# Womble

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · April 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299548

## Case

- **Full name:** Edward Lamont Womble v. Ronnie L. Honeycutt, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** April 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:26-cv-00059-MOC

EDWARD LAMONT WOMBLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
) ON INITIAL REVIEW
)
RONNIE L. HONEYCUTT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Doc. 1],
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis in this matter. [Docs. 2, 4].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Edward Lamont Womble (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State of North
Carolina currently incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution (“Alexander”) in
Taylorsville, North Carolina. On March 18, 2026, he filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, naming Ronnie L. Honeycutt, identified as the Warden at Alexander, and FNU Wilson,
identified as a Security Risk Group (“SRG”) Lieutenant at Alexander, as Defendants in this matter.
[Doc. 1]. Plaintiff names them in their individual and official capacities. [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff
alleges as follows.
On January 1, 2025, while incarcerated at Alexander, Plaintiff filed for protective custody
due to threats from gang members. [Id. at 6]. “The North Carolina Department of Adult Correction
[“NCDAC”] Employee” denied Plaintiff’s request, and Plaintiff was “forced” back to the general
population. [Id. at 6-7]. “Staff” were aware of the gang members because of Plaintiff’s request
for protective custody. [Id. at 11]. On July 14, 2025, on D-Block in Green Unit at Alexander,
Plaintiff was assaulted by two gang members affiliated with the ones that had previously
threatened him and prompted his request for protective custody. [Id. at 6, 10]. Plaintiff alleges
having suffered a broken eye socket, extreme pain, blurry vision, and bleeding on his brain from
the assault, as well as depression, paranoia, and lack of sleep. [Id. at 6, 8]. Defendant Honeycutt

“had knowledge of the [threats] from gang members” at Alexander when Plaintiff’s protective
custody request was denied. [Id. at 7].
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment based on
their failure to protect him from harm. [Id. at 4, 9]. He also claims that the State and the
unidentified NCDAC employee were negligent in breaching its duty to protect the Plaintiff. [Id.
at 7-8]. Plaintiff claims he suffered various physical injuries. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief,
including punitive damages. [Id. at 10].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the Complaint to determine

whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires
an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the court must identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as
fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,
a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear
failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S.
166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).
Plaintiff purports to sue Defendants, who are state officials, in their individual and official
capacities. However, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in
their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794,

2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See
Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants in their official capacities do not survive initial review and will be dismissed.
To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must affirmatively show that the
official charged acted personally in the deprivation of [his] rights.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912
F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.
1977) (citation omitted). Mere knowledge of a deprivation is insufficient. Williamson, 912 F.3d
at 171. As such, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought under §
1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). While personal involvement
is required, it need not be “hands-on.” Riddick v. Barber, 109 F.4th 649 (4th Cir. 2024). “Instead,
the ‘requisite causal connection’ between defendant and violation can be established if the
defendant ‘set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the actor[ ] know[s] or reasonably

should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. at 649-50 (citing Amisi
v. Brooks, 93 F.4th 659, 670 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (establishing
liability for a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” another person to a deprivation of
constitutional rights)).
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposes on prison
officials a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners and other prison
officials. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Still, not “every injury suffered by
one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials
responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. To state a claim against a prison official for failure

to protect, an inmate must show: (1) “serious or significant physical or emotional injury,” and (2)
that prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” De’Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be deliberately
indifferent, a prison official must “know of and disregard an objectively serious … risk of harm.”
Id.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every reasonable
inference, Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment based on
the failure to protect. Plaintiff alleges no personal participation or knowledge by Defendant
Wilson and plainly fails to state any claim for relief against this Defendant. As for Defendant
Honeycutt, Plaintiff alleges only that Honeycutt “had knowledge of the [threats] from gang
members” at Alexander when Plaintiff’s protective custody request was denied. These allegations
are so vague and conclusory that they fail to satisfy the most basic pleading requirements. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations,

unsupported by specific allegations of material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,
309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that
support each element of the claim). Furthermore, these allegations are insufficient to show that
Defendant Honeycutt had knowledge of and disregarded an objectively serious risk of harm. See
De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634.
Moreover, the body of the Complaint contains allegations against individuals who are not
named as defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]”); Myles
v. United States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o make someone a party the plaintiff must

specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez v. Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-
107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff’s failure to name a
defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders any action against the purported defendant a legal
nullity.”). The allegations directed at individuals not named as Defendants are therefore dismissed
without prejudice.
Finally, to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks relief under North Carolina law, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as no federal claim has passed initial review. See
Artis v. Dist. Of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 74 (2018) (when a district court dismisses all claims
independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] as well
all related state claims.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, those claims are dismissed
without prejudice.
Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial
review, and the Court will dismiss it without prejudice. The Court, however, will allow Plaintiff
to amend his Complaint to state a claim for relief, if the facts support such amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review
and will be dismissed without prejudice. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend
his Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted in
accordance with the terms of this Order. Any amended complaint will be subject to all timeliness
and procedural requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be
permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the
Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.
ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief and shall
be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in accordance with the terms of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend
his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to so amend his
Complaint, the matter will be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Honeycutt and Wilson are hereby
DISMISSED as Defendants in this matter.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner § 1983 form.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: April 2, 2026

tait-crtyre SS
Max O. Cogburn if
United States District Judge Boa gael

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299548. Public record. Not legal advice.