# Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State > Supreme Court of North Carolina · April 2, 2026 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299282 ## Case - **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina - **Decided:** April 2, 2026 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion by Justice Paul Newby - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299282 ## Opinion text IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 425A21-3 Filed 2 April 2026 HOKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., plaintiffs and CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, plaintiff-intervenor and RAFAEL PENN, et al., plaintiff-intervenors v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA and the STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, defendants and CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, realigned defendant and PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and TIMOTHY K. MOORE, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, intervenor-defendants Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) from an order entered on 17 April 2023 by Judge James Floyd Ammons Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County. On 20 October 2023, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31(a)–(b), the Supreme Court allowed defendant-intervenors’ petition for discretionary review prior to determination by the Court of Appeals. Heard in the Supreme Court on 22 February 2024. HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Melanie Black Dubis, Scott E. Bayzle, Catherine G. Clodfelter, and H. Lawrence Armstrong Jr. for plaintiff-appellees Hoke County Board of Education, et al. Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Neal A. Ramee and David B. Noland, for plaintiff-intervenor/realigned-defendant-appellee Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, by Christopher A. Brook, Maya Brodziak, pro hac vice; Chavis Jones, pro hac vice; and Michael P. Robotti, pro hac vice, for plaintiff-intervenor-appellees Rafael Penn, et al. Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Lindsay Vance Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Daniel P. Mosteller, Associate Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-appellee State of North Carolina. No brief for defendant-appellee State Board of Education. Matthew F. Tilley, W. Clark Goodman, and Michael A. Ingersoll for intervenor-defendant-appellants Philip E. Berger Sr. and Destin Hall.* Jane R. Wettach for Professors Dereck Black, Joseph Blocher, John Charles Boger, et al., amici curiae. NEWBY, Chief Justice. In this case we resolve whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its order of 17 April 2023. To do so, we must consider what happens to a case when the original claims have been transformed into claims very different than those in the pleadings. In other words, can a party completely change * Pursuant to Rule 38(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, “When a person is a party to an appeal in an official or representative capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and the person’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.” N.C. R. App. P. 38(c). Timothy Moore is no longer the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; accordingly, his successor, Destin Hall, has been automatically substituted as a party in this appeal. -2- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court the subject matter of its action without following the proper procedure for invoking the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a new, very different claim? We conclude that the answer is no. Rather, litigants are required to properly invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over claims they want resolved. If litigants do not do so, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims. In 1994, students from five low-wealth school districts, joined by their parents or guardians and their respective local school boards (plaintiffs), sued the State of North Carolina and State Board of Education (defendants), claiming that they had deprived the students in plaintiffs’ school districts of their education rights enshrined in the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiffs were subsequently joined by students from six urban school districts, who were also joined by their parents or guardians and their respective local school boards (plaintiff-intervenors). Like plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors alleged that defendants were not providing students in plaintiff-intervenors’ school districts a constitutionally compliant education.1 Thus, in 1994 plaintiff parties’ complaints presented challenges to the 1 When plaintiff-intervenors filed their intervening complaint in this action, they called the six intervening school boards “the urban school boards” and the school districts they administered “the urban school districts.” This opinion adopts those identifiers. Because the five school boards identified in plaintiffs’ complaint operated in self-described low-wealth counties, this opinion refers to those school boards as “the low-wealth school boards” and the school districts they administered as “the low-wealth school districts.” Throughout this opinion, references to the urban school boards, the urban school districts, the low-wealth school boards, and the low-wealth school districts are only to those school boards and school districts specifically named in plaintiffs’ and plaintiff-intervenors’ respective complaints; these identifiers do not broadly refer to any school board or school district that one could conceivably classify as “urban” or “low-wealth.” -3- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court constitutionality of the way state education funds were allocated in the named students’ school districts at that time—i.e., as-applied challenges.2 There were no claims saying there was a statewide constitutional problem with the existing education system—i.e., there was not a facial challenge. When this case was first considered by this Court, we had to determine the extent of the education rights in the constitution. Namely, did the State satisfy its constitutional duty merely by providing a free public education system for the children who live within its boundaries, or does the constitution also guarantee a certain quality of education for the public school students of this state? In Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997), this Court held that the constitution’s education provisions, taken together, have a qualitative component—specifically, the requirement for the State to provide schoolchildren with the “opportunity for a sound basic education.” This Court recognized that there are numerous facets to the successful provision of the opportunity for a sound basic education. Such facets include, but are not limited to, the quality of the system’s curricula, the level of the State’s education expenditures, and the performance of the public education bureaucracy 2 Throughout this litigation, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors have been collectively denominated the “plaintiff parties.” E.g., Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), 358 N.C. 605, 611, 599 S.E.2d 365, 374 (2004); cf. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 342, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (1997) (“plaintiff-parties”). Any references to plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors, or plaintiff parties do not include the “Penn Intervenors,” who intervened over a decade after this litigation began and whose claims are discussed below. -4- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court administering the school system at the state and local levels. Although this Court ultimately rejected most of the claims raised in the 1994 complaints, we remanded some of the claims for resolution. Most pertinently to the case today, this Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether school children in each named school district were being denied their opportunity for a sound basic education and, if so, why. At the same time, this Court recognized the judiciary’s general lack of expertise in matters of education policy; observed that such policy determinations properly resided in the legislative and executive branches; and conceded that courts should give proper deference to those branches. Once the case had returned to the trial court in 1997, the judge assigned to the case directed plaintiff parties to amend their complaints to encompass claims concerning prekindergarten services. The judge then decided to begin with a trial on the as-applied claims of the Hoke County students, recognizing that there needed to be a district-by-district assessment of the plaintiff parties’ school districts. As a result of this year-long trial, the trial court acknowledged that the State’s education system was generally constitutionally compliant, including its curriculum and funding. It determined, however, that the State’s education system was unconstitutional as applied to at-risk students in the Hoke County school district because resource allocation issues at both the state and local levels were preventing those students from receiving an opportunity for a sound basic education. In Hoke County Board of Education v. State (Hoke County I), 358 N.C. 605, 599 -5- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court S.E.2d 365 (2004), this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision while further clarifying that the constitutional education rights belonged only to students. We remanded the case so that plaintiff parties’ other as-applied claims concerning the other named school districts could proceed to trial. Several procedural developments then occurred. In 2005, a group known as the “Penn Intervenors,” who were represented by current Justice Anita Earls, sued defendants and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education and sought intervention in this lawsuit. The Penn Intervenors were students from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district; their parents or guardians; and, eventually, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which was added in an amended complaint. The trial court allowed the intervention only as to the issues raised in the Penn Intervenors’ complaint similar to those already before the court—i.e., as-applied claims. In 2006, five local school boards that had originally joined plaintiff-intervenors’ complaint voluntarily dismissed their claims. Over the next eleven years, none of the remaining as-applied claims were tried. The judge who presided over this case made numerous observations about his continuing belief that state and local education officials were not properly administering the school system. Then that judge retired, resulting in the appointment of a new judge. On 24 July 2017, the then-Attorney General of North Carolina filed a motion -6- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court for relief from the Hoke County trial judgment on the State Board’s behalf.3 In the motion and supporting documents, the Attorney General highlighted that the original claims, which were stated in the pleadings and refined by this Court’s decisions, were no longer the focus of this case. The subject of the original complaints—the education system of the 1990s and early 2000s—no longer existed. The litigation had instead become a statewide challenge to a “future school system,” exceeding the jurisdiction of the original pleadings. Therefore, the Attorney General argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to address this question. In this appeal, the General Assembly made similar arguments in support of its position that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a new, statewide claim. For example, the General Assembly argued that “[t]he trial court . . . exceeded its jurisdiction” by “purport[ing] to grant relief on a supposed ‘statewide’ claim that no party has ever asserted.” We agree. By 24 July 2017, the remaining participants in the litigation and the trial court officially transformed this case into one addressing matters never pled. Specifically, the trial court worked with the remaining parties in this case—while excluding the General Assembly—to enforce a statewide plan that overhauled the legislatively enacted educational system. What began as modest, as-applied challenges to the allocation of educational resources in the named school districts became a full-scale, facial assault on the entire educational system enacted by the 3 Former Attorney General Josh Stein is now Governor of North Carolina. -7- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court General Assembly. When this case ceased to be about the as-applied claims raised in the complaints and refined by this Court’s decisions, the trial court’s authority to hear the case likewise ceased. No facial constitutional challenge was ever pled. What is more, this unpled facial challenge was not directed to the one tribunal empowered to address it: a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County. As a result, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider that claim in the current case.4 4 Two of our dissenting colleagues clearly read the pleadings, this Court’s opinions, and Justice Earls’s recusal orders differently than we do. See Earls dissent infra; Riggs dissent infra. In disagreeing with our recitation of the pleadings, these dissenting colleagues take allegations out of context or misunderstand their significance. Indeed, they even rely heavily on allegations made in and supporting claims that were dismissed by this Court in Leandro. Instead of responding to each misused quotation by these dissents, we encourage the readers to review the pleadings, this Court’s opinions, and Justice Earls’s recusal orders for themselves. After all, “sunlight is the best disinfectant.” See Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, in Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 92, 92 (1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”). Here we will limit ourselves to a few examples that illustrate how these dissenting colleagues have mischaracterized allegations in the complaints. First, one dissenting colleague selectively quotes plaintiffs’ Count I to suggest that plaintiffs asserted a statewide claim. See Earls dissent infra Section I.A.3. n.8. She quotes the following from paragraph 84 in plaintiffs’ Count I: “[p]laintiff [students] ha[d] not received the [adequate] educational opportunities guaranteed by the . . . [c]onstitution[ ] because the State ha[d] failed to provide the necessary funds.” Id. (alterations in original). She omits, however, crucial language from the same paragraph. The full paragraph demonstrates that plaintiffs asserted as-applied claims: “Plaintiff school children have not received the educational opportunities guaranteed by the state [c]onstitution, because the State has failed to provide the necessary funds. The funding system substantially ignores the poverty of plaintiff districts.” (Emphases added.) Our dissenting colleague likewise omits important language when quoting an allegation contained in plaintiff-intervenors’ Count II. She quotes from paragraph 82 in plaintiff-intervenors’ complaint: “[t]he State’s public education system, including its educational funding system . . . [was] inadequate, inequitable, irrational, arbitrary and capricious, and not general and uniform, in violation of the . . . [c]onstitution.” Id. (alterations in original). The following paragraph in plaintiff-intervenors’ complaint, paragraph 83, demonstrates the as-applied nature of plaintiff-intervenors’ claims: “As a result of -8- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court defendants’ violations of their constitutional duty, the individual intervenors have been denied access to a general and uniform system of public education in which equal opportunities are provided.” (Emphasis added.) Another dissenting colleague asserts: “From the beginning, plaintiffs’ allegations alleged a statewide injury.” See Riggs dissent infra Section II.B. To support this statement, she cites the first factual allegation (paragraph 40) contained in plaintiffs’ complaint: [The State Board of Education and the State of North Carolina] have failed in numerous respects to satisfy their constitutional and statutory obligations regarding education. These failures stem from the State’s system for funding its schools, which does not take sufficient account of the substantial disparities in wealth among school districts. The result of inadequate funding is an education system with inadequate and unequal educational opportunities. Id. (alteration in original). When paragraph 40 is read in context with paragraphs 41 through 81 of the complaint, it becomes abundantly clear that plaintiffs were not asserting a facial attack of statewide funding. Rather, they were providing background for their allegations that the funding system left plaintiffs—i.e., low-wealth school districts—at a disadvantage relative to wealthier school districts. For instance, in paragraph 71 plaintiffs alleged that the average salary supplement in 1993–94 for teachers in Chapel Hill School District was $3,310, while that in Halifax was $208. Such disparities make it difficult for plaintiff districts to compete with wealthy districts for the most qualified teachers, and ultimately reduce the quality of the education available to children in plaintiff districts. (Emphasis added.) Then in paragraph 72 plaintiffs alleged that “in 1992–93, Robeson [County] (with approximately 22,535 students) was only able to hire 2 teachers entirely with local funds, while Chapel Hill (with approximately 6,733 students) hired 86. This relative inability to hire teachers restricts the ability of plaintiff districts to provide varied courses for schoolchildren.” (Emphasis added.) Obviously, plaintiffs intended the allegations in paragraphs 71 and 72 to highlight the alleged lack of resources in their counties as compared to other school districts. The allegations certainly cannot be rightly understood to allege that the statewide funding system deprived all of North Carolina’s children—including Chapel Hill students—of their constitutional education rights. Indeed, if plaintiffs had intended to assert a facial challenge to the statewide funding system, why did they delineate themselves as “low-wealth school districts”? If plaintiffs had asserted a facial constitutional challenge regarding statewide funding, such a delineation would have been entirely unnecessary. Further, the allegations alluded to by our dissenting colleague were made to support plaintiffs’ equal opportunity -9- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Consequently, we hold that any court decision entered in this matter after 24 July 2017 was entered without subject matter jurisdiction and is void ab initio, meaning it is “a nullity anywhere, at any time, for any purpose.” High v. Pearce, 220 N.C. 266, 271, 17 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1941) (first citing Clark v. Carolina Homes, Inc., 189 N.C. 703, 128 S.E. 20 (1925); and then citing Carter v. Rountree, 109 N.C. 29, 13 S.E. 716 (1891)). This includes this Court’s opinion in Hoke County Board of Education v. State (Hoke County III), 382 N.C. 386, 879 S.E.2d 193 (2022), and the 17 April 2023 Order. The trial court order of 17 April 2023 is vacated, and this matter is dismissed with prejudice.5 I. Background & Procedural History This litigation is one chapter in the long, ever-developing history of public education in this state. Indeed, as discussed below, several of this Court’s decisions throughout this litigation have established important principles concerning the education rights in the constitution. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), 358 N.C. 605, 599 S.E.2d 365 (2004). To comprehensively explain every twist and turn of this case’s background and procedural history would require gallons of ink spilled across many pages. The claim—plaintiffs’ Count III. The Court of Appeals dismissed Count III, and this Court affirmed the dismissal in Leandro. 5 Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because the various complaints and amended complaints presented as-applied constitutional challenges to the education system of 1994, which no longer exists. -10- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court following recitation of the facts and procedural history focuses on those aspects necessary to analyze the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction as it existed on 17 April 2023. A. Backdrop to the Pleadings Before diving into this case’s long procedural history, a brief survey of the context in which plaintiffs filed their complaint is in order. 1. 1971 Constitution The history of North Carolina reveals the State’s continually expanding commitment to providing children a free, beneficial public education. There have been setbacks to be sure, but undeniably, the long arc of history reveals this State’s commitment to enhancing the public education provided to the children within its borders. See William W. Peek, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, The History of Education in North Carolina 5 (1993), https://digital.ncdcr.gov/Documents/Detail/ history-of-education-in-north-carolina/2533439?item=2555702 [hereinafter NCDPI, The History of Education]. Notably, a constant throughout this history has been “the precedent of school support from a combination of state and local funds.” Id. at 9. In 1971, the people ratified our current constitution, which carried over most of the education provisions first included in the constitution of 1868. Unlike the two versions that preceded it, the 1971 constitution “was not . . . a product of haste and social turmoil. It was instead a good-government measure, long matured and carefully crafted . . . to consolidate and conserve the best features of the past, not to -11- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court break with it.” John V. Orth & Paul Martin Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution 32 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter State Constitution]; see also, e.g., McKinney v. Goins, 387 N.C. 35, 45 n.5, 911 S.E.2d 1, 10 n.5 (2025) (“The primary goal of the 1971 constitution was ‘editorial pruning, rearranging, rephrasing, and modest amendments,’ and ‘the great majority of the changes embraced in the 1971 constitution took the form of non-substantive deletions or contractions in language.’ ” (citation modified) (quoting State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 643, 781 S.E.2d 248, 254–55 (2016)); Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 617, 264 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1980) (concluding that the 1971 constitution’s “reference . . . to ‘a general and uniform system of free public schools’ requires no substantive change in the [S]tate’s long standing policy of providing its citizens with a basic tuition[-]free education” (quoting N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1) (emphasis omitted)). Like the 1868 constitution before it, the current constitution declares, “The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 15. It echoes, “Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” Id. art. IX, § 1. “These provisions . . . evince our State’s resolve to foster an upright, capable citizenry—even from youth.” State v. Tirado, 387 N.C. 104, 128 n.17, 911 S.E.2d 51, 69 n.17 (2025); see also State Constitution 62 (“Not a restriction on what the state may do, [Article I, Section 15] requires a commitment to social betterment. The -12- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court details are spelled out in Article IX, wholly devoted to education.”); id. at 177 (“Article IX . . . lead[s] off with a general statement on the utility of knowledge (as well as religion and morality) . . . .”). The constitution’s General and Uniform System Clause specifically obligates the General Assembly to “provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.” N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1; see also id. art. IX, § 3 (requiring the General Assembly to enact a compulsory school attendance law for “every child of appropriate age and of sufficient mental and physical ability . . . unless educated by other means”). Concomitantly, the constitution establishes a “state school fund,” requiring certain income streams to “be paid into the State Treasury and, together with so much of the revenue of the State as may be set apart for that purpose, . . . faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for establishing and maintaining a uniform system of free public schools.” Id. art. IX, § 6; see also State Constitution 181 (“The state school fund, the subject of Section 6, is funded principally from appropriations . . . .”). Nevertheless, consistent with the history of both state and local funding of education, the constitution allows for the General Assembly to “assign to units of local government such responsibility for the financial support of the free public schools as it may deem appropriate.” N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2, cl. 2. In addition, local governments may “use local revenues to add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary -13- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court school program.” Id. Furthermore, the constitution establishes “county school funds.” Id. art. IX, § 7, cl. a. The provision allowing county school funds stipulates that “[a]ll moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging to a county school fund,” as well as “the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in” a county “for any breach of the penal laws . . . , shall belong to and remain in” that county to be “faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public schools.” Id.6 The State Board is yet another aspect of the 1868 constitution carried over to the modern document, albeit with some modifications. See id. art. IX, § 4, cl. 1. The constitution charges the State Board with “supervising and administering the free public school system and the educational funds provided for its support,” including the power to “make all needed rules and regulations in relation thereto, subject to laws enacted by the General Assembly.” Id. art. IX, § 5. See generally State 6 In 2003, nearly a decade after this litigation began, the constitution was amended to add Article IX, Section 7’s second clause. An Act to Amend the North Carolina Constitution to Provide that the General Assembly May Place the Clear Proceeds of Civil Penalties, Civil Forfeitures, and Civil Fines Collected by a State Agency in a State Fund to Be Used Exclusively for Maintaining Free Public Schools, S.L. 2003-423, § 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 1284, 1284. The added clause provides, The General Assembly may place in a State fund the clear proceeds of all civil penalties, forfeitures, and fines which are collected by State agencies and which belong to the public schools pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Moneys in such State fund shall be faithfully appropriated by the General Assembly, on a per pupil basis, to the counties, to be used exclusively for maintaining free public schools. N.C. Const. art. IX, § 7, cl. b. -14- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Constitution 180 (“The State Board . . . administers the state school fund but not the county school fund . . . .”). The Superintendent of Public Instruction, an executive branch official, N.C. Const. art. III, § 7, cl. 1, serves as the State Board’s secretary and chief administrative officer, id. art. IX, § 4, cl. 2. 2. Chapter 115C and the State Education System in 1994 With the historical and constitutional framework set, we next address the school policy and funding in place when the complaints in this litigation were filed. Long before plaintiffs filed their complaint in May of 1994, the General Assembly had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to provide a system of elementary and secondary public education, both as to educational policy and funding. See NCDPI, The History of Education at 14. As of 1994, Chapter 115C governed elementary and secondary education (as it does today). N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-1 to -546.2 (1991 & 1993 Supp.). Consistent with the history recounted above, North Carolina’s education system operated on two levels: state and local. At the state level, the General Assembly, in accordance with the constitution, created an education system that set education policies and funded a public school system. The legislature vested the State Board, an executive agency, with “[t]he general supervision and administration of the free public school system.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-12 (1993 Supp.) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-12 (2025)). Accordingly, the State Board was required to “establish policy for the system of free public schools, subject to laws enacted by the General Assembly.” Id. In turn, the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Department -15- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court of Public Instruction were charged with administering the policies the State Board adopted. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-19 (1991) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-19 (2025)); N.C.G.S. § 115C-21(a)(1) (1993 Supp.) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-21(a)(1) (2025)); id. § 115C-21(b)(1) (repealed 2017). The lion’s share of public-school administration, however, happened at the local level. Indeed, “[a]ll powers and duties conferred and imposed by law respecting public schools, which [were] not expressly conferred and imposed upon some other official, [were] conferred and imposed upon local boards of education.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-36 (1991). “Said boards of education . . . ha[d] general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective administrative units,” and they were to “enforce the school law in their respective units.” Id. The General Assembly endowed the local school boards with specific powers and duties as well, N.C.G.S. § 115C-47 (1993 Supp.) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-47 (2025)), not the least of which was the duty to “provide adequate school systems within their respective local school administrative units, as directed by law,” id. § 115C-47(1) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-47(1) (2025)). Chapter 115C was (and still is) a comprehensive and detailed statutory scheme covering education policy. Three aspects of public education are relevant to this litigation: (1) curriculum, (2) accountability systems, and (3) funding. a. Curriculum First, consider curriculum. The State Board’s duties included developing the -16- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court curriculum for the instruction of public schoolchildren. Historically, the General Assembly had directed the State Board to design “Standard Courses of Study” for each grade. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 115C-81(a) (1981 Supp.) (repealed 2017); Elementary and Secondary School Reform Act of 1984, ch. 1103, § 2, 1984 N.C. Sess Laws 286, 286. The Standard Courses of Study “set forth what subjects [were to] be taught in each grade, and outline[d] the basal and supplementary books on each subject to be used in each grade.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-81(a) (1981 Supp.) (repealed 2017). The courses also provided “directions as to the best methods of teaching [subjects] as guidance for the teachers.” Id. “North Carolina ha[d] maintained a Standard Course of Study since the 1890[s]. . . . Every five to seven years since that time, the Standard Course of Study ha[d] been revised to reflect the needs of North Carolina students.” N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, North Carolina Standard Course of Study 7 (1999), https:// files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED431211.pdf. Starting in 1985, however, the General Assembly required the State Board to “adopt a Basic Education Program [(BEP)] for the public schools of the State.” The Current Operations Appropriations Act of 1985, ch. 479, § 55, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 412, 448–57. The General Assembly intended the BEP to accomplish “the mission of the public school community”—namely, “to challenge with high expectations each child to learn, to achieve, and to fulfill his or her potential.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-81(a) (1993 Supp.) (repealed 2017). Therefore, the BEP’s basic purpose was to “describe the education program to be offered to every child in the public schools.” Id. -17- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court § 115C-81(a1). The BEP offered “[i]nstruction . . . in the areas of arts, communications skills, physical education and personal health and safety, mathematics, media and computer skills, science, second languages, social studies, and vocational education.” Id.; see also id. § 115C-81(g) (requiring instruction on “Civic Literacy,” focusing on “the [N]ation’s founding and related documents”). In Chapter 115C, the General Assembly required the BEP to “include course requirements and descriptions similar in format to materials previously contained in the [existing] [S]tandard [C]ourse of [S]tudy.”7 N.C.G.S. § 115C-81(b) (1993 Supp.) 7 More specifically, subsection 115C-81(b) required the BEP to include: (1) A core curriculum for all students that takes into account the special needs of children and includes appropriate modifications for the learning disabled, the academically gifted, and the students with discipline and emotional problems; (2) A set of competencies, by grade level, for each curriculum area; (3) A list of textbooks for use in providing the curriculum; (4) Standards for student performance and promotion based on the mastery of competencies, including standards for graduation, that take into account children with special needs and, in particular, include appropriate modifications; (5) A program of remedial education; (6) Required support programs; (7) A definition of the instructional day; (8) Class size recommendations and requirements; (9) Prescribed staffing allotment ratios; (10) Material and equipment allotment ratios; (11) Facilities standards; and -18- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court (repealed 2017). “The [S]tandard [C]ourse of [S]tudy as it exist[ed] on [1 January] 1985, and as subsequently revised by the State Board, [was to] remain in effect until its components ha[d] been fully incorporated and implemented as part of the [BEP].” Id. § 115C-81(d). In Chapter 115C, the General Assembly contemplated the involvement of both the State Board and local school boards in the BEP’s implementation. In addition to developing the BEP itself, the State Board was “[t]o adopt rules requiring all local boards of education to implement the [BEP] on an incremental basis within funds appropriated for that purpose by the General Assembly and by units of local government.” Id. § 115C-12(9)(c) (repealed 2017). Such rules were to require each local school administrative unit to implement fully the [S]tandard [C]ourse of [S]tudy in every school in the [s]tate in accordance with the [BEP] so that every student in the [s]tate [would] have equal access to the curriculum as provided in the [BEP] and the [S]tandard [C]ourse of [S]tudy. Id. Chapter 115C directed the local school boards to “implement the [BEP] in (12) Any other information the [State] Board considers appropriate and necessary. N.C.G.S. § 115C-81(b) (1993 Supp.) (repealed 2017). Notably, the General Assembly also instructed the BEP to require “[l]ocal boards of education [to] provide for their respective local school administrative unit kindergartens as a part of the public school system . . . provided that funds are available from State, local, federal or other sources.” Id. § 115C-81(f)(1). The General Assembly further directed the State Board to adopt standards requiring “the Board [to] allocate funds for the purpose of operating and administering kindergartens to each school administrative unit in the State.” Id. -19- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court accordance with rules adopted by the State Board.” Id. § 115C-47(12) (repealed 2017). The General Assembly specifically explained how the BEP would be funded: The State Board shall implement the [BEP] within funds appropriated for that purpose by the General Assembly and by units of local government. It is the intent of the General Assembly that until the [BEP] is fully funded, the implementation of the [BEP] shall be the focus of State educational funding. It is the goal of the General Assembly that the [BEP] be fully funded and completely operational in each local school administrative unit by [1 July] 1995.[8] Id. § 115C-81(a) (emphasis added). To ensure the BEP was funded in all school districts, the General Assembly also created a supplemental funding program for low-wealth counties. Id. (“It is further a goal of the General Assembly to provide supplemental funds to low-wealth counties to allow those counties to enhance the instructional program and student achievement.”). The State Board complied with Chapter 115C’s directives and adopted a BEP. In 1994, however, the General Assembly was not on pace to fully fund the BEP by the extended 1 July 1995 deadline. b. Accountability Systems Next, consider the accountability systems embedded in the education system in 1994. The General Assembly, desiring a way to assess educational achievement, required the State Board to implement testing programs (i) to assure that all high school graduates possess those minimum skills and that knowledge thought necessary to 8 The General Assembly’s original deadline to fund the BEP was in 1993. The Current Operations Appropriations Act of 1985, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws at 456. -20- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court function as a member of society; (ii) to provide a means of identifying strengths and weaknesses in the education process; and (iii) to establish additional means for making the education system accountable to the public. N.C.G.S. § 115C-174.10 (1991) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-174.10 (2025)). The testing program’s first component, the “Annual Testing Program,” called for “developmentally appropriate individualized assessment instruments consistent with the [BEP] for the first and second grades, rather than standardized tests.” Id. § 115C-174.11(a) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-174.11(a) (2025)).9 The second component, the “Competency Testing Program,” required the evaluation of tenth graders “to assure that graduates of the public high schools . . . possess[ed] the skills and knowledge necessary to function independently and successfully in assuming the responsibilities of citizenship.” Id. § 115C-174.11(b) (repealed 2009). The third testing component was “End-of-course and End-of-grade Tests,” which were required for “grades three through [twelve]” and “designed to measure progress toward selected competencies, especially core academic competencies, described in the Standard Course of Study for appropriate grade levels.” Id. § 115C-174.11(c) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-11(c) (2025)). The statutes also provided a method for identifying “low performing school units” for state intervention and assistance. See id. §§ 115C-64.1 to -64.5 (repealed 1996). In addition to these generally applicable accountability programs, in Chapter 9 The current version makes no references to the BEP. -21- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court 115C the General Assembly tasked the State Board with developing and implementing a “Performance-based Accountability Program,” which was aimed primarily at improving student performance. N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-238.1 to -238.8 (1994) (repealed 1996 and recodified, as amended, at N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-105.20 to -105.35 (1997) (current version at N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-105.20 to -105.35 (2025))). Although participation in this program was optional, id. § 115C-238.2(a), participating local school boards received benefits, such as “increased flexibility in the expenditure of [s]tate funds,” id. § 115C-238.2(b)(4). In exchange, participants were required to develop “local plans” that, among other things, set out a roadmap for improving their local school administrative units and strategies for achieving “specific, measurable” student performance goals. Id. § 115C-238.3(a)–(b1). c. Funding Finally, consider funding. In Chapter 115C, the General Assembly provided, “It [was] the policy of the State of North Carolina to create a public school system that graduate[d] good citizens with the skills demanded in the marketplace, and the skills necessary to cope with contemporary society, using [s]tate, local and other funds in the most cost-effective manner.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(a) (1991) (emphasis added) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(a) (2025)). Accordingly, “[t]o insure a quality education for every child in North Carolina, and to assure that the necessary resources are provided, . . . the State of North Carolina [was] to provide from [s]tate revenue sources the instructional expenses for [then-]current operations of the public -22- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court school system.” Id. § 115C-408(b) (emphasis added) (current version at N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(b) (2025)). To that end, the State Board possessed “general supervision and administration of the education funds provided by the [s]tate and federal governments, except those mentioned in Section 7 of Article IX . . . , and also excepting such local funds as may be provided by a county, city, or district.” Id. § 115C-408(a). As had traditionally been the case, local governments played a supplemental financial role. For instance, in Chapter 115C the General Assembly provided that “the facilities requirements for a public education system [were to] be met by county governments.” Id. § 115C-408(b) (emphasis added). The General Assembly also created a “Critical School Facility Needs Fund,” id. § 115C-489.1(a) (repealed 1996), which was administered by the State Board and allowed local governments to apply for grants “to meet . . . particular critical need[s] in the local school administrative unit[s],” id. § 115C-489.2(a) (repealed 1996). With this overview of the education system as it existed in 1994, we turn to the pleadings that commenced this litigation more than three decades ago. As we relay the procedural history of this case, we will note relevant changes to the public education system. B. The Pleadings This case commenced nearly thirty-two years ago on 25 May 1994 when plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court, Halifax County. The named -23- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court plaintiffs were “students and their parents or guardians from the relatively [low-wealth] school systems in Cumberland, Halifax, Hoke, Robeson, and Vance Counties [(plaintiff students)] and the boards of education for those counties” (the low-wealth school boards). Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint complained of the State’s alleged failure to timely fund the BEP by the 1995 deadline and its “reli[ance] upon local governments to fill the gaps” in funding instructional expenses. Plaintiffs claimed this amounted to “an irrational, unfair, and unconstitutional funding system” resulting in adequate and equitable educational “opportunities . . . [being] denied to children in some of the poorest school districts in this State.” Plaintiffs’ factual allegations focused specifically on challenges unique to their low-wealth school districts. For example, “[b]ecause of their limited capacities to raise funds for education” due to circumstances like lower tax bases and low per capita income, plaintiffs asserted that “the county governments of [the low-wealth school] districts c[ould not] and d[id] not provide as much local funding per student for . . . schools as . . . counties with substantially greater tax bases per pupil.” Plaintiffs further alleged that the supplemental funding program for low-wealth counties did not provide sufficient resources to the low-wealth school boards to cover the deficiencies in the BEP’s funding. According to plaintiffs, these shortcomings led to many troubling results in the low-wealth school districts: the inability to provide certain courses and programs; insufficient facilities; lack of essential equipment; the -24- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court inability to hire and retain high quality teachers; the identification as “low performing” districts or placement on warning status; the inability to satisfy the Performance-based Accountability Program’s standards; and poor standardized test performances, to name a few. Based on their allegations, plaintiffs presented five claims for relief. In Count I, plaintiffs claimed “[p]laintiff [students] ha[d] not received the [adequate] educational opportunities guaranteed by the . . . [c]onstitution[ ] because the State ha[d] failed to provide the necessary funds” and “substantially ignore[d] the poverty of [the low-wealth school] districts.” In Count II, plaintiffs alleged that “the State’s system of funding education, which allocate[d] substantially less money for the education of schoolchildren in [the low-wealth school] districts than it d[id] for schoolchildren in wealthy school districts,” was arbitrary and irrational in violation of the constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. In Count III, plaintiffs asserted that “wide disparities in educational opportunities available to the schoolchildren in [the low-wealth school] districts and those available to the schoolchildren in wealthy districts” meant that “[d]efendants ha[d] violated plaintiffs’ rights” to a general and uniform system of public schools under Article IX, Section 2. Count IV claimed that “[d]efendants ha[d] violated the law of the land under the . . . [c]onstitution by failing to provide adequate educational opportunities.” And in Count V, plaintiffs submitted that defendants had violated Chapter 115C “by failing to provide plaintiff [students] with equal access to the [BEP], and by failing to assure that plaintiffs receive -25- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court necessary resources for instructional purposes on an equitable basis.” In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments consistent with their claims. On 18 October 1994, plaintiff-intervenors, another group animated by the State’s delay in fully funding the BEP, filed their own complaint. Plaintiff-intervenors were “students and their parents or guardians from the relatively large and wealthy school systems of the City of Asheville and of Buncombe, Wake, Forsyth, Mecklenburg, and Durham Counties [(plaintiff-intervenor students)] and the boards of education for those systems” (the urban school boards). Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. In their complaint, plaintiff-intervenors acknowledged that state law charged the urban school boards, like all local school boards, with a “responsibility to maintain adequate school systems within their districts,” citing subsection 115C-47(1) of the General Statutes. But like plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors alleged that “[t]he [then-]current [s]tate educational funding system d[id] not sufficiently take into consideration the burdens faced by urban school districts that must educate large numbers of students with extraordinary educational needs.” These included circumstances like students “living in or near poverty” or “requiring special education, English-as-a-second-language, or academically gifted services.” Plaintiff-intervenors also claimed the State’s educational funding system ignored “the high costs and ‘municipal overburden’ that characterize[d] the urban school districts.” According to plaintiff-intervenors, in 1994 the State’s educational funding system -26- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court “shifted virtually the entire burden of capital funding to local authorities that [were] unable to meet the urban school districts’ capital needs.” Thus, given the “disproportionately high” cost of educating students in their districts, plaintiff-intervenors alleged “[m]any of the urban school boards . . . lack[ed] sufficient [s]tate funding to provide all of their students with appropriate educational materials and supplies.” Based on these allegations, plaintiff-intervenors also advanced five claims for relief. In Count I, plaintiff-intervenors claimed they were entitled to relief because defendants failed to (1) “provide an adequate education to all students in the urban school districts,” and (2) “provide the urban school boards with the resources necessary to provide all of their students with an adequate education.” This second failure, said plaintiff-intervenors, prevented the urban school boards from accomplishing “the[ir] responsibility to provide all of their students with a constitutionally adequate education.” In Count II, plaintiff-intervenors contended “[t]he State’s public education system, including its educational funding system [(particularly the BEP’s supplemental funding program)] [was] inadequate, inequitable, irrational, arbitrary and capricious, and not general and uniform, in violation of the . . . [c]onstitution.” This meant that “[plaintiff-intervenor students] ha[d] been denied access to a general and uniform system of public education in which equal opportunities are provided” and that the urban school boards could not fulfill their responsibility to provide “equal educational opportunities.” -27- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Count III subsumed two grievances. More generally, plaintiff-intervenors complained that “whether a student receive[d] an adequate education depend[ed] on capricious circumstances, including where the student live[d].” More particularly, plaintiff-intervenors alleged that “[t]he State’s supplemental funding scheme irrationally discriminate[d] against school districts not defined as ‘low wealth’ or ‘small’ and against the students and communities served by those districts.” For these reasons, plaintiff-intervenors argued that the State’s funding of education “denied equal protection of the laws to [plaintiff-intervenor students]” because it “d[id] not provide, and d[id] not ensure that the urban school boards c[ould] provide, an adequate education to all students in the urban school districts.” For the same reasons, in Count IV, plaintiff-intervenors claimed that “[t]he State ha[d] denied due process of law to [plaintiff-intervenor students].” And in Count V, plaintiff-intervenors presented two theories of how defendants had violated Chapter 115C’s requirements: First, defendants had not provided the “resources necessary to allow [plaintiff-intervenor students] to have access to ‘adequate school systems’ that provide[d] them with a ‘[BEP]’ and ‘equal educational opportunities.’ ” Second, defendants had not provided resources sufficient to enable the urban school boards to provide an education that met the requirements of the BEP and other state standards. In their prayer for relief, plaintiff-intervenors sought declaratory judgments consistent with these claims. In Leandro, we summarized the nature of plaintiff parties’ allegations as -28- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court follows: Both plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors (hereinafter “plaintiff[ ]parties” when referred to collectively) allege in their complaints in the case resulting in this appeal that they have a right to adequate educational opportunities which is being denied them by defendants under the current school funding system. Plaintiff[ ]parties also allege that the North Carolina Constitution not only creates a fundamental right to an education, but it also guarantees that every child, no matter where he or she resides, is entitled to equal educational opportunities. Plaintiff[ ]parties allege that defendants have denied them this right. Plaintiffs allege that children in their poor school districts are not receiving a sufficient education to meet the minimal standard for a constitutionally adequate education. Plaintiffs further allege that children in their districts are denied an equal education because there is a great disparity between the educational opportunities available to children in their districts and those offered in more wealthy districts of our state. Plaintiffs allege that their districts lack the necessary resources to provide fundamental educational opportunities for their children due to the nature of the [S]tate’s system of financing education and the burden it places on local governments. They allege that the [S]tate leaves the funding of capital expenses, as well as twenty-five percent of current school expenses, to local governments. They further allege that although their poor districts are the beneficiaries of higher local tax rates than many wealthy school districts, those higher rates cannot make up for their lack of resources or for the disparities between systems. Plaintiffs also allege that students in their poor school districts are not receiving the education called for by the [BEP], part of the statutory framework for providing education to the children of this state. Plaintiffs complain of inadequate school facilities with insufficient space, poor lighting, leaking roofs, erratic heating and air conditioning, peeling paint, cracked -29- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court plaster, and rusting exposed pipes. They allege that their poor districts’ [then-current] media centers have sparse and outdated book collections and lack the technology present in the wealthier school districts. They complain that they are unable to compete for high quality teachers because local salary supplements in their poor districts are well below those provided in wealthy districts. Plaintiffs allege that this relative inability to hire teachers causes the number of students per teacher to be higher in their poor districts than in wealthy districts. Plaintiffs allege that college admission test scores and yearly aptitude test scores reflect both the inadequacy and the disparity in education received by children in their poor districts. Plaintiffs allege that end-of-grade tests show that the great majority of students in plaintiffs’ districts are failing in basic subjects. Plaintiff-intervenors allege that the current state educational funding system does not sufficiently take into consideration the burdens faced by their urban school districts, which must educate a large number of students with extraordinary educational needs. In particular, plaintiff-intervenors claim that their school districts have a large number of students who require special education services, special English instruction, and academically gifted programs. They allege that providing these services requires [the urban] school boards to divert substantial resources from their regular education programs. Plaintiff-intervenors contend that defendants . . . have violated the North Carolina Constitution and Chapter 115C . . . by failing to ensure that their relatively wealthy school districts have sufficient resources to provide all of their students with adequate and equal educational opportunities. In addition, plaintiff-intervenors claim that the [S]tate’s singling out of certain poor rural districts to receive supplemental state funds, while failing to recognize comparable if not greater needs in [the urban school] districts, is arbitrary and capricious .... Plaintiff-intervenors allege that deficiencies in physical facilities and educational materials are particularly -30- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court significant in their systems because most of the growth in North Carolina’s student population is taking place in urban areas such as those served by [the urban] school boards. They claim that their urban districts must serve a disproportionate number of children who due to poverty, language barriers, or other handicaps, require special resources. They allege that because urban counties have high levels of poverty, homelessness, crime, unmet health care needs, and unemployment which drain their fiscal resources, they cannot allocate as large a portion of their local tax revenues to public education as can the more rural poor districts. 346 N.C. at 342–44, 488 S.E.2d at 252–53 (emphases added). The pleadings (and this Court’s summary thereof) paint a clear picture of plaintiff parties’ original theory of the case—namely, that the State had distributed funding for the BEP in such a manner that the named students, in the named school districts, had not been given an opportunity to receive a constitutionally compliant education under the education system as it existed in 1994. Significantly, plaintiff parties did not allege that all children in all school districts across all one hundred counties were facing similar challenges, or that there was no way for the State’s funding system to operate constitutionally. In fact, by raising an alleged statutory violation, plaintiff parties seemed to concede that if the State had complied with the statutory requirements, then it would have provided a constitutionally compliant education system. Thus, the complaints did not allege that the State’s education policy was facially unconstitutional; rather, they challenged only the implementation of the education system in their respective districts. In other words, the complaints raised -31- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court as-applied challenges. See generally N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 388 N.C. 181, 189, 919 S.E.2d 175, 181 (2025) (“The chief distinction [between facial and as-applied challenges] is found in the differing degrees to which the two kinds of challenges can call a statute’s constitutionality into question. Whereas a facial challenge alleges that a statute can never be applied constitutionally, an as-applied challenge makes a significantly more modest claim. It merely asserts that a statute cannot be constitutionally applied to the party disputing its validity, ‘even if the statute is otherwise generally enforceable.’ ” (quoting State v. Packingham, 368 N.C. 380, 383, 777 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, 582 U.S. 98, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017))). On 2 November 1994, the Attorney General appeared on defendants’ behalf and moved to dismiss plaintiff parties’ complaints on several grounds. On 19 January 1995, the trial court transferred venue to the Superior Court, Wake County. On 1 February 1995, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss without explanation.10 Defendants appealed. C. Leandro v. State 1. Court of Appeals Decides Leandro v. State When this case was first appealed, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals immediately acknowledged that the judicial branch is not the appropriate forum to 10 Because these orders were entered before the case was designated as exceptional, they were entered by a resident judge of the superior court. -32- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court wrestle with education policy: “As a preliminary matter, we recognize that education is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local officials, and not of state judges. Judicial intervention in educational services is appropriate only when a constitutional right is ‘directly and sharply implicate[d].’ ” Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 6–7, 468 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1996) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988)). The Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that plaintiff parties’ complaints had failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 14, 468 S.E.2d at 552. Ultimately, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals had two primary holdings: First, it held that the General and Uniform System Clause “ensure[s] [only] a system of public education that [is] administered uniformly across the state”; it does not require “spending or programming uniformity” or “provide[ ] [a] fundamental right to equal educational opportunities.” Id. at 8–9, 468 S.E.2d at 548–49. Second, the Court of Appeals held that “the fundamental educational right under the . . . [c]onstitution is limited to one of equal access to education, and it does not embrace a qualitative standard.” Id. at 11, 468 S.E.2d at 550. Put more bluntly, the court concluded “that a constitutional fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities does not exist.” Id. at 12, 468 S.E.2d at 551. In light of these holdings, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court should have dismissed plaintiff parties’ lawsuits in their entireties. See id. at 8–14, -33- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court 468 S.E.2d at 548–52. The Court of Appeals further explained that plaintiff parties’ statutory claims alternatively failed because “the specific statutory provisions themselves provide[d] no basis for relief.” Id. at 14, 468 S.E.2d at 552. Following the Court of Appeals’ decision, plaintiff parties sought this Court’s discretionary review. 2. General Assembly Enacts the ABCs Accountability System While plaintiff parties’ petitions were pending before this Court, the General Assembly modified its accountability model for public schools in 1996.11 See An Act to Implement the Recommendation of the Joint Legislative Education Oversight Committee to Implement the State Board of Education’s ABC’s Plan in Order to Establish an Accountability Model for the Public Schools to Improve Student Performance and Increase Local Flexibility and Control, and to Make Conforming Changes, ch. 716, § 3, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 352, 354 (codified as amended at N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-105.20 to -105.21, -105.25 to -105.27, -105.30 to -105.32, -105.35 to -105.39 (1996 Supp.) (current versions at N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-105.20 to -105.23, -105.25 to -105.27, -105.30, -105.32, -105.35, -105.37, -105.38, -105.39 (2025)). The General Assembly directed the State Board to “develop a School-Based Management and Accountability Program” with “[t]he primary goal of . . . improv[ing] student performance.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-105.20(a) (1996 Supp.). More specifically, the 11 As one might expect, the General Assembly has frequently modified the public education system over the past three decades. It would be virtually impossible to track each change in this opinion. It was not uncommon for the education system to have undergone several changes in between the various orders and opinions in this case. Only a few examples are provided here, but many more changes occurred. -34- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court program was to (i) focus on student performance in the basics of reading, mathematics, and communications skills in elementary and middle schools, (ii) focus on student performance in courses required for graduation and on other measures required by the State Board in the high schools, and (iii) hold schools accountable for the educational growth of their students. Id. § 115C-105.35. The General Assembly instructed the State Board to “set[ ] annual performance standards for each school in the [s]tate in order to measure the growth in performance of the students in each individual school.” Id. To this end, the State Board was to create “rigorous student academic achievement performance standards for kindergarten through eighth grade and student academic performance standards for courses in grades 9–12” that “align[ed], whenever possible, with the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).” The Excellent Schools Act, ch. 221, § 3(e), 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 427, 431 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 115C-105.40 (1999)). Following these directives, the State Board developed “the ABCs (Accountability, Basics, and Local Control) Accountability System,” which it first employed in the 1996–1997 school year. The details of this complex program are largely beyond the scope of this opinion. But in broad strokes, [h]igh standards [were] at the center of the ABCs. The aim [was] to ensure that all students [were] learning and showing continuous improvement. . . . The plan look[ed] at the progress of individual schools, rather than at whole school systems. . . . The plan compare[d] the school with itself and measure[d] the progress of its own students by -35- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court comparing pretest and posttest scores on the North Carolina End-of-Grade Tests . . . . N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, ABCs of Public Education in North Carolina: A Journey Toward Excellence 3 (1999) [hereinafter NCDPI, ABCs of Public Education], https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED469452.pdf. To foster “accountability,” the ABCs Accountability System offered incentive awards to schools and their administrators and teachers. Id.; see also N.C.G.S. § 115C-105.36 (1998 Supp.). It also provided procedures for identifying and assisting low-performing schools, N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-105.38 to -105.38A (1998 Supp.), as well as grounds for the removal or dismissal of school personnel in low-performing schools, id. § 115C-105.39. As for the “basics” prong, the system required schools “to focus on reading, writing, and mathematics,” but gave schools “more freedom to integrate [other] subjects” like science, history, geography, and the arts. NCDPI, ABCs of Public Education at 3; see also N.C.G.S. § 115C-105.35(i)–(ii) (1996 Supp.). Regarding “control,” the program provided local administrators and teachers “more control over the schools in which they work and the flexibility to make their own decisions” when determining how to achieve their student performance goals. NCDPI, ABCs of Public Education at 3; see also N.C.G.S. § 115C-105.21(b) (1996 Supp.). Most pertinent to this opinion, under the ABCs Accountability System, there were four performance/proficiency levels to measure student performance. “Level I” meant the student did “not have sufficient mastery of knowledge and skills in th[e] subject area to be successful at the next grade level.” NCDPI, ABCs of Public -36- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Education at 47. “Level II” meant the student “demonstrate[d] inconsistent mastery of knowledge and skills in th[e] subject area and [was] minimally prepared to be successful at the next grade level.” Id. “Level III” meant the student “consistently demonstrate[d] mastery of grade level subject matter and skills and [was] well prepared for the next grade level.” Id. To be considered “proficient” or “at grade level,” students needed to score at least at Level III on their end-of-course/end-of-grade tests. Finally, “Level IV” meant the student “consistently perform[ed] in a superior manner clearly beyond that required to be proficient at grade level work.” Id. 3. Supreme Court of North Carolina Decides Leandro v. State Returning to the court system, this Court allowed plaintiff parties’ petition for discretionary review. We then affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss all of plaintiff parties’ claims. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 358, 488 S.E.2d at 261. This Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss plaintiff parties’ claims predicated on the notion that the constitution “mandate[d] equality in the educational programs and resources offered the children in all school districts in North Carolina” (i.e., plaintiffs’ Count III and plaintiff-intervenors’ Count II).12 Id. at 12 To the extent that plaintiff-intervenors’ Count II overlapped with their arguments under Count I, this Court treated Count II as subsumed by Count I. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 351–52, 488 S.E.2d at 257; cf. Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 612, 599 S.E.2d at 374–75 (listing the “surviving claims for trial” after Leandro and not including claims related to equality in the educational programs and resources offered to children in all school districts (citing Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353–54, 358, 599 S.E.2d at 255, 258–59)). This Court’s resolution of plaintiff-intervenors’ Count I is discussed below. -37- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court 348, 488 S.E.2d at 255. This Court did so because the General and Uniform System Clause “does not require that equal educational opportunities be afforded students in all of the school districts of the state.” Id. at 351, 488 S.E.2d at 257. In this analysis, this Court—guided by the constitution’s text, the historical context in which the people adopted it, and this Court’s caselaw—acknowledged the facial constitutionality of the State’s educational funding system multiple times. See id. at 349–50, 353, 488 S.E.2d at 256, 258. This Court observed further that equality across school districts would be practically impossible, resulting in a “steady stream of litigation [that] would constantly interfere with the running of the schools of the state and unnecessarily deplete their human and fiscal resources as well as the resources of the courts.” Id. at 350, 488 S.E.2d at 257; see also id. at 350–51, 488 S.E.2d at 256–57 (observing that other state courts had experienced “substantial problems” when dealing just with the right to a sound basic education, and concluding that the constitution’s framers did not intend for the General Assembly to strain to achieve the “impractical or unattainable goal” of absolute equality in educational offerings across school districts, noting “even greater problems of protracted litigation resulting in unworkable remedies” would follow) (first citing Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985); then citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995); then citing State ex rel. Bds. of Educ. v. Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1988); then citing William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance -38- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & Legal Educ. 219 (1990); then citing James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 Va. L. Rev. 349, 392–93 (1990); then citing Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, 1075–78 (1991); and then citing Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997))). In addition to the claims predicated on equality in educational opportunities, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss plaintiffs’ equal protection claims (i.e., plaintiffs’ Count II). Id. at 352, 488 S.E.2d at 258. We observed, “Any disparity in school funding among the districts resulting from local subsidies is directly attributable to Article IX, Section 2(2) itself. Plaintiffs are essentially reduced to arguing that one section of the North Carolina Constitution violates another. . . . This argument is without merit.” Id. This Court did not address plaintiff parties’ claims predicated on the Law of the Land Clause or due process principles (i.e., plaintiffs’ Count IV and plaintiff-intervenors’ Count IV). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss those claims was the final ruling on those claims and became the law of the case. See generally Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 536, 91 S.E.2d 673, 681–82 (1956) (“[W]hen an appellate court passes on a question and remands the cause for further proceedings, the questions there settled become the law of the case, both in subsequent proceedings in the trial court and on subsequent appeal, provided the -39- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court same facts and the same questions which were determined in the previous appeal are involved in the second appeal.”). This Court agreed with plaintiff parties, however, that a “right to a qualitatively adequate education arises under the . . . [c]onstitution.” Id. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254. Specifically, this Court acknowledged that “Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 . . . combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.” Id. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. We then defined some core qualitative components for a “sound basic education.” Id. (first citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989); and then citing Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)). Accordingly, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss plaintiff parties’ claims premised on the adequacy of educational opportunities (i.e., plaintiffs’ Count I and plaintiff-intervenors’ Count I), allowing those claims to proceed to determine “whether the State ha[d] failed to meet its constitutional obligation to provide an opportunity for a sound basic education to plaintiff parties.” Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 612, 599 S.E.2d at 374 (emphasis added) (citing Leandro, 346 N.C. at 348, 488 S.E.2d at 255). This Court also reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss plaintiff parties’ claims predicated on the 1994 statutes (i.e., plaintiffs’ Count V and plaintiff-intervenors’ Count V). Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353–54, 488 S.E.2d at 258–59. We did so because “most of the sections of the statutes [plaintiff parties] rel[ied] upon -40- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court d[id] little more than codify a fundamental right guaranteed by our [c]onstitution.” Id. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258. Indeed, this Court observed, “The General Assembly . . . seem[ed] to have recognized the constitutional right to a sound basic education and to have embraced that right in Chapter 115C.” Id. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 254. The statutes cited in plaintiff parties’ complaints “reiterate[d] the constitutional requirement that every child in the state have equal access to a sound basic education.” Id. at 354, 488 S.E.2d at 259. And “[t]o the extent that plaintiff[ ]parties c[ould] produce evidence tending to show that defendants ha[d] committed the violations of Chapter 115C alleged in the complaints and that those violations ha[d] deprived children of some districts of the opportunity to receive a sound basic education, [they were] entitled to do so.”13 Id. Thus, this Court acknowledged that the statutory framework established by the General Assembly provided for a constitutionally compliant statewide public education system. Finally, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss plaintiff-intervenors’ equal protection claim to the extent it challenged the BEP’s supplemental funding program for low-wealth counties (plaintiff-intervenors’ Count III). Id. at 352–53, 488 S.E.2d at 258. This Court stated that the General Assembly could create a supplemental funding program so long as it did not “distribute[ ] state 13 This Court clarified that “none of the statutes relied upon by plaintiff[ ]parties require[d] that substantially equal educational opportunities be offered in each of the school districts of the state.” Leandro, 346 N.C. at 354, 488 S.E.2d at 259. -41- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court funds to the districts in an arbitrary and capricious manner unrelated to . . . educational objectives.” Id. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258. This Court continued, “Plaintiff-intervenors ha[d] made sufficient allegations in their complaint to entitle them to proceed to attempt to prove that the state supplemental funding system in question [was] unrelated to legitimate education objectives and, therefore, . . . arbitrary and capricious.” Id. In sum, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss three of plaintiffs’ five claims and two of plaintiff-intervenors’ claims. We reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision as to the rest of plaintiff parties’ claims. Accordingly, there were three “surviving claims for trial”: (1) whether the State ha[d] failed to meet its constitutional obligation to provide an opportunity for a sound basic education to plaintiff parties, (2) whether the State ha[d] failed to meet its statutory obligation, pursuant to Chapter 115C of the General Statutes, to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education to plaintiff parties, and (3) whether the State’s supplemental school funding system [was] unrelated to legitimate education objectives and, as a consequence, [was] arbitrary and capricious, resulting in a denial of equal protection of the laws for plaintiff-intervenors. Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 612, 599 S.E.2d at 374–75 (emphasis omitted and emphases added) (citations omitted) (citing Leandro, 346 N.C. at 348, 353–54, 488 S.E.2d at 255, 258–59). Importantly, these surviving claims for trial were the as-applied challenges as pled, which related to specific students in specific school districts operating under a specific education system that existed in 1994. -42- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court This Court remanded those surviving as-applied claims to the trial court for resolution. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 348, 353–54, 488 S.E.2d at 255, 258–59. We did so, however, with a keen awareness of the constitutionally assigned roles for the different branches of government in education policy. This Court accordingly acted “with some trepidation,” understanding that “judges are not experts in education and are not particularly able to identify in detail those curricula best designed to ensure that a child receives a sound basic education.” Id. at 354, 488 S.E.2d at 259. Instead, this Court “acknowledge[d] that the legislative process provides a better forum than the courts for discussing and determining what educational programs and resources” should be provided. Id. This Court pointed out that legislators, unlike judges, “are popularly elected to represent the public for the purpose of making just such decisions.” Id. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 259. We also emphasized that the legislature, unlike the courts, is “not limited to addressing only cases and controversies brought . . . by litigants” and may “conduct public hearings and committee meetings” to “hear and consider the views of the general public as well as educational experts,” thereby “permit[ting] the full expression of all points of view.” Id. Elsewhere, this Court expressed other concerns. For example, the Court acknowledged that education policy is an area where “there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving” problems, that “[o]n even the most basic questions . . . the scholars and educational experts are divided,” and that funding increases were not a guaranteed cure-all to perceived problems plaguing -43- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court public education. Id. at 356, 488 S.E.2d at 260 (emphasis omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42–43, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1301–02 (1973)). Additionally, as noted above, this Court appeared concerned about “protracted litigation resulting in unworkable remedies,” observing that “[s]ubstantial problems have been experienced in those states in which the courts have held that the state constitution guaranteed the right to a sound basic education.” Id. at 350–51, 488 S.E.2d at 257. Thus, when remanding the case, this Court took care to non-exhaustively enumerate some factors to guide the trial court as it considered whether defendants had provided plaintiff students and plaintiff-intervenor students with an opportunity for a sound basic education. See id. at 355–57, 488 S.E.2d at 259–60. Specifically, this Court instructed the trial court to consider “[e]ducational goals and standards adopted by the legislature,” “the level of performance of the children of the state and its various districts on standard achievement tests,” and “the level of the [S]tate’s general educational expenditures and per-pupil expenditures.” Id. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 259–60. This Court was clear, however, that no single factor alone was to be dispositive. See id. at 355–57, 488 S.E.2d at 259–60. Acutely aware that judges would be tempted to insert themselves into a province more appropriately handled by the legislative and executive branches, this Court expressed grave concern about the potential for judicial interference with the constitutional powers and duties of the other two branches. To that end, this Court -44- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court provided the following guidance to future courts: In conclusion, we reemphasize our recognition of the fact that the administration of the public schools of the state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of government. Therefore, the courts of the state must grant every reasonable deference to the legislative and executive branches when considering whether they have established and are administering a system that provides the children of the various school districts of the state a sound basic education. A clear showing to the contrary must be made before the courts conclude that they have not. Only such a clear showing will justify a judicial intrusion into an area so clearly the province, initially at least, of the legislative and executive branches as the determination of what course of action will lead to a sound basic education. Id. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261. With those sentiments, this Court remanded the case to the trial court. D. Post-Leandro Developments in the Education System Approximately a month after this Court’s Leandro opinion in 1997, the education system underwent another relevant change—one addressing the substantive component of education. The General Assembly passed an amendment to section 115C-12 requiring the State Board to “develop a comprehensive plan to revise content standards and the [S]tandard [C]ourse of [S]tudy in the core academic areas of reading, writing, mathematics, science, history, geography, and civics.” See The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 1997, ch. 443, § 8.27(a), 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 1344, 1396–97 (codified as amended at N.C.G.S. § 115C-12(9a) (1998 Supp.) (recodified as amended at N.C.G.S. § 115C-12(9c) (2025)). The revised content standards developed in the core -45- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court academic areas [were to] (i) reflect high expectations for students and an in-depth mastery of the content; (ii) be clearly grounded in the content of each academic area; (iii) be defined grade-by-grade and course-by-course; (iv) be understandable to parents and teachers; (v) be developed in full recognition of the time available to teach the core academic areas at each grade level; and (vi) be measurable, whenever possible, in a reliable, valid, and efficient manner for accountability purposes. N.C.G.S. § 115C-12(9a) (1998 Supp.). The State Board dutifully revised the Standard Course of Study following this statutory amendment. E. The Hoke County Trial On 10 October 1997, the Attorney General moved on defendants’ behalf “to dismiss all claims by [the low-wealth] school boards and [the urban] school boards” for lack of standing. The Attorney General maintained that “[t]he constitutional right to the opportunity for ‘a sound basic education’ . . . belongs solely to the children attending the public schools[,] . . . not . . . to the [low-wealth and urban] school boards. Indeed, those boards have the duty to protect that right for all students enrolled in their local schools.” On 30 October 1997, before the trial court could rule on defendants’ motion, the then-Chief Justice designated the case as exceptional pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts and reassigned it to a special judge of the superior court (the first replacement judge). On 24 November 1997, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss without explanation. The case therefore proceeded with the low-wealth and urban school boards participating -46- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court in the litigation. Nearly a year later, on 15 October 1998, “plaintiffs[,] at the behest of the trial court,” amended their complaint to present allegations regarding prekindergarten services. Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 618, 599 S.E.2d at 378. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that “[t]he [low-wealth school] districts d[id] not have sufficient resources to provide the prekindergarten and other programs and services needed for a sound basic education.” Plaintiff-intervenors also amended their complaint the same day, making similar allegations about the urban school districts’ inability to provide sufficient prekindergarten services. Defendants, through the Attorney General, denied these allegations. Because plaintiff parties had asserted different allegations about how the State’s educational funding system affected each of them, the trial court “bifurcated [this case] into two separate actions”—one for plaintiffs’ remaining claims, one for plaintiff-intervenors’. Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 613, 599 S.E.2d at 375. The trial court held a trial on plaintiffs’ claims first. Id. Due to the “sheer size and complexity of dealing with evidence” from each unique school district, the trial court decided to hold separate trials for each plaintiff school district—one at a time, see Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 613, 599 S.E.2d at 375. The trial court and the parties agreed that the first trial would address only the Hoke County school district. Id. The claims pertaining to the Hoke County school district came on for trial in September of 1999. The trial court allowed the introduction of evidence that -47- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court “reache[d] a broader constituency” than the students in the case’s caption; indeed, “a far greater proportion of the evidence pertain[ed] to the circumstances of Hoke County’s student population in general than it d[id] to the named plaintiffs in particular.” Id. at 615, 599 S.E.2d at 376. Also, “the trial court heard evidence concerning the plight of those children who were about to enter the school system”— i.e., “prospective enrollees” of the Hoke County school system. Id. at 640–41, 599 S.E.2d at 392–93. Moreover, “the trial court took evidence on, and made conclusions about, student performance across the state.” Id. at 633 n.14, 599 S.E.2d at 387 n.14; see also id. at 625, 599 S.E.2d at 382–83. The reference to student performance in school districts around the state necessarily rested on an assumption that there were Leandro-compliant school districts to which comparisons could be drawn. Nevertheless, all the “evidence in the case w[as] restricted to its effect on Hoke County.” Id. at 613, 599 S.E.2d at 375. The trial on the Hoke County claims “lasted approximately fourteen months and resulted in over fifty boxes of exhibits and transcripts, an eight-volume record on appeal, and a [M]emorandum of [D]ecision that exceeds 400 pages.” Id. at 610, 599 S.E.2d at 373; cf. id. at 621, 599 S.E.2d at 380 (highlighting the Memorandum of Decision’s “free-wheeling nature”). Throughout the trial, defendants “consistently t[ook] the position” that the State’s educational funding system generally “me[t] the constitutional mandate.” Indeed, defendants “fought ‘tooth and nail’ to prevent any finding that (1) the State. . . [was] not providing the equal opportunity for each child to obtain a sound basic -48- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court education,” or (2) “the State . . . [was] not providing sufficient funding to its school districts to provide each and every child with the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.” According to defendants, any constitutional violations occurring in the Hoke County school district were due to how “the individual school district . . . spen[t] the money the State provide[d].” Accord Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 631, 599 S.E.2d at 386. The trial court largely agreed with defendants. See id. at 634–35, 599 S.E.2d at 388–89. The trial court reviewed five aspects of the State’s education system to ensure compliance with Leandro: (1) its curriculum (namely, the BEP and the Standard Course of Study developed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 115C-12(9a)), (2) its teacher licensing/certification system, (3) its funding delivery system, (4) the ABCs Accountability System, and (5) its student performance standards. Notably, the trial court observed that “plaintiffs ha[d] stated that they have no complaint about the content of the [s]tate curriculum”; rather, “plaintiffs . . . confessed that their only complaint about the Standard Course of Study is how it ‘is brought into practice’ or ‘implemented.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the end, the trial court affirmed that each component was constitutionally sound. The trial court stated that the State’s educational funding system was “structurally sufficient to enable school systems to distribute and allocate funds for every child to have an equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.” Significantly, the trial court explicitly stated, “The evidence clearly and convincingly -49- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court show[ed] that the majority of North Carolina children [were] not at-risk of educational failure and [were] obtaining a sound basic education as required by Leandro.” As summarized by this Court, the trial court found that the State’s general curriculum, teacher certifying standards, funding allocation systems, and education accountability standards met the basic requirements for providing students with an opportunity to receive a sound basic education. As a consequence, the trial court concluded that “the bulk of the core” of the State’s “Educational Delivery System . . . is sound, valid, and meets the constitutional standards enumerated by Leandro.” Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 632, 599 S.E.2d at 387 (alteration in original); see also id. at 634, 599 S.E.2d at 388 (noting that the trial court found, “as a general proposition,” that “the State’s Funding Delivery System for education was adequate” and observing “that the trial court went to great lengths in its efforts to convey its view that the evidence offered no definitive showing that the State’s overall funding, resources, and programs scheme lacked the essentials necessary to provide a sound basic education”). In other words, the trial court acknowledged that the State’s provision and funding of education were facially constitutional, meaning any viable constitutional challenge to the education system would therefore have to be an as-applied challenge. But after reviewing data produced under the ABCs Accountability System and comparing Hoke County students to other students across the state, the trial court determined that “at-risk” students in Hoke County were not receiving a sound basic -50- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court education.14 According to the trial court, this was because neither defendants nor the Hoke County school board had “strategically allocat[ed] the available resources to see that at-risk children have the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.” (Emphasis added.) Accord Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 637, 599 S.E.2d at 390. The trial court therefore “ordered the State to reassess both its financial allocations and its other resource provisions earmarked for Hoke County schools . . . to ensure that ‘at-risk’ children in Hoke County are afforded a chance to take advantage of their constitutionally-guaranteed opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.” Id. (emphases added); see also id. at 608–09, 599 S.E.2d at 373. It left the “ ‘nuts and bolts’ of the educational resource [allocation] assessment in Hoke County to the other branches of government” and provided only general guidelines. Id. at 636, 599 S.E.2d at 389; see also id. at 637–38, 599 S.E.2d at 390. In short, the trial court: (1) informed the State what was wrong with Hoke County schools; (2) directed the State to reassess its educational priorities for Hoke County; and (3) ordered the State to correct any and all education-related deficiencies that contribute to a student’s inability to take advantage of his right to the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. Id. at 638, 599 S.E.2d at 390. 14 See generally Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 632 n.13, 599 S.E.2d at 387 n.13 (“[A] particular and identifiable subgroup of students has been singled out by experts in the education field and described as ‘at-risk’ students. In a general sense, such students are those who, due to circumstances such as an unstable home life, poor socio-economic background, and other factors, either enter or continue in school from a disadvantaged standpoint, at least in relation to other students who are not burdened under such circumstances.”). -51- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court “In addition to ordering the State to reassess its resource allocations to Hoke County schools in an effort to improve them for students currently in attendance,” id. at 640, 599 S.E.2d at 392, the trial court also found that, in the Hoke County school district, “the evidence showed that the State was providing inadequate resources for . . . ‘at-risk’ prospective enrollees, and that the State’s failings were contributing to the ‘at-risk’ prospective enrollees’ subsequent failure[s] to avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education,” id. at 641, 599 S.E.2d at 392–93. “The trial court concluded that [s]tate efforts towards providing remedial aid to ‘at-risk’ prospective enrollees were inadequate,” and it ordered the State to provide pre-kindergarten classes for that group. Id. at 642, 599 S.E.2d at 393. F. Supreme Court of North Carolina Decides Hoke County Board of Education v. State (Hoke County I) Following the Hoke County trial, the parties cross-appealed and petitioned this Court for discretionary review prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals. This Court allowed their petitions. At the outset of the opinion in Hoke County I, this Court acknowledged that although “[t]his litigation started primarily as a challenge to the educational funding mechanism imposed by the General Assembly[,] . . . [w]ith the Leandro decision, . . . the thrust of this litigation [had] turned from a funding issue to one requiring the analysis of the qualitative educational services provided to the respective plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors.” Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 609, 599 S.E.2d at 373 (emphasis added). Moreover, the statutory question that remained after Leandro -52- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court “ha[d] been subsumed, for all practical purposes, by the constitutional question.” Id. at 612 n.1, 599 S.E.2d at 374 n.1. In other words, because the education policy established by the statutes provided a constitutionally compliant sound basic education, compliance with the statutes would equate to constitutional compliance. Plaintiff-intervenors’ equal protection claim concerning the BEP’s supplemental funding program for low-wealth counties was not yet ripe because it had not yet been addressed in a separate action. Id. at 612 n.2, 599 S.E.2d at 375 n.2. Thus, in Hoke County I this Court considered whether “the evidence show[ed] that the State ha[d] failed to provide Hoke County school children with the opportunity to receive a sound basic education, as defined in Leandro.” Id. at 610, 599 S.E.2d at 373 (emphasis added). After addressing some procedural matters, this Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that statewide educational policy and funding were generally constitutionally sound. See id. at 632–38, 599 S.E.2d at 387–91. In its analysis, this Court pointed out that “the question of whether students are obtaining a sound basic education” is different than “the question of whether they were afforded their opportunity to obtain one.” Id. at 625 n.11, 599 S.E.2d at 383 n.11. Indeed, we recognized that “[t]he failure to obtain such an education may be due to any number of reasons beyond the defendant State’s control, not the least of which may be the student’s lack of individual effort and a failure on the part of parents and other caregivers to meet their responsibilities.” Id. As such, this Court stated, “In order to -53- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court prevail, plaintiffs must show more than a failure on the part of Hoke County students to obtain a sound basic education.” Id. Rather, “in order to show Hoke County students [were] being wrongfully denied their rightful opportunity for a sound basic education, plaintiffs [were required to] show that their failure to obtain such an education was due to the State’s failure to provide them with the opportunity to obtain one.” Id. Ultimately, this Court agreed that at-risk students in Hoke County were being deprived of their constitutional opportunity for a sound basic education and affirmed the trial court’s directive for defendants to correct those shortcomings in that county. See id. at 638, 599 S.E.2d at 391. Nonetheless, this Court reversed the portions of the Memorandum of Decision that had required the State to provide prekindergarten services for all at-risk children in Hoke County. Id. at 645, 599 S.E.2d at 395. We began by explaining that the General Assembly’s establishment of “the proper age parameters for starting and completing school” were nonjusticiable political questions. Id. at 638–39, 599 S.E.2d at 391. Finally, although this Court agreed that the State was not adequately providing resources for at-risk prospective enrollees in the Hoke County school district, id. at 642, 599 S.E.2d at 393, we concluded that the trial court’s ordered remedy was, “at best,” “a premature judicial encroachment on a core function of our [S]tate’s legislative and executive branches” given the evidence the parties had presented at trial, id. at 644–45, 648, 599 S.E.2d at 394–97. Notably, Hoke County I was replete with reminders of its holding’s narrowness. -54- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court This Court continually expressed its understanding that plaintiff parties’ claims were as-applied challenges.15 This Court also disclaimed “any opinion as to whether non ‘at-risk’ students in Hoke County [were] either obtaining a sound basic education or being afforded their rightful opportunity by the State to obtain such an education.” Id. at 634, 599 S.E.2d at 388 (emphasis added). We clarified that “non ‘at risk’ students [in Hoke County] [were] not: (1) held or presumed to be obtaining a sound basic education, or (2) precluded from pursuing future claims that they [were] not being afforded the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.” Id. at 633 n.15, 599 S.E.2d at 387 n.15 (second emphasis added). 15 See, e.g., Hoke County I, 358 N.C. at 609, 599 S.E.2d at 373 (“This litigation started primarily as a challenge to the educational funding mechanism imposed by the General Assembly that resulted in disparate funding outlays among low wealth counties and their more affluent counterparts. With the Leandro decision, however, the thrust of this litigation turned from a funding issue to one requiring the analysis of the qualitative educational services provided to the respective plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors.” (emphases added)); id. at 610, 599 S.E.2d at 373 (“The Leandro decision and the ensuing trial have resulted in the thrust of the instant case breaking down into the following contingencies: (1) Does the evidence show that the State has failed to provide Hoke County school children with the opportunity to receive a sound basic education . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 612, 599 S.E.2d at 374–75 (“The surviving claims for trial [after Leandro] included the following: (1) whether the State has failed to meet its constitutional obligation to provide an opportunity for a sound basic education to plaintiff parties, . . . and (3) whether the State’s supplemental school funding system is . . . arbitrary and capricious, resulting in a denial of equal protection of the laws for plaintiff-intervenors.” (first and third emphases added) (citations omitted)); id. at 623, 599 S.E.2d at 381 (“We begin our examination under the umbrella of the State’s first argument—namely, whether there was a clear showing of evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that ‘the constitutional mandate of Leandro has been violated [in the Hoke County School System] . . . .’ ” (alteration in original) (emphasis added)); id. at 625 n.11, 599 S.E.2d at 383 n.11 (“Thus, in order to show Hoke County students are being wrongfully denied their rightful opportunity for a sound basic education, plaintiffs must show that their failure to obtain such an education was due to the State’s failure to provide them with the opportunity to obtain one.” (emphases added)). -55- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Additionally, this Court emphasized its “consideration of the case [was] properly limited to the issues relating solely to Hoke County” because only those issues were “raised at trial.” Id. at 613, 599 S.E.2d at 375. And “because this Court’s examination of the case [was] premised on evidence as it pertain[ed] to Hoke County in particular,” its “holding mandates [could not] be construed to extend to the other four [low-wealth school] districts named in the complaint.” Id. at 613 n.5, 599 S.E.2d at 375 n.5 (emphases added). This Court instructed the trial court to move forward with proceedings for each of the other low-wealth and urban school districts because their individual claims had not yet been adjudicated. Id. at 648, 599 S.E.2d at 397. In summary, by this stage of the case, many of the original claims had been dismissed. After Hoke County I, this Court had reiterated the trial court’s observations that the structure and funding of the State’s education system as they existed in 1994 were facially constitutional, settling that matter for purposes of this action. In Hoke County specifically, however, there had been a showing that at-risk students were being deprived of their opportunity to receive a sound basic education, and this Court affirmed the trial court’s directive for defendants to work with the Hoke County school board to remedy the resource allocation problem identified in the Hoke County trial. Otherwise, this Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the remaining plaintiff parties’ as-applied claims. G. Post-Hoke County I In the years following Hoke County I, -56- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court [t]he State . . . established the Disadvantaged Student Supplemental Fund . . . to assist at-risk children, and . . . funded the Low Wealth Schools Fund . . . . Additionally, the State . . . allocated funds to (1) expand the More-at-Four program which provide[d] education to at-risk four-year-olds; (2) reduce class size; (3) increase resources to the Hoke County school system, including increased teacher salaries and creation of Learn to Earn High Schools; and (4) create new programs to adequately train school superintendents and administrators. Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 198 N.C. App. 274, 276, 679 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2009). Importantly, however, the rest of plaintiff parties’ claims remained untried. Indeed, the parties engaged in protracted, non-trial proceedings for several more years. Throughout this period, the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law amounting to an appealable order. Instead, the original claims were neglected, steadily abandoned, and seemingly forgotten. The scope of this action contemporaneously began to exceed the boundaries set by the complaints and refined by Leandro and Hoke County I. By no later than 2017, the litigation went off in a different direction, focusing on public education statewide. All the while, the very education system upon which plaintiff parties’ complaints were based was steadily changed and then replaced. 1. 2004–2011 a. The Penn Intervenors Intervene On 9 February 2005, over a decade after this case commenced, several “public school students in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district” and their parents or guardians (Penn Intervenors) sought to intervene in the action against both -57- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court defendants and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board “to enforce their constitutional rights to a sound basic education.” Their complaint also raised equal protection claims. Notably, the Penn Intervenors were represented by current Justice Anita Earls, who would eventually cast the deciding vote in Hoke County III (discussed below).16 On 19 August 2005, the trial court allowed permissive intervention to consider the Penn Intervenors’ claims concerning “the failure of the [Charlotte-Mecklenburg school] district to provide sufficient human, fiscal, and educational resources to its central city and high poverty schools.”17 It denied intervention concerning any equal protection claims and expressly disallowed “evidence or argument on the [Penn Intervenors’] . . . conten[tion] that the [Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board’s] student assignment system violate[d] their right to a sound basic education under Leandro.” The trial court then “sever[ed] the [Penn Intervenors’] claim so as to permit 16 Justice Earls also signed two amicus briefs at various points in this case’s saga: one on behalf of the University of North Carolina School of Law Center for Civil Rights, Mem. of Law as Amici Curiae at 15, Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95-CVS-1158 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2004), and one on behalf of the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, New Br. of Amicus Curiae at 32, Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Education v. State (Hoke County II), 367 N.C. 156, 749 S.E.2d 451 (2013) (per curiam) (No. 5PA12-2); Hoke County II, 367 N.C. at 157, 749 S.E.2d at 453 (“Anita S. Earls . . . for Southern Coalition for Social Justice . . . , amici curiae.”), which she founded, Anita Earls, N.C. Jud. Branch, https:// www.nccourts.gov/judicial-directory/anita-earls (last visited Apr. 11, 2025). 17 Accordingly, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board was involved in this case both as a participant with plaintiff-intervenors and as a defendant named by the Penn Intervenors. -58- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court a separate trial of [their] claims.”18 On 30 September 2005, the Penn Intervenors filed an amended complaint, which Justice Earls also signed, that further developed the claim allowed by the trial court and added several more students and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Branch of the NAACP as plaintiffs.19 The Penn Intervenors’ amended complaint alleged the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board’s then-current student assignment plan created “many ‘high poverty’ and low-performing schools” in its district, which enrolled and “locked in[ ]” many at-risk students. Ultimately, the Penn Intervenors claimed that “the [Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board], the State . . . , and the State Board . . . each . . . violated their duty to provide sufficient human, fiscal and educational resources to [the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district’s] high poverty and low-performing high schools in order to assure that all students in those schools receive a sound basic education.” They therefore sought “[a]n order enjoining [the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board, the State, and the State Board] to provide sufficient human, fiscal, and educational resources to every [Charlotte-Mecklenburg] high school, including every high poverty and low-performing school, to assure that all students in the [Charlotte-Mecklenburg] high schools [were] being consistently 18 This was an example of the proper method to alter an existing action. The aspiring intervenors made a request of the trial court, and the trial court denied the request as to claims unrelated to the existing litigation but allowed intervention as to what it considered to be related claims. 19 The Penn Intervenors filed an amended complaint to ensure this claim would be addressed. This procedure was notably not practiced later in this litigation. -59- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court provided with a sound basic education.” b. Most Urban School Boards Voluntarily Dismiss Their Claims On 4 May 2006, plaintiff-intervenors Asheville City Board of Education, Buncombe County Board of Education, Durham Public Schools Board of Education, Wake County Board of Education, and Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education voluntarily dismissed their claims.20 Thus, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board was the only urban school board remaining in the litigation. Even had the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board voluntarily dismissed its claims, however, it would still have been a participant in this litigation by virtue of being named a defendant by the Penn Intervenors. Following those urban school boards’ voluntary dismissals, this litigation involved only the established violations of at-risk Hoke County students’ rights, plaintiff parties’ yet-to-be-tried claims concerning the other low-wealth and urban school districts, and the Penn Intervenors’ new claims concerning the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district. c. Notices of Hearing and Orders Regarding Hearings As the case languished into its second and third decades, the proceedings strayed beyond the issues raised in the original complaints even further. Indeed, at times in the various so-called “Notice[s] of Hearings and Order[s] [Regarding] 20 Accordingly, from here on out, references to “plaintiff parties” do not include those urban school boards that voluntarily dismissed their claims. -60- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Hearings,” the first replacement judge considered evidence concerning school districts not named in the complaints, and he made statements concerning the general state of education in North Carolina. Yet, in line with the law of the case, the first replacement judge repeatedly reiterated that the problem was not education policy or funding; rather, he found that the problem was a failure of the educational establishment and classroom instruction—i.e., implementation and delivery. One such example can be found in the trial court’s 16 March 2009 “Notice of Hearing and Order Re[garding] Hearing.” In this document, the trial court recounted an “academic disaster” in Halifax County despite not having held a trial on claims related to that school district: The bottom line is that Halifax County Public School children are suffering from a breakdown in system leadership, school leadership and a breakdown in classroom instruction by and large from elementary school through high school. .... . . . Financial data furnished by [the Department of Public Instruction] shows that the cost to the taxpayers to provide school level expenditures, the majority of which are salaries and benefits for employees, has exceeded $75,000,000.00 for the past three years. .... With all of this expense being paid to the adults whose responsibility it is to provide an equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education to each and every child in the Halifax County Public School system, there seems to be little trickle down benefit to the children entrusted to the adults in these schools. -61- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court .... . . . [I]t is time for the State to exert itself and exercise command and control over the Halifax County Public Schools beginning in the school year 2009–2010, nothing more and nothing less. By this Notice of Hearing and Order, the [trial] [c]ourt is providing the [e]xecutive [b]ranch the opportunity, initially at least, to exercise its constitutional authority over the Halifax County School system to remedy the academic disaster which is occurring there on behalf of the children who have no other place to turn to for a sound basic education. .... The [trial] [c]ourt will entertain no excuses or whining by the adults in the educational establishment in Halifax County about how it’s the children’s fault, not theirs, for failing to provide the academic environment where children can obtain a sound basic education. If these children had Leandro compliant school leadership and teachers, they can learn and obtain a sound basic education rather than fail and drop out of school doomed to a lifetime of poverty and its multiple damages. (Emphasis omitted & added.) Thereafter, the trial court scheduled a “non-adversarial hearing” where “the State . . . , acting through its [e]xecutive [b]ranch,” would be given “the opportunity to report to the [trial] [c]ourt concerning the actions that the [e]xecutive [b]ranch w[ould] take with regard to the Halifax County Public School system in response to the [trial] [c]ourt’s serious concerns . . . regarding the failure of the Halifax County Public School system.” As another example, in a memorandum addressed to his replacement and the General Assembly, Governor, Attorney General, and Superintendent of Public -62- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court Instruction, the first replacement judge explained: Leandro requires that the children, not the educational establishment, have the [c]onstitutional right to the . . . opportunity to obtain a sound, basic education. This has not and is not happening now as the little children are not being taught to read and write because of a failure in classroom instruction as required by Leandro. . . . This is not happening now. Our children that cannot read by the third grade are by and large doomed not to succeed by the time they get to high school. As shown by the record in this case, that is a failure of classroom instruction. . . . Reduced to essentials, in my opinion the children are not being provided the opportunity because after all the millions spent, 90% of school costs are for adult salaries and benefits, and the data show as it did years ago and up to now the educational establishment has not produced results. Memorandum from Judge Howard Manning Jr., Retired, to the North Carolina General Assembly, Governor, Attorney General, and Superintendent of Public Instruction (Nov. 9, 2021) (emphases added), https://s3.documentcloud.org/ documents/21102063/manning-memo.pdf. These excerpts are emblematic of the trial court’s view that there was not a general problem with education funding or education policy. Instead, the problem lay with the education establishment responsible for implementing and administering the education system. -63- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court d. The Speaker of North Carolina House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of North Carolina Senate Attempt to Intervene and Hoke County Board of Education v. State (Hoke County II) After the 2010 midterm elections, members of a political party different from the Governor, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney General’s political party became the majority in both the House of Representatives and Senate.21 Thereafter, in 2011 a disagreement arose between the Governor and State Board (executive branch defendants) and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate (the General Assembly). Specifically, “the General Assembly [had] instituted changes to North Carolina’s prekindergarten program in the 2011 biennial budget law.” Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County II), 367 N.C. 156, 158, 749 S.E.2d 451, 454 (2013) (per curiam) (citing Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2011, S.L. 2011-145, § 10.7, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 253, 354–56). In response, plaintiff parties sought “a judicial determination that the 2011 legislative changes failed to comply with the State’s constitutional obligations recognized in Leandro and Hoke County [I].” Id. The trial court then entered a “Memorandum of Decision and Order Regarding Pre-Kindergarten Services for At-Risk Four Year Olds,” wherein it determined that 21 This marked the first time during this litigation that the Governor, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Attorney General, and the majorities of the House and Senate were not of the same political party other than 1995 to 1998 and 2003 to 2004, when that political party lost the majority in the House. -64- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court certain aspects of the 2011 amendments were unconstitutional. The Governor then issued an executive order that, in the General Assembly’s view, was an “attempt[ ] to interpret the [trial court’s] [o]rder as establishing a new constitutional obligation upon the State to provide free, universal Pre-K services to each and every at-risk four year old in North Carolina beyond the levels of service funded by the General Assembly.” Disagreeing with the Governor’s executive order, the General Assembly asked the Attorney General to seek clarification from the trial court about the scope of its order. The Attorney General refused to do so because of “an inability to obtain a conflict waiver from the Governor or the Department of Public Instruction.” The Attorney General no longer “adequately represented” the General Assembly’s interests, so the General Assembly moved to intervene in the trial court proceedings to represent “the interests of the legislative branch.” The trial court denied the General Assembly’s motion to intervene, reasoning “[t]he . . . obligation[ ] to establish and maintain public schools is the ‘shared province of the executive and legislative branches,’ ” and declining to “put[ ] itself, or the judiciary, in the middle of th[e] political dispute” between the General Assembly and Governor. Thus, from 2011 forward, the General Assembly ceased to be a party to this action. See generally N.C.G.S. § 1-72.2 (2025) (stating that “when the State of North Carolina is named as a defendant . . . , both the General Assembly and the Governor constitute the State,” but recognizing that the legislative and executive -65- HOKE CNTY. BD. OF EDUC. V. STATE Opinion of the Court branches are distinct entities for purposes of litigation and that the General Assembly may sometimes need to independently represent its own interests as its own party in an action); Berger v. State Conf. of NAACP, 142 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2022) (observing North Carolina is a State that “ha[s] chosen to authorize multiple officials to defend their practical interests in cases”). The validity of the General Assembly’s 2011 amendments was the subject of another appea [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11299282. Public record. Not legal advice.