to inclusion in the
regular rate of pay. Id. at 10.
In opposition, Defendants primarily attempt to distinguish case law marshalled by
Plaintiffs. See Doc. 45, at 10–13. In previous communications with the Court and Plaintiffs,
Defendants maintained “line-by-line” payroll and timekeeping data for potential opt-in plaintiffs
are “not really relevant to the similarly situated” analysis, as the focus is instead on whether the
relevant employees were subject to the same payroll policies and performed the same job duties.

3. Plaintiffs state Defendants produced the relevant data for a “Shawn Foster” rather than the
“Shaun Foster” who opted into this suit. (Doc. 44, at 8 n.2). Defendants do not reply to this
contention. While the individual timekeeping and payroll data for one of over a dozen opt-ins are
unlikely to be crucial at this pre-notice stage of discovery, Plaintiffs will undoubtedly be entitled
to such information for each opt-in plaintiff prior to filing a motion addressing the final “similarly
situated” inquiry.
(Doc. 43, at 6); see Doc. 39-3, at 5–6; see also Clark, 68 F.4th at 1010 (“Whether other employees
are similarly situated for the purposes of joining an FLSA suit typically depends on whether they
performed the same tasks and were subject to the same policies—as to both timekeeping and
compensation—as the original Plaintiffs were.”).
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ request for payroll and timekeeping data

for the “Putative FLSA Collective” is overbroad at this stage of the case. Such detailed “line-by-
line” information may well be both relevant and proportional in the post-notice discovery stage,
when Plaintiffs will bear the burden to demonstrate each opt-in plaintiff who joins this suit “is in
fact ‘similarly situated’ to the original plaintiffs.” Clark, 68 F.4th at 1003; see also Gudger v.
CareCore Health, LLC, 2025 WL 1311274, at *2 (S.D. Ohio) (“If the court decides that [n]amed
Plaintiffs are similarly situated to the opt-ins by a preponderance of the evidence, the opt-ins
become parties to the suit and can proceed collectively with [n]amed Plaintiffs to trial.”). At that
time, however, the scope of information relevant to this final similarly situated analysis will
necessarily be bounded by the opt-ins who do, in fact, join this suit. Here, Plaintiffs seek detailed

payroll and timekeeping data for an expansive set of potential opt-ins, which is all but guaranteed
to be a significantly larger set of individuals than the group of actual opt-ins. The Court has little
trouble concluding, at the very least, Plaintiffs are not presently entitled to a greater amount of
information than they will be when shaping their final “similarly situated” argument after other
plaintiffs have, in fact, opted in, particularly during what is meant to be an “expedite[d]” stage of
these proceedings. Clark, 68 F.4th at 1011.
Perhaps providing such detailed information on a putative collective-wide basis may be

proper and proportional with a narrower scope of potential opt-in plaintiffs. For example, Plaintiffs
cite Durbin v. Foundations Health Solutions, LLC, in which another judge of this Court ordered
the defendants to produce “timekeeping and payroll records for [n]amed Plaintiff, the current opt-
in plaintiffs, and the Potential Plaintiffs from November 22, 2019 to the present.” 2023 WL
6383709, at *5 (N.D. Ohio). In Durbin, however, the court significantly sua sponte narrowed the
definition of “potential plaintiffs” before granting this pre-notice discovery. The plaintiff in Durbin
originally defined “potential plaintiffs” as all non-exempt employees who performed certain

duties, “including but not limited to” six different employment positions. Id. at *5 n.5. The Court,
indicating this definition was “open ended and provide[d] insufficient guidance to” the defendant,
adjusted the definition to include “only those [six] types of professionals who [the plaintiff] has
specifically named.” Id. Here, however, Plaintiffs’ definition of the “Putative FLSA Collective” is
not readily subject to narrowing. Plaintiffs do not offer any job titles or categories of workers to
which the production of detailed timekeeping and payroll data may be limited, as their present
definition appears to cover essentially all of Defendants’ hourly, non-exempt employees. See Doc.
45, at 14.
Nor are detailed payroll and timekeeping data regularly necessary to support a plaintiff’s

preliminary similarly situated showing under Clark. For example, another judge of this Court
approved notice to potential opt-ins where the existing parties to the suit offered: (1) testimony
from the named plaintiff and three existing opt-ins “regarding team meetings, pre-shift duties, and
handoffs;” (2) testimony, along with paystubs for only one of the opt-in plaintiffs, indicating the
employer “failed to include shift differentials and other bonuses in overtime calculations;” (3)
evidence indicating the defendant maintained the same punch system and “pay-to-shift” policies
for all hourly employees across its facilities; and (4) employee handbooks indicating all hourly
employees were required to conduct certain work-related duties prior to the start of their shifts.
Balderas v. Norplas Indus., Inc., 2025 WL 2837584, at *3 (N.D. Ohio). According to the Balderas
court, such evidence “surpasse[d] ‘bare allegations’ and [was] sufficient to surpass the Clark
threshold” as several district courts had “facilitated notice on similar or thinner records” post
Clark. Id. (collecting cases). In one such example, the court facilitated notice to potential opt-in
plaintiffs based solely on the sworn declarations of seven employees and the applicable employee
handbooks. See Gifford v. Northwood Healthcare Grp., LLC, 2023 WL 5352509, at *4 (S.D. Ohio);

see also Gudger, 2025 WL 1311274, at *3 (approving notice based on four declarations and the
“[n]amed Plaintiffs[’] . . . representative pay statements”). Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel
Discovery is denied to the extent it pursues production of complete and detailed “timekeeping and
payroll data for the potential FLSA collective” in Microsoft Excel format. (Doc. 44, at 10–11).
Plaintiffs resist this conclusion, warning the Court that Defendants’ refusal to produce
collective-wide timekeeping and payroll data at this stage is “designed to manufacture a future
argument – namely, that Plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing is insufficient – based on an informational
deficit that Defendants themselves have created. . . . Defendants are effectively preventing
Plaintiffs from developing the very evidentiary record the Court will need to assess the motion for

notice.” Id. at 11. However, to the extent Defendants argue the collective-wide data is not necessary
for Plaintiffs to meet their burden under Clark, general principles of equitable estoppel would
govern any subsequent attempt to argue the absence of such data forecloses the facilitation of
notice. See Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 776 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[J]udicial estoppel is utilized in
order to preserve ‘the integrity of the courts by preventing a party from abusing the judicial process
through cynical gamesmanship.’” (quoting Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218
(6th Cir. 1990))). Estoppel operates with particular force where: (1) a party adopts a litigation
position clearly inconsistent with an earlier position; (2) this party successfully persuaded the court
to accept its earlier position; and (3) accepting the subsequent inconsistent position would provide
the party with “an unfair advantage.” United States v. Hammon, 277 F. App’x 560, 566 (6th Cir.
2008) (citing In re Commonwealth Inst’l Sec., Inc., 349 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here,
Defendants have persuaded this Court that “Plaintiffs do not need detailed payroll information for
thousands of employees to make their similarly situated analysis.” (Doc. 45, at 13). Any assertion
to the contrary by Defendants after Plaintiffs move the Court to approve notice to potential opt-ins

would likely provide Defendants with an unfair advantage. See Hardy v. Square D Co., 199 F.
Supp. 2d 676, 681 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (explaining a litigant may not “have its cake and eat it too”).
Finally, Plaintiffs do not make clear to what extent Defendants have failed to produce the
requested policies governing workday start and end times, clocking in and out, wages, bonuses,
shift differentials, computation of work hours, “among other related policies/documents.” (Doc.
44, at 10) (citing Request for Production4 Nos. 8, 22, & 23); see Doc. 39-4, at 6, 10 (Defendants’
responses to Plaintiffs’ RFPs). Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 22 and 23, which
requested all policies regarding “when the workday begins and ends for Plaintiffs” and “all clock-
in, clock-out, and timekeeping policies that apply to Plaintiffs,” respectively. (Doc. 39-4, at 10).

Defendants’ only objection offered as to these RFPs involved Plaintiffs’ definition of “Plaintiffs,”
which included all potential opt-ins to this suit. Id. Plaintiffs do not explain in what manner
Defendants’ responsive productions are insufficient. Further, RFP No. 8 targeted “all documents
and ESI” provided to Plaintiffs regarding their pay, timekeeping, break policies, overtime rates of
pay, “or other terms of employment.” Id. at 6. Defendants objected on broader grounds to this RFP,
arguing it exceeded the proper scope of discovery under Clark and was not “proportional to the
needs of the case.” Id. Nevertheless, Defendants directed Plaintiffs to the same documents

4. Hereinafter “RFP.”
referenced in response to RFP Nos. 22 & 23. Id. (citing Bates Nos. PILK000001-PILK000417);
see id. at 10 (same). Plaintiffs again do not identify how these productions were insufficient.
At the November Discovery Dispute Conference addressing this matter, the Court told
Plaintiffs

I think [the Defendants have] given you, as I understand it, the policies and rules
and handbooks . . . and, if I’m mistaken about that, you can correct me, but [the
Defendants have] represented to me that they’ve done that. If that’s true, I think
that’s enough at this juncture without past [legal] complaints and actions and so
forth.
(Doc. 43, at 13). In reply, counsel for Plaintiffs stated “the [employee] handbooks are redacted in
certain places, so we don’t have a complete employee’s handbook. We would appreciate being able
to see that, but we understand the point in general.” Id. Consistent with this Court’s orders, id. at
15–16, Defendants have since produced complete and unredacted copies of the employee
handbooks governing the relevant facilities, see Doc. 44, at 8. To the extent the official policies
governing employee timekeeping, payroll, rate of pay calculation, work duties, and other material
terms or conditions of employment are not contained within the employee handbooks, Defendants
must produce them to Plaintiffs. Other employees will generally be similarly situated when they
“performed the same tasks and were subject to the same policies—as to both timekeeping and
compensation—as the original plaintiffs were.” Clark, 68 F.4th at 1010. Therefore, Defendants
must disclose all official policies governing employee pay, timekeeping, shift differentials, and
any other term or condition of employment impacting “timekeeping and compensation” at
Defendants’ relevant facilities.
Identifying Information for Potential Opt-Ins
Next, Plaintiffs claim entitlement to the “FLSA Class List” in Microsoft Excel format,
which they define as “contact information of all Putative FLSA Collective Members, including the
names, mailing addresses, email addresses, phone number(s), positions held, facilities worked,
rate(s) of pay, and dates of employment during the relevant period (hereinafter the ‘FLSA Class
List’).” (Doc. 44, at 13).5 Defendants argue, particularly in light of the discovery they have already
produced to this point, further producing contact information for “all employees who have worked
at every facility operated by Defendants during the past five years” amounts to “in form or function

. . . the solicitation of claims.” (Doc. 45, at 13 (quoting Clark, 68 F.4th at 1010)).
Production of potential opt-in or collective-wide contact information is regularly endorsed
by courts within the Sixth Circuit post-Clark. For example, in Durbin, the court ordered
Defendants to produce “the names, dates of employment, location(s) of employment, last-known
mailing addresses, mobile telephone numbers, and personal email addresses for all current and
former hourly, non-exempt” employees who “worked 40 or more hours in any workweek” in
roughly the preceding four years. 2023 WL 6383709, at *5. Similarly, in McCall, the court, while
providing guidance regarding the permissible scope of discovery (as opposed to ruling on a motion
to compel), stated the plaintiff was “at the very least . . . entitled to learn the identity (by name and

contact information, and within the requisite statute of limitations) of other employees who are (or
were) required . . . to perform the same categories of activities” described in the plaintiff’s
complaint. 2023 WL 4904023, at *9; accord Jones v. Ferro Corp., 2023 WL 4456815, at *5 (N.D
Ohio) (“[T]he Court agrees . . . that at least some discovery into the identities, job titles, and contact
information of potential opt-in plaintiffs is warranted.”).
None of these opinions suggest, much less hold, that production of such contact
information would be rendered unnecessary conditional on the employer producing the “job

5. Here, “Putative FLSA Collective Members” encompasses the same definition adopted by
Plaintiffs with respect to other categories of discovery. See Doc. 44, at 9.
descriptions and timekeeping and compensation policies” governing all of their employees, as
Defendants now argue. (Doc. 45, at 14). Instead, the contact information of potential opt-ins is
necessary because other employees “will usually have knowledge—sometimes unique
knowledge—of the relevant facts” including whether they may be “subject to individualized
defenses” and whether the merits of their claims, including whether the employer’s policies caused

similar FLSA violations, are “similar to the merits of the original plaintiffs’ claims.” Clark, 68
F.4th at 1010, 1012. That is, contact information for potential opt-ins is necessary not just to
determine whether those employees are subject to the same policies as the original plaintiffs, but
to preliminarily determine whether there is a strong likelihood the merits of the potential opt-ins
claims with respect to those policies are sufficiently similar to the merits of the original plaintiffs’
claims. Thus, Defendants’ production of their pay and timekeeping policies, as well as the job
descriptions of employees at the relevant facilities, does not negate the relevance of obtaining the
contact information for potential opt-in plaintiffs.
Finally, Defendants do not contest, and the Court finds no reason to doubt, Plaintiffs’

representation that Defendants’ counsel, in an email to Plaintiffs’ counsel, indicated that contact
information for potential opt-ins would “probably not be hard to pull.” (Doc. 44, at 15 n.7).
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel with respect to the “FLSA Class
List” in Excel or equivalent format with the sole exception that Defendants need not produce the
“rate(s) of pay” for all “Putative FLSA Collective” members. Such detailed information, which
may be conditional on multiple different factors such as shift differentials, hours worked, holidays
or other irregular days worked, pay incentives, etc., approaches the detailed “line-by-line” payroll
data for potential opt-ins the Court previously determined is not properly discoverable at this stage.
Defendants’ Corporate & Organizational Structure
Plaintiffs further seek information related to Defendants’ corporate structure and details
regarding the operation and oversight of Defendants’ facilities. See Doc. 44, at 15–17 (specifically
requesting full responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 & 4 and RFPD No. 12). Plaintiffs maintain that,
to comply with this Court’s order directing Defendants to identify “what entity owns each plant,

who owns that entity . . . all the way up,” Defendants must “actually explain the integrated
relationship” between the Defendants and their parent companies and other affiliated corporate
entities within the “NSG Group.” Id. at 16 (quoting Doc. 43, at 8–9). On Plaintiffs’ account, such
explanation requires Defendants to “produce actual organizational charts that identify the company
officers and managers overseeing these facilities, as well as specific ownership interests and
ownership-related documents. Id. (citing Wesel v. Certus Healthcare Mgmt., LLC, 2025 WL
1928081, at *3 (S.D. Ohio)). This information will, in turn, bolster Plaintiffs’ allegations that
Defendants operate as “joint employer[s]” of the workers within Plaintiffs’ Putative FLSA
Collective. Id. at 15.

In response to the Court’s oral order at the November conference, Defendants produced a
one-page chart providing an overview of their corporate ownership structure which, on their
account, “provides the information this [C]ourt suggested Plaintiffs were entitled to at this stage
in the litigation.” See Doc. 45, at 16. The chart depicts Defendant NSG Glass North America, Inc.,
as what appears to be a wholly owned subsidiary of NSG Holding (Europe) Limited, which itself
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. Id. Defendant Pilkington North
America, Inc., is depicted as the last link in a long chain of entities which eventually lead back to
Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. Id. Defendants’ chart does not identify which entity owns each of
Defendants’ relevant operating facilities, though Defendants appear to have separately provided
this information to Plaintiffs prior to the filing of this Motion. See Doc. 39-7, at 2 (“These are two
distinct corporate identities, and we’ve identified which one operates which plant. We’ve identified
all production facilities operated by either Pilkington or NSG. You’re welcome to make whatever
arguments you’d like to the judge.”).
It is axiomatic that employees must work for the same employer if they are, for purposes

of FLSA, to be similarly situated with respect to the duties they perform and the policies to which
they are subject.6 In certain circumstances, however, two separate entities may be deemed “joint
employers” of a given set of workers and subsequently be held “simultaneously responsible for
FLSA obligations.” 7 Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1131 (6th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Farris
v. Alliance Health Care Braeview, Inc., 2022 WL 504215, at *8–9 (N.D. Ohio); Rojas v. First Pick
Farms LLC, 2026 WL 18617, at *18–20 (W.D. Mich). However, the standards governing the
doctrine are unsettled, as “FLSA does not define ‘joint employer,’ nor has the Sixth Circuit
‘explicitly identified a test for evaluating joint employment relationships in the context of FLSA
claims.’” Farris, 2022 WL 504215, at *8 (quoting Reyes-Trujillo, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 779–80). To

determine whether two entities are joint employers, then, courts routinely port over standards from
other related employment contexts. See, e.g., Little v. Serv. Convenience, Inc., 2025 WL 3706411,
at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio) (borrowing the Sixth Circuit’s test for “joint employer” status from the Title
VII context). Even then, a varying range of factors may be considered and afforded differing
weight according to the context in which a given labor dispute arises. See id., at *2; Hay v. Cmty..

6. See Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 Green Bag 2d 111 (2012).
7. Previously, the Department of Labor issued regulations purporting to interpret FLSA and the
factors applicable to a “joint employer” analysis. Reyes-Trujillo v. Four Star Greenhouse, Inc., 513
F. Supp. 3d 761, 779–82 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (tracing the relevant regulatory history). The
Department of Labor repealed the relevant regulation in September 2021 and has not since
substituted a similar regulatory provision. See 86 Fed. Reg. 40939–40 (July 30, 2021)
(“rescind[ing] the final rule titled ‘Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act’”).
Health Sys., Inc., 2026 WL 75831, at *25 (M.D. Tenn) (“Deciding whether joint employer status
exists requires looking ‘holistically . . . at the totality of the factors in the aggregate, rather than
requiring satisfaction of all the factors.’” (quoting Edmondson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2024 WL
4635051, at *10 (M.D. Tenn.))).
For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to identify the broader focus of the joint

employer analysis and the information which may be relevant and proportional to that analysis.
Generally, “joint employer status [will] exist when ‘two or more employers exert significant
control over the same employees—where from the evidence it can be show that they share or co-
determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.’” Hay, 2026
WL 75831, at *25 (quoting Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1985)). The essence
of the analysis then is whether both entities and their agents retained the authority to control the
others’ workers in the performance of their duties, make hiring and firing decisions, alter their
compensation and benefits, and discipline employees. See EEOC v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550
F. App’x 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2013).

Under Clark, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a strong likelihood they share an employer or
joint employers for there to be a strong likelihood they are similarly situated. Producing a single-
page corporate ownership chart provides little to no guidance on whether Defendants operate as
joint employers of Plaintiffs and potential opt-ins. Rather, what must be produced is information
bearing on the day-to-day control over workers employed at each facility at issue in this case.
Plaintiffs’ RFP No. 12, which seeks “organizational charts, directories, lists, and other documents
or ESI as will reveal, by name and position, Defendants’ (and any of its related entities’) officers,
managers, and supervisors of Plaintiffs, as well as all personnel involved in human resources
and/or compensation,” is on point. (Doc. 39-4, at 7). This request targets information bearing on
who controls the day-to-day operations at each of Defendants’ plants, as well as how those
managerial agents fit into the Defendants’ organizational structure, rendering it highly relevant to
the joint employer inquiry. Of particular relevance to Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate joint
employer status will be the identities, roles, and positions of any managerial agents within
Defendants’ corporate structure (as represented in the “map” Defendants already produced) that

either exert control over, or are simultaneously controlled by, multiple distinct corporate entities
(and their agents) under the “NSG Group” umbrella. Similarly, Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery
on any individuals who exercise general managerial control over each of Defendants’ plants at
issue in this case, including information identifying whether such individuals wield authority on
behalf of multiple entities within the NSG Group.
To be clear, Plaintiffs are not entitled to information identifying and describing individuals
who exercise general corporate control (such as corporate officers) within the NSG Group
generally. Rather, discovery must be targeted towards those individuals who retain authority over
the terms and conditions of employment and day-to-day operations at each of the relevant facilities,

particularly if such individuals act on behalf of multiple entities within Defendants’ corporate
structure.
The Court thus grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery on Defendants’ corporate
and management structure as set forth herein. Defendants are to provide a supplemental response
to Plaintiffs’ RFP No. 12 consistent with this opinion’s discussion of the standards governing the
joint employer determination.
Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admission
Finally, Plaintiffs seek an order requiring Defendants to fully answer 13 Requests for
Admission.8 (Doc. 44, at 16–18) (identifying RFA Nos. 6–18). These RFAs target information
related to the inclusion of certain incentives into overtime pay generally, as well as specific
information pertaining to named Plaintiff Rebecca Harpel’s hours worked, base rate of pay,

bonuses and incentives, and overtime pay. See Doc. 39-8, at 2–5. Defendants objected to each of
these RFAs arguing they were “outside the scope of discovery to be conducted at this phase of the
litigation, as set forth in the Court’s Case Management Conference Order dated March 26, 2025,”
i.e., the order authorizing discovery consistent with Clark. Id. Now, Defendants further argue these
RFAs were not “designed to elicit information Plaintiffs could use to argue there was a substantial
likelihood that employees . . . would be similarly situated” with the original Plaintiffs, as they
target only the “merits” of Plaintiffs’ underlying FLSA claims. (Doc. 45, at 18–19).
Defendants’ arguments are misplaced. As explained in Clark, “the very point of the
‘similarly situated’ inquiry is to determine whether the merits of other-employee claims would be

similar to the merits of the original plaintiffs’ claims.” Clark, 68 F.4th at 1012. Plaintiffs’ focus on
the merits of the alleged FLSA violations is therefore unobjectionable, as their burden to
demonstrate they are similarly situated with the potential opt-ins will necessarily require showing
a similarity with respect to the merits of the alleged FLSA violations. Nor is it an issue, as
Defendants suggest, that many of these RFAs “applied solely to Plaintiff Rebecca Harpel.” (Doc.
45, at 18). It is commonplace for the original plaintiffs in FLSA actions to offer “representative
examples” of alleged statutory violations in order to show they are similarly situated with other
employees. These representative examples of FLSA-violating conduct, combined with

8. Hereinafter “RFA.”
demonstrating other employees are subject to the same policies as the plaintiff offering the
example, is a prototypical manner in which to demonstrate the employees are similarly situated.
See, e.g., Gudger, 2025 WL 1311274, at *3 (explaining “representative examples of miscalculated
overtime” combined with the plaintiffs’ declarations “support that the declarants were not properly
paid overtime because of” the employer’s pay and timekeeping practices and that such practices

existed on a “company-wide” basis).
Thus, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery with respect to these RFAs,
and orders Defendants to substantively respond to Plaintiffs’ RFA Nos. 6–18, subject to the
following exceptions. First, Defendants need only answer RFA No. 6 with respect to the named
Plaintiffs in this action. Requiring Defendants to detail whether certain non-discretionary
payments were included in workers’ regular rates of pay on a putative-collective wide basis
approaches the type of line-by-line payroll data the Court previously determined is outside the
proper scope of discovery at this stage under Clark. Additionally, Defendants need not answer RFA
No. 7 in its entirety. This RFA is largely circular, as it asks Defendants to admit that “one or more

Plaintiffs . . . were not fully compensated for all overtime hours as a result of one or more pay
policies and/or practices identified . . . in response to Representative Plaintiffs’ interrogatories”
without considering the possibility that Defendants, as they ultimately did, might deny the
existence of any such policies in response to the preceding interrogatories. See Doc. 39-8, at 2.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 44) be, and the same hereby
is, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth herein.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 11, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299728. Public record. Not legal advice.