# Shelton

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · January 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296926

## Case

- **Full name:** Joshua Stockton v. LaTonya Shelton, Sergeant, Ester Unit, ADC, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** January 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION

JOSHUA STOCKTON PLAINTIFF

v. 4:23-cv-00806-KGB-JJV

LATONYA SHELTON,
Sergeant, Ester Unit, ADC, et al. DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to Chief
United States District Judge Kristine G. Baker. Any party may serve and file written objections
to this Recommendation. Objections should be specific and include the factual or legal basis for
the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the
evidence that supports your objection. Your objections must be received in the office of the
United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this
Recommendation. Failure to file timely objections may result in a waiver of the right to appeal
questions of fact.
I. INTRODUCTION
Joshua Stockton (“Plaintiff”) has filed this pro se action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging Sergeant LaTonya Shelton violated his Eighth Amendment right to receive adequate
medical care by denying him pain medications and an extra mattress when he transferred to the
Ester Unit on July 20, 2023.1 (Doc. 7.) Plaintiff, who is no longer incarcerated, brings this
claim against Defendant Shelton in her official and individual capacities. And monetary damages
are the only relief sought.

1 I have previously recommended that all other claims and Defendants be dismissed without
prejudice. (Docs. 15, 38.)
1
Defendant Shelton has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing she is entitled to
dismissal with prejudice. (Docs. 59-61.) Plaintiff has filed a Statement of Disputed Facts.
(Doc. 65.) After careful consideration and for the following reasons, I recommend the Motion
for Summary Judgment be granted, the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Shelton be
dismissed with prejudice, and this case be closed.

II. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, demonstrates there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Thereafter, the nonmoving party cannot rest on mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but
instead, must come forward with evidence supporting each element of the claim and demonstrating
there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S at
322; Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). In this regard, a factual dispute is
“genuine” if “the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-
moving party.” Greater St. Louis Constr. Laborers Welfare Fund v. B.F.W. Contracting, LLC,
76 F.4th 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2023).
III. FACTS
On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred from the Wrightsville Unit to the Ester Unit at
around 5:30 p.m. (Doc. 59-1 at 16.) At that time, he had an authorization allowing him to keep
several pain medications on his person (“OPM”) and a prescription for an extra mattress for the

2
treatment of chronic back pain.2 (Doc. 59-1 at 16-20; Doc. 59-2; Doc. 59-7 at 4-5, 9-10.)
Sergeant Shelton was working intake that evening. (Doc. 59-2.)
Plaintiff says Sergeant Shelton said she did not have time to inventory all of his property
because she needed to pick-up her child, put his property including his OPM medications in
storage, and gave him his OPM medications when she returned to work the following day at 9:00

a.m. to complete the inventory. (Doc. 59-2 at 16-28.) In contrast, Sergeant Shelton says she
inventoried all of Plaintiff’s property that evening and allowed him to keep his OPM medications.
(Doc. 59-2.) The property intake form, which says Plaintiff was allowed to keep his OPM
medications, is inconclusive because Sergeant Shelton signed it on July 20, 2023, while Plaintiff
signed it on July 21, 2023. (Doc. 59-6.)
During the July 20, 2023 intake, Sergeant Shelton did not give Plaintiff an extra mattress
because his copy of the prescription had to be verified by the Ester Unit staff. (Doc. 59-1 at 17-
26; Doc. 59-2; Doc. 59-3; Doc. 59-5 at 4; Doc. 59-9 at 2-3). After intake, Plaintiff went to the
infirmary for his initial health screening, but he did not have his extra mattress script validated at
that time.3 (Doc. 59-1 at 17-26; Doc. 59-2.) On July 22, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a Health

Request Form to the medical department seeking validation. (Doc. 59-3; Doc. 59-7 at 7; Doc.
59-8.) Plaintiff received validation on July 25 or 26, 2023, and Sergeant Shelton gave him an
extra mattress on the same day. (Doc. 59-1 at 17-28; Doc. 59-2.)

2 It appears those pain medications were duloxetine, diclofenac gel, and over the counter
medications. (Doc. 59-1 at 10-18; Doc. 65 at 25)

3 There is no indication in the medical records that Plaintiff asked for validation during his initial
medical screening. (Docs. 59-7, 59-8.) And, during his deposition, Plaintiff said he could not
remember whether he asked the medical department to do so. (Doc 59-1 at 22-24.)
3
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which is derived from the Eleventh Amendment,
precludes the recovery of monetary damages from state officials acting in their official capacities,
unless the state has waived its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989); Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016). Because Defendant Shelton is a
state official and the State of Arkansas has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, she is
entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s request for monetary damages from her in her
official capacity. Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1991).
B. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity shields a public official from suit for civil damages when his conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Carter v. Ludwick, 139 F.4th 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2025). State officials sued
in their personal capacities are entitled to qualified immunity from damages unless: (1) the facts

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or
statutory right, and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.
Jones v. Faulkner Cnty., Arkansas, 131 F.4th 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2025); Beard v. Falkenrath, 97
F.4th 1109, 1114 (8th Cir. 2024). If there is no evidence of a constitutional violation, as in this
case, then the analysis ends, and the defendants are entitled to dismissal. See Jones, 131 F.4th at
874; Smith-Dandridge v. Geanolous, 97 F.4th 569, 575 (8th Cir. 2024).
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must have evidence: (1) he had an
objectively serious medical need; and (2) Defendant Shelton subjectively knew of, but deliberately
disregarded, that serious medical need. See Dantzler v. Baldwin, 133 F.4th 833, 843 (8th Cir.

4
2025); Jones v. Faulkner Cnty., 131 F.4th 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2025). The parties agree Plaintiff
had an objectively serious medical need for his OPM medications and an extra mattress. See
Presson v. Reed, 65 F.4th 357, 366 (8th Cir. 2023) (an objectively serious medical need is one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment). And Plaintiff says the delay in
receiving them caused him pain. (Doc. 59-1 at 30.)

Thus, this case turns on the second element of deliberate indifference, which is a high
threshold that goes well beyond negligence or gross negligence. Hall v. Higgins, 77 F.4th 1171,
1179 (8th Cir. 2023); Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010). To establish
deliberate indifference, there must be evidence the defendants “recognized that a substantial risk
of harm existed and knew that their conduct was inappropriate in light of that risk.” Shipp v.
Murphy, 9 F.4th 694, 703 (8th Cir. 2021); Smith v. Lisenbe, 73 F.4th 596, 660 (8th Cir. 2023).
This level of mental culpability is “akin to criminal recklessness.” Presson v. Reed, 65 F.4th 357,
367 (8th Cir. 2023).
Here, it is undisputed the policy required the Ester Unit medical department to verify

Plaintiff’s extra mattress script. There is no evidence Sergeant Shelton acted with deliberate
indifference when she complied with that policy, instructed Plaintiff to obtain validation from the
medical department, and immediately gave him an extra mattress when he presented the correct
documentation five to six days later. See Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 343 (8th Cir. 2011)
(prison officials lacking medical expertise may rely on the medical staff’s treatment decisions).
Similarly, even if I presume Plaintiff did not have his OPM medications from 5:30 p.m. on July
20 to 9:30 a.m. the following morning, the denial of a single dose of medications does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. See Parks v. Hughes, Case No. 10-2581, 2010 WL 4323194
(8th Cir Nov. 3, 2010) (two-week delay in receiving OPM medications was not a constitutional

5
violation); Ervin v. Busby, 992 F.2d 147, 150-51 (8th Cir. 1993) (one-month delay in refilling
prescription was not a constitutional violation). Finally, there is no evidence Plaintiff complained
of pain during the brief delay in receiving his OPM medications or extra mattress. See Dantzler,
133 F.4th at (“self-reported assertions of pain” in the absence of corroborating evidence are
insufficient to establish detrimental effect of delay in medical care). And, more importantly, there

is no evidence Defendant Shelton was subjectively aware Plaintiff was experiencing any such pain.
Holden, 663 F.3d at 342 (no Eighth Amendment violation when prison officials were unaware a
prisoner was in pain).
It is clear from Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he was frustrated about not receiving
his OPM medications and extra mattress immediately upon arrival at the Ester Unit. But during
a prison transfer, certain security measures and validations are necessary. And doing so takes
time. Because nothing in the record before me suggests Sergeant Shelton acted with deliberate
indifference in completing these obligations, I conclude she is entitled to qualified immunity and
dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim against her with prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) be GRANTED, Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Shelton be DISMISSED with prejudice, and this case
be CLOSED.
2. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis
appeal from an Order adopting this Recommendation and the accompanying Judgment would not
be taken in good faith.

6
Dated this 9th day of January 2026. \ \)
JOE we
UNITERS YATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296926. Public record. Not legal advice.