# Lyon

> District Court, S.D. Texas · March 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11298092

## Case

- **Full name:** Edward B. Lyon, Jr. v. Bryan Collier, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** March 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11298092

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the acts of subordinates do not trigger individual § 1983 liability for supervisory officials
- holding that a § 1983 claimant must establish that the defendant was either personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation
- holding that under § 1983, officials are not vicariously liable for conduct of those under their supervision; they are accountable for their own acts and for implementing unconstitutional policies that result in constitutional deprivations

## Opinion text

Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 11, 2026
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
EDWARD B. LYON, JR., §
Plaintiff;
Vv. Civil Action No. H-23-0800
BRYAN COLLIER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court in this pro se state prisoner civil lawsuit is defendants Bryan
Collier and Lannette Linthicum’s motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 37), to which plaintiff
filed a response in opposition (Docket Entry No. 38).
Having considered the motion, the response, the record, matters of public record, and
the applicable law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to
dismiss and DISMISSES this lawsuit for the reasons shown below.
I. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit against Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ’”) employees Bryan Collier, Lannette Linthicum, Joe
Tovar, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (“BPP”), Chairman Gutierrez, and the State
Classification Committee (“SCC”). Plaintiff claimed that the defendants conspired against
him to deny him craft shop privileges, to interfere with his consideration for parole, and to
force his transfer to cool bed housing (fully or partially air conditioned housing). He

contended that the actions were all in retaliation for short articles he wrote for two prison-
related newsletters commencing in 2018, some of which focused on the TDCJ. Plaintiff
argued that the defendants’ actions violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Texas Tort Claims Act, and the American Medical Association (“AMA”) Patient Bill of
Rights. He also challenged his conviction and life sentence for murder with a deadly
weapon. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and monetary damages.
Following initial screening of the lawsuit, the Court severed plaintiff's claims against
Joe Tovar and transferred them to the Northern District of Texas,’ and severed his claims
against the BPP and Chairman Gutierrez and transferred them to the Western District of
Texas.” The Court further dismissed plaintiffs official capacity claims against Collier and
Linthicum, his claims against the SCC, his claims regarding the AMA Patient Bill of Rights,
his challenges to his conviction, and his claims arising at the Gib Lewis, French Robertson,
Ramsey, and Allred Units. The Court also dismissed his claims for injunctive relief seeking
transfer to the Ramsey Unit with reinstatement of his craft shop privileges.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a more definite statement as to his remaining claims
against Collier and Linthicum. Following its screening of the more definite statement, the

'The district court granted plaintiff’ s motion to dismiss the lawsuit on August 23, 2024. Lyon
v. Tovar, C.A. No. 2:24-cv-121-Z-BR (N.D. Tex.).
’The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim and imposed a “strike”
against plaintiff on August 1, 2024. Lyon v. Chairman Gutierrez, C.A. No. A-24-cv-00654-DII
(W.D. Tex.). No appeal was taken.

Court dismissed plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Linthicum and retained for further
disposition his remaining individual and supervisory capacity claims against both defendants.
As his remaining claims against Collier, plaintiffasserts in his more definite statement
that TDCJ promulgated and enforced an unconstitutional cool bed program for heat-sensitive
inmates with the “knowledge, input, and approval” of Collier. He further claims that Collier
instructed SCC members to levy “bogus” positive heat sensitivity scores against him in 2019,
2020, and 2021, resulting in his unwanted transfers to cool bed housing. As a result of the
transfers, he was unable to continue the “thriving” craft shop business he had established at
the Ramsey Unit. (Docket Entry No. 27, p. 1.) Plaintiff believes Collier took his newsletter
articles “personally” and “is certain [Collier] ordered one or more SCC members to
manipulate heat sensitivity scores that caused [plaintiffs] transfers[]” in retaliation for his
newsletter articles. Jd., pp. 2, 3. Plaintiff argues that Collier’s actions were clearly
retaliatory because his diabetes and high blood pressure medications would not cause a
positive heat sensitivity score and he had signed a “DNR” that declined all medical
treatments. According to plaintiff, the retaliatory heat scores and unit transfers ceased in
2022 after he stopped writing articles about the prison system, which proved that his articles

were the cause of his retaliatory transfers. Plaintiff also claims that Collier retaliated against
him for his articles by providing input to the BPP that resulted in negative parole decisions.

As his remaining claims against Linthicum, plaintiff complains that she refused to

accept telephone calls and a letter from his free world friend regarding plaintiffs heat score.
He further claims that she failed to notice that he had another “bogus” positive heat score and
failed to take steps to remove it on her own. He alleges that she exhibited personal
involvement in the unlawful actions of others by not taking steps to permanently stop the
pretextual heat scores and unit transfers.
In their pending motion to dismiss, defendants Collier and Linthicum move for
dismissal of these claims. Plaintiffresponds, in part, that his claims should not be dismissed
until he has been provided an opportunity to undertake or complete discovery. Plaintiffhas
filed no motions for discovery or identified any proposed or necessary discovery, and his

argument provides no basis for delaying disposition of the motion to dismiss.
Moreover, defendants have moved for dismissal predicated on the defense of qualified
immunity, and are entitled to determination of the defense prior to discovery. See Ramirez

v. Guadarrama, 3 F 4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[A] defendant’s entitlement to qualified
immunity should be determined at the earliest possible stage of the litigation.”). Plaintiffhas

not requested any limited discovery for purposes of addressing defendants’ qualified
immunity defense. See Carswell v. Camp, 54 F Ath 307, 310 (Sth Cir. 2022). To the

contrary, plaintiff states in his response that he
has stated a chronology of events, backed up by exhibits to his Original
Complaint and this motion that proves all of the elements of his claims for
reprisals and retaliation against him for his activities protected by the First
Amendment to overcome [defendants’] assertions and immunity claims.

(Docket Entry No. 38, p. 4.) Thus, plaintiffs response shows that the motion to dismiss
is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. FRCP 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), a defendant

may move to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Surviving a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion requires the
plaintiffs pleading of “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible where
the factual allegations “allow[ | the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When
considering a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion, the courts accept all well-pleaded facts as true and
view them in favor of the party opposing the motion. /n re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,
495 F.3d 191, 205 (Sth Cir. 2007).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does not
allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and
thus does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.
Id. at 556. While all well-pleaded facts are taken as true, the courts do not accept as true

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. Plotkin v. IP
Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (Sth Cir. 2005).
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Twombly at 557. If the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, then the complaint has alleged—but has not shown —that
the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and dismissal is appropriate.
B. Pro se Pleadings
Pleadings filed pro se are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Courts have adopted the
rule that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are to be liberally construed. Jd. Even though
pleadings by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard, courts must be able to draw

a reasonable inference from the pleadings that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The complaint must allege sufficient facts which
convince the Court that the plaintiffhas at least a colorable claim, and conclusory allegations
will not suffice. See Mills v. Criminal Dist. Ct., 837 F.2d 677, 678 (Sth Cir. 1988).
C. Individual Capacity
Plaintiff sues Collier and Linthicum in their individual capacity. To state a § 1983
claim against a defendant in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant was personally involved in the actions complained of or is responsible for the

policy or custom giving rise to the alleged constitutional deprivation. Alderson v. Concordia
Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that under § 1983, officials

are not vicariously liable for conduct of those under their supervision; they are accountable
for their own acts and for implementing unconstitutional policies that result in constitutional
deprivations); Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., Miss., 678 F.3d 344, 349 (Sth Cir. 2012) (holding that

a § 1983 claimant must establish that the defendant was either personally involved in the
deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation).
D. Supervisory Capacity
Plaintiff also sues Collier and Linthicum in their supervisory capacity. There is no
vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under section 1983. Thompkins v.
Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (Sth Cir. 1987). See also Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d
183, 189 (Sth Cir. 2011) (noting that the acts of subordinates do not trigger individual § 1983
liability for supervisory officials). A supervisory official such as Collier or Linthicum may
be held liable under § 1983 only if the official affirmatively participated in the acts that
caused a constitutional deprivation or implemented an unconstitutional policy that caused the
deprivation. Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (Sth Cir. 2011).
E. Retaliation
To state a claim for retaliation, a prisoner must allege (1) that he was exercising or
attempting to exercise a specific constitutional right, (2) that the defendant intentionally
retaliated against the prisoner for the exercise of that right, (3) that an adverse retaliatory

action, greater than de minimis, was undertaken against the prisoner by the defendant, and
(4) that there was causation, i.e., that but for the retaliatory motive, the adverse action would
not have occurred. Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (Sth Cir. 2003); Jones v. Greninger,
188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999). Claims of retaliation by prisoners are regarded with
skepticism, lest the federal courts potentially embroil themselves in every adverse action that

occurs within a state penal institution. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Sth Cir. 1995).
A prisoner must allege more than a mere personal belief that he is the victim of
retaliation. Jones, 188 F.3d at 325. Individual capacity claims such as the instant claims
must be pleaded with factual detail and particularity, not mere conclusory allegations.
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Sth Cir. 1995). The prisoner “must produce direct
evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario, allege a chronology of events from
which retaliation may be plausibly inferred.” Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.
F. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability “unless the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). Thus, to overcome

a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the official violated a
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the official’s challenged
conduct. Bakutis v. Dean, 129 F.4th 299, 303 (Sth Cir. 2025).

Courts have historically conducted a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Under the first prong, courts must determine whether a constitutional right would have been
violated on the facts alleged. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 395 (Sth Cir. 2004).
Under the second prong, courts must determine whether the defendant’s actions violated
clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Id. Courts are allowed to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs
should be addressed first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Ill. ANALYSIS
A. Improper Venue
Defendants move to dismiss for improper venue plaintiffs claims that arose at the
Clements Unit, which is located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division. Plaintiffs complaint raised claims against
defendant Joe Tovar that arose at the Clements Unit, and the Court severed and transferred
those claims to the Amarillo Division on May 31, 2024. The Amarillo Division dismissed
the claims on August 23, 2024.
Plaintiff acknowledges in his response that the Court severed and transferred the
claims, such that defendants’ argument is moot. He does not allege that any claims that arose
at the Clements Unit remain pending in this lawsuit. Consequently, defendants’ motion to
dismiss plaintiffs claims arising at the Clements Unit is DENIED AS MOOT.

B. Claims as to Cool Bed Housing
Plaintiff acknowledges, and public online court records show, that in 2017, TDCJ and
class-action prisoners settled their disputes in Cole v. Collier, C.A. No. 4:14-CV-1698, 2017
WL 3049540 (S.D. Tex.). As part of the settlement, TDCJ contracted with an outside
medical expert to create amethod of determining which inmates most needed air-conditioned
(cool bed) housing. See Tiede v. Collier, 796 F. Supp. 3d 275, 308 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26,
2025). Pursuant to the resulting protocols, a “heat score” is generated using information
from the inmate’s electronic health record. Jd. If an inmate has a heat score of one or above
(a positive score), an inmate is assigned to cool bed housing. Heat scores are updated
multiple times a day, and TDCJ reviews a report of changes in heat scores and a report of all
inmates with heat scores, which are both generated every night. /d. Thus, all prisoners are
evaluated on a continual basis as to heat scores, and the scores can change at any point based

on various factors, including changes in health records.
Plaintiff argues in his response to the motion to dismiss that he was forced to undergo
unwanted medical treatment for heat sensitivity through use of cool bed housing at the Gib
Lewis Unit in Tyler County and the Allred Unit in Wichita County during 2021-2022. These
allegations are separate from his retaliation claims against defendant Collier, infra.
The Allred Unit is located within the jurisdiction of the Northern District of Texas,
Wichita Division, and the Gib Lewis Unit is located within the jurisdiction of the Eastern
District of Texas, Lufkin Division. On June 14, 2024, the Court dismissed without prejudice

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and for improper venue all of plaintiffs claims that arose at the Gib Lewis Unit and Allred
Unit, including his claims for improper cool bed housing at those units. Consequently,
plaintiff may not reassert the dismissed claims and they do not provide grounds for the denial
of defendants’ motion to dismiss.
C. Plaintiff's DNR
Throughout his complaint and more definite statement, plaintiff alleges that his
transfers to cool bed housing violated the Do Not Resuscitate (“DNR”) form he signed in
2021 that declined all medical treatments, including cool bed housing. He attached a copy
of his DNR to his response. (Docket Entry No. 38, pp. 10-12.) Plaintiff argues that because
his DNR negated any justification for his transfers to cool bed housing, the transfers were
clearly retaliatory.
Plaintiff misconstrues the purpose and effect of his DNR. Through his DNR, he
declines as life-saving resuscitation measures any out-of-hospital cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, transcutaneous cardiac pacing, defibrillation, advanced airway management,
and artificial ventilation. /d., p. 10. By its own terms, the purpose of the DNR is to “direct
health care professionals to forgo resuscitation attempts and to permit the person to die a
natural death with peace and dignity. This Order does NOT affect the provision of other

emergency care, including comfort care.” Jd., p. 11, original emphasis.
Contrary to plaintiffs arguments, the DNR does not act to decline or prohibit non-
lifesaving, non-resuscitation medical measures, and did not act to prevent his transfer to cool

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bed housing. Plaintiffs allegations against Collier and Linthicum arising from their alleged
failure to comply with his DNR provide no factual or legal basis for a claim against Collier
for retaliation or any claims against Collier and Linthicum for constitutional violations. No
viable claim for relief under § 1983 is raised as to the DNR, and the DNR provides no basis
for denial of the pending motion to dismiss.
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs claims against them
arising from his execution of the DNR. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and
plaintiff's claims predicated on his execution of the DNR are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE as barred by qualified immunity.
D. Retaliation and Qualified Immunity as to Collier
Plaintiff contends that Collier retaliated against him for his newsletter articles that at
times reported negatively about TDCJ. He asserts that Collier retaliated against him by
reinstating pretextual heat scores, causing his transfers to cool bed housing or other units
without craft shops, and imputing information to the parole board to negatively influence his
parole decision at “secret meetings.” (Docket Entry No. 27, p. 3.)
The Court ordered plaintiff to file a more definite statement of the facts supporting
his retaliation claims against Collier. In response, plaintiff stated that because two wardens
at plaintiff's facilities mentioned his articles, “I am certain Mr. Collier had read my articles
about TDCJ’s losing the heat lawsuit.” (Docket Entry No. 27, p. 1.) Plaintiff further alleged
that he “is certain Mr. Collier had one or more [state classification committee] members levy

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heat sensitivity scores against him at various times in 2019, 2020, and 2021 to justify
transferring him to” cool bed units and other units. 7d. In response to the Court’s order to
state supporting factual allegations as to Collier’s personal involvement in plaintiffs heat

scores and unit transfers, plaintiff stated in his more definite statement that, “[I]f [I] were in
Mr. Collier’s shoes, [I] would have taken the articles [I] wrote about TDCJ’s loss of the heat
lawsuit extremely personally.” Jd., p. 3.
Plaintiffs conclusory assertions of his personal beliefs do not support a viable claim
for retaliation for purposes of FRCP 12(b)(6). See Jones, 188 F.3d at 324-25. Plaintiff's
allegations do not produce direct evidence of motivation or allege a chronology of events
from which retaliation may be plausibly inferred. See Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. Plaintiff

assumes that Collier read his newsletter articles and took them “extremely personally”
because that is what plaintiff states he himself would have done. However, plaintiffs
allegation as to what he himself would have done under the circumstances does not constitute
factual support of a retaliatory motive as to the actions taken by Collier.
Moreover, plaintiff's conclusory allegations do not suffice to establish causation.
Plaintiff acknowledges that his positive heat scores were generated by an algorithm based

upon such factors as his medical conditions and medications, and that the heat score system
was implemented for all prisoners as a result of class action litigation against TDCJ.
Plaintiffs pleadings show that he began submitting newsletter articles in 2018, that the heat

score system commenced in 2019, that he received his first positive heat score in December

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2019, and that he was not transferred from the Ramsey Unit until 2021 when he received a
second positive heat score. Plaintiff does not allege a chronology of events from which
retaliation may be plausibly inferred by this Court.’ See Woods at 1166. Moreover, because
plaintiffs factual allegations establish that his 2021 transfer from the Ramsey Unit was due
to a positive heat sensitivity score, his pleadings do not establish causation — that is, but for
the retaliatory motive, the complained of incident would not have occurred. McDonald v.
Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 2331 (Sth Cir. 1998). See, e.g., Streater v. Davis, No. 21-11253 (5th
Cir. Oct. 18, 2022) (per curiam) (dismissing prisoner’s appeal as frivolous for insufficient
factual allegations in the complaint to allow the court to draw the inference that he was
transferred because of a pretextual heat related condition). Plaintiff's retaliation claims are
premised on conclusory assertions and his personal belief that he was a victim of retaliation
and no viable claim is raised for purposes of FRCP 12(b)(6).
Moreover, Collier is entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs retaliation claims
against him. Plaintiff claims that the adverse actions purportedly taken by Collier —

pretextual heat scores and transfers to cold bed units — were in retaliation for plaintiffs
newsletter articles. The doctrine of qualified immunity affords protection against individual
liability for civil damages to officials “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

*Plaintiff alleges that his “bogus” transfers ceased in 2022 after he stopped writing newsletter
articles. However, the Court notes that the online Prison Legal News publication shows that plaintiff
published articles throughout 2023 and into 2024, including an article published on July 15, 2023,
entitled “Texas Prisons are Fire Traps,” which placed TDCI in an unfavorable light. The article can
be found at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2023/Jul/15/texas-prisons-are-fire-traps/ (last
visited March 2, 2026).
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow vy. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Here, the Court must determine
whether plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right and,
if so, whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable. See Rankin v.
Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103 (Sth Cir. 1993). Plaintiff pleads no factual allegations establishing
that, at the time of the purported retaliatory heat scores and transfers, he enjoyed a
constitutional right to not receive a positive heat score or be transferred to a cold bed unit.
To the contrary, it is well established that prisoners have no constitutional right to be
incarcerated in the prison unit or facility of their choice. Thomas v. Pearson, 342 F. App’x
21, 22 (Sth Cir. 2009). A prisoner has no constitutionally protected interest in placement in

a particular facility. Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996). Nor may plaintiff claim

a constitutional right to access a prison craft shop, as he admits that use of the craft shop was
aprivilege, not aright. Plaintiffacknowledges that he disputed the cold bed housing and was
subsequently removed from cold bed housing, but he complains that he was not then returned
to the Ramsey Unit or transferred to a unit with a craft shop. This latter complaint raises no
viable claim for relief, as he had no constitutional right to be returned to the Ramsey Unit or
be sent to a unit with a craft shop.
Defendant Collier is entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's retaliation claims
against him. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and plaintiff's retaliation claims
against Collier are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by qualified immunity.

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E. Remaining Claims Against Defendant Collier
It is unclear whether plaintiff contends that Collier conspired with any other
defendants as to the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. “To establish a conspiracy
claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that there was an agreement among the alleged
co-conspirators to deprive him of his constitutional rights and that such an alleged
deprivation actually occurred.” Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F. App’x 312, 314 (Sth Cir.
2019). “Conclusory allegations that do not reference specific factual allegations tending to
show an agreement do not suffice to state a civil rights conspiracy claim under $ 1983.” Id.
Plaintiffs allegations of conspiracy in his pleadings are conclusory and based on his personal
opinions, not specific factual allegations, and are insufficient to raise a viable claim for
conspiracy as to Collier.
Plaintiff additionally claims that Collier violated his well established constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment. However, plaintiff does not establish that, at the time of
Collier’s relevant conduct, plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right not to be
assigned to a cold bed unit following a positive heat score. Although plaintiff also claims
that he had a constitutional right to decline assignment to a cold bed unit because it was
unwanted medical treatment, he does not establish that, at the relevant times, cold bed
housing was recognized by legal authority as medical treatment. Even so, plaintiffs
pleadings show that he rejected his assignment to a cold bed unit and was reassigned to non-
cold bed housing. No violation of an established constitutional right is shown.

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Moreover, plaintiff fails to plead specific factual allegations sufficient to give rise to

a viable claim against Collier in his supervisory capacity, and the claims must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiffs claims against Collier are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred
by qualified immunity.
F, Claims Against Defendant Linthicum
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Linthicum violated his constitutional rights by
refusing to accept telephone calls and a letter from his free world friend regarding plaintiff s
heat score. He further claims that she failed to notice that he had another pretextual positive
heat score and failed to take steps to remove it on her own. He alleges that she exhibited
personal involvement in the unlawful actions of others by taking no steps to permanently stop
pretextual heat scores and unit transfers.
Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to raise a viable claim against Linthicum for
violation of his constitutional rights in either her individual capacity or supervisory capacity.
He does not establish that, at the time of the occurrences, Linthicum was constitutionally
obligated under established authority to accept telephone calls or letters from plaintiffs
friends. Nor does he plead sufficient factual allegations establishing that Linthicum
implemented an unconstitutional policy that caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Defendant Linthicum is entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs claims against
her arising from her refusal to accept telephone calls or a certified letter from plaintiffs

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friend. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and plaintiffs claims against
Linthicum are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by qualified immunity.
IV. STATE LAW CLAIMS
Plaintiff's pleadings raise state law claims over which the Court may exercise
supplemental or pendent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Under § 1367, “a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over specified state law
claims, which it may (or may not) choose to exercise.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). Under § 1367(c)(3), the “district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if... (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
The general rule in this circuit “is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction
over remaining state law claims when all federal law claims are eliminated before trial.”
Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prod. Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (Sth Cir. 2009). In
this instance, the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, and
it declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. See Bradley v. Sheriff's
Dep’t St. Landry Par., 958 F.3d 387, 396 (Sth Cir. 2020).
For these reasons, plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to being raised in state court.

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Vv. CONCLUSION
For the reasons shown above, the Court ORDERS as follows.
l. Defendants Bryan Collier and Lynette Linthicum’s motion to dismiss (Docket
Entry No. 37) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT.
2. Defendants Bryan Collier and Lynette Linthicum’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff's claims arising at the Clements Unit is DENIED AS MOOT, as the
claims were dismissed by earlier order.
3. Plaintiffs state law claims against defendants Bryan Collier and Lynette
Linthicum are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
4. Defendants Bryan Collier and Lynette Linthicum’s motion to dismiss the
remainder of plaintiff's claims against them is GRANTED and the claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
5. Any and all other pending motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
Signed at Houston, Texas, on this the /_ day of March, 2026.

KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11298092. Public record. Not legal advice.