# Savage

> District Court, D. Oregon · March 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11297065

## Case

- **Full name:** Rebecca Adams Savage and Outlaw Industries, LLC v. Elevenate, Inc., Elevenate AB, and Etanavele AB
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** March 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

REBECCA ADAMS SAVAGE and
OUTLAW INDUSTRIES, LLC, an
Oregon limited liability company,
Case No. 3:26-cv-00302-AB
Plaintiffs,
OPINION & ORDER
v.

ELEVENATE, INC., a Delaware
corporation; ELEVENATE AB, a
Swedish aktiebolag; and ETANAVELE
AB, a Swedish aktiebolag,

Defendants.

Daniel C. Peterson
Cosgrave Vergeer Kester, LLP
900 SW Fifth Avenue 24th Floor
Portland, OR 97204

Attorney for Plaintiffs
Andrew Gard
Francis Torrence
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP
888 SW Fifth Avenue Suite 900
Portland, OR 97204-2025

Attorneys for Defendants

BAGGIO, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Rebecca Adams Savage and Outlaw Industries, LLC bring this case against
Defendants Elevenate, Inc., Elevenate AB, and Etanavele1 AB.2 Plaintiffs allege breach of
contract, violation of Oregon Revised Statute § 646A.097, and intentional interference with
contractual relations. Torrence Decl. Ex. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 23–42, ECF No. 2. On March 11,
2026, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). See generally TRO. For the
following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Etanavele AB (“EAB”) is a Swedish manufacturer of ski apparel, general
outdoor apparel, streetwear, accessories, and other consumer goods under the brand names
“Elevenate” and “E11 . . . .” Savage Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 14. Defendant EAB is alleged to be the
corporate parent of Defendant Elevenate, Inc. (“Elevenate”)—the U.S. subsidiary of the
Elevenate brand. Compl. ¶ 2; Eek Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 25.
In August 2016, Plaintiff Savage entered into a “Restricted Common Stock Grant
Agreement” with Defendants Elevenate and EAB, whereby Plaintiff Savage was granted

1 The Court notes that both parties identify typographical errors with this Defendant.
Plaintiffs assert it should be “Etanevele,” Pls.’ Mot. TRO (“TRO”) 1 n.1, ECF No. 12, while
Defendants assert it should be “Etenavale,” Defs.’ Resp. TRO (“Defs.’ Resp.”) 1, ECF No. 22.
The parties are directed to confer on the correct spelling of this Defendant and docket a notice
with the Court.
2 Defendants Elevenate AB and Etanavele AB are aktiebolags, which in Sweden is akin
to a limited liability company or corporation in the United States. TRO 1 n.2.
350,000 shares of common stock in Defendant Elevenate “as remuneration for legal services
provided in connection with the establishment of and early work on” Defendant Elevenate. Eek
Decl. ¶ 3; Savage Decl. ¶ 5; Savage Decl. Ex. 1 (“Stock Agreement”), at 2, ECF No. 14-1. This
represented a 5.1% ownership interest in Defendant Elevenate; Defendant EAB owned the
remaining 95% interest. Savage Decl. ¶¶ 5, 11. Under the Stock Agreement, Plaintiff Savage was

guaranteed to collect no less than $50,000 for her shares under certain conditions. Eek Decl. ¶ 3;
Savage Decl. ¶ 5.
In December 2020, Plaintiff Outlaw—which is Plaintiff Savage’s company—entered into
an “Exclusive Service Agreement” with Defendants Elevenate and EAB. Savage Decl. ¶ 8; Eek
Decl. ¶ 4; Savage Decl. Ex. 2 (“Service Agreement”), ECF No. 14-2. Under the Service
Agreement, Plaintiff Outlaw was granted the “exclusive right to promote, market, and sell”
Elevenate brand products in the United States. Savage Decl. ¶ 8. In exchange for Plaintiff
Outlaw’s services, Plaintiff Outlaw was to be reimbursed for all expenses, paid a yearly fixed
payment, and paid commission on wholesale and retail sales. Id.; Defs.’ Resp. 3. Under certain

conditions, the Service Agreement could be terminated by either Plaintiff Outlaw or Defendant
Elevenate. See Service Agreement 8–9.
In the fall of 2025, Defendant Elevenate AB (“Vebua”) purchased all of Defendant
EAB’s assets, including Defendant EAB’s 95% ownership interest in Defendant Elevenate.
Savage Decl. ¶ 11; Eek Decl. ¶ 7. This acquisition occurred because of Defendant EAB’s
financial difficulties. See Eek Decl. ¶¶ 8–9. Defendant Vebua now operates and controls
Defendants EAB and Elevenate. See Savage Decl. ¶¶ 12–13.
In light of Defendant Vebua’s acquisition of Defendant EAB’s assets, on October 21,
2025, Defendant Vebua inquired as to whether Plaintiff Savage would be willing to sell her 5.1%
ownership interest in Defendant Elevenate. Eek Decl. ¶ 10. Defendant Vebua was considering a
further acquisition of Defendant Elevenate. Id. During these initial discussions, Plaintiff Savage
indicated that Defendant Elevenate had outstanding amounts owed to Plaintiff Outlaw. Id.
Defendant Vebua paid those amounts on or about October 23, 2025. Id. The next day, Plaintiff
Savage was offered $50,000 in exchange for her shares in Defendant Elevenate in addition to a

six-month opportunity to work with Defendant Vebua, with the opportunity for another six-
month extension. Id. ¶ 11.
On December 16, 2025, Plaintiff Savage informed Defendants of her acceptance of the
offer to purchase her shares, contingent upon Plaintiff Outlaw receiving outstanding commission
payments and expense reimbursements. Id. ¶ 13. Negotiations ensued, with additional
outstanding payments made to Plaintiffs on January 7, 2026. Id. ¶ 14. On January 9, 2026,
Plaintiff Savage and Outlaw accepted an offer to purchase Plaintiff Savage’s shares and
terminate the Service Agreement, with two additional terms. Id. ¶ 15; Torrence Decl. Ex. A, at 1,
ECF No. 26-1. Defendants accepted the additional terms, and on January 10, 2026, Defendants

emailed to Plaintiffs a Settlement and Stock Purchase Agreement and Termination of the
Services Agreement. Torrence Decl. Ex. B, at 1, ECF No. 26-2; Torrence Decl. Ex. C, ECF No.
26-3 (Termination of Services Agreement); Torrence Decl. Ex. D, ECF No. 26-4 (Settlement and
Stock Purchase Agreement). On January 11, 2026, however, Plaintiff Savage communicated that
she was reneging on the proposed agreements. Eek Decl. ¶ 16; Torrence Decl. Ex. E, ECF No.
26-5.
In light of the unsuccessful negotiations, on January 16, 2025, both parties sent notices
terminating the Service Agreement for cause. Savage Decl. ¶ 17; Eek Decl. ¶ 17; Torrence Decl.
Ex. G, ECF No. 26-7 (notice sent to Plaintiffs); Torrence Decl. Ex. H, ECF No. 26-8 (notice sent
to Defendants). This Complaint followed. Plaintiffs assert $244,384.06 in damages for breaches
of the Service Agreement, $301,290.74 in damages for breaches of the Stock Agreement, and
$305,290.47 in treble damages. Savage Decl. ¶ 22.
STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes courts to issue TROs. Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(b). The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction hearing
is held. W. Watersheds Project v. Bernhardt, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1008–09 (D. Or. 2019). The
legal standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are “substantially identical . . . .”
Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). The
standard for a preliminary injunction is a high one: it “may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts is irreparable harm and
inadequacy of legal remedies.” L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634
F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction
is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs move for a TRO prohibiting Defendants from “removing the funds owed to
Plaintiffs to Sweden to further Defendants’ ongoing efforts to avoid their obligations to
Plaintiffs.” TRO 3. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an order:
prohibiting Defendants from removing, injuring, destroying, selling, consigning,
transferring, encumbering, converting, concealing, or otherwise disposing of any
assets maintained in the State of Oregon, including the product inventory held at
the warehouse located at 14601 N Bybee Lake Ct, Portland, OR 97203, aside from
sales of product to U.S. based wholesale and retail customers in the ordinary course
of business; restraining Defendants from transferring, causing to transfer, or
permitting the transfer of any of Elevenate, Inc.’s assets, including payments made
for purchase of products to any other party (including to Etanevele AB or Elevenate
AB); and directing Defendants to deposit all proceeds of the sale of product
inventory or collections of debts with the court or into a designated escrow account
under the control of Plaintiff’s counsel during the pendency of this case.

TRO 2. Plaintiffs argue a TRO is appropriate here because, among other things, “[i]f no action is
taken . . . , any judgment Plaintiffs may obtain against Defendants will be unenforceable and
uncollectable in the United States and the likelihood that Plaintiffs will ever be compensated for
their damages will be virtually extinguished.” TRO 15. Defendants respond that a TRO is
inappropriate because, in relevant part, Plaintiffs purported irreparable harm is speculative and
purely economic. Defs.’ Resp. 13–14. The Court agrees with Defendants and finds that Plaintiffs
have not shown they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
To obtain preliminary relief, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely
in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. This means “harm that is immediate,
rather than remote or speculative.” Or. Firearms Fed’n, Inc. v. Brown, 644 F. Supp. 3d 782, 810
(D. Or. 2022) (collecting cases). Moreover, the harm must be “harm for which there is no
adequate legal remedy . . . .” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir.
2014). Thus, “economic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable harm, because
such injury can be remedied by a damage award.” Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television &
Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991); see also L.A. Mem’l Coliseum
Comm’n, 634 F.2d at 1202 (“[M]onetary injury is not normally considered irreparable.”).
Here, Plaintiffs purported irreparable harm is purely economic. See TRO 15 (asserting as
irreparable harm the inability to enforce and collect a judgment against Defendants for economic
damages). The Court finds that such harm alone is insufficient to support a finding of irreparable
harm. See Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 944 F.2d at 603; L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 634 F.2d at 1202.
Moreover, even if pure economic harm was actionable, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
that such harm is immediate. Plaintiffs’ evidence is speculative at best.
Here, Plaintiffs assert that they are likely to suffer harm because:

If no action is taken to restrain [Defendant] Vebua from removing Elevenate assets
from the United States or otherwise using such proceeds for its own benefit during
the pendency of this case, any judgment Plaintiffs may obtain against Defendants
will be unenforceable and uncollectable in the United States and the likelihood that
Plaintiffs will ever be compensated for their damages will be virtually extinguished.

TRO 15. Plaintiffs support this assertion with the declarations of Plaintiff Savage. Specifically,
since fall of 2025, Plaintiff Savage asserts that Defendants have undertaken “a series of sham
transactions in order to evade the existing obligations of Elevenate and EAB, including those
obligations owed to Outlaw under the Service Agreement and to Savage under the Stock
Agreement.” Savage Decl. ¶ 10. Moreover, since Defendant Vebua acquired Defendant EAB,
Defendant Vebua has moved “all of EAB’s assets to Vebua, leaving EAB and Elevenate with no
ability to conduct business and fulfill obligations to creditors, including Plaintiffs . . . .” Second
Savage Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 30. Consequently, Defendant Vebua now operates and controls
Defendant EAB and Elevenate and converts all their income. Savage Decl. ¶ 12. Indeed,
Defendants have told Plaintiffs that Defendants EAB and Elevenate are insolvent. Id. ¶ 15; see
also Second Savage Decl. Ex. 1, at 2–3, ECF No. 30-1 (“There are no assets or cash in
[EAB] . . . . [EAB] will move to liquidation, and the consequence will most probably be
liquidation of [Elevenate] as [it] holds no assets.”). Because of this, Plaintiffs have not received
timely payments of amounts owed. See Second Savage Decl. ¶¶ 4–7.
But as Defendants identify, Plaintiffs’ evidence is still lacking in the necessary factual
support. See Defs.’ Resp. 13. For example, although Defendants have made untimely payments
to Plaintiffs, Defendants have not altogether discontinued payments. See Eek Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14
(payments to Plaintiffs in October 2025 and January 2026); see also Second Savage Decl. ¶¶ 4–7
(untimely payments). Moreover, Defendants appear to have engaged in good faith negotiations to

terminate their contractual relationship with Plaintiffs. See Eek Decl. ¶¶ 10–16. In fact,
Defendants sent to Plaintiffs finalized agreements to purchase Plaintiff Savage’s shares and
terminate Plaintiff Outlaw’s Service Agreement as of January 10, 2026. Torrence Decl. Ex. B, at
1; see also Torrence Decl. Exs. C–D. But it was ultimately Plaintiff Savage who reneged on
those agreements. Eek Decl. ¶ 16.
All in all, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer immediate, rather
than remote or speculative, harm. That Defendant Vebua’s acquisition of Defendant EAB has
resulted in delayed payments to Plaintiffs and the transfer of Defendant EAB’s assets out of the
United States is insufficient to show that any potential judgment to be obtained by Plaintiffs will

not be recoverable. Moreover, Defendants submit banking data showing two accounts—one
maintained in New York and one global account—which, on Plaintiffs’ admission, show
additions of over $200,000 since litigation commenced between the parties. Pls.’ Reply 18, ECF
No. 28; Eek Decl. ¶ 26; see also Torrence Decl. Ex. K, ECF No. 26-11 (bank statements).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Plaintiffs’ harm is purely economic and
speculative. Accordingly, the Court finds preliminary relief inappropriate. See L.A. Mem’l
Coliseum Comm’n, 634 F.2d at 1202 (“[M]onetary injury is not normally considered
irreparable.”); Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th
Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury.”).
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, one of the four essential requirements of a TRO, the Court
DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [12].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2026.

AM . BAGGI
United States District Judge

9 — OPINION & ORDER

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11297065. Public record. Not legal advice.