# David Durham v. Dr. David Brown

> Louisiana Court of Appeal · March 4, 2015

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11291488

## Case

- **Court:** Louisiana Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** March 4, 2015
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-1042

DAVID DURHAM, ET AL.

VERSUS

DR. DAVID BROWN, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. C-2013-0357
HONORABLE H. WARD FONTENOT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John Gregory Bergstedt
Fraser, Wheeler & Bergstedt
4350 Nelson Road
P. O. Box 4886
Lake Charles, LA 70606-4886
Telephone: (337) 478-8595
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellees - Dr. David Brown and Dr. Chuen Kwok

Randall Scott Iles
P. O. Box 3385
Lafayette, LA 70502
Telephone: (337) 234-8800
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiffs/Appellants - David Durham and Robert Durham
René J. Pfefferle
Jennifer M. Durham
Watson, Blanche, Wilson & Posner
P. O. Drawer 2995
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-2995
Telephone: (225) 389-5511
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellees - West Louisiana Health Services, Inc.,
Beauregard Memorial Hospital Home Health Agency, and West
Louisiana Health Services, Inc.
THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

In this medical malpractice case, Plaintiffs David and Robert Durham

appeal the trial court’s grant of several medical providers’ motions for summary

judgment. Plaintiffs filed suit against Beauregard Memorial Hospital Home Health

Agency, Dr. David Brown, and Dr. Chuen Kwok for allegedly providing negligent

medical care to Plaintiffs’ mother before her death. Defendants moved for

summary judgment, contending Plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert testimony to

meet their burden of proof at trial. At a hearing on the matter, Plaintiffs sought to

prove their malpractice claim with letters purportedly written by medical experts.

The trial court did not consider the letters because they were not in affidavit or

equally reliable form and ruled in favor of Defendants. Because we find Plaintiffs’

letters are not of sufficient evidentiary quality to create a genuine issue of material

fact, we affirm.

I.

ISSUE

We must determine whether the trial court erred in granting

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

David and Robert Durham are the sons of Catherine Durham, a former

patient of Dr. David Brown. Dr. Brown performed a cholecystectomy on Ms.

Durham in 2006. Following her surgery, Ms. Durham received postoperative care

from Dr. Chuen Kwok, a urologist, and Beauregard Memorial Hospital Home
Health Agency (“BMH”). Roughly two weeks after her cholecystectomy, Ms.

Durham was admitted to Beauregard Memorial Hospital with complaints of

abdominal pain. In the following days, Dr. Brown performed two procedures on

Ms. Durham, one with the assistance of Dr. Kwok. Roughly two days after her

second procedure, Ms. Durham died.

After Ms. Durham’s death, David and Robert Durham filed suit

against Dr. Brown, Dr. Kwok, and BMH. In their petition for damages, the sons,

individually and on behalf of their mother, sought survival and wrongful death

damages arising from Defendants’ alleged negligence in the medical care rendered

to Ms. Durham. Dr. Brown and Dr. Kwok answered and filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment, contending that Plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert

testimony to support their malpractice claim. In support of their motion, the

doctors attached a copy of a medical review panel opinion unanimously finding

that Defendants complied with the applicable standard of care in regards to their

medical treatment of Ms. Durham. The doctors also attached a set of unanswered

interrogatories that had been posed to Plaintiffs. BMH answered and filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment on the same grounds, along with the same medical

review panel opinion.

Plaintiffs did not file a formal opposition to Defendants’ motions, but

did email three documents to Defendants two days before a hearing on the matter:

(1) an affidavit of a nurse, which spoke to a potential breach of the applicable

standard of care by BMH; (2) a letter, purportedly written by a urologist, wherein it

was alleged that Dr. Kwok breached the standard of care; and (3) an unsigned

letter, purportedly written by a doctor, which alleged a breach in the applicable

standard of care and causation between the breach and Ms. Durham’s death.

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At a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, Defendants

introduced a certified copy of the medical review panel opinion attached to their

original motion and the affidavits of two medical review panel members, which

Defendants stated they had previously sent to the court and opposing counsel.

Defendants argued that Plaintiffs could not meet their evidentiary burden because

the affidavit of Plaintiffs’ nurse was untimely served and failed to testify as to

causation, an essential element of their claim. Defendants also argued that

Plaintiffs’ letters were inadmissible due to their form. Plaintiffs conceded that

their nurse could not testify as to causation, which they sought to prove through the

letters from their doctors. Plaintiffs further contended that they were not aware of

the need to present their doctors’ countervailing expert opinion in affidavit form

because no affidavits had been attached to Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment or filed with the court prior to the hearing.

The trial court found that Defendants’ medical review panel opinion

was sufficient to shift the evidentiary burden to Plaintiffs. The court chose not to

consider Plaintiffs’ letters because they were not in affidavit or equally reliable

form, and it ultimately found that Plaintiffs had failed to overcome their

evidentiary burden. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions and allowed

Plaintiffs to proffer their supporting evidence. Plaintiffs appealed.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Grants of summary judgment are subject to de
novo review “using the same criteria that govern the trial
court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is
appropriate, i.e., whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact and whether the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” We shall consider the

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record and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at
trial on the matter, then he must only present evidence
showing a lack of factual support for one or more
essential elements to the non-mover’s case. Once the
mover has made a prima facie case that the motion
should be granted, the non-mover must then present
evidence sufficient to show a genuine issue of material
fact. If the non-mover fails to present some evidence that
he might be able to meet his burden of proof at trial, the
motion should be granted.

Smith v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 13-1172, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/14),

134 So.3d 122, 125 (citations omitted).

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ motions

for summary judgment because the motions lacked adequate evidentiary support.

We disagree. Defendants presented sufficient evidence to shift the evidentiary

burden to Plaintiffs, who failed to establish their ability to carry their burden of

proof at trial.

To prevail in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the applicable standard of

care; (2) a breach of the applicable standard of care; and (3) a causal connection

between the breach and the resulting injury. La.R.S. 9:2794. Generally, expert

testimony is required to establish the applicable standard of care and whether a

breach of that standard occurred, “except where the negligence is so obvious that a

lay person can infer negligence without the guidance of expert testimony.”

Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726, p. 6 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 884.

4
Defendants bore the initial burden of demonstrating a lack of factual

support for at least one essential element of Plaintiffs’ claim. See La.Code Civ.P.

art. 966(C)(2). Here, Defendants met their burden with the submitted medical

review panel opinion. The panel unanimously found a lack of factual support for

the contention that there was a breach of the standard of care, an essential element

of Plaintiffs’ claim. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument on appeal, a medical review

panel opinion finding a lack of factual support for an element of a plaintiff’s claim

has consistently been found to meet a defendant’s evidentiary burden as mover in a

summary judgment proceeding. See LeCroy v. Byrd Reg’l Hosp., 10-904 (La.App.

3 Cir. 2/2/11), 56 So.3d 1167; Brown v. Riverland Med. Ctr., 06-1449 (La.App. 3

Cir. 3/7/07), 952 So.2d 889, writ denied, 07-740 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 177; and

Young v. Mobley, 05-547 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 923 So.2d 917. As such, the

burden shifted to Plaintiffs to present evidence sufficient to show that they could

be able to satisfy their burden of proof at trial.

The record indicates expert testimony was required to establish

Plaintiffs’ malpractice claim, as the negligence alleged was not so obvious it could

be inferred without the aid of experts. See Samaha, 977 So.2d 880. Plaintiffs

conceded that the only expert testimony they had to attest to medical causation, an

essential element of their claim, was in the form of letters. To begin, the letters

were untimely served under La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). Moreover, the letters lack

the evidentiary quality to create a genuine issue of material fact. This court has

found that “[u]nsworn and unverified documents,” such as letters, “are not of

sufficient evidentiary quality to be given weight in determining whether there is a

genuine issue of material fact.” Mouton v. Sears Roebuck, 99-669, p. 8 (La.App. 3

Cir. 11/3/99), 748 So.2d 61, 66, writ denied, 99-3386 (La. 2/4/00), 754 So.2d 232

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(citations omitted); See also Brown, 952 So.2d 889. “The requirement that

documents be verified or authenticated is not merely a mechanical one of form

only. It is based on the fundamental fact that such documents are not self-

proving.” Handy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 04-1277, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05),

896 So.2d 316, 322 (citations omitted). For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’

letters will not be given weight in our determination.

A review of the record reveals no other expert testimony in support of

Plaintiffs’ claim. There are references in the record to the untimely served

affidavit of Plaintiffs’ nurse, but the affidavit itself was not provided on appeal.

Even if the affidavit had been provided, it would be unavailing. Plaintiffs already

conceded that the affidavit alone could not establish the necessary elements of their

malpractice claim. Since Plaintiffs have “fail[ed] to produce factual support

sufficient to establish that [they] will be able to satisfy [their] evidentiary

burden…at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.” La.Code Civ.P. art.

966(C)(2). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ motions

for summary judgment.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Costs of this appeal are assessed

against David Durham and Robert Durham.

AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11291488. Public record. Not legal advice.
