# Marcus Brown v. Mohammed Siddiqui and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296020

## Case

- **Full name:** Marcus Brown v. Mohammed Siddiqui and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296020

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that under the specific facts of that case, “that the assistance of counsel during discovery could have strengthened Mr. Santiago’s case ‘in a manner reasonably likely to alter the outcome.’”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARCUS BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. )
) Case No. 3:22-CV-2372-MAB
MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI and )
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff Marcus Brown’s Motion to
Conduct Additional Limited Discovery and Temporarily Stay Summary Judgment
Briefing Schedule (Doc. 120) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Summary Judgment
Record (Doc. 126). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Conduct
Limited Additional Discovery is GRANTED (Doc. 120) and Plaintiff’s Motion to
Supplement Summary Judgment Record is DENIED as MOOT (Doc. 126). Additionally,
for the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED
as MOOT without prejudice (Doc. 110). Defendants may file a new or renewed motion
for summary judgment after the limited, additional discovery discussed in this Order has
been completed.
BACKGROUND
On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff Marcus Brown filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated at
Pontiac Correctional Center and Menard Correctional Center (see Docs. 1, 7, 16).1
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he injured his shoulder at Pontiac in February 2018

before he was transferred to Menard in May 2018 (Doc. 1 at pp. 9-13). The Complaint then
alleges certain constitutional violations committed by Defendants Wexford and Dr.
Siddiqui related to the care of Plaintiff’s shoulder (see generally Docs. 1, 16).2
Following a threshold review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, this Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on the following claims:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr.
Ritz, Dr. Siddiqui, and Moldenhauer for denying and
delaying Brown medical care for his torn rotator cuff.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Wexford Health Sources, Inc. for establishing cost cutting
policies which denied Brown care for his torn rotator cuff.

(Doc. 16 at pp. 3-5).
Defendants subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 48), which was granted as to Defendants
Moldenhauer and Dr. Ritz and denied as to Defendants Wexford and Dr. Siddiqui (Id. at
pp. 21-22). Consequently, a Final Scheduling Order was entered that set a discovery
deadline of February 10, 2025, and a dispositive motion deadline of March 10, 2025 (Doc.
60). Discovery disputes and delays ensued, such that those deadlines were extended on

1 Plaintiff filed his Complaint against employees at both Pontiac and Menard Correctional Centers (see Doc.
1). On October 11, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
against the Defendants employed at Pontiac and transferred Plaintiff’s case to this Court to resolve his
claims against Dr. Siddiqui, Wexford, and several other Defendants employed at Menard (Doc. 7).
2 Detailed summaries of Plaintiff’s claims and this case’s procedural history can be found in the Court’s
Merit Review Order (Doc. 16) and the Court’s Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’
exhaustion-based summary judgment motion (Doc. 58; see also Doc. 48).
several occasions (see, e.g., Docs. 82, 83, 87, 91, 102).
On July 9, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion to Appoint

Counsel (Doc. 109). One day later, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 110) and supporting memorandum (Doc. 111). While awaiting the appearance of
newly recruited counsel, Plaintiff moved to extend his response deadline to Defendants’
motion (Doc. 114). However, rather than simply grant Plaintiff’s requested 90-day
extension, the Court stayed Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to Defendants’ summary
judgment motion until recruited counsel was given an adequate opportunity to

familiarize himself with the case (Doc. 115).
At a Status Conference held on August 14, 2025, Plaintiff’s recruited counsel
appeared and indicated he has received all discovery exchanged to date (Doc. 119). As a
result, the Court lifted the stay on responding to Defendants’ summary judgment motion
and set a response deadline of October 17, 2025 (Id.). At that time, Plaintiff’s counsel also

requested to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of conducting depositions of Dr.
Siddiqui and a Wexford Rule 30(b)(6) representative (Id.). Defendants objected to the
request and the Court indicated that it was not inclined to reopen discovery given the age
and posture of this case (Id.).3

3 At the status conference, the Court explained that given the age and the current posture of this case, it had
decided to recruit counsel to assist Plaintiff with the summary judgment briefing and trial, if necessary.
However, for the reasons explained below, the Court is now convinced that good cause exists and it would
be too prejudicial to not allow Plaintiff to conduct very limited discovery. The Court recognizes that
Defendants will incur prejudice as well by expending additional time and resources preparing their
witnesses for deposition and refiling their summary judgment motion. However, after carefully
considering the parties’ briefs, the balance weighs in favor of Plaintiff and limited discovery will be
permitted.
On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Conduct Limited
Additional Discovery and Temporarily Stay Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule (Doc.

120). Defendants timely filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 121) and Plaintiff timely
filed a Reply in Support thereafter (Doc. 122). In conformance with the Court’s prior
Order lifting the stay (Doc. 119), Plaintiff also filed a Response in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on October 17, 2025 (Doc 124). Defendants
timely filed a Reply in Support of their motion one week later (Doc. 125). Finally, on
November 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Supplement Summary Judgment Record, as

well as a supporting exhibit containing medical records (Docs. 126, 126-1). Defendants
filed their Response in Opposition on November 21, 2025 (Doc. 127).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) states, “A schedule may be modified only
for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” In other words, Rule 16(b)(4) allows this

Court to modify a scheduling order when good cause is shown. Id.; see also Smart v. Int’l
Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local 702, 453 Fed. Appx. 650, 655 (7th Cir. 2011). “In making a Rule
16(b) good-cause determination, the primary consideration for district courts is the
diligence of the party seeking amendment.” Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 720 (7th
Cir. 2011). See also Allen v. Brown Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th 843, 852–53 (7th Cir. 2022) (“The

central consideration in assessing whether good cause exists is the diligence of the party
seeking to amend [the scheduling order].”).
Relatedly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), after a party moves
for summary judgment:
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons,
it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may:

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
discovery; or

(3) issue any other appropriate order.

(emphasis added). Accordingly, “[a] party seeking relief under Rule 56(d) must show by
affidavit or declaration specific reasons discovery should be extended, which requires
more than a fond hope that more fishing might net some good evidence.” Smith v. OSF
HealthCare Sys., 933 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2019).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Motion to Conduct Limited Additional Discovery seeks leave to: (1)
depose Dr. Siddiqui; (2) depose a Wexford representative pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6); and
(3) discover and disclose additional medical records from outsider providers (Doc. 120).
The Court addresses each of these requests in turn.
I. Deposition of Dr. Siddiqui
Plaintiff seeks leave to depose Dr. Siddiqui because Plaintiff believes Dr.
Siddiqui’s deposition will be indispensable to establishing his state of mind, which is a
necessary component of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against him (see Doc. 120
at pp. 6-7). Plaintiff further avers that good cause exists to allow Dr. Siddiqui’s deposition
at this time, and any minimal prejudice to Defendants is substantially outweighed by the
significant prejudice Plaintiff would face were he not allowed to depose Dr. Siddiqui (Id.
at pp. 8-9). In response, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good
cause to excuse his previous failure to depose Dr. Siddiqui while proceeding pro se (Doc.
121 at pp. 1-5). In addition, Defendants argue that deposing Dr. Siddiqui is not necessary

and will be unduly prejudicial (Doc. 121 at pp. 6, 9-10).
For the following reasons, the Court finds good cause exists to allow Plaintiff to
depose Dr. Siddiqui. First and foremost, the record demonstrates that both Plaintiff and
his recruited counsel were diligent in conducting discovery. Regarding Plaintiff, he was
proceeding pro se throughout the course of discovery (see Docs. 91, 109). Pertinently, in
addition to the difficulties that any incarcerated pro se litigant would face in deposing an

opposing party, Plaintiff established numerous, additional complexities unique to his
situation: (1) his suffering from a mental illness (see, e.g., Doc. 98 at p. 4); (2) his placement
on crisis watch and resulting loss of property (Id. at p. 3, Doc. 104 at p. 2); and (3) his
reliance on other inmates to assist him (see, e.g., Doc. 98 at p. 3). Consequently, based upon
both his unique personal circumstances as well as the general hurdles Plaintiff faced as

an incarcerated pro se litigant, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to depose Dr. Siddiqui
was not due to a lack of diligence. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 785 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“Taking depositions, conducting witness examinations, applying the rules of evidence,
and making opening statements are beyond the ability of most pro se litigants to
successfully carry out.”).

In response, Defendants contend that regardless of the difficulties Plaintiff faced,
he could have attempted to conduct Dr. Siddiqui’s deposition by alternative means such
as by written question (see Doc. 121 at p. 6). The Court does not find the existence of a
theoretical alternative demonstrates a lack of diligence on Plaintiff’s part. For one, this
contention does not account for the realities of Plaintiff’s situation, which included his
placement on crisis watch and his then-ongoing mental health concerns (see, e.g., Doc. 103

at p. 2). Moreover, conducting a deposition by written questions would have created
another set of challenges for Plaintiff, including: (1) preparing appropriate written
questions; (2) arranging their deposition; and (3) paying for expenses associated with
taking a written deposition including officer fees, costs, witness fees, and the cost of the
deposition transcript. See Winger v. Jeffreys, 19-CV-00236-SPM, 2022 WL 4467644, at *3
(S.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2022) (detailing what would have been required for the inmate litigant

to have conducted a deposition by written questions). In short, the Court sees no reason
why the theoretical, yet equally challenging, option of conducting a deposition by
alternative means would suffice here. See, e.g., Miller v. Campanella, 794 F.3d 878, 880 (7th
Cir. 2015) (“Taking depositions, conducting witness examinations, applying the rules of
evidence, and making opening statements are beyond the ability of most pro se litigants

to successfully carry out.”); Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010), and explaining that gathering evidence was
one of several challenges a pro se inmate litigant faced). Accordingly, just as Plaintiff’s
failure to depose Dr. Siddiqui does not demonstrate a lack of diligence on Plaintiff’s part,
the Court will not fault Plaintiff for failing to utilize an alternative method of deposing

Dr. Siddiqui that was beyond his personal capabilities.
Moreover, after Plaintiff was recruited counsel, there can be no doubt that counsel
acted promptly and diligently. From the very first time Plaintiff’s recruited counsel
appeared before the Court, counsel immediately alerted the Court to the need to depose
Dr. Siddiqui (see Doc. 119). And just eight days after first attending a Status Conference,
counsel filed the instant Motion to Conduct Limited Additional Discovery (Doc. 120).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s motion included an affidavit prepared by counsel that specified
reasons ― such as needing to understand Dr. Siddiqui’s treatment decisions, mental state,
and responsibilities ― as to why Plaintiff could not adequately present facts to oppose
Defendants’ motion without deposing Dr. Siddiqui (see Doc. 120-1). In fact, Defendants’
own Motion for Summary Judgment supports Plaintiff’s contentions as to the substantial
need to depose Dr. Siddiqui because it repeatedly cites an affidavit prepared by Dr.

Siddiqui (Doc. 111-2) to support Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and
corresponding summary judgment arguments (see, e.g., Doc. 111 at pp. 2-17, 22-26).
Consequently, the Court finds that both Plaintiff and his recruited counsel were
diligent and therefore, good cause exists to amend the scheduling order to allow
Plaintiff’s recruited counsel to depose Dr. Siddiqui. Furthermore, given the significance

of Dr. Siddiqui’s deposition testimony, as well as his affidavit accompanying Defendants’
motion, the Court concludes that Plaintiff would suffer prejudice “in a manner
reasonably likely to alter the outcome” of his case if recruited counsel were not provided
with an opportunity to depose Dr. Siddiqui. See Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 766 (7th
Cir. 2010) (concluding that under the specific facts of that case, “that the assistance of

counsel during discovery could have strengthened Mr. Santiago’s case ‘in a manner
reasonably likely to alter the outcome.’”); James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 331 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Therefore, on the whole, a lawyer appointed in time to help plaintiff with discovery
could have potentially helped him present sufficient facts to create a genuine issue about
why defendants ... advised a continuation of ineffective treatments that prolonged his
pain.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion

to Conduct Limited Additional Discovery is GRANTED as to his request to depose Dr.
Siddiqui (Doc. 120).
II. 30(b)(6) Deposition of a Wexford Representative
Plaintiff similarly argues that good cause exists to allow him to conduct a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition of a Wexford representative (Doc. 120 at p. 7). Plaintiff further
contends that, due in part to Defendants’ refusal to produce materials Plaintiff requested

related to Wexford’s policies, the record is unfairly devoid of evidence to support
Plaintiff’s Monell claim in Count 2 (Id.). In response, Defendants aver that Plaintiff’s
request to depose a Wexford representative must be denied because “Plaintiff’s
boilerplate Monell claims against Wexford lack a specific factual basis, the burden of
preparing a witness for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is much greater than that of preparing

a fact witness, and the deposition is likely to entail further discovery motion[.]” (Doc. 121
at p. 6). Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony demonstrates
the lack of merit as to his Monell claim (Id. at pp. 7-8).
The Court need not rehash its prior findings as to the diligence of Plaintiff and his
counsel. Put simply, just as Plaintiff’s failure to depose Dr. Siddiqui did not demonstrate

a lack of diligence, the Court finds the same is true for Plaintiff’s failure to depose a
Wexford representative prior to the close of discovery. Similarly, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s recruited counsel was diligent in seeking to depose a Wexford representative
pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) after being recruited by the Court.
Moreover, the Court finds that the prejudice to Wexford of having to prepare a
Rule 30(b)(6) representative is substantially outweighed by the prejudice Plaintiff would

face by not being permitted to conduct such a deposition. First and foremost, Plaintiff has
established that he attempted to timely obtain discovery materials related to Wexford’s
policies and practices (see, e.g., Doc. 104 at p. 3) (Plaintiff’s pro se Motion to Compel
seeking, among other things, Wexford’s policies related to collegial review). Defendants’
response to that motion further demonstrates that a dispute existed as to the discovery of
Wexford’s policies at a time when discovery was still ongoing (Doc. 107 at pp. 2-4). And

while that Motion to Compel was ultimately denied as moot because Plaintiff was
recruited counsel, the Court’s denial specifically stated that “Plaintiff’s appointed counsel
may refile any of those motions as counsel deems necessary.” (Doc. 109).
Thus, not only does good cause exist to extend discovery deadlines to allow for
the deposition of Wexford representative, but insofar as it relates to the discovery of

Wexford’s policies and practices related to the treatment of Plaintiff’s shoulder injury and
the provision of outside care (including collegial review policies), it is readily apparent
that this was an ongoing dispute prior to the close of discovery (Id.; see also Doc. 104 at p.
3). See Johnson v. Haskell, 24-1156, 2025 WL 1000160, at *3 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) (“Because
Johnson raised the issue of needing further discovery and why, and he tried to issue

requests for the items he sought, he acted in a ‘diligent, sensible, and sequenced
manner.’”). On top of that, it was a discovery dispute that the Court indicated could be
refiled after recruited counsel appeared (Doc. 109).4 And crucially, as far as the Court can
discern (see, e.g., Doc. 121 at pp. 9-10), those documents were not provided to Plaintiff

after he was recruited counsel (see also Doc. 122 at p. 2). The lack of any discovery to those
documents demonstrates the significant prejudice Plaintiff would face were he not
allowed to depose a Wexford representative pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). Plaintiff’s Monell
claims hinges on his ability to establish that Wexford’s policies were to blame for the
denial of meaningful treatment for his shoulder injury (see Doc. 16 at pp. 3-4). Thus, it is
self-evident why obtaining evidence as to those policies, both as written and as applied

in practice, is necessary to fully and fairly adjudicate that claim. Plaintiff’s counsel has
also provided an affidavit attesting to the necessity of obtaining this evidence to prevail
on his Monell claim (Doc. 120-1).
Moreover, while Defendants will suffer some prejudice from having to prepare a
Rule 30(b)(6) representative at this stage of proceedings, the Court finds Defendants are

partially to blame for the prejudice they now seek to avoid. Namely, Defendants refused
to provide Plaintiff with any requested Wexford policy due to their belief that the request
was vague, overbroad, and posed safety and security concerns – including the “clear risk
that custody officers might take copies of Wexford written policies in Plaintiff’s
possession and let them fall into the wrong hands.” (Doc. 107 at p. 4). In other words,

rather than working with the then pro se Plaintiff to try to find a solution that allowed
Defendants to produce some of Wexford’s policies in a narrow and controlled manner,

4 Of course, the prior discovery dispute related to the production of documents rather than a Rule 30(b)(6)
deponent.
Defendants instead categorically refused to produce any of Wexford’s written policies
(see Doc. 122 at p. 2; see also Doc. 107 at p. 4).

Ironically, Defendants have now proposed an alternative to conducting a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition wherein they would produce certain Wexford policy documents (Doc.
121 at pp. 9-10). That is precisely what Plaintiff previously sought during discovery but
Defendants categorically refused to produce the documents (see Docs. 104, 107).
Accordingly, the Court will allow Plaintiff to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of a
Wexford representative. Defendants chose to argue that it was impermissible to produce

any Wexford policy documents to Plaintiff. As a result, it seems only fair that they must
now be prepared to discuss those policies through a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Ultimately,
the prejudice Defendants now face is of their own making.5 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Motion to Conduct Limited Additional Discovery is GRANTED as to his request to
depose a Wexford representative pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) (Doc. 120).

III. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Medical Records and Motion to Supplement
Finally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Conduct Additional Limited Discovery also
requests leave to “belatedly disclose medical records from Plaintiff’s outside treaters that
are absent from the medical records heretofore produced by Defendants.” (Doc. 120 at p.
2). Defendants’ Response to that discovery request indicated that “Defendants have no

opposition to Plaintiff’s request for additional medical records. Plaintiff indicated he has
subpoenaed the additional records. Defendants have no objection to this so long as

5 Defendants also raise several substantive arguments as to why Plaintiff’s Monell claim lacks merit (see
Doc. 121 at p. 7). However, those merits-based arguments are more appropriately raised in a motion for
summary judgment after Plaintiff has had an opportunity to review evidence of Wexford’s policies.
Defendants receive a copy and are granted leave to use these records in any reply
memorandum that may be necessary.” (Doc. 121 at p. 6). However, as evinced by

Plaintiff’s later-filed Motion to Supplement Summary Judgment Record, Plaintiff did not
receive those records from NorthShore University HealthSystem (“NorthShore”) until
October 31, 2025 (Doc. 126, p. 2). By that time, Plaintiff had already filed his Response in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants had filed
their Reply in Support (see Docs. 124, 125). Due to that delay and the completion of
briefing on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants changed their

position and opposed Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the summary judgment record
(Doc. 127). Specifically, Defendants now argue that Plaintiff should not be permitted to
supplement the summary judgment record with those medical records because summary
judgment briefing has concluded and they will no longer have an opportunity to address
those records or any corresponding statement of fact (Id.).

The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments to be more compelling, and therefore,
GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to conduct additional, limited discovery regarding these
medical records (Doc. 127). Again, Defendants previously consented to the discovery of
these supplemental records (Doc. 122 at p. 6) and their newfound opposition is premised
upon an inability to respond to those records (see Doc. 127). Yet, for the reasons discussed

above, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff will be permitted to depose Dr.
Siddiqui and a Wexford representative.
Crucially, in light of these two additional depositions that will be conducted, the
Court believes the prudent course of action is to require Defendants to refile their
summary judgment motion after those depositions have been completed. See Ferguson v.
Cook Cnty., Illinois, 349 F.R.D. 210, 213 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (Granting the plaintiff’s motion to

reopen discovery for good cause and then holding that pursuant to “Rule 56(d),
defendants’ pending motions for summary judgment are denied without prejudice
because they will, in all likelihood, need to be re-briefed following additional
discovery.”). The Court does not make this decision lightly, but believes such a result is
necessitated by the potential significance of the two additional depositions that are to be
conducted, and the Court’s strong desire to ensure this action is determined on the merits

and not due to procedural concerns. See Id. Accordingly, Defendants’ pending Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED as MOOT without prejudice (Doc. 110).
In light of this determination and Defendants’ previously expressed acquiescence
to the late discovery of Plaintiff’s outside medical records so long as they had an
opportunity to address them in summary judgment briefing (see Doc. 121 at p. 6), the

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to conduct additional, limited discovery regarding
these medical records (Doc. 127). Consequently, because Defendants will be required to
file a new (or renewed) Motion for Summary Judgment after the additional limited
discovery discussed in this Order is completed, Plaintiff’s later-filed Motion to
Supplement Summary Judgment Record is DENIED as MOOT (Doc. 126).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Conduct Limited Additional
Discovery is GRANTED (Doc. 120) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Summary
Judgment Record is DENIED as MOOT (Doc. 126).
Additionally, in light of the Court’s discovery rulings and their likely impact upon
the parties’ summary judgment briefing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

DENIED as MOOT without prejudice (Doc. 110). Defendants may file a new or renewed
motion for summary judgment after the limited, additional discovery discussed in this
Order has been completed.
The deadline for Plaintiff to conduct the depositions of Dr. Siddiqui and a Wexford
representative is May 18, 2026. Thereafter, Defendants’ deadline to file a new (or
renewed) Motion for Summary Judgment is June 17, 2026. Plaintiff shall then have 30

days from the date Defendants’ motion is filed to file a Response in Opposition. Finally,
Defendants shall have 14 days from the date Plaintiff’s response is filed to file a Reply in
Support of their motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 17, 2026
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11296020. Public record. Not legal advice.