# JORDAN

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · February 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296088

## Case

- **Full name:** Scott J. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296088

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “the ALJ’s credibility determination . . . based on a broad view of the record . . . would have been supported by substantial evidence regardless of whether the ALJ had explicitly considered [the claimant’s] employment history.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SCOTT J., : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, :
:
vs. : NO. 24-cv-6865
:
FRANK BISIGNANO, :
Commissioner of Social Security, :
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LYNNE A. SITARSKI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE February 6, 2026

Plaintiff Scott J. brought this action seeking review of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration’s (SSA) decision denying his claim for Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433.
This matter is before me for disposition upon consent of the parties. For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff’s Request for Review (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed for SSDI on October 24, 2021, alleging disability since
November 17, 2017, due to small fiber neuropathy, fibromyalgia, pain, muscle spasms and brain
fog. (R. 213). The application was denied at the initial level and upon reconsideration, and
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (R. 72-76, 82-88).
Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (VE) testified at an administrative
hearing on April 8, 2024. (R. 27-52). On April 18, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable
to Plaintiff. (R. 11-26). Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals Council denied his request for
review on October 29, 2024, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner
for purposes of judicial review. (R. 1-6).
On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. (Compl., ECF No. 1).
On February 13, 2025, he consented to my jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(C).
(Consent, ECF No. 8). On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Brief and Statement of Issues in Support
of Request for Review. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16). The Commissioner filed a Response on
November 4, 2025. (Resp., ECF No. 19).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court has considered the administrative record in its entirety and summarizes here
the evidence relevant to the instant request for review.
Plaintiff was born on August 25, 1967, and was 50 years old on the alleged disability
onset date. (R. 256). He completed a four-year college. (R. 214). Plaintiff previously worked
as an automotive production supervisor and a dog walker. (Id.).
A. Medical Evidence
Plaintiff first developed fatigue1 in 2015, without any obvious precipitating event. (R.
359). Since that time, he has fairly consistently complained to his medical providers about this
problem. (See R. 360, 367, 374, 462, 464, 490, 501, 509, 590, 602, 609, 767, 838, 881, 886. But

see R. 426, 575, 580 (denying fatigue during these visits)). Due to Plaintiff’s fatigue, his
treatment has included educating him regarding the need to pace himself while performing
activities. (See, e.g., R. 459, 470, 496, 509).
Since his alleged disability onset, Plaintiff has also experienced significant involuntary
weight loss, which he suggests may be associated with problems eating. On November 18, 2017,

1 Plaintiff’s medical records sometimes couple his fatigue with malaise (i.e.,
“malaise/fatigue”). (See R. 524, 577, 584, 590, 602, 609, 881, 886).
Plaintiff weighed 227 pounds (down from 260 on December 21, 2016). (R. 595, 611). By
March 1, 2019, his weight had fallen to 225 pounds, and he complained of a “sensation of
something stuck in his throat.” (R. 303). On June 7, 2021, he weighed 191 pounds. (R. 448).
He lost nine more pounds by the time of a March 28, 2022 appointment. (R. 792). On May 4,
2023, Plaintiff told his primary care physician, Louise Butler, M.D., that he often does not finish
his meals because he gets tired while chewing. (R. 920). By December 6, 2023, Plaintiff
weighed 159 pounds. (R. 871).

Additionally, during the relevant period Plaintiff has reported pain and stiffness, often
associated with movement. (See, e.g., R. 590 (May 18, 2018: “I feel like the tin man getting up
and moving.”)). A March 25, 2019 CT scan showed mild to moderate spondylosis of the
cervical spine. (R. 394). On June 7, 2021, it was noted that an MRI showed mild to moderate
spondylosis in his lumbar spine. (R. 450). In response to worsening neck pain and upper
extremity weakness, on August 2, 2023, Plaintiff underwent a cervical spine MRI, which showed
mild to moderate degenerative changes mildly progressed since 2020. (R. 552, 862, 920). On
November 6, 2023, Plaintiff complained of “[g]eneralized achiness in his neck and low back,” as
well as “[g]eneralized upper as well as lower extremity numbness paresthesia and weakness.”
(R. 849). A lumbar spine MRI taken that day showed “evidence of advanced disc degeneration

especially L5-S1 and to a less[er] degree L4-L5.” (R. 860). At various points, Plaintiff has also
complained of pain in various other joints and body parts, including his chest, shoulders, arms,
elbows, hands, ribs, abdomen, hips, thighs, knees and feet. (See, e.g., R. 360, 374, 447, 460,
530).
Plaintiff was diagnosed by his rheumatologist with fibromyalgia in 2020. (R. 462). At
an October 13, 2021 visit with Kristine Vanselow, M.D., Plaintiff reported a “widespread itching
sensation,” a sensation of being “squeezed,” and “ongoing, uncontrolled pain” that the doctor
noted appeared “related to fibromyalgia,” with symptoms worse at night especially following
daytime activity. (R. 527; see also R. 438 (complaining on May 3, 2021 of “full body pain”)).
Dr. Vanselow observed that “multiple medications including amitriptyline, duloxetine, savella
[and] effexor have been tried without relief” and suggested gabapentin and lyrica, but Plaintiff
stated his belief that they had been attempted as well. (Id.). She referred him to the fibromyalgia
clinic. (Id.). At the November 19, 2021 outpatient evaluation, he reported tenderness all over
his body (but primarily in the neck and back), and his Revised Fibromyalgia Impact

Questionnaire Score placed him in the “severe” range. (R. 464). Plaintiff’s treatment plan
consisted of approximately 15 sessions of physical therapy consisting of, inter alia,
breathing/relaxation techniques, stretching and range of movement improvement, body
strengthening, aerobics, aquatics, manual therapy, neuromuscular re-education, a peripheral
nerve evaluation, posture and body mechanics training and patient education about the condition.
(R. 465). One month later, it was noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms remained “at baseline.” (R.
521). On March 28, 2022, Dr. Vanselow noted that Plaintiff’s worsening symptoms could not be
fully explained by his fibromyalgia and small fiber neuropathy diagnoses alone. (R. 790). She
also recorded that after initial visits at the fibromyalgia clinic Plaintiff did not return because his
pain worsened and he felt that “they didn’t listen to him . . . .” (Id.).

Despite these issues, Plaintiff has had largely normal physical and mental examination
results, including full motor function, normal gait, coherent thought processes, normal thought
content, cooperative demeanor, and normal mood and affect. (See, e.g., R. 303, 307-08, 312-13,
316-17, 319-20, 322-23, 382-83, 386-87, 400-01, 427, 522, 528-29, 540, 546, 548-49).
On May 26, 2022, consultative examiner Gregory Coleman, Psy.D., conducted a mental
status evaluation of Plaintiff. (R. 806-18). Upon examination, he was irritable but otherwise
cooperative and normal, with coherent and goal-directed thought processes, good insight and
judgment, and intact attention, concentration, and memory. (R. 808). His activities of daily
living (ADLs) included personal care, cooking and preparing food, cleaning, doing laundry,
shopping, managing money, driving (although limited due to pain), taking public transportation,
socializing with family daily and friends and neighbors regularly, watching television, listening
to music, using social media, playing video games and dog-walking. (R. 809). He was
recommended for psychological therapy and vocation training and assessed with a good
prognosis, provided that he followed through with treatment and found “suitable full-time

employment” following completion of training. (Id.).
In the attached Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities
(Mental), Dr. Coleman opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in understanding or remembering
simple or complex instructions, carrying out simple ones, or making simple work-related
decisions; mild limitations in carrying out complex instructions, making judgments on complex
decisions or interacting with others; and moderate limitations in responding appropriately to
usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting. (R. 810-11). Dr. Coleman further
determined that Plaintiff’s abilities to concentrate, persist or maintain pace and adapt or manage
himself were not affected by his impairments. (R. 811).
On this same date, consultative examiner Ziba Monfared, M.D., also conducted an

Internal Medicine Examination of Plaintiff. (R. 819-22). Plaintiff complained to Dr. Monfared
that his pain, rated six or seven on a scale of 10 and sometimes worsening at night, traveled from
his neck through the rest of his body. (R. 819). Reported ADLs again included driving, cooking,
cleaning, laundry, shopping, childcare, personal care, watching television, listening to the radio,
using social media and playing video games. (R. 820). Upon examination, Plaintiff was in no
acute distress, demonstrated normal gait and stance without the need for an assistive device,
walked on heels and toes without difficulty, squatted 80 percent, and maneuvered himself
through the examination on his own. (Id.). Reviews of his musculoskeletal system and
extremities were also normal, and he exhibited full grip strength bilaterally without any
limitation in dexterity or grasping objects. (R. 821). His prognosis was assessed as good. (R.
822).
In the attached Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities
(Physical), Dr. Monfared opined that Plaintiff could continuously lift and carry up to 100
pounds, use his hands and feet bilaterally, and perform all postural maneuvers; sit, stand and

walk for eight hours at a time or in a workday; ambulate without a cane; and carry out all
activities listed on the form. (R. 825-30). Plaintiff also demonstrated normal range of motion in
all joints. (R. 832-35).
On June 3, 2022, State agency psychological consultant Richard Williams, Ph.D., opined
that Plaintiff had no limitations in adapting or managing himself and in understanding,
remembering, or applying information and mild limitations in interacting with others and
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (R. 58). Upon reconsideration on November 15,
2022, State agency psychological consultant Douglas Schiller, Ph.D., opined that Plaintiff had
mild limitations in all four areas of mental functioning. (R. 67).
On July 21, 2022, State agency medical consultant Josie Mae Henderson, M.D., opined

that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds; frequently lift and carry 10 pounds;
push and pull without additional limitations; stand and/or walk and sit for six hours each in an
eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and frequently climb ramps
and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (R. 60). Upon reconsideration on
November 28, 2022, State agency medical consultant Charles Joseph Hubbard, Jr., M.D., opined
that Plaintiff had no exertional or postural limitations. (R. 68).
On October 6, 2023, it was noted that based on any antibody test Plaintiff had recently
been diagnosed with Sjogren’s syndrome,2 with unspecified organ involvement. (R. 865, 869,
917). Plaintiff was prescribed Duexis to assist with his joint pain and inflammation caused by
the condition. (R. 917). On November 10, 2023, he expressed concerns to Dr. Butler that the
syndrome could affect his heart rate, although he denied noticing any irregularities at that time.
(R. 914). On February 16, 2024, he returned for a follow up with no specific action taken or
recommended regarding his Sjogren’s syndrome. (R. 913).
B. Nonmedical Evidence

The record also contains non-medical evidence. On February 5, 2022, Plaintiff’s wife
completed an Adult Function Report on his behalf in which she wrote that he suffers from
stiffness and pain throughout his body, especially with activities such as sleeping, walking, and
driving. (R. 240). She indicated that Plaintiff’s pain impacts his ability to focus or lie down for
more than four hours. (R. 240-41). She described Plaintiff’s typical day as waking, stretching,
feeding and walking the dogs, driving his daughter to school, performing some unspecified
“work,”3 napping, running errands, working more, attending appointments, possibly napping,
and picking up his daughter from school. (R. 241). She reported that Plaintiff has pain with

2 Per the regulations:

Sjogren’s syndrome is an immune-mediated disorder of the
exocrine glands. Involvement of the lacrimal and salivary glands is
the hallmark feature, resulting in symptoms of dry eyes and dry
mouth, and possible complications, such as corneal damage,
blepharitis (eyelid inflammation), dysphagia (difficulty in
swallowing), dental caries, and the inability to speak for extended
periods of time. Involvement of the exocrine glands of the upper
airways may result in persistent dry cough.
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.00D7(a)(i).
3 Plaintiff’s wife may have been referring to his dog-walking work that did not rise to the
level of substantial gainful activity. (R. 17).
personal care but can do it without assistance. (Id.). Plaintiff also prepares his own meals, does
laundry, vacuums, washes dishes, mows and cleans up the yard, shops (mostly online but also in
stores sometimes), manages money, watches television, plays with his dogs, and socializes with
others (including monthly visits to family). (R. 242-44). His wife checked boxes indicating that
Plaintiff has difficulty with lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting,
kneeling, stair climbing, memory, completing tasks, concentration, understanding, following
instructions and using his hands. (R. 244-45). She predicted that Plaintiff could walk for 20

minutes at a time. (R. 245). She added that he can generally follow spoken instructions but must
read written ones twice and that he has “no attention span,” does not finish what he starts, and
struggles with changes to his routine. (R. 245-46). Plaintiff’s wife further indicated that he
wears a wrist brace. (R. 246).
On October 23, 2022, Plaintiff’s wife completed a second Adult Function Report that
largely tracked the earlier one, although she now endorsed additional impairments and
limitations. (R. 258-65). She noted that Plaintiff does not sleep more than four hours at a time,
suffers from brain fog, lacks a short-term memory and experiences spasms that cause him to drop
things. (R. 258). She claimed that he had stopped mowing the yard, working outside,
socializing with non-family and getting along with others and that due to brain fog he could no

longer manage money. (R. 260-63). Additionally, she claimed that Plaintiff required a cane
when walking on uneven ground. (R. 264).
At the April 8, 2024 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that he has diagnoses for
Lyme disease, Epstein-Barr virus, fibromyalgia, small fiber neuropathy and Sjogren’s syndrome.
(R. 41). He indicated that he is unable to grip fully, that he lacks balance due to his neuropathy
and that due to his conditions he has lost 100 pounds from his prior high of 260 or 270 pounds.
(R. 42, 45). In a typical day, he goes to bed around 1 a.m., sleeps for approximately four hours
before getting up due to tightness, stretches for up to 30 minutes, feeds his dogs and lets them
out, does more stretches while showering, makes breakfast, watches television, uses a heating
pad and TENS unit, naps, goes to appointments as needed, walks his dogs again, helps to cook
dinner, washes dishes, vacuums, mows the lawn (which must now be broken up over two days),
and takes a bath. (R. 44-45). He also drives his daughter to and from school but only drives
within 10 minutes of his home due to spasms and pain, which he assessed as “at least seven or
eight . . . .” (R. 32-33, 45). Plaintiff claimed he can only sit for approximately 20 minutes

before having to move. (R. 44). He stated that his resting muscle tension is “through the roof”
and that his pain makes it difficult to pay attention and concentrate, which he believed would
prevent him from working full-time. (R. 45-46). According to Plaintiff, he has “tried everything
[he] can,” but his symptoms have persisted. (R. 46).

III. LEGAL STANDARD
To be eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate to
the Commissioner that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential analysis is used to evaluate a disability claim:
First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the
Commissioner considers in the second step whether the claimant has
a “severe impairment” that significantly limits his physical or
mental ability to perform basic work activities. If the claimant
suffers a severe impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based on
the medical evidence, the impairment meets the criteria of the
impairment listed in the “listing of impairments,” . . . which result
in a presumption of disability, or whether the claimant retains the
capacity to work. If the impairment does not meet the criteria for a
listed impairment, then the Commissioner assesses in the fourth step
whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the
residual functional capacity [RFC] to perform his past work. If the
claimant cannot perform his past work, then the final step is to
determine whether there is other work in the national economy that
the claimant can perform.

Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The
disability claimant bears the burden of establishing steps one through four. If the claimant is
determined to be unable to resume previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five to establish that, given the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and mental
and physical limitations, he is able to perform substantial gainful activities in jobs existing in the
national economy. See, e.g., Poulos v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007).
Judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner is limited. A district court is
bound by the factual findings of the Commissioner if they are supported by substantial evidence
and decided according to correct legal standards. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” and “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112,
118 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Even if the record could support a contrary conclusion,
the decision of the ALJ will not be overruled as long as there is substantial evidence to support it.
See, e.g., Simmonds v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1986). The Court exercises plenary
review over legal issues. See, e.g., Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.
1999).

IV. ALJ’S DECISION
Following the administrative hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in which he made the
following findings:
1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
on September 30, 2023.
2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from
his alleged onset date of November 17, 2017 through his date last insured of
September 30, 2023 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments:
peripheral neuropathy; Sjogren’s syndrome; fibromyalgia; and degenerative disc
disease of the cervical spine (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that,
through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the claimant can
tolerate frequent exposure to unprotected heights, extreme cold, extreme heat and
vibrations. He can frequently operate hazardous machinery.
6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past

relevant work as a packaging supervisor, DOT# 920.132-010, light as generally
performed and medium as actually performed, SVP 6; production supervisor,
DOT# 699.130-010, light as generally and actually performed, SVP 7; plant
manager, DOT# 183.117-010, sedentary as generally performed and medium as
actually performed, SVP 8; and supervisor, motorcycle, DOT# 806.131-014, light
as generally and actually performed, SVP 8. This work did not require the
performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at
any time from November 17, 2017, the alleged onset date, through September 30,
2023, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).
(R. 14-22). Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 22).

V. DISCUSSION

In his request for review, Plaintiff raises three issues:
1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to
properly analyze or consider whether the claimant met or equaled a
medical listing for Sjorgren’s [sic] Syndrome?

2. Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to
properly analyze or consider whether the claimant met or equaled a
medical listing for fibromyalgia?

3. Whether substantial evidence existed to support the
Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the claimant could
perform work at a medium exertional level?

(Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 10 (capitalization omitted)).
A. The Medical Listings at Step Three
At step three, the ALJ analyzes whether a claimant’s impairments or combination of
impairments meet or medically equal one of the listings that prevent an adult, regardless of age,
education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a).
This inquiry functions to identify those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe they
would be found disabled regardless of their vocational background, making further inquiry
unnecessary. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990). The claimant bears the burden of
producing medical findings showing her impairments meet or medically equal a listed
impairment. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120 n.2. To meet this burden, the claimant must establish
all the requirements of the relevant listing. Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530 (claimant who meets only
some of the listing requirements, “no matter how severely, does not qualify”); see also Hartung
v. Colvin, No. 12-6155, 2016 WL 2910096, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2016). Meeting a listing
cannot be based on diagnoses alone. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(d). Because matching or equaling a
listing at step three results in an automatic finding of disability, the listings are strictly construed
against claimants. See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530-32.
1. Sjogren’s Syndrome
As both parties note, to meet or equal the listing for Sjogren’s syndrome (Listing 14.10)

Plaintiff must show that it involves at least two organs/body systems with: (1) one involved to a
moderate or greater degree; and (2) two or more constitutional symptoms or signs (i.e., severe
fatigue, fever, malaise or involuntary weight loss). 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §
14.10A(1)-(2). Alternatively, he must show “[r]epeated manifestations” of the condition, at least
two of the constitutional symptoms or signs, and marked limitations in: (1) ADLs; (2)
maintaining social functioning; or (3) timely completing tasks because of deficiencies in
concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10B(1)-(3).
According to Plaintiff, he has fulfilled this duty because the record shows that he
consistently “complained for years” about coughing and difficulty swallowing and, moreover,

experienced problems regarding “his hands and knees locking up,” fatigue, malaise, and
involuntary weight loss of more than 100 pounds since the onset of this condition. (Pl.’s Br.,
ECF No. 16, at 11 (citing SSR 16-3p)). However, the Commissioner counters that the record
contains hardly any evidence of Sjogren’s syndrome beyond a few passing references to a
diagnosis and a follow up and certainly nothing constituting “repeated manifestations.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 19, at 7). He continues that, in fact, Plaintiff denied many of the constitutional markers
described in the listing and, even when such problems as fatigue were noted, no indication exists
that they were repeatedly “severe” as defined by the relevant regulations. (Id. at 7 & n.3 (citing
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.00(C)(12))). Moreover, he points out that the ALJ’s
discussion of Plaintiff’s ADLs reflects that they were not “markedly” restricted and highlights
the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had only mild limitations in interacting with others and
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (Id. at 7).
The Commissioner continues that Plaintiff may have preferred a more granular analysis
of the listing but adds that the ALJ was not required to use any particular language in

constructing a decision that sufficiently develops the record to permit meaningful judicial
review. (Id. at 7-8 (citing Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004))). He maintains
that under applicable case law the ALJ was instead permitted to fulfill this duty through a
discussion of the medical record following his conclusion that Plaintiff’s impairments did not
meet or equal a listing, without tailoring this discussion to the one for Sjogren’s syndrome. (Id.
at 8 (citing Rembert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 142 F. App’x 570, 572 (3d Cir. 2005))). He
emphasizes that the ALJ reiterated throughout the decision that Plaintiff’s examinations were
largely benign, that his treatment was conservative without the need for injections or surgeries,
that he engaged in a variety of ADLs, and that all record opinions found that his impairments
were not fully work-preclusive. (Id.). The Commissioner contrasts the ALJ’s analysis backed

by substantial evidence with Plaintiff’s summary conclusions, unsupported arguments and failure
to cite to the records that purportedly establish his contentions. (Id. (citing Atkins v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 810 F. App’x 122, 129 (3d Cir. 2020))). He therefore asks the Court to reject
Plaintiff’s undeveloped assertions and affirm the ALJ’s step three finding regarding Plaintiff’s
Sjogren’s syndrome. (Id.).
The Commissioner is correct that Plaintiff has failed to adequately develop his
contentions. See Groff v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-06040-RAL, 2022 WL 17083647, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 17, 2022) (“It is necessary to demonstrate, not just assert, that the ALJ erred.
Demonstration calls for careful citation to the evidence, not just a conclusory assertion that
leaves the judge to search through 1,000 pages of records to see if the assertion is so.”) (citing
United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91, 113 (3d Cir. 2021)). Although he catalogues several
ailments that he attributes to his Sjogren’s syndrome and posits that “the record” at large
“clearly” meets or exceeds Listing 14.10, (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 19, at 7), he makes no attempt to
explain how the specific criteria listed in either subsection “A” or “B” have been fulfilled. For

instance, as a threshold matter subsection “A” requires “involvement of two or more organs/body
systems,” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10A, but Plaintiff identifies none. Indeed, it is
doubtful that he could carry this burden because his Sjogren’s syndrome diagnosis was “with
unspecified organ involvement.” (R. 869, 905 (emphasis added)). Moreover, given his failure to
name the affected organs or body systems, Plaintiff also necessarily does not explain how at least
one of them was impacted to a moderate or greater severity level. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 1, § 14.10A(1). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not specify which two or more of the relevant
constitutional markers (fatigue, fever, malaise and involuntary weight loss) he allegedly has at a
“severe” level. Although Plaintiff’s 100-pound weight loss undoubtedly meets this requirement,
he merely claims that he “experience[s] fatigue and malaise,” without elaborating in any way as

to their supposed severity.4 (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 11).

4 There is no question that Plaintiff repeatedly complained to his medical providers about
fatigue and malaise. (R. 360, 367, 374, 462, 464, 490, 501, 509, 524, 577, 584, 590, 602, 609,
767, 838, 881, 886). However, the record generally reflects that these symptoms were not
severe. For example, when asked about being “[a]lways tired/fatigue[d],” Plaintiff responded,
“no.” (R. 575, 580; see also R. 426 (denying fatigue outright), 559 (reporting “some weakness
and fatigue”). But see R. 374 (checking a box on a form indicating that he had “[f]atigue,
profound and impairs daily function”)). Plaintiff’s providers also suggested at times that his
fatigue could be managed by pacing himself when carrying out activities. (See R. 459, 470, 496,
509).
The record indicates that Plaintiff consistently denied the existence of the remaining
Turning to the listing’s subsection “B” criteria, which Plaintiff also does not address, it is
doubtful that the handful of references in the record to his Sjogren’s syndrome, some of which
merely acknowledge the diagnosis, constitute “repeated manifestations” of the condition. (R.
865, 869, 913, 914, 917). In addition, as just stated, Plaintiff fails to identify a second severe
constitutional symptom or sign beyond his involuntary weight loss. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.
P, app. 1, § 14.10B (also requiring “at least two” of these to establish the subsection “B”
criteria). Lastly, he does not show a marked level of limitation in ADLs, social functioning or

timely completing tasks because of deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. pt.
404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10B(1)-(3); see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00F(2)(d)
(defining “[m]arked limitation” as one in which the claimant’s “functioning in this area
independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited”). As the
ALJ noted, despite his diagnoses Plaintiff’s ADLs included cooking, cleaning, laundry, shopping
and childcare. (R. 19 (citing Ex. 10F/1-2); see also R. 241-44 (Adult Function Report
additionally listing ADLs of, inter alia, caring for and walking dogs, attending appointments,
personal care, and washing dishes)). He also socialized in person and online with family and (for
at least a significant period after the alleged disability onset) friends, (R. 242-44), and Drs.
Coleman, Williams and Schiller all determined that he had only mild limitations in interacting

with others. (R. 58, 67, 810-11). And as for any limitations in completing tasks due to problems
with concentration, persistence or pace, Dr. Coleman determined that he had none and Drs.
Williams and Schiller concluded that they were only mild. (R. 58, 67, 811).
For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s first claim.

constitutional marker, fever. (R. 319, 322, 374, 426, 532, 534, 543, 551, 559, 573, 575, 584,
604, 609, 611, 767, 851, 856, 899).
2. Fibromyalgia
Because fibromyalgia is not an impairment listed in Appendix 1, at step three the ALJ
must instead determine whether it medically equals a listing, such as Listing 14.09D for
inflammatory arthritis.5 SSR 12-2p. Listing 14.09 may be equaled in four ways. First, there
must be persistent inflammation or deformity of: (1) a major lower extremity joint plus: (a) a
documented medical need for a mobility aid (such as a walker); or (b) an inability to use an
upper extremity to independently initiate, sustain and complete work-related activities involving
fine and gross movements as well as a documented medical need for a hand-held assistive or

seated mobility device involving the use of the other hand; or (2) a major upper extremity joint
plus a medically documented inability to use either upper extremity to carry out such activities.
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09A(1)-(2). Second, a claimant must have inflammation
or deformity in an upper or lower extremity joint involving at least two organs/body systems
with: (1) one involved at a moderate or greater severity level; and (2) two or more of the severe
constitutional symptoms or signs noted in the prior subsection. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §
14.10B. Third, the claimant must have spondylitis or other spondyloarthropathies resulting in
ankylosis (fixation or immobility) of the spine measured at a minimum of 30 degrees of flexion
from a vertical (zero degrees) position. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10C. Fourth, the listing

may be equaled through “[r]epeated manifestations” of inflammatory arthritis, at least two of the
constitutional symptoms or signs, and marked limitations in: (1) ADLs; (2) maintaining social
functioning; or (3) timely completing tasks because of deficiencies in concentration, persistence,
or pace. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10B(1)-(3).

5 Disability may also be established at step three if the claimant’s fibromyalgia, in
combination with one or more other medically determinable impairments, equals a listing, see
SSR 12-2p, but here Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have considered whether his
fibromyalgia alone met or equaled Listing 14.09. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 12).
Plaintiff’s “argument” in support of this claim consists of a single bald assertion: “It is
also submitted that the ALJ should have considered whether the Claimant’s fibromyalgia met or
equaled a listing at 14.09 D.” (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 12 (citing SSR 12-2p)). That is it.
Accordingly, this Court could easily find that the claim has been waived. See McGuirk v.
O’Malley, No. 23-1192, 2024 WL 3470848, at *6 n.2 (W.D. Pa. July 18, 2024) (“The Court
finds Plaintiff’s argument on this point difficult to follow as it is very conclusory and Plaintiff
provides no citations to the record. Thus, this argument is likely waived . . . .”); Hyer v. Colvin,

No. 15-297-GMS, 2016 WL 5719683, at *11 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (“It is not enough merely
to present an argument in the skimpiest way, and leave the Court to do counsel’s work – framing
the argument, and putting flesh on its bones through a discussion of the applicable law and
facts.”) (quoting Ve Thi Nguyen v. Colvin, No. C13-882, 2014 WL 1871054, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
May 8, 2014)).
Nonetheless, in light of the sentence’s placement at the end of Plaintiff’s (albeit limited)
argument in support of his Sjogren’s syndrome claim, and giving him the benefit of the doubt,
this Court treats that argument as lodged on behalf of his fibromyalgia claim as well. As such,
however, Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia claim suffers from the same defects, i.e., a lack of any attempt
whatsoever to cite relevant evidence and explain how it fulfills the criteria of the relevant listing.

(See Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 11-12; see supra § V.A.1). But even if Plaintiff had engaged with
the listing criteria, a brief review of each of the four ways in which the inflammatory arthritis
listing may be established shows that his claim is inadequate.
First, assuming Plaintiff could show persistent inflammation in a major lower extremity
joint (such as his knees (see, e.g., R. 523, 539, 547, 553)), the record documents no medical need
for any of the assistive devices mentioned in subsection “A.1” of Listing 14.09. See 20 C.F.R.
pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09A(1) (requiring, inter alia, a medical need for a walker, bilateral
canes/crutches, seated mobility device, or hand-held assistive device). Dr. Monfared noted upon
physical examination that Plaintiff required no such mobility aids, (R. 820), and Plaintiff himself
only claimed to need, at most, a single cane when walking on uneven ground and a wrist brace.
(R. 246, 264). Further, the record lacks evidence that Plaintiff could not use one or both of his
arms to perform work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09A(1)(b)-(2).
Second, it remains unclear which two organs/body systems are allegedly involved with any
major joint inflammation, let alone how either is “severely” involved, and as determined above,

(see supra n.4), the record does not establish that Plaintiff’s fatigue or malaise was severe. 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09B. Third, although Plaintiff was diagnosed with lumbar
and cervical spondylitis, (R. 394, 422, 426-27, 450-51), it was described as only “mild-to-
moderate.” (R. 394, 450). Along these lines, the Court could locate no references in the record
to “ankylosis,” and in fact Dr. Monfared confirmed that Plaintiff’s range of motion in his lumbar
and cervical spine was within normal limits. (R. 833). Fourth, as noted with Plaintiff’s
Sjogren’s syndrome, he cannot meet the full set of “repeated manifestations” criteria because of
his lack of severe fatigue, fever or malaise (notwithstanding his severe involuntary weight loss)
and because he was not “markedly” limited in ADLs, social functioning, or timely completing
tasks due to deficiencies in his concentration, persistence, or pace. (R. 58, 67, 241-44, 810-11);

see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09D.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s first two claims.
B. Medium Work RFC
1. The Parties’ Positions
After setting forth the applicable background law including the definition of “medium
work,” Plaintiff submits that the ALJ’s determination that he could work at a medium exertional
level is unsupported by substantial evidence because it ignores the “overwhelming evidence” of
his pain and discomfort, weakness, and ambulation and memory problems in favor of a few more
positive but cherrypicked treatment notes. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 12-13 (citing Sykes, 228
F.3d 259; Chitwood v. Brown, 788 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1986); Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601 (2d
Cir. 1986))). He posits that this evidence indicates that his symptoms were consistent with his
diagnoses despite the ALJ’s contrary findings and that the ALJ merely substituted his own lay
opinion in place of what the evidence actually shows. (Id. at 13 (citing McEaney v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 536 F. Supp. 2d 252 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Boulton v. Astrue, No. 5:07CV88-J, 2008 WL

474410 (W.D. Ky. 2008))). He cites several cases for the propositions that pain and weakness
are non-exertional impairments that must be considered by the ALJ, that subjective complaints of
pain must be accorded great weight if backed by the evidence and only discounted if refuted by
it, and that they may support a claim for disability. (Id. at 14 (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d
31 (1st Cir. 1999); Smith v. Calvano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Taybron v. Harris, 667
F.3d 412, 415 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981); Bittel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1981)
(additional citations omitted))). He adds that his lengthy employment history (having worked for
36 years) and the fact that he lost his job due to the inability to keep pace counsel in favor of
awarding him benefits and, moreover, that his age at the time of alleged disability onset (50)
places a greater burden on the Commissioner when denying them. (Id. (citing Dikeman v.

Halter, 245 F.3d 1182, 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001); Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th
Cir. 1990))).
The Commissioner counters that the ALJ’s medium work RFC determination was
consistent with the regulations and supported by substantial evidence. (Resp., ECF No. 19, at 9
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 404.1545(a)(1),
404.1546(c); SSR 96-8p) (additional citation omitted)). He observes that Plaintiff again fails to
identify any specific evidence warranting greater limitations or that the ALJ did not consider and
instead offers only broad and unsupported generalities regarding the decision’s supposed defects.
(Id.). Reminding the Court that it is not the ALJ’s burden to explain why Plaintiff did not require
further restrictions, he asserts that the ALJ fulfilled his duty to make findings based on the record
evidence when he acknowledged Plaintiff’s alleged difficulties but pointed out his repeatedly
benign examination results, lack of more aggressive treatment, and substantial ADLs, which
collectively furnished a reasonable basis to discount his subjective complaints. (Id. at 9-10
(citing R. 19-20) (additional citations omitted)). The Commissioner continues that the ALJ also

considered Drs. Williams’s and Schiller’s findings on both initial review and reconsideration that
Plaintiff did not have any severe mental impairments or work-related restrictions, as well as Dr.
Coleman’s consultative opinion that he had a moderate limitation in his ability to respond
appropriately to usual work situations and changes in work routines but only mild or no
limitations in all other areas of mental functioning. (Id. (citing R. 20-21, 810-11)). Turning to
the opinions on Plaintiff’s physical functioning, the Commissioner emphasizes that although Dr.
Henderson concluded on initial review that Plaintiff was limited to light work, Dr. Hubbard upon
reconsideration and Dr. Monfared in his consultative opinion determined that Plaintiff had no
exertional restrictions. (Id. at 10-11 (citing R. 59-62, 68-69, 825-30)). The Commissioner
maintains that in the face of these opinions ranging from no exertional limitations to a restriction

to light work (but none suggesting Plaintiff could not work at all), the ALJ reasonably resolved
the conflicting evidence in finding that Plaintiff could work at the medium exertional level. (Id.
at 11 (citation omitted)).
Next, the Commissioner refutes Plaintiff’s claims that the ALJ ignored his symptoms
such as pain, weakness and memory problems, stressing that the ALJ in fact credited many of
them and limited his RFC accordingly but adding that the ALJ also retained great discretion
having reviewed the record and conducted the hearing to evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints. (Id. (citing R. 19-20; Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 2014); Burke v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 317 F. App’x 240, 244 (3d Cir. 2009); Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97,
103 (2019))). He argues that a reasonable mind considering the record could find several
grounds for concluding that Plaintiff’s complaints were not fully corroborated. (Id. at 12).
Additionally, he points out that Plaintiff failed to identify the purportedly “overwhelming
evidence” ignored by the ALJ and contrasts this deficiency with the ALJ’s repeated citations to
the record in support of his findings. (Id.). Noting that the ALJ need not refer to each piece of

evidence, and that the fact that he did not do so does not mean he failed to consider the entire
record, the Commissioner submits that the Court should accept the ALJ’s representation that he
considered all the evidence. (Id. (citing Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d
Cir. 2008); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 297 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2008); Hur v.
Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir.
2004))). He maintains that, reading the decision as a whole, the ALJ easily fulfilled the
reasonable articulation requirement by setting forth his logic in crafting Plaintiff’s RFC and
asserts that Plaintiff’s contrary contentions amount to nothing more than an improper request for
the Court to usurp the ALJ’s role and reweigh the evidence to formulate a new RFC. (Id. at 12-
13 (citing Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 369 (2021); T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of

Roswell, 574 U.S. 293, 302 (2015); Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir.
2011); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004))).
2. Analysis
RFC is “the most a [Plaintiff] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(1). To determine the RFC, the ALJ must base the assessment on “all of the relevant
medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41. That
evidence includes medical records, observations made during formal medical examinations,
descriptions of limitations by the claimant and others, and observations of the claimant’s
limitations by others. Id. The ALJ’s finding of residual functional capacity must “be
accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v.
Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
Moreover, under Social Security Ruling 16-3p, the ALJ must follow a two-step process
in evaluating the Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms specifically: (1) determine if there is an
underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment, shown by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, that could reasonably be expected to
produce the Plaintiff’s pain or symptoms; then (2) evaluate the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the Plaintiff’s
functioning. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4-8 (Mar. 16, 2016). In evaluating the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must consider
relevant factors such as the objective medical evidence, evidence from medical sources,
treatment course and effectiveness, daily activities, and consistency of Plaintiff’s statements with
the other evidence of record. Id.
It is within the province of the ALJ to evaluate the credibility of a claimant. Van Horn v.
Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983). “Although ‘any statements of the individual

concerning [his] symptoms must be carefully considered,’ the ALJ is not required to credit
them.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing SSR 96–7p
and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)). An ALJ’s “findings on the credibility of [a] claimant [] ‘are to be
accorded great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of
observing a witness’s demeanor and credibility.’” Irelan v. Barnhart, 243 F. Supp. 2d 268, 284
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (citation omitted). An ALJ may disregard a claimant’s subjective complaints
when contrary evidence exists in the record. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067-68 (3d Cir.
1993). However, the ALJ must provide her reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony.
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122; Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1990).
Here, despite Plaintiff’s contention that the evidence of his disabling “pain and
discomfort, ambulation problems, and weakness,” as well as his “memory issues,” was
“overwhelming,” (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 13), he fails to cite any such evidence in support of
his argument. It is true that in the “Factual History” section of his brief, he cites a handful of
treatment notes reflecting these maladies, such as: (1) a May 2018 note from Colleen Matejicka,

D.O., in which he complains about “feel[ing] like the tin man getting up and moving”; (2)
another from Dr. Butler in May 2023 recording his complaints of worsening numbness in his
arms and wrists; and (3) a third note from Marcelino Oliveri, D.O., in November 2023 noting
Plaintiff’s limp and complaints of radicular leg pain and upper and lower extremity numbness,
paresthesia, and weakness. (Id. at 8 (citing R. 590, 849, 920)). However, these treatment notes,
even coupled with Plaintiff’s testimony along the same lines, (see, e.g., R. 33, 45-46), hardly
constitute “overwhelming” evidence of disability in the face of the contrary evidence relied upon
by the ALJ in his decision.
This evidence included, among other records: (1) Dr. Monfared’s consultative opinion
setting forth Plaintiff’s ADLs of housework and childcare, finding full strength in the upper

extremities and no sensory deficits or muscle atrophy upon examination, and concluding that
Plaintiff could perform medium work; (2) Dr. Hubbard’s administrative findings that Plaintiff
has no exertional limitations; (3) a September 5, 2023 treatment note from Hany Salama, M.D.,
recording that Plaintiff had a normal gait and range of motion with no edema or tenderness; (4)
MRIs showing only mild to moderate degenerative changes in the cervical and lumbar spine; (5)
chiropractic care but a lack of any more aggressive treatment of his disc issues like epidural
steroid injections or surgeries; (6) Drs. Williams’s and Schiller’s administrative findings that he
has no severe mental impairments; (7) Dr. Coleman’s consultative opinion that he had no or only
mild limitations in all areas of mental functioning (except for one moderate limitation); and (8)
Plaintiff’s acknowledgement that his medication causes no side effects. (R. 19-21 (citing Exs.
2A, 4A, 3F/23, 4F, 9F, 10F, 11E/4, 13F/10)). In short, Plaintiff essentially asks this Court to
reweigh the evidence referenced in his brief against that cited by the ALJ in support of his
decision, but such second-guessing is not permissible under applicable case law. See Chandler,
667 F.3d at 359 (“Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual

determinations.”) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
Moreover, Plaintiff is incorrect that the ALJ failed to account for the impairments set
forth above. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s allegations surrounding them,6 (see R. 19 (noting
his claims of, inter alia, pain, difficulty lifting and need for a cane and that his conditions
collectively “affected his memory”)), but determined that their purported “intensity, persistence
and limiting effects” were not fully consistent with the medical evidence, (id.), as detailed in the

6 Plaintiff appears to cite Sykes, Chitwood and Bapp for the proposition that an ALJ must
“acknowledge the Claimant’s non-exertional limitations,” (see Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 13),
although his omission of any pinpoint citations or explanatory parentheticals leaves the Court
unable to assure itself of the precise point he wishes to make in invoking these cases. Further
obscuring his intentions is the fact that the shared legal tenet set forth in all three does not apply
here, where the ALJ did not rely on the Medical Vocational Guidelines to determine disability
and, furthermore, took testimony from a VE. See Sykes, 228 F.3d at 266 (“when the claimant has
exertional and nonexertional impairments[,] . . . courts . . . require the testimony of a vocational
expert or other similar evidence,” not just resort to the guidelines); Chitwood, 788 F.2d at 1388
(“Where a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment, such as pain, that significantly
limits his or her ability to perform the full range of work contemplated by the Guidelines, the
ALJ may not rely on the Guidelines to satisfy the Secretary’s burden of proof, but must instead
produce vocational testimony.”); Bapp, 802 F.3d at 603 (“[W]hen a claimant’s nonexertional
impairments significantly diminish his ability to work—over and above any incapacity caused
solely from exertional limitations—so that he is unable to perform the full range of employment
indicated by the medical vocational guidelines, then the Secretary must introduce the testimony
of a vocational expert (or other similar evidence) that jobs exist in the economy which claimant
can obtain and perform.”). In any event, to the extent that these cases stand for the premise
seemingly proffered by Plaintiff, they are distinguishable because in this case the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s nonexertional impairments. (R. 19).
prior paragraph. Additionally, although Plaintiff correctly points out that subjectively reported
non-exertional impairments like pain may support a claim for disability, particularly where
corroborating medical evidence exists, (see id. at 14 (citations omitted)), it remains “well settled
that a claimant need not be pain-free or experiencing no discomfort in order to be found not
disabled.” Andreolli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-1632, 2008 WL 5210682, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 11, 2008) (citing Welch v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 1986)). Here, as explained
by the ALJ, other substantial evidence existed apart from Plaintiff’s testimony that his pain was
not as severe and/or limiting as alleged.7 (R. 19 (citations omitted); see also Pl.’s Br., ECF No.

16, at 14 (acknowledging that an ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain if
contrary evidence exists) (citing Smith, 637 F.2d at 972)).
Finally, Plaintiff suggests that his employment history and age each warrant awarding
benefits. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 14 (citations omitted)). The Court easily disposes of this first
proposition, for which Plaintiff cites no authority,8 because “[t]he law is well-established that the
ALJ’s failure to afford [a claimant] heightened credibility based solely on [his or] her work

7 Because the ALJ’s RFC determination was backed by substantial evidence, Plaintiff’s
two out-of-circuit district court cases cited on page 13 of his brief are distinguishable. (Pl.’s Br.,
ECF No. 16, at 13 (citing McEaney, 536 F. Supp. 2d 252; Boulton, 2008 WL 474410)). First, the
ALJ was not required to perform a “function-by-function” assessment of every physical and
mental ability listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b)-(d), as set forth in McEaney. See Glass v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-15279, 2019 WL 5617508, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2019) (“Contrary
to Plaintiff’s assertion otherwise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit does
not require an ALJ to perform a ‘function-by-function’ analysis at step four, so long as the ALJ’s
RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record.”) (collecting cases).
Second, in Boulton, “no medical source opinion” supported the ALJ determination that Plaintiff
could perform medium work. 2008 WL 474410, at *4. In this case, by contrast, two of the three
medical sources to evaluate Plaintiff’s physical capabilities concluded that he had no exertional
limitations at all (with a third limiting him to light work). (R. 59-62, 68-69, 825-30).
8 Relatedly, Plaintiff identifies no legal support for the notion that it is significant that he
lost his last job due to an alleged inability to keep pace. Furthermore, the Court observes that the
three opinions in the record to assess his mental functioning all set forth no or only mild
limitations in this area. (R. 58, 67, 811).
history does not amount to an error requiring remand.” Shore v. Kijakazi, No. 20-1169-SRF,
2022 WL 782701, at *10 (D. Del. Mar. 15, 2022) (citations omitted); see also Sanborn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F. App’x 171, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that “the ALJ’s credibility
determination . . . based on a broad view of the record . . . would have been supported by
substantial evidence regardless of whether the ALJ had explicitly considered [the claimant’s]
employment history.”). Corley v. Barnhart, 102 F. App’x 752, 755 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ
did not err by failing to afford Corley heightened credibility based solely on his work history.”).

In purported support of his attendant contention regarding his age, Plaintiff cites Dikeman
and Terry, which both observed: “As age is one of the factors that must be considered, it should
surprise no one that the [Commissioner] faces a more stringent burden when denying disability
benefits to older claimants.” Dikeman, 245 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Terry, 903 F.2d at 1275)
(alteration in Dikeman). Specifically, if, as here, the claimant “is ‘closely approaching advanced
age (50–54), [the Commissioner] will consider that [his] age, along with a severe impairment and
limited work experience, may seriously affect [his] ability to adjust to a significant number of
jobs in the national economy.’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c)) (some alterations added).
However, based on Plaintiff’s own arguments, his work experience is anything but “limited.”
(See Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 14 (highlighting 36-year employment history)). Moreover, in both

Dikeman and Terry, the ALJ determined that the claimant could not perform her past relevant
work, triggering application of the Medical Vocational Guidelines or “grid rules.” Dikeman, 245
F.3d at 1184; Terry, 903 F.3d at 1275; see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Grid Rule
200.00(a) (“The following rules reflect the major functional and vocational patterns which are
encountered in cases which cannot be evaluated on medical considerations alone, where an
individual with a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) is not
engaging in substantial gainful activity and the individual’s impairment(s) prevents the
performance of his or her vocationally relevant past work.”) (emphasis added); see also Lesh v.
Saul, No. 1:19-cv-01416-RDM-GBC, 2020 WL 5500186, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2020) (noting
that an inability to perform past relevant work “could trigger the grid rules due to [the
claimant’s] borderline age category”). Here, by contrast, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could
perform his past relevant work as a packaging supervisor, production supervisor, plant manager
and supervisor of motorcycle assembly, and thus the need to consider the grid rules and the
impact of Plaintiff’s age under them never arose. (R. 21 (citing Dictionary of Occupational

Titles 806.131-014)); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (if the ALJ determines at step four that the
claimant can perform past relevant work, he or she “will find [the claimant] not disabled” and
proceed no further in the sequential analysis).
For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s third claim as well.

VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Request for Review is DENIED. An
appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Lynne A. Sitarski .
LYNNE A. SITARSKI
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296088. Public record. Not legal advice.