# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · March 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296386

## Case

- **Full name:** Kikifer’s Entrepreneurial Academy, Keishonda Williamson, and Henry McDavid v. Winnebago County Community Health Board, Region 1 Planning Council, Winnebago County, Illinois, and Winnebago County Community Health Board Members
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296386

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that race discrimination is “not only judicially cognizable” but also “one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system,” citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION

KIKIFER’S ENTREPRENEURIAL )
ACADEMY, KEISHONDA WILLIAMSON, )
and HENRY McDAVID, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 25 C 50082
)
WINNEBAGO COUNTY COMMUNITY ) Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
HEALTH BOARD, REGION 1 PLANNING )
COUNCIL, WINNEBAGO COUNTY, )
ILLINOIS, and WINNEBAGO COUNTY )
COMMUNITY HEALTH BOARD )
MEMBERS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In March 2020, voters in Winnebago County, Illinois, approved a sales tax increase to fund
mental health services in the county. Defendant Winnebago County Community Health Board
(“the Board”) was tasked with administering $89 million of these funds, and in 2022, began to
distribute grants via a competitive application process. Plaintiff Kikifer’s Entrepreneurial Academy
(“KEA”), a private school founded and led by African Americans, applied for one of these grants,
but the Board rejected the application, ostensibly because KEA’s “financial history was
incongruent with the amount of requested funding.” In this lawsuit, KEA alleges the Board’s denial
of its grant application was in fact a function of race discrimination. KEA and two of its staff
members, Keishonda Williamson and Henry McDavid, have sued the Board and other municipal
entities alleged to play a role in the grant denial process. They assert claims under Illinois and
federal civil rights statutes, including the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, 740 ILCS 23/5; Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 & 1985.
Plaintiffs have voluntarily amended their complaint several times. The Defendants have moved
to dismiss the most recent iteration, arguing that the individual Plaintiffs lack standing, and that
KEA’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief. As explained below, the motions are granted and
the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The facts laid out below are taken from Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint [44], which
the court must accept as true at the pleading stage. Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678
(7th Cir. 2024).
Kikifer’s Entrepreneurial Academy “is a community-based, African American-led private
educational institution located in Rockford, Illinois.” (Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”) [44] ¶ 3.) The
school offers “youth-centered academic programming, entrepreneurship education, and holistic
support and mental health services,” and primarily serves African American youth. (Id.) On three
occasions—August 8, 2024, September 8, 2024, and October 26, 2024—KEA applied for a grant
from the Winnebago County Community Health Board for mental health funding.1 (Id. ¶ 45.) In
support of its grant applications, KEA produced dozens of supportive letters from community
members, some of whom offered live testimony at Board meetings in support of the applications.2
(Id. ¶¶ 46–50.) The grant applications were prepared, at least in part, by Keishonda Williamson
and Henry McDavid, two educators employed by KEA. Ms. Williamson is African American, but
Mr. McDavid’s race is unstated. (Id. ¶¶ 60–61.)
The Board rejected all three of KEA’s applications—the first was denied on September 4,
2024, and the second two met the same fate on December 4, 2024.3 (Id. ¶ 45.) The complaint

1 Plaintiffs do not state how much money they requested or what they planned to do
with it, but contemporary press accounts suggest they intended to construct a specialized facility
for mental health treatment. See Brea Walters, Rockford Private School Asks for Mental Health
Funding, WFIR CW (Jan. 2, 2025, at 17:34 CST), https://www.wifr.com/2025/01/02/rockford-
private-school-asks-mental-health-funding/.

2 The Third Amended Complaint does not state the date these meetings took place,
nor does it identify the community members that allegedly offered testimony. (See Third Am.
Compl. [44] ¶¶ 49–50.)

3 The Third Amended Complaint states that the applications were denied on these
two dates, but does not explicitly specify which applications were denied on which dates. Because
does not reference any sort of appeal process, so it appears that the Board’s denial was final.
The reasons for the denial are unclear; KEA claims that the Board officially reasoned that KEA’s
“financial history was incongruent with the amount of requested funding,” but provides no
additional detail on KEA’s funding request or financial history. (Id. ¶ 69.) Regardless, KEA argues
that the official explanation is pretextual; in KEA’s view, the Board’s reason for denying the
application rested on prejudice against African Americans. Whether KEA believes that a similarly
underfunded Caucasian-led organization would have been more favorably treated is not clear.
But the Complaint alleges that the Board adopted a preference for financial congruency that, while
ostensibly neutral, was designed to disqualify African Americans. According to KEA, African
American-led institutions have “limited cash reserves due to historical underfunding and ongoing
discrimination,” serve clients who “often lack insurance or have Medicaid with lower
reimbursement rates,” and invest in “cultural competency training and community engagement
that generates no direct revenue.” (Id. ¶¶ 71–74.) KEA has alleged that Defendants were aware
of the historic challenges KEA faces and favored applications from well-financed organizations
as a pretext to discriminate against African Americans. (Id. ¶ 77.) KEA also claims that
Defendants generally evaluated applications using “undefined and subjective evaluation
standards” that “favored white-led institutions” and “devalued forms of community support
essential to African American-led organizations” such as grassroots support from community
members. (Id. ¶¶ 83–86.) Defendants ultimately disbursed over $89 million to organizations that
were “white-led,” but nothing to “Black-led providers”, despite “numerous . . . comprehensive
funding applications” having been submitted by groups led by African Americans. (Id. ¶¶ 86–87.)
This lawsuit resulted. Plaintiffs filed the initial version of their Complaint on February 24,
2025, without the assistance of counsel. KEA is an institution that must be represented by an
attorney, see Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2011), but Mr.

only the August 8 application could have existed on September 4, the court assumes that the
remaining two applications were rejected on December 4.
McDavid and Ms. Williamson, neither of whom are lawyers, sought the court’s permission to
appear on their employer’s behalf, asserting that “KEA has been systemically denied funding,
rendering it unable to afford private legal counsel.” (Motion for Non-Attorney Appearance [22] at
1.) After the court denied this request [37], counsel appeared on Plaintiffs’ behalf [39] and filed a
Third Amended Complaint [44]. This Complaint alleges violations of the Illinois Civil Rights Act,
740 ILCS 23/5 (Count I), the Equal Protection Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II),
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Count III). It also alleges that
Defendants incurred municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV), conspired to violate
civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count V), and discriminated in contracting on the basis of race,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count VI). Defendants have moved to dismiss all counts pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) [51, 55, 58], Plaintiffs opposed [61, 62, 63], and Defendants replied
[64, 65, 68]. The motions are now fully briefed.
ANALYSIS
I. Article III Standing
Defendants argue, first, that Plaintiffs Keishonda Williamson and Henry McDavid, two
employees of KEA, lack standing to pursue this action.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution “confines” the jurisdiction of the federal courts “to ‘Cases’
and ‘Controversies.’ ” FDA v. All. For Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024). For there to
be a “Case” or a “Controversy,” each plaintiff in federal court must demonstrate standing—a
“personal stake” in the case. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). The
“irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing consists of three elements: (1) a concrete,
particularized injury in fact, (2) caused by the defendant, (3) that would likely be redressed by
judicial action. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing this requirement. Bazile v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir.
2020). But because Defendants have made a facial attack to standing, the court “must accept as
true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the
complaining party.” Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
At issue in this case is the concreteness requirement. To proceed in federal court,
Plaintiffs must allege a concrete injury that is “real, and not abstract.” Patterson v. Howe, 96 F.4th
992, 996 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). To meet this standard, the asserted injury must be
one with a “close relationship” to a harm that is “traditionally recognized as providing a basis for
a lawsuit in American courts.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417. This includes tangible harms, such
as monetary loss or physical injury, but also certain intangible harms that have been traditionally
remedied by the common law, such as defamation, intrusion upon seclusion, or the disclosure of
private information. The key question is whether the asserted harm has a “close historical or
common-law analogue”—an “exact duplicate” is unnecessary. Ewing v. MED-1 Solutions, LLC,
24 F.4th 1146, 1151 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424–25).
Williamson and McDavid lack standing because they have not explained how they
suffered concrete harm. The Complaint alleges that Ms. Williamson and Mr. McDavid are
educators employed by KEA who were responsible for preparing the grant applications at issue
in this case. (TAC ¶¶ 13–14.) They do not claim they were harmed financially by the grant denial,4
rather, they vaguely assert they suffered “severe emotional and psychological harm” after the
applications were denied. (Id. ¶¶ 60–65.) This clearly does not pass muster. The Seventh Circuit
has repeatedly considered various vaguely defined psychological injuries, including confusion,
stress, and worry, and has found such injuries insufficient to establish Article III standing. See,
e.g., Pierre v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 29 F.4th 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2022) (psychological harm
“induced by a debt collector’s letter” is not concrete); Gunn v. Thrasher, Buschmann & Voelkel,
P.C., 982 F.3d 1069, 1071 (7th Cir. 2020) (“infuriation or disgust” not concrete harms); cf.

4 Even if they had alleged, for instance, that KEA could have increased their
compensation if they had successfully obtained the grant, such a “harm” would be too speculative
because it relies on the actions of a third-party.
Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.) (unwanted text
messages qualify as concrete because they are similar to the common law “intrusion upon
seclusion” tort). The same applies here—it was their employer’s grant that was denied, not their
own, so they cannot show that they personally suffered a concrete harm.
Williamson and McDavid might suggest they suffered a dignitary or stigmatic harm, but
this runs into similar challenges. It is of course true that a claim of race discrimination is
cognizable in the federal courts, even absent any financial or physical consequence. Carello v.
Aurora Policemen Credit Union, 930 F.3d 830, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (observing that race discrimination is “not only judicially cognizable” but
also “one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system,” citing Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). But, again, plaintiffs asserting stigmatic harms must still show
that the discrimination affected them on a personal level, Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, 163 F.4th
1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 2026), and Williamson and McDavid have not done so. The operative
complaint simply alleges that KEA’s grant application was denied because it is an African
American-led organization, and that Williamson and McDavid are “educator[s] employed by KEA.”
(TAC ¶¶ 13, 14, 109.) There is no allegation that either individual is a member of the
organization’s leadership, or that Williamson’s race (McDavid’s race is not clear) played a role in
Defendants’ decision to deny the grant. Absent this information, the claims of the individual
Plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice.
II. Sufficiency of the Complaint
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a complaint need only “allege ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 921–22 (7th Cir.
2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 922 (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). At this stage in the litigation, the court accepts as true all well-
pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ctr. for
Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014).
In addition to these familiar standards, the court is mindful of Rule 8(a), which directs that
a complaint be a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” The Third Amended Complaint does not appear to meet this standard. The claims are
difficult to pin down, and the sprawling complaint focuses largely on extraneous details about
inequities in mental healthcare that may at some point have evidentiary value but are not sufficient
to state a claim. (E.g., TAC ¶¶ 5, 38–44, 74–78.) The Complaint also merges claims for relief; it
is difficult to tell, for example, whether Plaintiffs are offering a disparate impact theory, a disparate
treatment theory, or some combination of the two.
Nor is it clear who, exactly, harmed KEA. The court presumes that some of the allegations
are aimed at the Board, the entity that allegedly denied the grant application. But other
Defendants are listed as well, and the Complaint suffers from the problem of “group pleading,” a
practice where allegations are made collectively against all Defendants using vague language
that does not specify the role that each Defendant played in the case. Group pleading is not per
se impermissible—there is “no ‘group pleading’ doctrine, per se, that either permits or forbids
allegations against defendants collectively.” Robles v. City of Chicago, 354 F. Supp. 3d 873, 875
(N.D. Ill. 2019). But a complaint must include enough specificity so that each defendant has “fair
notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,
614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)); see also
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Each defendant is entitled to
know what he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful.”). In other words, “the key is to generally
name the ‘persons responsible for the problem.’” Cosby v. Rodriquez, 711 F. Supp. 3d 983, 997–
98 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (quoting Hyung Seok Koh v. Graf, No. 11-cv-02605, 2013 WL 5348326, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013)).
Group pleading is pervasive throughout the Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs lump
Defendants (each a different government agency) together without explaining the specific role
that each played in denying the grant. For example, the Third Amended Complaint states that
“Defendants imposed financial prerequisites that predictably excluded organizations providing
culturally competent care” (TAC ¶ 68), and alleges that “Defendants denied KEA funding [using]
a facially neutral justification that masks racial exclusion.” (id. ¶ 69). Plaintiffs thus assert that
someone denied their grant application for race-based reasons—or for facially neutral reasons
that have a disparate impact on the basis of race. But the Complaint does not specify which
Defendant did what, leaving the court guessing about the role that each played in the scheme.
This lack of specificity makes it impossible for the court to analyze, or Defendants to respond to,
the allegations made here. It does not give Defendants fair notice, and dismissal is appropriate.
See Knight, 725 F.3d at 818 (“A complaint based on a theory of collective responsibility must be
dismissed.”)
The court dismisses the Third Amended Complaint without prejudice. Plaintiffs have
already amended their complaint several times, but the court will allow a further pleading, and
directs that a Fourth Amended Complaint be filed within 28 days. The allegations in this document
(1) should focus exclusively on the acts of wrongdoing that are alleged to violate the statutes at
issue in this case; (2) should omit any extraneous or redundant details that are not relevant to the
claim; (3) should identify any discriminatory policies, or facially neutral policies that have disparate
impact, that are alleged to have resulted in the grant denial; (4) and should identify the dates and
actors involved in adopting the challenged policies, denying KEA’s applications, or engaging in
other unlawful acts.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motions to dismiss [51, 55, 58] are granted. As explained herein, Plaintiffs
have leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint within 28 days. This Amended Complaint should
specify the actions each individual Defendant is alleged to have committed and should otherwise
adhere to Rule 8’s direction to plead “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Defendants’ responsive pleading will be due 21 days thereafter.
ENTER:

Dated: March 3, 2026 é
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296386. Public record. Not legal advice.