# SCUTERI

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · March 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296164

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Andrew Scuteri v. Pablo Perez, Jade Reedy, Centurion Health Services, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** March 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

MICHAEL ANDREW SCUTERI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:23-cv-00103-MJD-JMS
)
PABLO PEREZ, )
JADE REEDY, )
CENTURION HEALTH SERVICES, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiff Michael Andrew Scuteri, by recruited counsel, moves for an award of attorney
fees following the Court's civil contempt order against Defendants Dr. Pablo Perez and
Centurion Health Services, LLC ("Medical Defendants"). [Dkt. 254.] For the reasons explained
below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. Legal Standard
"[I]t is within the trial court's discretion to award fees upon a finding of civil contempt."
Tranzact Technologies, Inc. v. 1Source Worldsite, 406 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
National Labor Relations Board v. Neises Construction Corporation, 62 F.4th 1040, 1058 (7th
Cir. 2023) ("These fees are regularly awarded in contempt cases.") (collecting cases).
"In calculating reasonable attorneys' fees, the district court should first determine
the lodestar amount by multiplying the reasonable number of hours worked by the market rate."
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 491 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir. 2007). "The reasonable
hourly rate used in calculating the lodestar must be based on the market rate for the attorney's
work. The market rate is the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community
normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in question." Id. "The burden of
proving the market rate is on the party seeking the fee award. However, once an attorney
provides evidence establishing his market rate, the opposing party has the burden of
demonstrating why a lower rate should be awarded." Id. at 659-60.

II. Discussion
The Court previously issued a compensatory civil contempt award for Plaintiff against
the Medical Defendants in the amount of $6,180.00. [Dkt. 253.] The contempt order found that
the Medical Defendants had failed to comply with the Court's Preliminary Injunction, which had
ordered them to provide Plaintiff with 500 mg of Tylenol three times each day for the remainder
of this case. Id. (citing Dkt. 140).
Following the civil contempt Order, Plaintiff moved for attorney fees. [Dkt. 254.] In that
motion and the attached exhibits, Plaintiff requests that his attorney be awarded $225.00 per hour
for 25.4 hours of legal work on the contempt motion, that his attorney's paralegal be awarded
$125.00 per hour for 2.5 hours of paralegal work, and that his attorney receive $90.92 in mileage

to attend an in-person client meeting at the prison where Plaintiff is incarcerated. Id.; [dkts. 255,
255-1.] His total fee request comes to $6,118.42.
The Medical Defendants do not contest the award of attorney fees generally or the
specific hourly rates for Plaintiff's attorney and paralegal. See generally [dkt. 260.] Instead, they
argue that the amount requested is "excessive" because it "contain[s] work that is not related to
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction." [Id. at ¶ 1.] The Medical Defendants
specifically challenge the following itemized billings:
• 2.4 hours on January 6, 2026, to travel to Putnamville Correctional Facility to meet
with client, because counsel should have called his client on the phone.
• 0.2 hour on November 25, 2025, to read a three-sentence email from the Medical
Defendants' attorney.
• 0.3 hour on December 11, 2025, to exchange and examine brief emails with the
Medical Defendants' attorney regarding her request that Plaintiff withdraw his

contempt motion, and another 0.2 hour that same day to examine that
correspondence.
• 1.5 hours on December 19, 2025, to "[e]xamine legal authorities cited in defendant's
response to [the contempt motion]," because the Medical Defendants did not cite any
legal authority in their response brief.
• 1.5 hours on January 9, 2026, to review Eighth Amendment case law on qualified
immunity, because the Medical Defendants have not asserted qualified immunity in
this lawsuit.
• 2.0 hours on January 8, 2026, for "legal research regarding reply in support of

[contempt motion]" and another 1.0 hour on January 9, 2026, to "check and update
legal authority in our reply requesting sanctions for violation of injunction and
complete reply brief." The Medical Defendants observe that Plaintiff did not cite any
legal authority in his reply brief.
Id. at ¶¶ 2-7.
The Medical Defendants conclude with the following statement: "Defendants will accept
what Order the Court issues regarding reasonable and fair fees to Plaintiff's attorney for
prevailing on his [contempt motion], but a review of the fees submitted reveal excessive time for
action that simply was not necessitated by the injunction issue." Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiff replies that the prison would not let him hold a video conference with his client
and that his decision to travel there for an in-person meeting was reasonable. [Dkt. 263 at ¶ 3.]
He argues that reviewing and responding to emails requires "more than a cursory glance,
irrespective of how many sentences it may contain," and that in this case, his emails "required

assurance that the information was accurate and in line with the Court's Preliminary Injunction."
Id. at ¶ 4. He concedes that the Medical Defendants' response brief did not include any legal
citations but argues that the 1.5 hours billed on December 19, 2025, reflects time spent
"reviewing the response in detail, cross-referencing it with the record and medical
documentation, and formulating a strategy for the reply. The absence of legal citations in the
Defendants' response does not mean less work was required and in fact, required more detailed
analysis of the record." Id. at ¶ 6. He argues that his research into qualified immunity "was
necessary to anticipate potential defenses and to understand the full scope of the legal framework
governing the enforcement motion. Legal research is a fundamental part of competent
representation, particularly in civil rights litigation where constitutional standards are complex

and evolving." Id. at ¶ 2. And he argues that the amount of "legal research is not necessarily
reflected in the number of citations in the final brief" and that in this case, "[t]he reply brief
focused on factual arguments and responses to the Defendants' factual assertions, but research
was necessary to ensure the legal framework was properly applied." Id. at ¶ 7.
Having reviewed the Parties' briefs and relevant portions of the record, the Court finds
that Plaintiff's request for attorney fees is generally reasonable but that the number of hours
billed for attorney time should be pared down to reflect work that was actually and reasonably
performed in support of Plaintiff's contempt motion.
The Court agrees with recruited counsel that billing 2.4 hours to travel for an in-person
meeting with his client was reasonable. The Court knows all too well that attorneys who have
been recruited to represent pro se prisoners in this District often encounter difficulties arranging
video conferences—and even phone calls—with their clients. Resolving those difficulties may

require substantial attorney or paralegal time, which would cut into the potential cost savings of
forgoing an in-person meeting. Further, there are benefits to meeting with a client in person
rather than over the phone. Meeting a client in person eases communication, shows respect, and
fosters trust within the attorney-client relationship. There is a limit to the length of time an
attorney may reasonably spend traveling for an in-person meeting when alternatives are
available, and attorneys must use their professional judgment to strike the right balance. In this
case, recruited counsel's decision to spend 2.4 hours traveling to meet with his client in person
was a reasonable exercise of his professional judgment and therefore not excessive.
Billing $90.92 in mileage to travel from Carmel, Indiana, to Putnamville Correctional Facility,
where Plaintiff is incarcerated, is also reasonable.

The Court agrees with recruited counsel that responding to emails is a time-consuming
aspect of office work. Even short emails take time—sometimes more time than longer emails.
See also BLAISE PASCAL, Lettres Provinciales, Letter XVI (1657) ("I have only made this letter
longer because I have not had time to make it shorter."). Here, the Court finds that billing 0.2
hour to review an email on November 25, 2025, 0.3 hour to correspond with defense counsel via
email on December 11, 2025, and another 0.2 hour to review earlier email correspondence is not
excessive.
The Court agrees with the Medical Defendants that billing 1.5 hours to "[e]xamine legal
authorities cited in defendant's response [brief]" is unreasonable in this case because the Medical
Defendants’ response brief did not actually include any citations to legal authority. The Court
also agrees that it is unreasonable to bill 1.5 hours to research qualified immunity for a reply
brief when the Medical Defendants have not—indeed, may not—raise qualified immunity in this
case. See, e.g., Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 734 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) ("qualified
immunity does not apply to private medical personnel in prisons"). Finally, the Court agrees that
it is unreasonable to bill 2.0 hours for "legal research" and 1.0 hour to "check and update
citations” for a reply brief that includes no citations to legal authority. Therefore, the Court will
deduct 6.0 hours from Plaintiff's requested attorney time.
II. Conclusion
In sum, Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. [Dkt. 254.] The Court finds that recruited counsel reasonably billed 19.4 hours of
attorney time at a rate of $225.00 per hour, 2.5 hours of paralegal time at a rate of $125.00 per
hour, and $90.92 for mileage. The Court makes this finding after deducting 6.0 hours of
excessive billing for attorney time. In total, the Court ORDERS the Medical Defendants to pay
$4,768.42. The Medical Defendants shall tender this payment to recruited counsel within 30
days of the issuance of this Order and shall file a Notice that they have done so.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: 20 MAR 2026 Tob aioe
Marl J. Dinsyfigre
United StatesWMagistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296164. Public record. Not legal advice.