# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296975

## Case

- **Full name:** Memphis in May International Festival, Inc. v. Arch Insurance Company
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296975

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the exclusion to acts by a pair of teenage brothers who fired BB guns at the interstate
- holding that the duty to indemnify “issue is not appropriate for summary judgment”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
)
MEMPHIS IN MAY INTERNATIONAL )
FESTIVAL, INC., )
)

)
Plaintiff,

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-02327-SHM-tmp
)
ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
)
Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendant Arch Insurance Company’s
(“Arch”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 33.) For the
reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendant’s motion.

I. Background
The following factual background is undisputed unless
otherwise noted. Plaintiff Memphis in May International
Festival, Inc. (“MIM”) has owned and operated the Beale Street
Music Festival (“Festival”) and World Champion Barbecue
Competition (“Competition”) (collectively “Events”) in Memphis,
Tennessee, since the 1970s. (ECF No. 36 ¶ 1.) MIM contracted
with the Memphis River Parks Partnership (“MRPP”) for a venue to

hold the 2023 Festival and Competition. (Id. at ¶ 2.) The parties
executed the Tom Lee Park Rental Agreement (“Park Agreement”) on
March 3, 2023, which designated Tom Lee Park, Ashburn-Coppock
Park, and surrounding staircases as the places MIM would use to
host the Events (collectively referred to as “the Park”). (Id.
at ¶¶ 2-3.) The Park Agreement included a section allocating
responsibility to pay for damage to the Park that might arise
during the period MIM would use the Park.1 (Id. at ¶ 6.) The City
of Memphis would pay the first $350,000 in damages. (Id.) MIM
agreed to place money into an escrow account to pay for the next
$250,000 in damages. (Id.) If damages exceeded $600,000, the
City of Memphis would pay an additional $150,000 in damages.

(Id.) MIM agreed to be responsible for all damages exceeding
$750,000. (Id.) The Park Agreement also required MIM to obtain

1 Plaintiff MIM appears to dispute this characterization of the Park
Agreement, but does not state specifically what part of the
characterization it disputes and does not dispute the existence or
language of the Agreement. (ECF No. 36 ¶ 6.) MIM responds similarly
to the description of the Park Agreement and the Arch Policy
throughout its response to Arch’s statement of facts. (See generally
ECF No. 36.) Therefore, the facts of the existence and language of
the Park Agreement are undisputed and the characterization in this
factual background is limited to this section and is not a legal
conclusion.
comprehensive general liability insurance and deliver it to MRPP.
(Id. at ¶ 10 and ECF No. 33-10 at 21.)

MIM obtained a comprehensive general liability insurance
(“CGL”) policy (“the Policy”) from Defendant Arch covering the
May 2023 Events. (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 11.) The CGL Policy is the
subject of this case.

On September 8, 2023, after MIM had hosted the Events, MRPP
sued MIM in Tennessee state court for breach of contract. MRPP
alleged that MIM had failed to pay for the damage to the Park
required by the Park Agreement. (See ECF No. 33-10 at 2-10 and
ECF No 36 at ¶ 19.) MRPP alleged $1,425,366 in damages, so that
MIM would owe an additional $675,366. (See ECF No. 33-10 at 2-
10 and ECF No 36 at ¶¶ 21-22.) MRPP’s complaint seeks $675,366
plus interest and attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 33-10 at 2-10.) The
state court case is ongoing. See generally Ct. Docket, Riverfront
Development v. Memphis in May, CT-3703-23 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Div.
9, filed September 8, 2023) https://circuitdata.shelbycountytn

.gov/crweb/ck_public_qry_doct.cp_dktrpt_frames?backto=D&case_id
=CT-3703-23&begin_date=&end_date=.
In August 2023, relying on the Arch Policy, MIM asserted
policy coverage for and defense against the damages MRPP sought
in its state case. (ECF No. 36, ¶¶ 25, 27.) Arch denied coverage
on October 13, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 26.) On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff
MIM filed suit against Defendant Arch in Tennessee court seeking
(1) a declaratory judgement that the Policy covers the damages
MRPP seeks from MIM in its state case, (2) breach of contract,

(3) promissory estoppel, and (4) statutory bad faith under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 56-7-105. (Id. ¶ 28.) Arch removed MIM’s suit to
this Court on May 16, 2024, and brought the instant motion for
summary judgment on all claims on June 12, 2025. (ECF No. 33.)

II. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
The Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. A federal district court has original jurisdiction of
all civil actions between citizens of different states “where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
For purposes of jurisdiction, MIM is a citizen of the State
of Tennessee, with its principal place of business in Memphis,
Tennessee. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.) Arch is a foreign corporation
organized under Missouri law with its principal place of business
in Jersey City, New Jersey, making it a citizen of Missouri and

New Jersey. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) The parties are completely diverse.
The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. In its
complaint, MIM seeks damages “in no event less than the total
sum of any damages that may be awarded to MRPP in the MRPP
Litigation and the total sum of all costs and fees incurred by
Plaintiff in defending itself in connection with said
Litigation.” (ECF No. 1-3 at 15.) MRPP seeks $675,366 in damages

from MIM in the state court case. (ECF No 33-10. at 8.) Even if
MIM is successful in defending the state court case, it will
seek attorneys’ fees from Arch for defending that case.
Plaintiff also alleges statutory bad faith under Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 56-7-105, which carries with it attorneys’ fees in this case.
(ECF No. 1-3. at 14.) Given the possibility that MIM will lose
its state court case and the attorneys’ fees at issue in both
cases, it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. The amount in controversy requirement is
satisfied. Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 377
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that jurisdiction under § 1332 is proper
where the amount in controversy “more likely than not” exceeds

$75,000).
Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the choice-of-law
rules of the forum state. See Performance Contracting Inc. v.
DynaSteel Corp., 750 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2014); Mountain
Laurel Assurance Co. v. Wortham, No. 217CV02660TLPTMP, 2018 WL
5269829, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 23, 2018). Where insurance
contracts lack a choice-of-law provision, “Tennessee courts
apply the substantive law of the state in which the policy was
issued and delivered.” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chester–
O’Donley & Assocs., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998);
see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 56–7–102 (“[E]very contract [issued
by any insurance company doing business in Tennessee] shall be

held as made in [Tennessee] and construed solely according to
the laws of [Tennessee]”).
The Policy does not have an explicit choice of law
provision. It was issued in Tennessee to MIM. (ECF No. 33-8 at
5-7.) Neither party disputes the application of Tennessee law,
and both parties argue citing Tennessee law. The Court applies
Tennessee law.

III. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court must
grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). The moving party must show that the nonmoving party,
having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, lacks evidence
to support an essential element of its case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1); Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th
Cir. 2018). All facts, evidence, and inferences drawn therefrom
must be “viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty. Sch., 47 F. Supp.
3d 665, 695 (W.D. Tenn. 2014).
The Court “is not required to speculate on which portion of

the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to
wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts
that might support the nonmoving party's claim.” InterRoyal Corp.
v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). Although
summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is ‘an integral
part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action’ rather than a ‘disfavored procedural shortcut.’”
F.D.I.C. v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir.
2009) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327
(1986)).

Questions of law are decided by the Court. Where, as here,
the Court has jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and
Tennessee law applies, the Court must “anticipate or predict how
the Tennessee Supreme Court would decide the issues based on all
of the available data.” Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. HECO Realty,
LLC, No. 1:20-CV-02631-STA-JAY, 2024 WL 4920771, at *7 (W.D.
Tenn. Sept. 24, 2024) (citing Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d
415, 422 (6th Cir. 2019). That task includes considering the

published opinions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Lindenberg
v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 348, 358 (6th Cir.
2018). Unpublished Tennessee Court of Appeals opinions are
considered persuasive, nonbinding authority, unless otherwise

noted. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(G)(1). Federal Courts must be
“extremely cautious about adopting substantive innovation in
state law.” Fox, 930 F.3d at 422.

IV. Analysis
The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “[i]nsurance
policies are, at their core, contracts,” and “questions regarding
the extent of insurance coverage present issues of law involving
the interpretation of contractual language” in the policies.
Garrison v. Bickford, 377 S.W.3d 659, 663–64 (Tenn. 2012). Courts
interpret insurance policies using the same tenets applied to
other contracts. Id. at 664. The policy should be construed as
a whole, in a reasonable and logical manner with terms given
their ordinary meaning, with the primary purpose “to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the parties.” Id., citing Clark
v. Sputniks, LLC, 368 S.W.3d 431, 441 (Tenn.2012)

Insurance contracts are “strictly construed in favor of the
insured, and if the disputed provision is susceptible to more
than one plausible meaning, the meaning favorable to the insured
controls.” Garrison, 377 S.W.3d at 664; citing Tata v. Nichols,
848 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tenn.1993). A “strained construction may
not be placed on the language used to find ambiguity where none
exists.” Id., citing Farmers–Peoples Bank v. Clemmer, 519 S.W.2d

801, 805 (Tenn.1975).
Here, the parties disagree about the meaning of the Policy
and whether it applies to the damages MRPP seeks in the state
court litigation. This Court construes each relevant clause of
the Policy in accordance with the above principles stated above.

A. Duty to Defend vs. Duty to Indemnify
MIM asserts in its complaint that Arch owes MIM both the
“duty to defend” and the “duty to indemnify” in the state

litigation against MRPP. (ECF No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 55, 71-72.) The
parties appear to agree that the duty to defend is determinable
at the summary judgment stage, while disagreeing about whether
the duty to indemnify can be resolved at that stage. (Compare
ECF No. 33-2 at 4-5 with ECF No. 35 at 10-13.)

B. Duty to Defend
For the following reasons, Arch has a duty to defend MIM in
the state court proceeding. Determining an insurer’s duty to
defend is a matter of law that “may be resolved by summary
judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact.”
Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d
302, 305 (Tenn. 2007). A duty to defend arises “solely” from
“the allegations contained in the underlying complaint.” Id.,

citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d
831, 835 (Tenn.1994). “An insurer's duty to defend the insured
is triggered when the underlying complaint alleges damages that
are within the risk covered by the insurance contract and for
which there is a potential basis for recovery.” Forrest Const.,
Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 703 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). An insurer
cannot “refuse to defend an action against its insured unless it
is plain from the face of the complaint that the allegations
fail to state facts that bring the case within or potentially
within the policy's coverage.” Drexel Chem. Co. v. Bituminous
Ins. Co., 933 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (internal

quotations omitted).
The duty to defend arises if even one of the allegations in
the concurrent state court case is covered by the insurance
policy. Travelers, 216 S.W.3d at 305. Although the duty to
indemnify is based on facts found by the trier of fact, the duty
to defend is “based on the facts alleged.” Id. Doubt about
whether the claimant in the other case has stated a cause of
action that falls within the insurance policy’s coverage “is
resolved in favor of the insured.” Id.
The Court must determine whether MRPP’s allegations in the
state court case against MIM are “within or potentially within”
the Policy’s coverage. Drexel Chem. Co., 933 S.W.2d at 480.
Doing so requires the Court to interpret the Policy.2

1. The meaning of “occurrence”
Arch’s Policy provides that Arch “will pay those sums that

[MIM] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance
applies.” (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 12) The Policy provides that the
insurance “applies to ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ only
if: (1) the ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ is caused by an
‘occurrence’ that takes place in the ‘coverage territory.’” (Id.
at ¶ 13) The Policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident,

2 MIM argues that the Court should examine the “entire factual
situation in determining whether the underlying suit alleges claims
that trigger the insurer’s duty to defend,” citing Main St. Am.
Assurance Co. v. Marble Sols., LLC, 557 F. Supp. 3d 844, 856 (W.D.
Tenn. 2021). (ECF No. 35 at 11.) The language from Marble Sols,
which is absent context, is unpersuasive. Under Tennessee law,
analysis of the duty to defend is limited to the underlying
complaint. In Marble Sols, the court did not look beyond the
underlying complaint. It considered the factual situation alleged
in the underlying complaint to determine whether the insurer had a
duty to defend. See Marble Sols., 557 F. Supp. 3d at 855-858. The
quote MIM uses from Marble Sols cites Gassaway v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 439 S.W.2d 605, 607 (1969), which discussed the “entire factual
situation” in determining whether an insurer was liable for damages
resulting from an underlying lawsuit, not whether the insurer had a
duty to defend that lawsuit. Id. The court in Marble Sols used the
standard the Court uses here, examining “solely…the allegations
contained in the underlying complaint.” Marble Sols., 557 F. Supp.
3d at 851 (citing Travelers, 216 S.W.3d at 305).
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
same general harmful conditions.” (Id.)
“The insuring agreement should be construed before the

exclusions.” Travelers, 216 S.W.3d at 306. Both parties agree
that, for purposes of summary judgment, the damage to Tom Lee
Park that MRPP alleges constitutes “property damage.” (Compare
ECF No. 33-2 at 7 with ECF No. 35 at 12.) The parties dispute
whether the damage to the Park was an “occurrence” as defined by
the Policy. (ECF No. 33-2 at 6 and ECF No. 35 at 10.) Where, as
here, the relevant factual record is undisputed, deciding whether
there was an “occurrence” under an insurance policy is proper
when deciding a motion for summary judgment. See Travelers, 216
S.W.3d at 304-08.
The Policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general

harmful conditions.” (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 13.) In Travelers, the
Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that “accident” in a CGL policy
means “an unforeseen or unexpected event.” 216 S.W.3d at 308.
That can include “negligent acts of the insured causing damage
which is undesigned and unexpected.” Id. The Tennessee Supreme
Court “consider[s] foreseeability from the perspective of the
insured.” Id. In general, this Court must construe the Policy
in favor of the insured. See Travelers, 216 S.W.3d at 305 (“Any
doubt as to whether the claimant has stated a cause of action
within the coverage of the policy is resolved in favor of the
insured”); see also Planet Rock, Inc. v. Regis Ins. Co., 6 S.W.3d
484, 491 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (giving the underlying complaint

a “liberal construction” in finding for the insured); see also
Am. Justice Ins. Reciprocal v. Hutchison, 15 S.W.3d 811, 815
(Tenn. 2000) (“If the ambiguous language limits the coverage of
an insurance policy, that language must be construed against the
insurance company and in favor of the insured”).
Defendant Arch’s central argument is that Plaintiff MIM
expected the damage to the Park because of clauses in the Park
Agreement between MIM and MRPP. (ECF No. 33-2 at 6-10.) Those
clauses include the damages allocation clause described above,
the parties’ general plan to inspect the Park before and after
the Events, and other minor clauses that require MIM to make
reasonable efforts to minimize damage to the Park. (Id.) As

stated, the damages allocation clause allocated the first
$350,000 in damages to the Park to the City of Memphis, the next
$250,000 in damages to MIM, the next $150,000 in damages to the
City, and all additional damages to MIM. (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 6.)
Arch argues that this clause in the Park Agreement means that
MIM foresaw damages to the Park, even those in excess of
$750,000, making those damages expected and not based on an
“accident” or an “occurrence” under the Policy. (ECF No. 33-2 at
6-10.) Plaintiff MIM responds that the damages in excess of
$750,000, for which it is being sued in the concurrent state
court case, were unexpected and are based on an “occurrence”
under the Policy. (ECF No. 35 at 12-13.)

The alleged damages in excess of $750,000 are based on an
“occurrence” under the Policy. MRPP’s complaint in the state
court case does not specifically allege what caused the damage
to the Park.3 (ECF No. 33-10 at 2-10.) The complaint does allege
the dollar amount of damages, along with an attached exhibit
detailing some of the specifics of the alleged damages. (ECF No.
33-10 at 7.) The complaint also alleges that damages exceeded
the $750,000 the parties allocated in the Park Agreement.
One might argue that MIM expected some damage to the Park,
but one cannot know from the complaint how the damage was alleged
to have occurred, and one cannot conclude from the undisputed
record that MIM expected damages to the Park to exceed $750,000.

MIM’s failure to expect the amount of damage alleged is evidenced
by the fact that the Park Agreement required MIM to purchase CGL
insurance to cover “property damages,” presumably because MIM
would be liable for all damages to the Park in excess of $750,000.
(ECF No. 33-10 at 21.) The same provision required MIM to present

3 The most specific statement in the complaint is that the damages
resulted “from [MIM’s] 2023 festivals.” (ECF No. 33-10 at 3.) That
statement comes from the complaint’s introduction, not its set of
numbered factual allegations. (Id.)
the CGL policy it purchased to MRPP and prevented MIM from
canceling that policy without notifying MRPP. (Id.)
The before-and-after Park inspections and the contractual

requirements that MIM take steps to minimize damage to the Park
do not demonstrate that MIM expected damages in excess of
$750,000. Merely taking precautions for an event is not
conclusive evidence that the precaution taker expected the event.
One would not say that one “expects” a fire because one owns a
fire extinguisher. Arch’s logic would imply that purchasing
insurance to cover an event means that one expects the event,
making insurance contracts meaningless. See Crestbrook Ins. Co.
v. Crosby, No. 2:22-CV-2406-MSN-ATC, 2023 WL 3767085, at *6 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2023) (“some outcomes that are foreseeable are
nevertheless ‘accidents’: Otherwise, a liability policy would be
rendered almost meaningless”) (citing Travelers, 216 S.W. 3d at
308-09).4

For purposes of determining the duty to defend, the damages
in excess of $750,000 that MRPP claims in the concurrent state
court case were based on an “occurrence” under the Policy. The
state court complaint does not specify the manner in which the
damages alleged occurred, and the undisputed record demonstrates

4 Although Crestbrook discusses this point in the context of whether
particular negligent acts are covered by an insurance policy, the
principle is the same as the principle here.
that MIM did not expect damage to the Park to exceed $750,000.
Because there was an occurrence, the state court claim, at this
stage of the analysis, alleges damages “within or potentially

within the policy's coverage.” Drexel Chem. Co., 933 S.W.2d at
480.5
2. Exclusion 2.j.(1), of Property “Rent, Owned, or
Occupied.”

After Tennessee courts interpret the insuring agreement,
they consider its exclusions. Travelers, 216 S.W.3d at 306. For
Arch to have a duty to defend, the MRPP state court allegations
must not fall under an exclusion and must come “within or
potentially within the policy's coverage.” Drexel Chem. Co.,
933 S.W.2d at 480.

5 MIM argues that this Court should decide that the damage MRPP
alleges to the Park is an “occurrence” based on a letter from Mark
Thompson of American Specialty, Arch’s authorized agent, to MIM.
(ECF No. 35 at 7, 12.) In that letter, Thompson says that the damage
to the Park constitutes an “occurrence,” but denies coverage on
different grounds. (ECF No. 33-8.) Inconsistent, out-of-court
positions taken by Arch and its agents are not relevant to defining
“occurrence” for purposes of the present analysis. An insurer may
give alternate or incorrect legal reasons for its denial of coverage
and not be estopped from correcting or offering different reasons
for denying coverage in court. See Richards Mfg. Co. v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 773 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (“if the insurer
gives proper notice of a reservation of rights it will not waive its
.
rights to rely on a breach of condition… It is not required that the
reason given for the insurer's position be legally correct. The
position taken may be correct, but for other legal reasons. It is
the insurer's conclusion regarding the existence or non-existence of
certain coverage that must be clearly and fairly communicated to the
insured, not its legal reasons therefor”)
Arch argues that the alleged damage to the Park is excluded
by 2.j.(1) of the Policy. (ECF No. 33-2 at 10-13.) That exclusion
provides that the insurance does not apply to “property damage

[to]…property you own, rent, or occupy.”6 (Id. at 11.) Arch
argues that MIM “rented” and/or “occupied” the Park, so that the
property damage alleged falls under the exclusion. (Id. at 11-
13.) Arch relies on the language of the Park Agreement between
MIM and MRPP, the property relationship between the two parties
established by that Agreement, and the meaning of the word
“rent”. (Id.)
MIM argues that it did not “rent” or “occupy” the Park, but
had a license to use the Park for the Events, so that the alleged
damage to the Park is not excluded by the 2.j.(1) exclusion.
(ECF No. 35 at 15-18.) In the alternative, MIM argues that there
is an exception to the exclusion that covers the damage alleged

in the state court case. Section 2.j. in relevant part, provides
that exclusion 2.j.(1) does “not apply to ‘property damage’…to
premises…rented to you for a period of seven or fewer consecutive
days.”7 (ECF No 35 at 15-17.) MIM argues that, even if it rented
the Park, the exception applies because any rental or occupation
did not exceed seven consecutive days, but lasted only during

6 “you” in this context refers to MIM, the insured party.
7 This exception to the 2.j.(1) exclusion does not include the terms
“occupy” or “own.”
the Events that took place during May 5-7, 2023, and May 17-20,
2023. (Id.)
MIM argues that “there are genuine and material factual

disputes as to whether MIM ‘rented’ the [Park] for the Events.”
(Id. at 17.) However, MIM disputes no facts relevant to this
issue. Instead, it argues that the Park Agreement between MIM
and MRPP is a license. That is, MIM disputes the legal
characterization of the contractual relationship between itself
and MRPP governing MIM’s use of the Park.
The Court need only interpret the Policy and the Park
Agreement to decide whether MIM “rented” or “occupied” the Park
for purposes of determining the duty to defend. Both are issues
of law, not fact. See Clark, 368 S.W.3d at 441 (Tenn. 2012)
(“[t]he question of the extent of insurance coverage is a
question of law involving the interpretation of contractual

language”) and Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn.
1999) (“[t]he interpretation of a contract is a matter of law”).
It is for the Court to interpret the Park Agreement and to decide
whether MIM “rented” or “occupied” the Park during the relevant
time.8

8 The Parties do not dispute the existence or content of the Park
Agreement. (ECF No. 36 at ¶2.) They only disagree about its
meaning.
Insurance policy exclusions “must be construed against the
insurance company and in favor of the insured.” Martin v.
Powers, 505 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 491 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tenn. 1973)).9

That standard is consistent with the standard that “contracts of
insurance are strictly construed in favor of the insured, and if
the disputed provision is susceptible to more than one plausible
meaning, the meaning favorable to the insured controls.” Martin,
505 S.W.3d at 517.
The Policy does not define “rent” or “occupy.” When a
policy does not define words, Tennessee courts give “those words
their usual, natural and ordinary meaning.” Marlin Fin. &
Leasing Corp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 157 S.W.3d 796, 809
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “rent” as “to pay for the use of another's

property.” RENT, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The
parties cite no cases and the Court is aware of no cases decided
under Tennessee law that define the phrase “own, rent, or occupy”

9 Arch quotes language from a 1998 Tennessee Court of Appeals case
that says “[e]xclusions should not be construed broadly in favor of
the insurer, nor should they be construed so narrowly as to defeat
their intended purpose.” Standard Fire Ins. Co., 972 S.W.2d at 8.
That appears to be a slightly different standard for interpreting
insurance policy exclusions than the standard used by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Martin in 2016. The Tennessee Supreme Court does
not appear to have cited language from Standard Fire since deciding
Martin. The Tennessee Supreme Court standard controls.
in the context of a CGL insurance policy, although that phrase
is relatively common in CGL policies. See 9 Couch on Ins. §
126:16 (“The two most common are exclusions related to property

in the insured's ‘care, custody, and control’ and to property
‘owned, rented, or occupied’ by the insured”).
Determining whether and for how long MIM rented or occupied
the Park initially appears straightforward. MIM signed the Park
Agreement with MRPP for use of the Park. (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 2-3.)
MIM was defined as a “renter” in that Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
The Agreement provided that MIM would “occupy and use the Park
from April 22,2023-May 27, 2023.” (Id.) That included necessary
set up and disassembly days surrounding the two Events. (Id.)
The period is longer than seven consecutive days, the exception
to the exclusion that MIM argues applies. MIM nowhere alleges
that it performed the Park Agreement on different dates or in a

way different than the Agreement provides. The Policy itself
refers to the Park as premises that MIM owns, rents, or occupies.
(ECF No. 33-5 at 15.) Based on the language of the Park Agreement
and the ordinary use of the words “rent” and “occupy,” it might
appear that MIM rented or occupied the Park for more than seven
consecutive days, so that the damage alleged by MRPP is excluded
by the Policy.
However, the inquiry does not end there. Tennessee courts
have not merely taken the language used in a contract conveying
a property interest to define the property interest at stake.
In Williams v. Starace, for instance, the Court of Appeals
concluded that a contract titled “Agreement of Purchase and Sale”

of a property was a lease of that property, not a sale. Williams
v. Starace, No. 85-162-II, 1985 WL 4074, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 29, 1985) (“This Court concludes that the ‘Agreement of
Purchase and Sale’ was, in effect a lease of the described
property”). The court analyzed the language of the contract
itself and the rights accorded the parties. Id. A federal court
applying Tennessee law took a similar approach in United States
v. Anderson Cnty., Tenn., 575 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Tenn. 1983),
aff'd, 761 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1985). There, the court examined
the property interest actually conveyed to a party (Union
Carbide) rather than the label the parties applied to the
property interest. The court reasoned that: “[i]n determining

what interest Union Carbide may have in [the property], however,
the Court is not bound by the terminology used by the parties to
the Contract.” Anderson Cnty., 575 F. Supp. at 576. This Court
must therefore consider the language and the rights accorded MIM
in the Park Agreement, and not merely characterize the Agreement
as a rental agreement based on its title and terminology.
MIM argues that, despite its title, the Park Agreement was
in fact a “license” to use the Park for the April 22 to May 27
period. (ECF No. 35 at 15-18.) MIM argues that, because the
Agreement was a mere license, it did not “rent” or “occupy” the
Park during that period, and that, if it did “rent” the Park, it
did so for fewer than seven consecutive days. (Id.) As stated,

this Court is aware of no cases decided under Tennessee law that
have collectively defined “own, rent, or occupy” or their
variations in a CGL contract. The only case of which the Court
is aware that speaks to this issue is Paktank Louisiana, Inc. v.
Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (E.D. La. 1988).
In Paktank, decided under New York law, the court concluded that
an insurance policy’s exclusion of property damage to property
“owned or occupied by or rented to the insured” did not apply to
a dock the insured had a license to use. Id. at 1093.10 This
Court will apply that principle here. If MIM can show that it
had a license to use the Park during the term of the Agreement,
the damage to the property would not be excluded by exclusion

2.j.(1).
“A ‘license,’ with respect to real estate, is an authority
to do a particular act or series of acts on another's land
without possessing any estate therein.” Lange v. Sullivan, No.
W201801218COAR3CV, 2019 WL 2024581, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8,

10 The Paktank court did find that the policy excluded the dock
damage because the insured “used” the property in accordance
with a different exclusion mandating that damage to “property
used by the insured” was excluded from coverage, an exclusion
not found in Arch’s Policy. Paktank, 688 F. Supp. at 1093.
2019) (citing Barksdale v. Marcum, 7 Tenn. App. 697, 708, perm.
app. denied (Tenn. July 14, 1928)). Licenses are “not
assignable, and [are] generally revocable at the will of the

licensor.” Anderson Cnty., 575 F. Supp. at 578, (citing
Barksdale, 7 Tenn. App. At 708). Licenses “generally do[] not
create an interest in land.” Lange, 2019 WL 2024581, at *2.
MIM cites Anderson Cnty., to demonstrate the difference
between a license and a lease.11 In that case, discussed above,
the court applied Tennessee law in deciding how to determine the
property relationship between the U.S. government, which owned
a piece of land, and Union Carbide, which used that land.
Anderson Cnty., 575 F. Supp. 574. In addition to the factors
cited above, the court wrote that, “[g]enerally, during the
existence of a lease, the tenant is the owner of the premises
and entitled to exclusive possession.” Id. at 577. The absence

of exclusive possession favored finding a license. Id. In
Anderson Cnty., stringent limitations on using and altering the
property weighed in favor of finding a license rather than a
lease. Id. at 578 (“control over the business of [Union Carbide]

11 Although the Policy uses the term “rent” rather than “lease,” the
two are largely synonymous. See LEASE, Black's Law Dictionary (12th
ed. 2024) “A contract by which a rightful possessor of real property
conveys the right to use and occupy the property in exchange for
consideration, usu. rent” (emphasis added). Even if the two are not
synonymous, the analysis in Anderson Cnty. is relevant in deciding
what a “license” is and is therefore relevant here.
and rights of entry and inspection retained by the owner of the
realty are so extensive as to negative any notion that a lease
of the realty was intended or effected”).

Summarizing the caselaw above, when determining whether a
party’s property rights constitute a license, Tennessee law
considers (1) whether there is specific authority to do a
particular act or series of acts on another's land without
possessing any estate therein; (2) whether the right is
assignable; (3) whether the rights are revocable at the will of
the licensor; (4) whether the user of property has exclusive
possession; and (5) the extent to which the use is limited and
regulated by the owner.

a. Authority to do particular acts
Factor (1) addresses the purpose of the agreement. “A
‘license,’ with respect to real estate, is an authority to do a
particular act or series of acts on another's land without
possessing any estate therein.” Lange, 2019 WL 2024581, at *2.

Section 1 of the Park Agreement provides that “[MRPP] hereby
grants permission to [MIM] to use the Park…for the Beale Street
Music Festival and World Championship Barbeque Cooking Contest.”
(ECF 33-10 at 11.) The Agreement later provides that “[MIM] will
use the Park for the Event (which includes the Beale Street Music
Festival and World Championship Barbeque Cooking Contest)…and
for no other purpose whatsoever without the prior written consent
of [MRPP].” (Id.) The language in the Agreement is clear that
MIM’s use of the Park is limited to a particular set of acts on

MRPP’s land during and surrounding the Events. It is not a
general grant of an interest in a property, but a specific grant
of the authority to do particular acts on a piece of property.
Factor (1) therefore favors finding that MIM’s interest is a
license.
b. Assignability

Factor (2) considers assignability of the potential
property interest. Section 24 of the Park Agreement’s terms and
conditions provides that “[MIM] shall not assign this Agreement.”
(ECF No. 33-10 at 22.) A license is not assignable. Barksdale,
7 Tenn. App. at 708. Factor (2) therefore favors finding a
license between MIM and MRPP.

c. Revocability
Factor (3) says that licenses are “generally revocable at
the will of the licensor.” Id. The Park Agreement does not
appear to be revocable at the will of the licensor, MRPP. No

clause in the agreement explicitly grants or denies revocability.
The third clause of the terms and conditions provides that
“[MRPP] shall have the right to immediately terminate this
Agreement upon the failure to comply with the Park Agreement,”
but later provides that MIM has a right to cure any such failure.
(ECF No. 33-10 at 15.) Therefore, this factor weighs against

finding a license for MIM to use the Park.
d. Exclusive Possession
Factor (4) addresses exclusive possession. Absence of a

right of exclusive possession suggests a license rather than a
lease. See Anderson Cnty., 575 F. Supp. at 577-78. The Park
Agreement provides that “[a]ny exclusive use of the Park by
Renter shall be limited to the places and times shown in this
Agreement (May 5 - 7, 2023 and May 17 - 20, 2023) or as otherwise
agreed in writing by Renter and Partnership.” (ECF No. 33-10 at
16.) Neither party has offered a written agreement altering this
section.
Section thirteen of the terms and conditions lays out
policies to maintain public access to the Park, even during the
“rental period.” (Id. at 19.) It provides that “[MIM] shall

ensure uninhibited public access from the Riverside Drive
pedestrian bridge across Ashburn-Coppock Park to Martyrs Park at
all times. To provide connected access to the riverfront
throughout the month of May, the Bluff Walk must remain open at
all times during the Event rental period unless closed at the
written direction of Memphis Police Department.” (Id.)
Section three of the terms and conditions provides that
“Representatives of [MRPP] shall be designated by [MRPP] prior
to the event and shall have the right to enter all portions of

the Park at any time and on any occasion, including entering the
portion of the Park rented to [MIM].” (Id. at 15.) Thus, the
owner retained a right to enter at all times throughout the
Agreement.
The Park Agreement does not grant a right of exclusive
possession to MIM. Factor (4) therefore weighs in favor of
finding that the Park Agreement grants a license.
e. Owner Regulation of Use

Factor (5) addresses the owner’s regulation of the
property’s use. In Anderson Cnty., the court found that “control
over the business of [the licensee] and rights of entry and
inspection retained by the owner of the realty are so extensive
as to negative any notion that a lease of the realty was intended
or effected.” The court therefore found a license rather than

a lease in the agreement to use the land. Anderson Cnty., 575
F. Supp. at 574. In the Park Agreement, MIM’s use of the Park
is also highly regulated by the terms and conditions. For
example, section five regulates the sale of alcohol by vendors
at the Park. (ECF No. 33-10 at 16.) Section eight mandates
approval by MRPP of any electrical, plumbing, carpentry, and
other services MIM requires during its use of the Park. (Id.)
Section eleven mandates how and when litter is to be removed and
limits the use of pyrotechnics at the Park. (Id. at 17.) Section

twelve prevents MIM from erecting fences at certain Park
locations. (Id. at 19.) Section fourteen bars MIM from driving
stakes into the ground at certain locations. (Id. at 20.) The
Operation Policy and Procedures detail the specific paths MIM’s
vendors, subcontractors, employees, and other associated persons
may use during the Events. (Id. at 23.)
In short, the Park Agreement’s regulations of MIM’s
activities are so extensive that characterizing MIM’s interest
in the Park as a leasehold or rental would be improper. Like
the agreement in Anderson Cnty., this factor favors finding a
license.
f. Conclusion

Factors (1), (2), (4), and (5) favor finding that MIM had
a license from MRPP to use the Park. Only factor (3) weighs
against that conclusion. Even if Factor (4), addressing
exclusive possession, were construed to weigh in favor of finding
a rental during the Event dates of May 5-7 and 17-20, 2023, that
period would fall under the exception to exclusion 2.j.(1).
Arch argues that this result would create a “moral hazard”
because other courts have held that the primary function of “own,
rent, or occupy” exclusions is to “prevent the insured from using
a liability insurance policy as if it provided property insurance
and insulate against the moral hazard problem where an insured
has less incentive to take precaution owing to the existence of

insurance.” Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 273 F. Supp.
2d 903, 912 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (internal citations omitted). That
argument is unpersuasive for three reasons.
First, finding MIM had a license to use the Park accords
with the general principle stated in Charter Oak. “Tennessee
Courts have uniformly held that licenses create no interest in
real property.” Lange, 2019 WL 2024581 at *2.
Second, the Park Agreement itself mandates and incentivizes
MIM to take precautions to minimize damage to the Park. The
Park Agreement explicitly provides measures MIM must take to
protect the Park.12 The Park Agreement’s damage allocation
clauses also incentivize MIM to minimize damage to the Park.

(ECF No. 33-10 at 11-12.)
Third, the Policy provides some level of property insurance
in exception K(1), discussed below. That section provides an
exception to exclusion 2.j.(1). Exception K(1) provides that

12 Clause seven states that “[MIM] shall promote positive messages
about the Park and urge its vendors, volunteers, BBQ team members
and guests, and ticket buyers to respect the Park to avoid damaging
the Park property”. The Operation Policy and Procedures state that
“[MIM] agrees to survey all irrigation prior to laying out and set
up the festival to minimize damage done to the system” and states in
detail other precautionary measures MIM must take to protect the
Park. (ECF No. 33-10 at 12 and 23-24.)
exclusion 2.j.(1) “do[es] not apply to damages to premises while
rented to you, or temporarily occupied by you with permission of
the owner, caused by fire, lightning, explosion, smoke, aircraft

or vehicles, riot or civil commotion, vandalism, leakage from
fire extinguishing equipment or water damage.” (ECF No. 33-5 at
59.) The “moral hazard” principle, that the exclusion must be
read so as to “prevent the insured from using a liability
insurance policy as if it provided property insurance”, does not
clearly apply to the Policy at issue here, because the Policy
does provide some level of property insurance.
Because MIM did not “own, rent, or occupy” the Park, but
had a license, in the language of the Park Agreement, to “use
the Park for the Event[s],” (ECF No. 33-10 at 11.) the alleged
damage to the Park is not excluded by exclusion 2.j.(1) of the
Policy.

3. Exclusion 2.a., of damages “expected or intended”
The Policy includes a different exclusion that Arch argues
applies to MRPP’s Park damages claims. Section 2.a. excludes
“property damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured.” (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 16.) Arch argues, for many of the
reasons considered above in the section analyzing the term
“occurrence,” that MIM “expected” the damages to the Park and
that the exclusion therefore applies. (ECF No. 33-10 at 17-18.)
“Expected or intended” clauses are common in insurance

policies. See generally 31 A.L.R.4th 957 (1984). The Supreme
Court of Tennessee has decided that, “in order to find that an
intended or expected acts exclusion applies, it must be
established that the insured intended the act and also intended
or expected that injury would result.” Tennessee Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49, 55 (Tenn. 1991) (emphasis in
original). Whether the insured expected and intended the acts
and consequences are “separate and distinct inquiries.” Id. The
“purpose of such exclusionary language is to prohibit the use of
insurance to provide indemnity for civil tort liability that
results from an insured's intentional wrongdoing.” Id. at 54.
Arch makes no argument and identifies nothing in MRPP’s

state court complaint alleging that MIM “intended” to damage the
Park. (ECF No. 33-2 at 17-18.) Arch also makes no argument that
MIM intentionally committed specific acts for which harm to the
Park was reasonably foreseeable. (Id.) If Arch were to contend
that the “act” was hosting the Events, the exclusion would be so
broad so as to swallow much of the Policy. It would be
inconsistent with the general purpose established by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee that such exclusions are to prevent liability
resulting “from an insured’s intentional wrongdoing.” Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d at 54. Insurance policy
exclusions “must be construed against the insurance company and
in favor of the insured.” Martin, 505 S.W.3d at 517. Tennessee

Courts have typically held this exclusion to apply to instances
of specific, intentional, harmful acts. See Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d at 56 (concluding that the exclusion
applied because a woman intended to injure someone by burning
money from a safety deposit box) and Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Buckner, 302 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)
(applying the exclusion to acts by a pair of teenage brothers
who fired BB guns at the interstate). Exclusion 2.a. does not
exclude the damage to the Park that MRPP alleges in the state
court case.13

4. Vandalism
Section K(1) in the “excess policy” portion of the Policy
provides that the relevant exclusions, including exclusion
2.j.(1) discussed above, “do not apply to damages to premises
while rented to you, or temporarily occupied by you with

13 Arch cites language from Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. that
“[i]t is immaterial that the actual harm was of a different
character or magnitude or nature than that intended.” 814 S.W.2d at
55. This principle governing the kind of harm “expected or
intended” from an action is limited to the analysis of “expected or
intended” exclusions, and not a general statement of the definition
of “expected” that would affect the analysis of “occurrence” above.
Id.
permission of the owner, caused by…riot or civil commotion, [or]
vandalism.” (ECF No. 33-5 at 59.) The parties appear to agree
that, if the damage to the Park were the result of vandalism,

this exception to the exclusions would apply and the Policy would
cover the alleged damage to the Park, triggering the duty to
defend. (Compare ECF no. 33-2 at 16-17 with ECF No. 35 at 18-
19.)
A duty to defend arises solely from “the allegations
contained in the underlying complaint.” Travelers, 216 S.W.3d
at 305. “The pleading test for determination of the duty to
defend is based exclusively on the facts as alleged rather than
on the facts as they actually are.” St. Paul, 879 S.W.2d at
835. Doubts about whether the claimant in the concurrent case
has stated a cause of action that falls within the insurance
policy’s coverage are “resolved in favor of the insured.”

Travelers, 216 S.W.3d at 305.
Section K(1) applies to premises “rented” to or “temporarily
occupied” by the Plaintiff. (ECF No. 33-5 at 59.) The Court has
concluded that, because MIM had a license to use the Park, it
did not “rent” or “occupy” the Park in the sense of the “own,
rent, or occupy” exclusion. That analysis applies to the term
“rent” here, but not necessarily to the term “temporarily
occupy.” Deciding whether MIM “temporarily occupied” the Park
at this stage, however, is unnecessary, because MRPP’s complaint
does not allege facts that trigger the clause.
MRPP’s complaint does not allege acts of civil commotion or

vandalism that might have damaged the Park. (ECF No. 33-10 at 2-
10.) The complaint does not allege or describe how the damage
occurred at all, beyond generally alleging that it occurred
“from” the Events. (Id.) MRPP’s complaint is insufficient to
trigger Arch’s duty to defend based on this exception to the
exclusions. Although it is possible that facts could emerge to
make this clause relevant in the course of litigation in this
case or in the state court case, the complaint does not allege
sufficient facts here. Therefore, this exception does not
require Arch to defend in the state court case.14
Because MIM had a license to use the Park, the damage to
the Park alleged by MRPP in the state court suit against MIM

falls within the Policy, triggering Arch’s duty to defend. The
Court DENIES Arch’s motion for summary judgment on MIM’s breach
of contract claim that Arch failed to fulfill its duty to defend.

14 This conclusion does not mean the exception will be irrelevant
when determining Arch’s duty to indemnify. Facts may arise in the
state case that may trigger this clause although those facts are not
alleged in the complaint.
C. The Duty to Indemnify
The duty to indemnify is distinct from the duty to defend.
“The duty to defend is based on the facts alleged, while the
duty to indemnify is based upon the facts found by the trier of
fact.” Travelers, 216 S.W.3d at 305.

Arch argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its
duty to indemnify. (ECF No. 33-2 at 4-6.) Tennessee courts and
courts applying Tennessee law typically refrain from deciding
the duty to indemnify at the summary judgment stage, especially
when the underlying case has yet to be resolved. See Marble
Sols., 557 F. Supp. 3d at 859–60 (“Because the duty to indemnify
turns on the facts as determined by a trier of fact, courts have
held that this question is not amenable for determination at the
summary judgment stage”, collecting cases); see also St. Paul,
879 S.W.2d at 834 (holding that the duty to indemnify “issue is
not appropriate for summary judgment”); Policeman's Ben. Ass'n

of Nashville v. Nautilus Ins. Co., No. M2001-00611-COA-R3CV,
2002 WL 126311, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2002) (“[b]ecause
an insured's duty to indemnify is dependent upon the outcome of
a case, any declaration as to the duty to indemnify is premature
unless there has been a resolution of the underlying claim”
(internal citations omitted)). MIM disputes facts that may or
may not emerge in the state court case, such as the causes of
the damage to the Park, which may affect this case. (ECF No. 35
at 19.) Summary judgment on this issue at this stage would be
premature.
The Court therefore DENIES Arch’s motion for summary

judgment on MIM’s claim of breach of contract for violation of
Arch’s duty to indemnify.

D. Promissory Estoppel

Arch also seeks summary judgment on MIM’s promissory
estoppel claim. (ECF No. 33-2 at 19.) MIM alleges that Arch is
promissorily estopped by representations of its agents that Arch
or its representatives would provide a policy that would cover
damage to the Park and delivered a policy that did not. (ECF No.
1-3 at 13-14.)
This claim depends on whether the Policy covers the damage
to the Park that MRPP alleges. The Court has concluded that the
Policy includes a duty to defend MIM in the state court case.
The Court has not determined whether the Policy includes a duty
to indemnify in that case. Therefore, it is unclear at this
stage whether Arch has failed to fulfill its promise to deliver

a policy that would cover the damage MRPP alleges, let alone
whether Arch is estopped. That precludes the Court at this stage
from determining whether Arch is promissorily estopped by the
representations of its representatives.
The Court DENIES Arch’s claim for summary judgment on MIM’s
promissory estoppel claim.

E. Statutory Bad Faith
Arch argues for summary judgment on MIM’s statutory bad
faith claim arising under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-105. (ECF No.

33-2 at 20-21.) Arch argues that § 56-7-105 does not apply to
CGL policies, like the Policy in this case, (Id.), citing For
Senior Help, LLC v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 515 F. Supp. 3d
787, 800 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) and Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Cherry, 213 Tenn. 391, 394, 374 S.W.2d 371, 372 (1964). MIM
concedes that those authorities preclude a bad faith claim on
the Policy at issue here. (ECF No. 35 at 22.)
The Court GRANTS Arch’s motion for summary judgment on
MIM’s statutory bad faith claim.

V. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS
IN PART Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court
DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
promissory estoppel claim and its breach of contract claims,
including its duty to defend claim. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s statutory bad faith
claim.

So ordered this 30th day of March, 2026.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296975. Public record. Not legal advice.