# Reeves

> District Court, E.D. New York · February 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296195

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Reeves v. City of New York, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296195

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the custom or policy prong of the Second Circuit test for Monell liability

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————X
MICHAEL REEVES,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 24-cv-2408 (NRM) (MMH)

CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.

Defendants.
—————————————————————X
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Michael Reeves, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the City of New York, the New York City Police Department (the
“NYPD”), NYPD Detective Destiny Davila, and various other individual officers of
the NYPD. Reeves alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional and statutory
rights when NYPD officers arrested him, and Detective Davila seized and searched
his cell phone. Defendants have moved to dismiss Reeves’s complaint for failure to
state a claim. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part
and denied in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The below facts are drawn from the complaint, Compl., ECF No. 1, and are
assumed to be true for purposes of this motion to dismiss. Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ.,
9 F.4th 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff Michael Reeves is a Black man with diabetes. Compl. at 14–15, ¶¶ 20,
32.1 Defendants were familiar with Reeves and his history prior to the arrest. Id. at
5. At 6:00 AM on March 12, 2024, three NYPD officers arrested Reeves at his home.

Compl. at 14, ¶ 20. During his arrest, the officers “violently kick[ed] and bang[ed] on
the front door” and “threatened to break into the apartment if Reeves did not come
outside.” Id. at 14, ¶ 28. When Reeves stepped out of his apartment, “the officers
slammed him into the wall,” and Reeves “was violently placed into handcuffs.” Id. at
14, ¶¶ 28–29. During his arrest, Reeves complained of pain, notified the officers of
previous injuries, and requested that his hands be cuffed in front of his body. Id. at

14, ¶ 28. The officers instead cuffed his hands behind his back. Id. Following his
arrest, he was driven to the police station “as neighbors and other onlookers stared
in total shock.” Id. at 14, ¶ 29.
The police arrested Reeves in connection with a criminal complaint of
attempted rape made in December 2023. Id. at 5, 7, 10. Reeves denies committing
the crime alleged in the criminal complaint, id. at 6, and characterizes the criminal
complainant as a “disgruntled employee/house clean[er]” that Reeves had fired for

drug use on the job, id. at 9. Between the time the NYPD received the criminal
complaint against him and when he was arrested, Reeves had five interactions with
the police, some initiated by Reeves and some initiated by the police. Id. at 5. During
these interactions, officers did not arrest Reeves. Id. at 5–6.

1 The complaint contains information that is presented both in narrative form
and in numbered paragraphs. Accordingly, the Court uses both the ECF pagination
and, where appropriate, paragraph numbers when citing the complaint.
Following his arrest, Reeves was first held at a police precinct for several hours
before being moved to NYPD Central Booking. Id. at 14, ¶ 30. Officers repeatedly
searched his person, including by frisking “around his genitals and buttocks in public

view,” and seized his two cellphones. Id. at 7, 9. While in custody, Detective Davila
informed Reeves that “she was charging him with attempted rape.” Id. “After
[Davila] had searched through Reeves for hours, . . . she then gave Reeves a form to
sign” which purported to indicate that he consented to a search of his phone. Id. at 7
& 19, ¶ 72.
He was eventually released from Central Booking at approximately 1:00 AM

the following day, after receiving only a few cups of water and no food while in
custody. Id. at 7, 9 & 14–15, ¶ 30. Upon his release, Reeves was informed that “the
District Attorney decided not to prosecute because of inconsistencies [] in the alleged
victim[’s] statement.” Id. at 15, ¶ 30.
Reeves contends that the evidence gathered by the police “did not support” that
he had committed a serious sexual offense, id. at 16, ¶ 47, that the police arrested
him “[w]ithout conducting proper investigation with due diligence,” id. at 16, ¶ 52,

and that the police “had no articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion” that
Reeves had committed a crime, id. at 17, ¶ 53. Instead, Reeves asserts that he was
arrested “because he is a [B]lack man.” Id. at 16, ¶ 48. Reeves further contends that
“policy inactions” on the part of the City of New York and the NYPD led to his arrest.
Id. at 18, ¶ 65. Specifically, Reeves claims that “[t]he City of New York has failed to
adopt policies . . . and training against race-based arrest by law enforcement officers”
and that “[r]ace-based arrest [is] a known course of conduct by [the] NYPD.” Id. at
20, ¶ 87.
As a result of his arrest, Reeves suffered damages, “including economic and

non-economic injuries.” Id. at 17, ¶ 59. These include “financial losses,” id. at 15,
¶ 35; “a physical injury,” id. at 17, ¶ 60; “worsened” PTSD, including “extreme
depression and phobia,” id. at 17, ¶¶ 61–63, and negative impact on his “professional
and business opportunities,” id. at 15, ¶ 39.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Reeves filed the instant suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District

of New York on March 17, 2024. See generally Compl. The case was transferred to
the Eastern District shortly thereafter, Transfer Order, ECF No. 4 (Mar. 22, 2025),
and was directly assigned to the undersigned as a related case to Reeves v. N.Y.C.
Housing Auth., No. 23-CV-3646 (NRM) (MMH), Dkt. Order dated Apr. 1, 2024. U.S.
Magistrate Judge Marcia M. Henry granted Reeves’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis on June 28, 2024. Order, ECF No. 8. Pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121
F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997), Judge Henry also directed Defendant City of New York to

attempt to ascertain the identities of the unidentified individuals named as John
Does and Jane Does in the complaint. Id. The City initially identified Detective
Davila on August 12, 2024. Ltr. at 2, ECF No. 15.2 The City subsequently identified
Detective Davila as the arresting officer and identified four other officers who were

2 All page references are to ECF pagination unless otherwise noted.
involved in Reeves’s arrest on September 11, 2024. Status Report at 1–2, ECF No.
28.
Reeves raises multiple causes of action against Defendants, including (1) false

arrest against all Defendants, Compl. at 16;3 (2) excessive force against all
Defendants, id.; (3) malicious prosecution against all Defendants, id.; (4) negligent
infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants, id.; (5) Section 1983 illegal
search and seizure against Detective Davila, id. at 18; (6) invasion of privacy and
intrusion on seclusion against Detective Davila, id. at 19; (7) intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Detective John Doe 1, who supervised Reeves’s arrest, id.

at 20; and (8) respondeat superior against the City of New York and the NYPD, id. at

3 Reeves refers at various points in the complaint to the New York City Human
Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”), which is codified at N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.
See, e.g., Compl. at 4 (alleging Reeves suffered a “human rights violation under the
[NYCHRL]”). However, Reeves does not cite or describe with sufficient particularity
any specific provision of the NYCHRL that might provide a cause of action for the
claims he has alleged. Moreover, the Court notes the NYCHRL appears to expressly
exclude police officers acting in their official capacities from its coverage in situations
such as this. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-131 (“The provisions of this chapter which
make acts of discriminatory harassment or violence as set forth in chapter 6 of this
title subject to the jurisdiction of the commission shall not apply to acts committed
by members of the police department in the course of performing their official duties
as police officers whether the police officer is on or off duty.”). Accordingly, the Court
disregards references to the NYCHRL in the complaint. However, as discussed infra,
Reeves’s references to the NYCHRL and New York common law throughout the
complaint do suggest that he is raising several substantive claims — i.e., false arrest,
excessive force, and malicious prosecution — under both federal and state law. These
claims, both state and federal, will be evaluated below. See Smulley v. Fed. Hous.
Fin. Agency, 754 F. App’x 18, 22 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Courts should interpret pro se
complaints liberally to raise the strongest claims they suggest.” (citing Hill v.
Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011))).
22. Reeves also advances (9) a Monell claim against the City of New York. Id. at 18,
20.
On August 23, 2024, Reeves filed what he styled as an “Emergency Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,” ECF No. 26, which the
Court denied by written Order on March 31, 2025, Reeves v. City of New York, No. 24-
CV-2408 (NRM) (MMH), 2025 WL 974606 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025). Reeves also
moved for leave to file an amended complaint, ECF No. 55 (Feb. 22, 2025), which the
Court denied, Reeves v. City of New York, No. 24-CV-2408 (NRM) (MMH), 2025 WL
2778348 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, Dkt. Order

dated Sep. 30, 2025.4
Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on October 31, 2024. Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 39; Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def. Mem.”), ECF No.
40. Reeves filed a response on December 30, 2024. Pl. Opp’n to Def. Mot. to Dismiss
(“Pl. Opp’n”), ECF No. 47. Reeves also sought to stay this case, Mot. to Stay, ECF
No. 53 (Feb. 21, 2025), which the Court denied, Dkt. Order dated Feb. 26, 2025.

4 Reeves has filed to the docket many letters containing new allegations
against both the Defendants here and other entities not named in this suit. Reeves
sought to include at least some of these allegations in the proposed amended
complaint. Because the Court has previously denied Reeves leave to amend his
complaint to include these additional claims, the Court does not consider these letters
or the claims raised through them in the course of its evaluation of Reeves’s original,
unamended complaint. Cf. Ingber v. Truffleman, No. 13-CV-1207 (JS) (WDW), 2013
WL 5728254, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2013) (“Plaintiffs cannot amend their
Complaint through claims raised solely in a brief.”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Where, as here, a defendant has moved to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim, courts must evaluate whether the complaint pleads “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). On
the other hand, if “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief,” the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 558. Courts at this stage “must construe [the complaint] liberally, accepting all
factual allegations therein as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff[’s] favor.” Sacerdote, 9 F.4th at 106–07. However, courts need not accept
legal conclusions and “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 663. Complaints that advance only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
These standards apply to pro se complaints, but “[a] document filed pro se is to

be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation modified) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Reeves has named the NYPD as a Defendant in this
action. Compl. at 1, 3. “[T]he NYPD is a non-suable agency of the City.” Jenkins v.
City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also N.Y.C. Charter § 396
(“All actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law
shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency,

except where otherwise provided by law.”). Accordingly, the NYPD is dismissed as a
Defendant in this proceeding. See Malek v. N.Y. Unified Ct. Sys., No. 22-CV-5416
(HG) (RER), 2023 WL 2429528, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2023) (dismissing the NYPD
as a defendant in a case alleging violations of Section 1983).
The Court now considers each of Reeves’s claims in turn below.
I. False Arrest

Reeves’s first claim is for false arrest under Section 1983 and New York law
against all Defendants.5 Compl. at 16. “A § 1983 claim for false arrest is
substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Ackerson v.
City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation modified). “To plead false

5 The Court notes at the outset of this analysis that there is some ambiguity as
to whether the notice-of-claim requirements of New York law apply to Reeves’s state
law intentional tort claims — i.e., false arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Palmer v. City of New York, 564
F. Supp. 3d 221, 240–42 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (discussing this requirement in a factually
similar context and noting divergent conclusion in this circuit); Palmer v. City of New
York, No. 19-CV-5542 (RPK) (CLP), 2023 WL 3455058, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
2023) (revisiting the question after supplemental briefing by the parties). Reeves
attaches a notice of claim to his complaint, Compl. at 26–28, and appears to have
comported with the requirement that such notice of claim be filed within 90 days of
the alleged accrual of the claim, see N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e. Defendants have not
raised any arguments relating to whether the notice-of-claim requirements apply to
Reeves’s complaint, in part because Defendants appear to have interpreted Reeves’s
pro se complaint as not raising any state-law claims. See generally Def. Mem. (raising
arguments only as to federal claims). The Court declines to the reach the issue,
assuming without deciding that the notice-of-claim requirements present no bar to
Reeves’s state-law claims. This decision is without prejudice to Defendants’ ability
to raise such arguments at summary judgment.
arrest under New York law, a plaintiff must adequately allege that (i) ‘the defendant
intended to confine the plaintiff,’ (ii) ‘the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement,’
(iii) ‘the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement,’ and (iv) ‘the confinement was

not otherwise privileged.’” Palmer v. City of New York, 564 F. Supp. 3d 221, 243–44
(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir.
2019), then citing De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 47 N.E.3d 747, 760 (N.Y. 2016)).
“Probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest brought
under New York law or § 1983.” Ackerson, 702 F.3d at 19 (citation modified). “An
officer has probable cause to arrest when in possession of facts sufficient to warrant

a prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed or was committing an
offense.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997). While
“law enforcement officers are not required to explore and eliminate every
theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest” or “to continue
investigating, sifting and weighing information once probable cause has been
established,” an arresting officer’s “failure to make a further inquiry when a
reasonable person would have done so may be evidence of a lack of probable cause.”

Wagner v. Hyra, 518 F. Supp. 3d 613, 626 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation modified)
(citations omitted).
Here, Defendants assert that Reeves “cannot maintain a claim for false arrest”
because Reeves’s “arrest was supported by probable cause.” Def. Mem. at 10.
Defendants rely on the criminal complaint made against Reeves to establish probable
cause and argue that the Court may consider this document outside the pleadings at
the motion to dismiss stage because the criminal complaint is “incorporated by
reference[] and central to the case.” Id. at 8 n.1; see also Decl. of Joseph Zangilli dated
Oct. 28, 2024, Ex. A (“Criminal Compl.”), ECF No. 39-2. Defendants also contend

that Reeves’s complaint does not allege that “[t]he investigating officers had [any]
reason to doubt the truth of the victim’s statements” in the criminal complaint. Def.
Mem. at 11.
For his part, Reeves argues that “[t]he NYPD failed to conduct a proper
investigation,” Pl. Opp’n at 5, that “there was no reason to believe that Reeves had
committed a violent crime,” id. at 4, and that “the NYPD knew or should have known

that they lacked probable cause,” id. at 5.
First, the Court does not consider the criminal complaint at this stage because
it is not incorporated by reference or otherwise integral to Reeves’s complaint. “Some
courts have reasoned that it is proper to consider . . . police complaints in resolving
12(b)(6) motions for false arrest claims because these documents are integral to such
claims,” and “several courts have taken judicial notice of . . . police reports[] and
similar materials on a motion to dismiss, not for the truth of their contents, but rather

to establish their existence.” Alvarez v. Cnty. of Orange, N.Y., 95 F. Supp. 3d 385,
394–95, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (collecting cases). Other courts, however, decline either
to consider criminal complaints as integral to false arrests claims or to take judicial
notice of such documents. Id. at 395, 397 (collecting cases).
“[T]o be incorporated by reference, the complaint must make a clear, definite,
and substantial reference to the document[,]” and even “[l]imited quotation of
documents not attached to the complaint does not constitute incorporation by
reference.” Lewis v. Slaiby, No. 23-CV-0231 (VAB), 2025 WL 821039, at *16 n.4 (D.
Conn. Mar. 14, 2025) (quoting DeLuca v. AccessIT Grp., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60

(S.D.N.Y. 2010)). Reeves makes at most passing reference to the criminal complaint
in his pleading, and this is insufficient to incorporate by reference the criminal
complaint. Moreover, there is no evidence that Reeves “relied on th[is] document[] in
drafting the complaint.” Allyn v. Rockland Cnty., No. 12-CV-5022 (VB), 2013 WL
4038602, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013), aff’d, 646 F. App’x 60 (2d Cir. 2016). Reeves
complaint does not indicate on its face that the criminal complaint was even in

Reeves’s possession when he drafted his complaint. Finally, Reeves has challenged
the authenticity of the criminal complaint, Pl. Opp’n at 6, precluding its use at the
motion to dismiss stage, see Santiago v. City of Rome, No. 24-CV-00704 (BKS) (MJK),
2025 WL 553347, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2025) (“The requirement that there be no
dispute about the authenticity of documents integral to the complaint has been
interpreted strictly: even implicit, conclusory, contradictory, or implausible objections
to the authenticity or accuracy of a document render consideration impermissible.”

(citation modified)). Accordingly, the Court declines to consider the contents of the
criminal complaint at this juncture. However, because Reeves himself acknowledges
the existence of the criminal complaint while disputing its veracity, the Court takes
limited judicial notice of the fact that the complaint was made.
Turning to the motion itself, Defendants predicate their argument against
Reeves’s false arrest claim solely on the criminal complaint, contending that “there
was probable cause to arrest [Reeves] based on the complaint made against him.”
Def. Mem. at 11. However, “[a] report of a crime alone will not necessarily establish
probable cause.” Singleton v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 20-CV-9699 (LLS), 2021 WL

665032, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2021) (quoting Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 647
(2d Cir. 1994)). While “[t]he veracity of citizen complaints who are the victims of the
very crime they report to the police is assumed,” Miloslavsky v. AES Eng’g Soc’y, Inc.,
808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff”d, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir. 1993), law
enforcement’s receipt of this information does not necessarily establish probable
cause where “the circumstances raise doubt as to the [reporting victim’s] veracity,”

Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006).
Reeves does more than challenge the veracity of the criminal complaint as a
general matter; he cites specific facts that he asserts were or should have been known
to law enforcement after conducting only minimal investigation, such as the fact that
the “violent incident that allegedly took place on December 29th, 2023 . . . was not
reported until February 24, 2024,” Pl. Opp’n at 6, implying that the delay between
the alleged crime and the report should have alerted the police to the unreliability of

the criminal complaint. In his complaint, Reeves also characterized the criminal
complainant as having been made by a “disgruntled employee,” Compl. at 9, and
asserts that Defendants were familiar with Reeves and his background prior to the
arrest, id. at 5. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Reeves’s favor, as the Court
must at the motion to dismiss stage, Reeves has plausibly pleaded that Defendants
were aware of the earlier conflicts between him and the criminal complainant, and
that this knowledge gave rise to a limited duty to investigate before making an arrest
based on her bare allegations alone. Where “a bitter prior relationship exists and is
known to the arresting officer before the arrest is made, the complaint alone may not

constitute probable cause; the officer may need to investigate further.” Sankar v. City
of New York, 867 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation modified). Reeves
has specifically pleaded that police failed to take any such further investigative steps.
Compl. at 16, ¶ 52.
Reeves has pleaded sufficient facts, taken as true for purposes of this motion,
to demonstrate that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. See Hyde v.

Arresting Officer Caputo, No. 98-CV-6722 (FB), 2001 WL 521699, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May
11, 2001) (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations contain a ‘plausible interpretation’ of events and
thus ‘a court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)’ may not conclude
that probable cause existed.” (quoting Posr v. Court Officer, 180 F.3d 409, 415 (2d Cir.
1999))). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to Reeves’s false
arrest claims under federal and New York law.
II. Excessive Force

Reeves advances an excessive force claim under Section 1983 and state law
against all Defendants. Compl. at 16. “The elements of an excessive force claim
under Section 1983 are substantially the same as claims for excessive force [] under
New York law.” Batson-Kirk v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-1950 (KAM), 2009 WL
1505707, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2009). “The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use
of unreasonable and therefore excessive force by a police officer in the course of
effecting an arrest.” May v. Levy, 659 F. Supp. 3d 323, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (adopting
report and recommendation in part and modifying in part) (quoting Tracy v.
Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2010)). “Police officers’ application of force is

excessive, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, if it is objectively unreasonable in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Id. (quoting Maxwell v. City
of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004)). In order to be liable for an excessive
force claim, an officer must have been personally involved in the use of force. See
Spavone v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well
settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged

constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”).
“Personal involvement for the purposes of a § 1983 excessive force claim can be shown
where a police officer directly participates in an assault, or was present during the
assault with reasonable opportunity to intercede on plaintiff's behalf yet failed to do
so.” Palm v. Brooks, No. 22-CV-9729 (VB), 2024 WL 1908388, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 1,
2024).
Here, Reeves’s excessive force claim appears to rely on (1) the fact that “the

officers slammed him into the wall” prior to handcuffing him, Compl. at 14, ¶ 29, and
(2) the way in which he was handcuffed during his arrest, see id. at 14, ¶ 28 (stating
Reeves was “was violently placed into handcuffs” and handcuffed behind his back
despite complaints of pain and requests that his hands be cuffed in front of him). The
Court notes that, while Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint in its
entirety, they have advanced no specific arguments as to why Reeves’s excessive force
claims have not been adequately pled.
As an initial matter, at the time Reeves filed his complaint, the identity of the

officers who arrested him was unknown, and he accordingly named them
pseudonymously in the complaint. The City of New York subsequently identified
Detective Davila as the arresting officer and identified four other officers who were
involved in Reeves’s arrest. Status Report at 1–2, ECF No. 28. At the pleading stage,
Reeves “need not establish who, among a group of officers, directly participated in the
attack and who failed to intervene.” Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474

(S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005). And Reeves has sufficiently
pleaded the requisite personal involvement of the officers who allegedly conducted or
failed to intervene in the alleged excessive force at the time of his arrest.
The Court now considers the sufficiency of Reeves’s excessive force allegations,
beginning with his claim that officers slammed him into the wall before handcuffing
him. “[C]ourts have held that ‘not every push or shove’ in effectuating arrest
constitutes excessive force.” Salazar v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-1989 (KBF), 2016

WL 3748499, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2016) (quoting Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d
101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993)). However, “[t]he Second Circuit has emphasized that it is
typically inappropriate to dispose of an excessive force claim at the motion-to-dismiss
stage.” Ghani v. Town of W. Seneca, No. 24-CV-568 (GWC), 2025 WL 2323381, at *8
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing Oakley v. Dolan, 980 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2020)).
Evaluating Reeves’s claim “requires balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2010).
When “conducting that balancing” in the context of police conduct with
respect to a plaintiff, [courts] consider the following so-called Graham
factors: “(1) the nature and severity of the crime leading to the arrest,
(2) whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the
officer or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” [Courts] are also to
consider the so-called Figueroa factors: “[4] the need for the application
of force, [5] the relationship between the need and the amount of force
that was used, [6] the extent of the injury that was inflicted, and [7]
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.”

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989); then quoting Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 2016)).
Applying these factors to Reeves’s complaint, dismissal of the excessive force
claim is not appropriate. First, while attempted rape (the crime of which Reeves was
accused by the criminal complainant and which precipitated his arrest) is a serious
offense, the alleged crime took place several months prior to the March 12, 2024
arrest. No crime was ongoing at the time of Reeves’s arrest, and the arresting officers
were not placed in danger at the time of the arrest by the fact that Reeves had
allegedly committed a crime in December 2023. See Cox v. Fischer, 248 F. Supp. 3d
471, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (considering whether pre-arrest conduct was “dangerous [or]
threatening” when evaluating the first Graham factor). This factor thus weighs
against finding the arresting officer’s use of force reasonable.
Second, based on the allegations in the complaint and drawing reasonable
inferences in Reeves’s favor, there is no indication that Reeves either posed an
immediate threat to the safety of the arresting officers or actively resisted or
attempted to evade arrest. Reeves pleads that he did not resist arrest. Compl. at 14,
¶ 29. He also pleads that he exited his apartment at the direction of the officers, at

which point they “slammed” him into a wall and handcuffed him. Id. at 14, ¶¶ 28–
29. The facts as pleaded indicate that Reeves was compliant and nonviolent.
Accordingly, the second and third Graham factors weigh against the reasonableness
of the officer’s use of force. Moreover, in light of these well-pleaded facts, there was
no apparent need for this degree of force to effectuate Reeves’s arrest. See Ghani,
2025 WL 2323381, at *9 (holding that there was “little to no need for force” when

officers grabbed the plaintiff’s arm, pinned her against a wall, took her to the ground,
and forced her arms behind her back before the plaintiff began resisting once on the
ground). Accordingly, the first and second Figueroa factors also weigh against the
reasonableness of the officers’ use of force.
Third, the Court must evaluate the extent of any injuries suffered by Reeves
because of the alleged application of excessive force. Reeves pleads only that he
“suffered a physical injury” but does not describe the injury or its cause in detail.

Compl. at 17, ¶ 60. However, Reeves does attach to his complaint a medical record
from an emergency room visit on March 14, 2024, shortly after his arrest, which he
claims was “due to back injury derived from the illegal and humiliating arrest.”
Compl. at 31–32. Unlike the criminal complaint Defendants sought to have the Court
consider as part of the motion to dismiss, the Court considers this medical record
when analyzing the sufficiency of Reeves’s factual allegations because Reeves has
attached it to his complaint as an exhibit. See DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622
F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider . . . documents attached

to the complaint as exhibits . . . .”). This medical record indicates that Reeves was
diagnosed with “[a]cute left-side low back pain with sciatica, sciatica laterality
unspecified” and given acetaminophen, ibuprofen, and lidocaine. Compl. at 32; see
also Piper v. City of Elmira, 12 F. Supp. 3d 577, 593 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[A]lthough a
showing of excessive force does not require proof of permanent injury, de minimis
injuries may indicate that the amount of force was likewise de minimis.” (citations

omitted)); cf. Ghani, 2025 WL 2323381, at *10 (finding injuries, including a back
injury, to be “rather serious” where the plaintiff specifically pleaded that the injuries
were “caused” by force used during an arrest). In light of the latitude afforded to pro
se litigants like Reeves, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor at the
motion to dismiss stage, Reeves has alleged that he suffered injuries of some kind as
a result of the force used upon his body at the time of his arrest and that those injuries
led him to seek emergency medical treatment. Accordingly, and especially given that

Reeves has pleaded facts indicating that he posed no immediate risk to the officers or
anyone else at the time he was arrested, the third Figueroa factor weighs against the
reasonableness of the officers’ use of force.
Finally, the Court must evaluate whether the officers used force in good faith
or were instead maliciously or sadistically seeking only to cause harm. Nothing
alleged in the complaint would establish that the officers had the sole purpose to
harm Reeves. “Thus, though it is possible the officers acted unconstitutionally, these
circumstances do not suggest that the officers acted out of malice.” Ghani, 2025 WL
2323381, at *10. This factor is either neutral or in favor of Defendants. However,

the other factors heavily favor Reeves and thus preclude dismissal of the excessive
force claim.
The Court next considers that aspect of Reeves’s excessive force claim which
challenges the manner in which he was handcuffed. Claims of excessive force
predicated on tight handcuffing often present a high bar to plaintiffs. See Maila
Beach v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-06737 (ALC), 2023 WL 5576398, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 28, 2023) (asserting that “[t]here is consensus among courts in this circuit that
tight handcuffing does not constitute excessive force unless it causes some injury
beyond temporary discomfort” (quoting Johnson v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-5623
(ALC), 2020 WL 3100197, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020))). However, “[o]n an
excessive force claim involving handcuffing, ‘a plaintiff asserting a claim for excessive
force need not always establish that the plaintiff alerted an officer to the fact that the
handcuffs were too tight or causing pain,’ and the operative inquiry is ‘whether an

officer reasonably should have known during handcuffing that the officer’s use of
force was excessive.’” Baker v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 3d 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y.
2021) (citation modified) (quoting Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604, 613 (2d
Cir. 2019)). “A plaintiff satisfies this threshold if . . . the plaintiff signaled his distress
‘verbally or otherwise, such that a reasonable officer would have been aware of the
plaintiff’s pain.’” Id. (quoting Cugini, 941 F.3d at 613).
Here, the Complaint clearly alleges that the officers handcuffed Reeves behind
his back “despite his pleas of pain[] and repeated notifications of previous injuries
and request to be handcuffed in front.” Compl. at 14, ¶ 28. In light of the foregoing

analysis of the Graham and Figueroa factors as applied to Reeves’s arrest, and the
allegations that (1) Reeves complained of pain and specifically informed officers of
preexisting injuries that were exacerbated by the way his arms were handcuffed
behind his back and (2) the officers ignored these pleas, a reasonable jury could
conclude that the officers’ handcuffing of Reeves constituted excessive force. See
Baker, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 266–67 (denying a defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on an excessive force claim where the plaintiff “told [officers] that she had
an injured shoulder” and “complained that the handcuffs were too tight”).
In conclusion, presuming the truth of all Reeves’s well-pleaded assertions of
fact, a reasonable jury could conclude that this was a circumstance where little to no
force was warranted to effectuate Reeves’s arrest and that the arresting officers used
excessive force when they “slammed” him against a wall, as well as when they
continued to cuff Reeves behind his back despite his complaints of pain and his

alerting the officers that doing so exacerbated Reeves’s previous injuries. Defendants’
motion to dismiss the federal and state excessive force claims is denied.
III. Malicious Prosecution
Reeves raises a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 and New York
law against all Defendants. Compl. at 16. “In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim
against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish the elements
of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.” Alberty v. Hunter, 144 F.4th 408,
417 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation modified) (quoting Manganiello v. City of New York, 612
F.3d 149, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2010)). “To establish a malicious prosecution claim under

New York law, a plaintiff must prove (1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal
proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (3)
lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a
motivation for defendant's actions.” Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 161 (citation modified).
“[A] Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution does not
require the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution ended with some

affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that the criminal
prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022).
Reeves’s Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails at the first element.
Nowhere in the complaint does Reeves plead that a criminal proceeding was initiated
against him. To the contrary, his complaint pleads that, upon his release from
custody, he was told that “the District Attorney decided not to prosecute because of
inconsistencies [] in the alleged victim[’s] statement.” Compl. at 15, ¶ 30. Because

there was no criminal prosecution of Reeves, his complaint fails to state a claim for
malicious prosecution. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion with regard to this claim is
granted.
IV. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Reeves advances a state common-law negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim against all Defendants and groups this claim in his causes of action with his
claims for false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution. Compl. at 16–17.
Under New York law, “[t]o state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
a plaintiff must allege ‘a breach of the duty of care resulting directly in emotional

harm when the mental injury is a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the
breach and when the claim possesses some guarantee of genuineness.’”6 J.H. v.
Bratton, 248 F. Supp. 3d 401, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation modified) (quoting
Ornstein v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 881 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (N.Y. 2008)).
“Under this theory, the duty must be specific to the plaintiff, and not some
amorphous, free-floating duty to society.” Green v. City of Mount Vernon, 96 F. Supp.

3d 263, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation modified).
Reeves has failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
because he has not alleged a duty owed specifically to him. See id. (holding that, in a
case concerning allegations of unlawful search, false arrest, and excessive force,
“[p]laintiffs have alleged no such duty that the [d]efendant Police Officers specifically
owed them, and therefore they fail to state a claim under the direct duty theory”).

6 A plaintiff may also state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
under a bystander theory, where “a defendant’s conduct is negligent as creating an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about injuries to the plaintiff in consequence of shock or fright resulting
from his or her contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death
inflicted by the defendant’s conduct on a member of the plaintiff’s immediate family
in his or her presence.” Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 844 (N.Y. 1984)). Plaintiff does not “allege that
serious physical injury or death was inflicted by Defendant[s] on any member of
[Reeves]’s immediate family in [his] presence,” Green, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 299, and the
Court does not consider this theory of liability.
Alternatively, Reeves’s negligent infliction of emotion distress claim must be
dismissed because it is based on intentional conduct, i.e., Reeves’s arrest and the
alleged excessive force that accompanied it. See Regeda v. City of New York, No. 09-

CV-5427 (KAM) (VVP), 2012 WL 7157703, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 619567 (Feb. 19, 2013) (“[T]he negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim should be dismissed because it is based on intentional
conduct—the arrest of the plaintiff.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss as
to Reeves’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is granted.
V. Section 1983 Illegal Search and Seizure

Reeves advances a Section 1983 and Fourth Amendment claim for illegal
search and seizure of his cell phone following his arrest against Detective Davila.
Compl. at 18–19, ¶¶ 70–77. “An allegation of illegal search and/or seizure is
actionable under Section 1983.” RDK NY Inc. v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-01529
(EK) (JAM), 2024 WL 4333704, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2024) (citing Townes v. City
of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999)). “Under Riley v. California, ‘officers must
generally secure a warrant before conducting’ a search of ‘data on cell phones.’” Etere

v. Nassau Cnty., No. 24-1755, 2025 WL 2814406, at *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (summary
order) (first quoting 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) and then citing United States v. Smith,
967 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2020)). However, “‘[i]t is well settled that one of the
specifically established exceptions’ to the Fourth Amendment requirements that
private property not be searched without a search warrant issued upon probable
cause ‘is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.’” United States v. O’Brien,
926 F.3d 57, 75 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation modified).
Here, Reeves appears to allege that Detective Davila did not have a warrant

to search the content of his cell phone, Compl. at 19, ¶ 77, and Defendants do not
dispute this, see generally Def. Mem. at 6–7. Instead, Defendants assert that the
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies because
Reeves signed a consent form.7 Id. at 7. Reeves acknowledges in his complaint that
he signed a consent form, Compl. at 7, but alleges that Detective Davila only
presented him with the consent form after she had already searched the contents of

his cell phone, id. at 11, ¶ 6 & 19, ¶ 72; Pl. Opp’n at 10 (“Detective Davilla [sic] had
already browsed through the contents of his phone at least once before she offered
[Reeves] the sheet to allow her to look through the phone, a few more times.”).
Taking the well-pleaded facts in Reeves’s complaint as true, he has sufficiently
stated a Section 1983 illegal or unreasonable search and seizure claim. A consent
form presented to a suspect and executed only after a search is conducted does not
retroactively validate an unreasonable, warrantless search. See United States v.

Lawson, 961 F. Supp. 2d 496, 505–06 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The written consent which
[the criminal defendant] subsequently executed is of no effect, since the search had
already occurred.” (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 678

7 For the same reasons articulated supra with regard to the criminal complaint
against Reeves, the Court does not find the consent form itself, which Defendants
have attempted to put into the record, to be incorporated by reference or otherwise
integral to the complaint and therefore does not consider it at the motion to dismiss
stage.
(11th Cir. 2000))). It is true that consent can be given verbally, not just in writing,
see United States v. Collins, No. 19-CR-395 (PKC), 2020 WL 5439658, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sep. 9, 2020), aff’d, No. 21-1291, 2023 WL 309605 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2023), and the

relevant inquiry in a case such as this is “whether the officer had a reasonable basis
for believing that there had been consent to the search,” O’Brien, 926 F.3d at 77.
Whether Reeves signed a valid post-search consent form is one factor to consider in
determining whether he verbally or otherwise consented to the search before it
occurred. See Unites States v. Garcia, No. 09-CR-330 (DLI), 2011 WL 6010296, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2011) (“The court must determine whether the waiver was

voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances.” (citing United States v. Yu–
Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1119 (2d Cir. 1995))); United States v. Gore, No. 94-CR-282
(LMM), 1994 WL 698274, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1994) (“Defendant having orally
consented to the search, his execution of a consent form was actually not necessary,
although he did so.”). But the complaint does not allege that Reeves verbally
consented ex ante to a search of his cell phone. The validity and timing of Reeves’s
purported consent to the search are fact questions that are inappropriate to resolve

at the motion to dismiss stage, and, accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this
claim is denied.
VI. Invasion of Privacy and Intrusion on Seclusion
Reeves also raises what appear to be common-law invasion of privacy and
intrusion on seclusion claims against Detective Davila, though Reeves does not plead
any specific facts to support these claims. Compl. at 19, ¶ 78. However, New York
law recognizes neither of these common-law causes of action. Cooper v. Mount Sinai
Health Sys., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 3d 369, 379 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“New York law does
not recognize a legal claim for invasion of privacy.” (citing Howell v. N.Y. Post Co.,

Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993))); Hamlett v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
931 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“New York has consistently refused to
recognize a common law right of privacy, and hence there is no cause of action of
intrusion upon seclusion under New York law.”). Moreover, Section 50 of the New
York Civil Rights Law, which codifies a statutory right to privacy, is inapplicable
here, as it only prohibits the unauthorized use of a person’s name, picture, likeness,

or voice “for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade.” N.Y. Civ. Rights Law
§ 50; see also id. § 51 (providing for actions for injunction and damages to remedy
violations of Section 50). Finally, even if these causes of action existed under New
York law, Reeves has not sufficiently pleaded them. See Huan v. Fauci, No. 22-CV-
7392 (DG) (RML), 2024 WL 1181476, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1174538 (Mar. 19, 2024) (“Merely invoking a
cause of action, and even reciting its elements, is insufficient to state a claim absent

actual factual support for each element.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss these claims is granted.
VII. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Reeves advances a state common-law intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim against Detective John Doe 1, who Reeves alleges supervised his
arrest. Compl. at 20, ¶¶ 79–83. The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim under New York law are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,
measured by the reasonable bounds of decency tolerated by society; (2) intent to cause
or disregard or a substantial probability of causing severe emotional distress; (3) a

causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe emotional
distress.” Sorrell v. Cnty. of Nassau, 162 F. Supp. 3d 156, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). “The
conduct at issue must transcend the bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id.
Reeves alleges that John Doe 1 “acted intentionally by subjecting Reeves to a
humiliating public arrest” and asserts that the “conduct was extreme and

outrageous.” Compl. at 20 ¶¶ 80–81. However, allegations of false arrest, without
more, do not sufficiently plead the extreme and outrageous conduct required to state
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law. See
Sorrell, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 172 (“Plaintiffs, however, have not presented any
argument that defendants’ conduct [of alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution]
rose to the level of outrageous character required to sustain [an intentional infliction
of emotional distress] claim.”); cf. Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp. 2d 232,

284–87 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying summary judgment on an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim where (1) the court found evidence that the individual officer
falsely arrested, used excessive force against, maliciously prosecuted, and conspired
to fabricate evidence against the plaintiffs; and the individual officer’s “course of
conduct” included (2) stating that pregnant plaintiff’s children would be taken away
from her if she went to prison; (3) repeatedly using ethnic slurs against plaintiffs
during their arrest and interrogation; and (4) personally ordering pregnant plaintiff
strip searched). “Moreover, New York courts, as well as federal courts applying New
York law, have consistently held that where alleged conduct ‘fits well within the

traditional tort theories of false arrest and malicious prosecution,’ a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is not available.” Weaver v. City of New
York, No. 13-CV-20 (CBA) (SMG), 2014 WL 950041, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014)
(citation modified) (quoting Yang Feng Zhao v. City of New York, 656 F. Supp. 2d 375,
404–05 (S.D.N.Y.2009)).
Reeves’s allegations against John Doe 1, which are limited to supervising what

Reeves contends was a false arrest under state and federal law, are insufficient as a
matter of law to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is granted.
VIII. Monell Liability
Reeves invokes, as separate causes of action, both (1) the Monell doctrine of
municipal liability under Section 1983, Compl. at 18, ¶¶ 65–69, and (2) failure to
train or supervise under Section 1983, id. at 20–22, ¶¶84–93. However, failure to

train or supervise is not a separate cause of action but rather one theory by which a
plaintiff can establish a “custom or policy” for purposes of Monell liability. See
Cordero v. City of New York, 282 F. Supp. 3d 549, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (discussing the
custom or policy prong of the Second Circuit test for Monell liability). Accordingly,
the Court construes Counts II and VI of the complaint as a single claim to extend
liability for the alleged violations of Section 1983 against the City of New York under
the Monell doctrine. See Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Monell does not provide a separate cause of action for the failure by the government
to train its employees; it extends liability to a municipal organization where that

organization’s failure to train, or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned, led to
an independent constitutional violation.”).
A municipality can be liable under Section 1983 if a plaintiff’s rights are
violated “by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality.” Jones v.
Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)). A plaintiff must show (1) “a municipal policy or custom beyond

a single bad act by an officer” and (2) “a causal connection between the custom or
policy and the plaintiff’s loss of liberty.” Cordero, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (citing K.D.
ex rel. Duncan v. White Plains Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
and Vippolis v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985)). A “custom or
policy” may be shown by “a failure by official policy-makers to properly train or
supervise subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to
the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into contact.” Id. “At

the pleading stage, ‘the mere assertion . . . that a municipality has such a custom or
policy is insufficient in the absence of allegations of fact tending to support, at least
circumstantially, such an inference.’” Gross v. Johnson, No. CV 24-1722, 2025 WL
2722319, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2025) (quoting Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48
F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Montero v. City of Yonkers, New York, 890 F.3d
386, 403–04 (2d Cir. 2018) (dismissing Monell claim where plaintiff alleged that the
Yonkers Police Department had adopted an “unwritten policy” of retaliating against
him but offered no facts to support that claim).
Here, Reeves asserts that the City of New York “is liable under Monell for the

alleged policy inactions of the NYPD,” Compl. at 18, ¶ 65, and is specifically liable
“for the failure to train its officers not to engage in arrest on the basis of racial
profiling,” id. at 20, ¶ 85. Reeves also cites several news stories to support his
assertions that “[r]ace-based arrest[s] are a known course of conduct by [the] NYPD.”
See Compl. at 20, ¶ 87 & 21–22, ¶ 92.
Reeves also cites recent remedial legislation passed by the New York City

Council as support for his claim of a widespread pattern of racial disparities in NYPD
arrest practices. He asserts that “[d]ue to unfair targeting of [B]lack men, rampantly
and culturally accepted as the norm in the agency,” the Council passed a law
approximately two months prior to Reeves’s arrest, which “requires [NYPD] officers
to record the apparent race, gender, and ages of most people they stop for
questioning,” Compl. at 22, ¶ 92, and which Reeves appears to argue was an attempt
to rectify the racial disparities in police-citizen street encounters that Reeves has

asserted in his Monell claim.
This Court need not decide whether Reeves’ allegations are sufficient to show
the kind of widespread pattern and practice of unconstitutional racial profiling in
street arrests, and/or a failure to train NYPD officers to prevent such
unconstitutional disparities, as are required to state a claim under Monell. This is
because Reeves has not pled facts showing that the second essential element of a
Monell claim — causation — is met. Although Reeves has alleged generally that, as
a Black man, he is a member of the class subject to unconstitutional treatment by
police in street encounters and arrests, he has not alleged any facts tending to show

that this policy or practice caused the specific violations of Reeves’s constitutional
rights that are at issue in this lawsuit. Instead, he alleges that his wrongful arrest
and resulting excessive force by police were not the result of a street encounter or
racial profiling; according to Reeves, they occurred because Defendants improperly
relied on a false report made by a known criminal complainant that they failed to
duly investigate before accepting her dubious allegations as true and arresting

Reeves. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims as to the
City of New York is granted.
IX. Respondeat Superior
Reeves asserts that “the City [is] liable . . . pursuant to [r]espondeat superior
for the common law and state constitutional violations committed by the [Doe
Defendant-officers].” Compl. at 23, ¶ 98. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
“a master is vicariously liable for a tort committed by his servant while acting within

the scope of his employment.” Gibbs v. City of New York, 714 F. Supp. 2d 419, 421
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1280–81 (N.Y. 1979));
see also id. at 423 (holding that respondeat superior could create liability for the City
of New York if a police detective were found to be liable for malicious prosecution);
Triolo v. Nassau Cnty., 24 F.4th 98, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2022) (“New York law is clear
that municipalities can be liable for the actions of police officers on false arrest claims
under a theory of respondeat superior.”); Jones v. State, 307 N.E.2d 236, 237–38 (N.Y.
1973) (“A long line of cases has held the State or municipalities liable for the actions
of their police officers in the line of duty,” including “[t]he use of excessive force by

[State] troopers”).
Like Monell liability, “respondeat superior is not a cause of action under New
York law. Rather, it connects defendants to otherwise actionable torts.” King v. City
of New York, No. 16-CV-4299 (CBA) (PK), 2018 WL 4568798, at *6 n.10 (E.D.N.Y.
Sep. 24, 2018). Significantly, respondeant superior will not create municipal liability
for violations of Section 1983, only for violations of state law. See McAllister v. N.Y.C.

Police Dep’t, 49 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“It is well established that
a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 for alleged unconstitutional
actions by its employees below the policemaking level solely upon the basis of
respondeat superior.”); Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 22 (2d Cir.
2012), as amended (Dec. 4, 2012) (“Ackerson’s state law false arrest claim creates
liability for the City of White Plains, under a theory of respondeat superior.”
(emphasis added)). Finally, “because the determination of whether a particular act

was within the scope of the servant’s employment is so heavily dependent on factual
considerations, the question is ordinarily one for the jury.” Doe v. Hilton Cent. Sch.
Dist., 720 F. Supp. 3d 184, 192 (W.D.N.Y. 2024).
Here, because Reeves’s state-law false arrest and excessive force claims
against individual officers survive, his assertion of vicarious liability against the City
of New York under a state-law theory of respondeat superior also survives.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim as to the City is denied.
X. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants contend that Detective Davila’s conduct as alleged in the
complaint is shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Def. Mem. at 16–17.
However, “[q]ualified immunity may only be granted at the motion to dismiss stage
if ‘the facts supporting the defense appear on the face of the complaint and it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief.’” Belyea v. City of Glen Cove, No. 20-CV-5675 (MKB), 2022

WL 3586559, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2022) (quoting McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d
432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State Off. of Gen. Servs.,
992 F. Supp. 2d 102, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Since determining whether a defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity is generally a fact intensive inquiry, the Second
Circuit has made clear that it disfavors granting qualified immunity at the motion to
dismiss stage.”). As discussed supra, the facts alleged in the complaint, if proven,
could support a jury finding that Defendants falsely arrested Reeves, subjected him

to excessive force, and unreasonably searched his cell phone without a warrant. The
complaint also does not plead facts on its face that would require a finding of either
probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Reeves.
Moreover, there was “‘no question’ the rights to be free from arrest without
probable cause and excessive force during an arrest [were] ‘clearly established’” at
the time of Reeves’s arrest. Smith v. Arrowood, No. 21-CV-6318 (EAW), 2022 WL
3927884, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022) (quoting Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 423
(2d Cir. 1995)). The same is true for the right to be free from warrantless,
unreasonable searches of cell phones incident to arrest. See generally Riley v.

California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Detective
Davila on the ground of qualified immunity is denied, without prejudice to
Defendants to raise this defense in their answer or at summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part. Specifically, Defendants’ motion is decided as to each claim as follows:

State and Section 1983 false arrest Defendants’ motion is DENIED
State and Section 1983 excessive force Defendants’ motion is DENIED
State and Section 1983 malicious prosecution Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
Negligent infliction of emotional distress Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
Section 1983 illegal search and seizure Defendants’ motion is DENIED
Invasion of privacy and intrusion on seclusion Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
Intentional infliction of emotional distress Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
Monell liability for Section 1983 claims Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
Respondeat superior liability for state claims Defendants’ motion is DENIED

Additionally, the NYPD is dismissed as a Defendant.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge

Dated: February 5, 2026
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296195. Public record. Not legal advice.