# Belkadi

> District Court, N.D. West Virginia · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11298139

## Case

- **Full name:** Massinissa Belkadi v. C.C. Mayle, a police officer for the City of Morgantown
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

MASSINISSA BELKADI,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL NO. 1:24-cv-14
(KLEEH)
C.C. Mayle, a police officer
for the City of Morgantown,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 36]

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 36]. For the reasons discussed herein, the Motion
is GRANTED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff Massinissa Belkadi (“Belkadi”
or “Plaintiff”), by counsel, filed a Complaint against Defendant
C.C. Mayle (“Mayle” or “Defendant”), a police officer for the City
of Morgantown. ECF No. 1. The Complaint alleged (1) 42 U.S.C. §
1983 Excessive Force in violation of the Fourth, Eight, and
Fourteenth Amendments; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 False Arrest in
violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) 42
U.S.C. § 1983 Unlawful Search and Seizure in violation of the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unlawful Detainment in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments; (5) Battery; and (6) Assault. Id.
Defendant moved for partial dismissal of the Complaint on March
27, 2024 [ECF No. 3], which was granted on March 5, 2025.1 ECF
No. 21. Thus, pursuant to this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Dismissal [ECF No.

3, 27], the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage
are: (1) Excessive Force, (2) False Arrest under the Fourth
Amendment, (5) Battery, and (6) Assault under West Virginia Common
Law. On August 1, 2025, Defendant Mayle filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the remaining Counts. ECF No. 36. On August 22, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment. ECF No. 41. Then on September 5, 2025, Defendant filed
a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response. ECF No. 46. The Motion is thus
fully briefed and ripe for review.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on the evening of
February 2, 2023, he was in downtown Morgantown, West Virginia and

1 The Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of
Plaintiff’s Complaint for False Arrest and Unlawful Search and Seizure
because the alleged unlawful conduct is duplicative and included within
Count Two. Additionally, the Court dismissed Counts I through IV to the
extent the claims were brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

2 The following facts are provided from Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No.
1], Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 37], and the surveillance and body camera footage of
the incident [ECF 36, Ex. C, E].
planned to meet up later in the night with his girlfriend. Compl.,
ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 4-5. When the two met up, Plaintiff alleges his
girlfriend was intoxicated, and while attempting to help get her

back to his apartment, one of the girlfriend’s friends yelled at
Plaintiff and a stranger then picked up Plaintiff’s girlfriend and
carried her away. Id. at ¶¶ 6-10.
Defendant Officer C.C. Mayle arrived shortly thereafter. Id.
at ¶¶ 15-16. Prior to Mayle’s arrival, security footage from a
nearby Chase Bank, shows Belkadi approaching his girlfriend and
her friend. ECF No. 36, Ex. E, at 00:10-00:17. The group then
moves mostly out of shot, with only their lower halves visible,
but a confrontation clearly occurs with seven passersby’s
eventually joining the group. Id. at 00:18-00:43. Next, various
people, including Plaintiff, can be seen yelling, shoving, and
exhibiting other aggressive behaviors. Id. at 00:47-1:05.

Plaintiff’s girlfriend appears to fall to the ground and is then
helped to her feet by an unknown individual. Id. at 1:03-1:09.
Belkadi approaches the individual, shoving multiple women out of
the way to get there, and pushes the individual. Id. at 1:09-
1:13.
Around this time, a witness called 911 and requested that an
officer “come to High Street in front of Chase Bank.” ECF No. 36,
Ex. B, at 00:09-00:13. The caller explained that she witnessed a
man try to “take” his girlfriend by physically dragging her out of
a bar. Id. at 00:29-00:54. As Officer Mayle arrived on the scene,
he turned on his body camera, and a vehicle can be seen pulling up
next to him on High Street. ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:24-0029.

Mayle testified that the driver of said vehicle then pointed to
Plaintiff and informed Mayle that he had watched the individual
punch a female in the face.3 ECF No. 36, Ex. D, Mayle Dep., at p.
7:2-8. As Mayle approached the scene, his body camera recorded a
visibly agitated Plaintiff who was crying and yelling “Where is
she?”. ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:30-00:39.
As Mayle approached Plaintiff, dispatch informed Mayle via
radio call of the report that witnesses observed an incident
wherein a male beat a female, and multiple witnesses saw him
dragging her out of a bar into a vehicle. Id. at 00:39-00:59.
Mayle asked Plaintiff, “what’s going on man?” but Plaintiff did
not acknowledge Mayle and attempted to walk by him. Id. Then,

Plaintiff alleges, Mayle physically placed his hands on Plaintiff
and forced him to sit on steps outside a restaurant – detaining
him. ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 17-18.
Furthermore, the body camera footage shows Plaintiff objecting
to his detainment and repeatedly refusing to comply with Mayle’s
orders. ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 1:01-1:28. Plaintiff exhibits signs

3 While this interaction can be seen on Mayle’s body camera footage, the
audio is unclear. The contents of the statement made by the driver to
Mayle is taken from Mayle’s deposition.
of impairment and intoxication throughout the interaction
including crying, yelling at Mayle and onlookers, disobeying
orders, and struggling to communicate with Officer Mayle. Id. at

00:36-3:10. Additionally, Officer Mayle testified in his
deposition that he “could smell the odor of intoxicating beverage
coming off [Belkadi’s] breath.” Mayle Dep., at p. 18:5-6. At one
point during the interaction, Plaintiff can be seen observing
someone filming him, which causes Plaintiff to move toward the
bystander in an aggressive manner. ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 1:28-
1:38. Plaintiff testified, based on his actions, it would have
been reasonable for Mayle to believe Plaintiff may have used
violence against the bystander. ECF No. 36, Ex. A, Belkadi Dep.,
at 121-122:21-5.
Plaintiff alleges Mayle then started questioning and yelling
at him, he alleges Mayle accused Plaintiff of pulling his

girlfriend into a car, and then Mayle informed Plaintiff he would
be arrested if Plaintiff did not stop yelling at him. ECF No. 1,
at ¶¶ 19-24. Plaintiff can then be seen on the body camera footage
yelling at another onlooker, crying, and becoming increasingly
agitated. ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 1:55-2:11. Mayle attempted to
explain to Plaintiff that he was told by dispatch that Plaintiff
was observed dragging a woman into a car. Id. at 2:11-2:14.
Plaintiff responded by screaming at Mayle. Id. at 2:14-2:22.
Plaintiff then notices another onlooker filming and attempts to
stand up again. Id. at 2:25-2:30.
Mayle then asked Plaintiff for his ID and name, but Plaintiff
refused to provide either and claimed he did not have his wallet.

Id. at 2:30. Mayle asked again; Plaintiff refused once more to
provide his name. Id. at 3:00. Mayle then told Plaintiff to stand
up, and Plaintiff then provided his full name and began to reach
for his wallet to get his ID. Id. at 3:05.
When Plaintiff was ordered to stand, he remained seated and
responded with “no, no, no” and “no, sir”. Id. at 3:05-3:11.
Mayle told Plaintiff to stand 7 times. Id. at 3:02-3:11. After
Plaintiff did not stand, Mayle grabbed Plaintiff and lifted him to
a standing position. Id. at 3:10. Mayle then ordered Plaintiff
to turn around and Plaintiff can be seen turning to face Mayle.
Id. at 3:11-3:13; ECF No. 37, Ex. E, at 6:05. Mayle then swung
Plaintiff from a standing position which caused Plaintiff’s head

to strike the sidewalk. Id. at 3:14. Mayle testified that
Plaintiff took a “bladed” stance, and grabbed Mayle’s right arm,
resisting his attempt to arrest Plaintiff. Mayle Dep.,at 57:24,
60:18-24.Mayle testified that he believed Plaintiff was actively
resisting arrest. Id. at 60:14-15.
Mayle, along with another officer, then proceeded to handcuff
Plaintiff. ECF No. 37, Ex. C, at 3:15-3:30. There were no
additional punches, kicks, or strikes to Plaintiff. Id. at 3:30-
4:15. Plaintiff then requested to talk to Mayle in private and
Mayle escorted Plaintiff towards a police vehicle and informed him
that he was under arrest for disorderly conduct and public
intoxication. Id. at 4:25-5:18.

Plaintiff alleges he suffered injuries to his head and finger
by way of Mayle’s actions. ECF No. 1, at ¶ 45. Plaintiff was
treated at Mon Health Medical Center for his claimed injuries and
was diagnosed with a concussion and facial abrasions. Id. at ¶¶
46-47. Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct, obstructing
an officer, fleeing from an officer, public intoxication, and
underage possession/consumption of alcohol. Id. at ¶ 48. However,
all the charges were later dismissed. Id. at ¶ 49.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant “bears the

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nonmoving
party must “make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof.” Id.
at 317–18. Summary judgment is proper “[w]here the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there [being] no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986). The Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draws any reasonable
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
IV. DISCUSSION

In Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, he requests that
the Court grant summary judgment on each of the remaining Counts
in the Complaint.4 ECF No. 36. Additionally, Defendant asserts
all Counts should be dismissed as a matter of law, and Plaintiff’s
claims under § 1983 should be dismissed under the Doctrine of
Qualified Immunity. For the reasons stated herein, this Court
agrees on all fronts and hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36].
A. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Count
I (Excessive Force) of Plaintiff’s Complaint because Defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his
constitutional rights by use of excessive force, fails as a matter
of law because the force used was reasonable under the

4 Those remaining Counts are Count I (Excessive Force), Count II (False
Arrest), Count V (Battery), and Count VI (Assault).
circumstances. Therefore, no violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights occurred, and the doctrine of qualified
immunity precludes Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count I.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
It “may be invoked by a government official sued in his personal,
or individual, capacity.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall
Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The
protection extends to “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986).

An officer, generally, is protected by qualified immunity if
his “actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with
the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (citations omitted). The
inquiry involves asking “whether the totality of the circumstances
justified a particular sort of search or seizure.” Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985).
The test to determine whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity is two-fold: the Court must determine “(1)
whether a constitutional violation occurred; and (2) whether the
right was clearly established at the time of the violation[.]”
Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit applies a “split burden of proof for the qualified-
immunity defense.” Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th
Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden on
the first prong, and the officer bears the burden on the second
prong.” Id. The Court can address either prong first. Pearson,
555 U.S. at 236.
The “dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to
a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)
(citation omitted). Under the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”
analysis, force is not excessive if it is objectively reasonable

under the circumstances facing the officer, without regard to his
underlying intent. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
Courts analyze three factors to determine whether a police
officer used excessive force, violative of the Fourth Amendment:
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 120 (4th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The doctrine of
qualified immunity protects those police officers who could
reasonably believe that their actions were lawful, in light of
clearly established law at the time of the action. Id. at 117.

Against these considerations, the court must balance “the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The degree of the intrusion is “generally
measured by the amount of force employed to affect the seizure.”
Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2005). The
assessment considers “[t]he extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.”
Id. However, “the severity of injury resulting from the force
used has always been but one consideration in determining whether
force was excessive.” Smith v. Murphy, 634 F. App’x 914, 917 (4th
Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Critically, the “calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to

make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that
is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–
97. “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate
because the force used did not rise to a level of violating the
Constitution and he is entitled to qualified immunity. Reply, ECF
No. 46, at 5. Furthermore, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot
show a clear violation of his constitutional rights and therefore

has failed to meet his burden of satisfying the first prong of
Jones. This Court addresses only the Plaintiff’s burden outlined
in Jones, as Plaintiff’s failure to meet that threshold here is
dispositive of the claim in Count I.
Here, the doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant who was working in his capacity as a
government official when the subject interaction occurred.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. The uncontroverted facts, established
by the surveillance and body camera footage, show Mayle could have
reasonably believed his actions were consistent with the
constitutional rights he is alleged to have violated. Anderson,
483 U.S. at 638. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show that “it would

be clear” to a reasonable officer in Mayle’s position that “his
conduct was unlawful” given the totality of the circumstances he
confronted. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199.
First, the crimes at issue were public intoxication,
obstruction, and disorderly conduct. ECF No. 37, at 14.
Additionally, as Officer Mayle arrived on the scene, he was
informed by dispatch that a witness had reported seeing a male
assault a female and attempt to drag her out of a bar into a car.
ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:39-00:59. Then, Mayle was informed by
the driver of a passing vehicle that he watched the Plaintiff punch
a female in the face. ECF No. 37, at 3. Thus, Mayle could have
held a reasonable belief that severe criminal activity was afoot.

Pegg, 845 F.3d at 120.
Next, Mayle observed a visibly agitated, crying Plaintiff.
ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:30-00:39. As detailed above, he was then
informed by two independent sources that Plaintiff had recently
been violent with a female. Id. at 00:24-0029, 00:39-00:59.
Additionally, Plaintiff repeatedly disobeyed lawful orders: he
yelled at Officer Mayle in response to questions, he appeared
physically impaired and smelled of alcohol, and on two separate
occasions Plaintiff yelled at and made aggressive movements toward
bystanders who were filming the interaction. Id. at 1:01-1:38;
ECF No. 37, at 3. Based on these facts, a reasonable officer could
infer that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety of

the officer and others. Pegg, 845 F.3d at 120.
Lastly, Plaintiff was told to stand seven times before Mayle
assisted him to his feet. ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:30-00:39. Once
standing, Plaintiff was ordered to turn around but can be seen
turning to face Officer Mayle instead. Id. at 3:11-3:13. This
undisputed evidence provides a sufficient basis for the reasonable
belief that Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade. Pegg, 845 F.3d at 120.
When the Pegg factors, representing the government’s interest,
are balanced against the intrusion on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
rights, the scales tip decidedly in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff
sustained a concussion, facial abrasions, and an injury to his

finger. ECF No. 1, at ¶ 45-47. However, these injuries, and the
level of force used by Officer Mayle, do not suffice to overcome
the evidence which supports the objective reasonableness of
Mayle’s actions. In considering the record before the Court, as
well as the applicable law, summary judgment is appropriate because
a reasonable officer could have thought Mayle’s actions were
consistent with the constitutional rights Plaintiff alleges Mayle
violated. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638. Therefore, Mayle is entitled
to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the security and body camera footage do not create
a triable issue of fact with respect to the Excessive Force claim
in Count I, and the claim in Count I fails as a matter of law.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36] as to Count
I is GRANTED and Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II (False
Arrest) is GRANTED because the arrest was lawful.
Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of his
constitutional rights through false arrest, fails as a matter of
law because the initial detention of Plaintiff, and his eventual
arrest, were lawful. Therefore, Defendant is protected by the
qualified immunity extended to law enforcement officers on the
claim in Count II.
First, where a police officer has reasonable suspicion, based

on specific and articulable facts, that “criminal activity may be
afoot[,]” the officer may temporarily detain an individual. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The reasonable suspicion standard
is a less demanding standard than probable cause and is a
“nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.” United States v. Branch, 537
F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)).
A court analyzing the lawfulness of a Terry stop must view the
“cumulative information available” to the officer. Ornelas, 517
U.S. at 695-96. Therefore, a stop should not be deemed “unjustified

based merely on a ‘piecemeal refutation of each individual’ fact
and inference[.]” Branch, 537 F.3d at 337. Furthermore, an
“officer’s decision to stop and detain an individual must be
evaluated objectively.” Id.
In addition, “there is no cause of action for ‘false arrest’
under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable
cause.” Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974).
Probable cause exists when there is enough evidence to “warrant a
man of reasonable caution” to believe an offense has been
committed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
Plaintiff asserts that Mayle violated his Fourth Amendment
constitutional rights because Plaintiff’s arrest was unlawful, “as

the defendant could not have believed that he had legal authority
to arrest the plaintiff[.]” Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 65. Defendant
contends that summary judgment is appropriate because his initial
detention of Plaintiff was supported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion, and the subsequent arrest of Plaintiff was supported by
probable cause. Def. S.J. Memo., ECF No. 37. This Court agrees
with Defendant.
Here, Officer Mayle’s initial detention of Plaintiff was
lawful because it was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. The information that 911 dispatch, and the witness on
the scene provided Mayle, along with Plaintiff’s visible
impairment and agitated state, indisputably provide the specific

and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Likewise, the record establishes
probable cause existed for Mayle’s arrest of Plaintiff. The
information available to Mayle about the alleged incident,
Plaintiff’s condition, and his refusal to comply with lawful
orders, are together sufficient to “warrant a reasonable man of
reasonable caution” to believe an offense had been committed. Wong
Sun, 371 U.S. at 479.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest fails as a
matter of law because both the Officer’s initial detention, and
arrest of Plaintiff, were lawful. Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 36] as to Count II is GRANTED and Count II of
Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V (Battery) is
GRANTED because he is entitled to immunity from the battery
claim under West Virginia state law.
Plaintiff’s claim under West Virginia state law for battery
fails as a matter of law because legal justification existed for
Officer Mayle’s physical contact with the Plaintiff. In West
Virginia, a person is liable for battery if (1) “he acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the
other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a
contact,” and (2) “a harmful contact with the person of the other
directly or indirectly results.” W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 494 (W. Va. 2004).
However, “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of
physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490
U.S. at 396. Generally, a law enforcement officer “engaged in an
arrest is afforded a privilege that precludes a battery claim.”
Weigle v. Pifer, 139 F. Supp. 3d 760, 776 (S.D.W. Va. 2015)
(citation omitted). Under West Virginia state law:
(b) An employee of a political subdivision is
immune from liability unless one of the
following applies:

(1) His or her acts or omissions were
manifestly outside the scope of
employment or official responsibilities;

(2) His or her acts or omissions were
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or
in a wanton or reckless manner; or

(3) Liability is expressly imposed upon
the employee by a provision of this code.

Id. at 775-76 (citing W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b)). Additionally,
police officers “performing discretionary functions are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights[.]” Syl.
Pt. 4, City of Saint Albans v. Botkins, 228 W. Va. 393 (2011).
Therefore, “[West Virginia’s] approach to matters concerning
immunity historically has followed federal law.” Id. at 398.
In light of the Court’s preceding findings that the Defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claims because
the arrest of Plaintiff was lawful, and the force used to affect
the arrest was reasonable, this Court finds the Plaintiff’s claim
for Battery must also fail as a matter of law. Additionally,
nothing in the record indicates that Mayle should not be afforded
a privilege precluding a battery claim under State law. Mayle was
working as an employee of a political subdivision, his acts were
within the scope of his employment, and there is no evidence his
acts were done with “malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a
wanton or reckless manner.” W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b).
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to immunity from

Plaintiff’s battery claim and that claim fails as a matter of law.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36] as
to Count V is GRANTED and Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF
No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
D. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count VI (Assault)
is GRANTED because Plaintiff is entitled to immunity from the
Assault claim under West Virginia state law.
In West Virginia, a person is liable for assault if (1) “he
acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension
of such a contact,” and (2) “the other is thereby put in such
imminent apprehension.” Stanley, 602 S.E.2d at 495. However, as
discussed above, an officer’s right to conduct a lawful arrest
must coincide with his right to use physical force or to threaten
the use of such force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Here, Mayle was acting within the scope of his employment and
no exception under West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(b) applies.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to immunity under that section
on Plaintiff’s assault claim, and Plaintiff’s claim for assault
fails as a matter of law. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[ECF No. 36] as to Count VI is GRANTED and Count VI of Plaintiff’s
Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Vv. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 36] is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims under §
1983 (Count I and Count II) and under West Virginia state law
(Count V and Count VI). Counts I, II, V, and VI of Plaintiff’s
Complaint [ECF No. 1] are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. As
these were the only remaining claims against sole Defendant Officer
Mayle, this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and shall be
STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket. Any remaining pending
motions in this action shall be TERMINATED.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record by the CM/ECF system.

DATED: March 31, 2026

Tom 8 Bla
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11298139. Public record. Not legal advice.
