# Herechberger

> District Court, D. Oregon · March 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11288806

## Case

- **Full name:** Elizabeth Combs; Thomas Johnston; Kimberly Herechberger; Michelle Boltz v. PeaceHealth
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** March 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11288806

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requiring the admission of opinion evidence connected to existing data “only by the [say so] of the expert”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

OPINION & ORDER
ELIZABETH COMBS;
THOMAS JOHNSTON; Civ. No. 6:23-cv-01486-AA

KIMBERLY HERECHBERGER; Civ. No. 6:23-cv-01892-AA

MICHELLE BOLTZ, Civ. No. 6:24-cv-00246-AA

Plaintiffs,
v.

PEACEHEALTH,

Defendant.
_______________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant PeaceHealth’s consolidated Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 47, and Motion to Strike, ECF No. 69. Plaintiffs
Elizabeth Combs, Thomas Johnston, Kimberly Herechberger,1 and Michelle Boltz
bring religious discrimination claims against their former employer PeaceHealth
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and ORS
659A.030. See Combs and Johnston First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) No. 6:23-cv-01486-AA,
ECF No. 18; Herechberger Compl., No. 6:23-cv-01892-AA, ECF No. 1; and Boltz FAC,

1 PeaceHealth notes that Kimberly Herschberger’s last name is misspelled as
Herechberger. PeaceHealth testified Plaintiff’s name is spelled Herschberger in
PeaceHealth records. Le Decl. ¶ 64, ECF No. 50.
No. 6:24-cv-00246-AA, ECF No. 18. Michelle Boltz also brings a disability
discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and ORS 659A.112. The cases were consolidated for the limited

purpose of briefing summary judgment motions as to Defendant’s undue hardship
defense. For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s Motions, ECF Nos. 47, 69, are
GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND
“PeaceHealth is a not-for-profit healthcare system headquartered in
Vancouver, Washington, with medical centers, critical access hospitals, and medical
clinics located in Washington, Oregon, and Alaska.” Le Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 50. “As of
August 2021, PeaceHealth employed approximately 16,250 caregivers across Alaska,
Oregon, and Washington,” including “approximately 5,720 caregivers in Oregon.” Id.
I. The COVID-19 Pandemic

From May 5, 2020, until May 11, 2023, COVID-19, an infection caused by the
virus SARS-CoV-2, caused a global pandemic. Koekkoek Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 48. Dr.
Douglas Koekkoek, MD, PeaceHealth’s Chief Physician and Clinical Executive during
the pandemic, testified that COVID-19 “is spread primarily through respiratory
particles that travel through the air, which can land in a human’s eyes, nose, throat,
or mouth” to cause infection and is “one of the most contagious currently known
human pathogens.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 2. During the summer of 2021, the COVID-19 Delta

variant, “the deadliest and most transmissible variant of COVID-19 to date,” spread
through Oregon and the rest of the country, id. ¶ 10, causing an approximate 300%
spike in national COVID-19 cases, id. ¶ 37, Ex. 12, ECF No. 48-12, and, in Oregon,
causing a spike that exceeded OHSU worst case scenario prediction models, id. 19,
Ex. 4, 5, 6, ECF Nos. 48-4, 48-5, 48-6.

Dr. Koekkoek testified that “[i]n [his] 35-plus years in healthcare, [he] ha[s]
never experienced anything like the Delta variant.” Id. ¶ 11. Dr. Koekkoek testified
that “PeaceHealth’s facilities were overflowing with patients[,]” that their ICUs were
so full that they “had to stop elective surgeries and convert [former ICU] recovery
areas into COVID ICU areas[,]” id., “which created treatment delays for patients with
other serious conditions[,]” id. ¶ 12. Dr. Koekkoek testified that because the local

morgues could not handle more dead bodies, PeaceHealth had to turn some of their
areas into “cooling bays” to hold bodies of individuals who had died from COVID-19[,]
id. ¶ 11, that “family members and coworkers [became] ill with COVID[,]” id., that
“the Oregon Governor activated the Oregon National Guard to assist PeaceHealth
with everything from janitorial work to administering COVID-19 tests[,]” id. ¶ 22,
and that “[t]he impact was devastating and profound—despite all precautionary
efforts in effect[,]” id. ¶ 11. Dr. Koekkoek testified that his experiences with H1N1,

influenza, Ebola, and the wildfires “pale in comparison to the impact of the Delta
variant.” Id.
II. Oregon Health Authority Response
On August 5, 2021, the Oregon Health Authority (“OHA”) issued a rule
requiring all Oregon healthcare providers and staff to either be fully vaccinated
against COVID-19 by September 30, 2021, absent medical or religious exception, or
to “undergo COVID-19 testing at least weekly.” Former OAR 333-019-1010(3)-(5) (eff.
Aug. 5, 2021, to Aug. 24, 2021) (“OHA Rule” or the “Rule”).
But less than three weeks later, on August 25, 2021, OHA amended the Rule

to remove the testing option and to require vaccination of all health care providers
and staff by October 18, 2021, absent medical or religious exception. Former OAR
333-019-1010(3)-(4), (eff. Aug. 25, 2021, to June 30, 2023). The rule also provided
that employers “take reasonable steps to ensure that unvaccinated healthcare
providers and healthcare staff [with vaccine exceptions] are protected from
contracting and spreading COVID-19.” Former OAR 333-019-1010(5). Notably, at

the time that OHA amended the Rule, health care facilities, including PeaceHealth,
were already complying with masking and physical distancing requirements and with
requirements to screen, triage, and isolate symptomatic individuals and those known
to be infected with the virus. See former OAR 333-019-1011 (eff. Aug. 20, 2021, to
Mar 28, 2023); former OAR 437-001-0744 (eff. Nov. 6, 2020, to Apr. 2, 2023).
III. PeaceHealth’s COVID-19 Vaccination Policy
Earlier that summer, in response to CDC and OHSU Delta variant forecasts

and other epidemiologic data, PeaceHealth convened an Ethical Discernment Team
(the “Team”) to determine whether PeaceHealth should require its caregivers to be
vaccinated against COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 24, 25 (citing Ex. 7, Ethical Discernment five-
step decision-making process, ECF No. 48-7). Starting in late July 2021 and
continuing into the fall and throughout the Pandemic, the team reviewed
PeaceHealth’s internal epidemiologic data, id. ¶ 21, as well as CDC Morbidity &
Mortality Weekly Reports (“MMWR”) and other scientific and medical data published
in leading peer-reviewed medical journals about the COVID-19 Delta variant, the
safety and efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine and other mitigation methods, id. ¶¶ 26,

31–41 (citing Ex. 9–17, ECF Nos. 48-9 through 48-17), OHSU’s Oregon Delta variant
forecasts, id. ¶ 19 (citing Ex. 4, 5, 6, ECF Nos. 48-4, 48-5, 48-6), recommendations
from OHA, CDC, and professional health care organizations such as the American
Nursing Association, American Hospital Association, and American Medical
Association, id. ¶¶ 18, 28, 35–41 (citing Ex. 3, 11, 12, 13, 17, ECF Nos. 48-3, 48-11,
48-12, 48-13, 48-17), and actions taken by other major hospital systems such as the

Veterans Administration, id. ¶ 28. Dr. Koekkoek testified that “[b]y late July 2021,
it was clear that the threat and ultimate arrival of the Delta variant posed a
foundational risk to PeaceHealth’s ability to deliver healthcare services.” Id. ¶ 23.
Dr. Koekkoek testified that “[b]y August 2021, COVID-19 had become a
pandemic of the unvaccinated.” Id. ¶ 20. “PeaceHealth census data showed that
approximately 80% of COVID-19 patients hospitalized in its Oregon facilities were
unvaccinated, 90% of COVID-19 patients in Oregon ICUs were unvaccinated, and

over 90% of COVID-19 patients in the ICU on a ventilator in Oregon were
unvaccinated.” Id. He testified that “[a] significant portion of PeaceHealth’s patients
are medically vulnerable individuals, who either could not be vaccinated (due to age
or medical conditions) or who, despite vaccination, are more susceptible to serious
illness or death if they are exposed and experience a breakthrough contraction of
COVID-19.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 26–27, 32, 36 (describing medically vulnerable patients). Dr.
Koekkoek testified that the Team reviewed a July 2021 CDC report, in which the
CDC recommended that healthcare employers “[c]onsider vaccine mandates for
[healthcare providers] to protect vulnerable populations,” in addition to “[u]niversal

masking for source control and prevention[.]” Id. ¶ 36 (citing Ex. 11, CDC, Improving
communications around vaccine breakthrough and vaccine effectiveness, (July 29,
2021)). Carina Le, PeaceHealth System Director People Operations, testified that,
on August 3, 2021, PeaceHealth records showed that, in Oregon, 1,130 of 5,720
(19.7%) of PeaceHealth caregivers were unvaccinated or undeclared (failed to respond
to vaccination status surveys). Le Decl. ¶ 13.

Dr. Koekkoek testified that by early August, scientific data and guidance from
the CDC, OHA, and other leading public health sources indicated that COVID-19
vaccines were safe and effective, protected against severe illness and death, reduced
the risk of viral transmission, and that vaccinated individuals were less likely to
suffer severe illness or death—information reviewed by the Team. Koekkoek Decl. ¶
32 and ¶¶ 31, 33–37 (citing Ex. 9–17).2 PeaceHealth’s internal epidemiologic data

2 An August 2, 2021 editorial published in the New England Journal of
Medicine (“NEJM”) review of vaccine efficacy studies “showed that through the end
of June 2021, COVID-19 vaccines had averted an estimated 279,000 deaths and 1.25
million hospitalizations in the United States.” Koekkoek Decl. ¶ 33, Ex. 9 (Stephen
J.W. Evans & Nicholas P. Jewell, Vaccine Effectiveness Studies in the Field, 385(7)
N. ENG. J. MED. 650 (Aug. 2, 2021)); a June 30, 2021 study published in the NEJM
“showed that being fully vaccinated against COVID-19 reduced the risk of infection
by 91% and still protected against severe illness and hospitalization if breakthrough
infection occurred.” Koekkoek ¶ 34, Ex. 10 (Mark G. Thompson, et al., Prevention
and Attenuation of Covid-19 with the BNT162b2 and mRNA-1273 Vaccines, 385(4)
N. ENG. J. MED. 320–329 (June 30, 2021)); a July 29, 2021 CDC Report “indicated
that unvaccinated individuals were 8 times more likely to contract COVID-19 than
vaccinated individuals; 25 times more likely to be hospitalized if they contracted
also showed that COVID-19 vaccination reduced viral transmission. That data
showed that PeaceHealth’s patients were 7.1 times more likely to have been exposed
to COVID-19 and 11.6 times more likely to get COVID-19 from an unvaccinated

caregiver as compared to a vaccinated caregiver. Id. ¶ 21; see also Kroll Decl. ¶¶ 17–
19, ECF No. 49 (citing Ex. 2, 3, 4, ECF No. 49-1, 49-2, 49-3). Dr. Koekkoek testified
that “PeaceHealth’s Infection Prevention team had traced the death of two patients
at one of its facilities outside Oregon to COVID-19 exposure from an unvaccinated
caregiver.” Id. ¶ 44. Epidemiologist Catherine Kroll, PeaceHealth’s System Director
of Infection Prevention, testified that the disparity between the unvaccinated and

vaccinated caregiver exposure and transmission rates “were alarming [because]
[h]ospital-acquired COVID-19 could prolong a patient’s stay in one of our facilities by
days or weeks, further straining limited hospital resources.” Kroll Decl. ¶ 20.
Dr. Koekkoek testified that on July 27, 2021, the Ethical Discernment team
unanimously decided to implement a vaccination requirement policy. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27.

COVID-19; and 25 times more likely to die as a result of COVID-19.” Koekkoek ¶ 36,
Ex. 11 (CDC, Improving communications around vaccine breakthrough and vaccine
effectiveness, (July 29, 2021)); a September 2021 CDC Morbidity & Mortality Weekly
Report (“MMWR”) “pooled clinical and observational trial data for the Pfizer
BioNTech vaccine showed that it was approximately 95% effective at preventing
hospitalization or death.” Koekkoek Decl. ¶ 40, Ex. 15 (Kathleen Dooling, et al., Use
of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine in Persons Aged >16 Years: Recommendations
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice–United States, September 2021,
70 MMWR 2021:1344–1348 (Sept. 24, 2001),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7038e2.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
2026).
On August 3, 2021, PeaceHealth announced an employee vaccination requirement
that complied with the original OHA Rule. Id. ¶ 29.
On August 30, 2021, PeaceHealth formally updated its COVID-19 Vaccination

Requirement Policy in response to updated guidance from the CDC and OHA, and in
response to OHA’s amended Rule, which removed the testing option from the
vaccination requirement for healthcare employees. Le Decl. ¶ 17.
Dr. Koekkoek testified that, on August 16, 2021, the Team decided to
implement a medical and religious exception policy and “considered potential options
. . . for those caregivers who could not work fully remotely.” Koekkoek Decl. ¶¶ 42,

43, Ex. 18, ECF No. 48-18. Dr. Koekkoek testified that the Team determined, based
on its “review of the internal and external data and guidance [and] . . . the medical
science[,] . . . that, while multiple methods of protection against COVID-19 were
important, vaccination was the single most important method.” Id. ¶ 43. Dr.
Koekkoek testified that the Team determined that, “unlike vaccination, other
methods—such as PPE (including N95 masks), testing, social distancing, restrictions

on visitation, and additional hand hygiene protocols—were already the ‘baseline’
requirements, do not provide continuous protection 24 hours per day, and are
susceptible to human error[,]”and that, to be effective, PPE must be worn properly
and must be worn continuously but was less likely to be worn, for example, in
breakrooms where transmission could occur. Id. ¶ 44. As to testing, Dr. Koekkoek
testified that by time a test is positive, an infected person is likely to be contagious
for 48 hours before the test and that the cost of repeatedly testing a large volume of
unvaccinated caregivers was “significant.” Id. ¶ 45. Dr. Koekkoek testified that the
Team determined that, unlike the other preventive measures, “vaccination not only
protects against acquiring and transmitting the virus, it also—unlike any other

preventative measures—reduces the likelihood that an infected individual is
contagious or will develop serious illness or death if they do contract the virus.” Id.
¶ 46.
Dr. Koekkoek testified that the Team determined that given the risk of viral
transmission to PeaceHealth’s vulnerable patient population and to other staff, that
allowing unvaccinated caregivers to work in person was an “unjustifiable” risk

“regardless of whether the caregiver was in a patient facing or direct patient care
role, or if they worked with [other] caregivers who were in patient facing or direct
patient care roles.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 44. He testified that “[t]he caregivers themselves were
also at risk[,]” that “[m]ore caregivers and patients becoming infected with COVID-
19 threatened PeaceHealth’s ability to continue providing essential, life-saving
treatment for its patients.” Id. ¶ 49.

Dr. Koekkoek testified, that based on that data and reasoning, the Team
determined on or about August 18, 2021, that “allowing unvaccinated caregivers to
work in person (even with other precautions) would have subjected other caregivers
and patients—including those who were medically fragile or vulnerable—to a higher
risk of contracting COVID-19[,]” id. ¶ 48, and that “[t]he caregivers themselves were
also at risk” from unvaccinated employees, id. ¶ 49.
IV. Plaintiffs
In August 2021, Plaintiffs were employed at PeaceHealth’s Sacred Heart
Medical Center at Riverbend in Springfield, Oregon. Def. Mot. at 15–17. Combs was

employed as a Cook. Combs. Decl. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 58; Le Decl. ¶ 40. Johnston was
employed as a “Registered Cardiovascular Invasive Specialist.” Johnston Decl. ¶¶ 1–
3, ECF No. 59; Le Decl. ¶ 48. Herechberger was employed as a per diem Inpatient
Registered Nurse (“RN”) in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. Am. Herechberger
Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7, ECF No. 63; Le Decl. ¶¶ 64, 65. Boltz was employed as an Inpatient
RN in the Short Stay Unit. Boltz Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 60; Le Decl. ¶ 56.
Plaintiffs each applied for and were granted a religious exception to

PeaceHealth’s vaccination requirement. Le Decl. ¶¶ 41, 49, 57, 66. They later either
obtained other employment or were terminated. Combs Decl. ¶ 2; Johnston Decl.
¶ 15; Am. Herechberger Decl. ¶ 12; Boltz Decl. ¶ 12. Boltz also applied for a medical
exception, which was denied. Le Decl. ¶ 58. Plaintiffs bring Title VII, ADA, and state
law claims for failure to accommodate their religious beliefs and medical disability.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing
the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322–23 (1986). To meet its burden, “the moving party must either produce
evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or
show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential
element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine
Ins. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Devereaux v. Abbey,
263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (“When the nonmoving party has the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party need only point out ‘that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
A court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant
and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Clicks Billiards, Inc.
v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). But “[c]redibility
determinations [and] the weighing of the evidence” are jury functions, not those of a

judge, ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no genuine issue for trial.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs bring religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Oregon law
against their former employer, PeaceHealth, for failure to accommodate their
religious beliefs in opposition to COVID-19 vaccination. In addition to bringing a

religious discrimination claim, Boltz brings a disability discrimination claim against
PeaceHealth for failure to accommodate her disability under the ADA and Oregon
law.

I. Evidentiary Objection

As a preliminary matter, Defendant moves to strike the testimony of Plaintiffs’
expert witness, Rose Walker-Patterson, because she is “unqualified to render the
opinions in her Reports” and because her opinions are unreliable and irrelevant. Def.
Reply at 3–4, ECF No. 69. Patterson offers an amended and a rebuttal report
(collectively, “Reports”) on several matters connected to this case. See Janzen Decl.,
Ex. J (Patterson Am. Rep.), ECF No. 62-10; Ex. K (Patterson Rebuttal Rep.), ECF No.
62-11.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony.
Rule 702 permits a qualified expert to present testimony that “will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” so long as (1) “the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;” (2) “the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods;” and (3) “the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable

application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702;
see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993).
The proponent of expert evidence must prove its admissibility by a preponderance of
the evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10. A party who seeks to introduce expert
testimony must show that their expert is qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education” to render an opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Trial judges are charged with ensuring that “any and all . . . [expert] evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. “Under
Daubert, the trial court must act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude junk science that does

not meet Federal Rule of Evidence 702's reliability standards by making a
preliminary determination that the expert's testimony is reliable.” Ellis v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011). “A district court cannot be silent
about reliability when challenged.” United States v. Holguin, 51 F.4th 841, 854 (9th
Cir. 2022).
A. Patterson is Qualified to Offer Infection Preventionist Testimony

PeaceHealth contends that Patterson is not qualified to offer expert testimony
because she lacks relevant education, training, and experience. Def. Reply at 7.
In her amended Report, Patterson opines that “PeaceHealth could have
implemented [r]easonable accommodation of the weekly testing program without
significant hardship or expense and could have simply worked with the Oregon
Health Authority to implement similar best practices in disease transmission
prevention to provide accommodations for religious and disabled workers who needed

them.” Am. Patterson Rep. at 12. She further opines that even “direct patient
caregivers . . . can easily be accommodated with infection control methods [such as
masking and weekly testing].” Id. at 12–13. Patterson states that her opinions are
based on her experience as a nurse infection preventionist. Id. at 2–6. In her
amended Report, Patterson also interprets various scientific and medical studies and
epidemiologic data. Id. at 7, 10, 13–29. And she opines as to COVID-19 vaccine safety
and efficacy, id. at 7, 10, 13, 15–29, vaccine injuries and vaccine-related deaths, id.
at 7, 10, 13, 15–29, FDA vaccine approval, id. at 7, 9, 10, risks to patients and other
staff from vaccinated employees, id. at 7, 10, 15–29, and natural immunity as a viable

COVID-19 mitigation strategy, id. at 20, 25.
Patterson is a Registered Nurse, with a master’s degree in nursing
administration—not epidemiology, virology, or infectious disease—who earned a
certificate in infection control and prevention from the Certification Board of
Infection Control and Epidemiology. See Janzen Decl., Ex. P at 1 (Patterson Resume),
ECF No. 62-16; Patterson Dep. 75:21–80:14. From April 2017 through October 2022,

Patterson worked as the Infection Preventionist and Employee Health nurse for Sky
Lakes Medical Center (“SLMC”), a small, rural hospital in Klamath Falls, Oregon.
Patterson Resume; Patterson Dep. 86:02–86:09; Patterson Am. Report ¶ 9. Patterson
was part of a committee that developed a “playbook planning for the pandemic[,]”
with which she was “heavily involved.” Id. at 86:10–87:05. She reported to the
Director of Quality but quit her job in October 2022 after the Director unexpectedly
resigned, and she was not selected for that position. Patterson Resume; Patterson

Dep. 87:14–88:23.
Patterson is not a medical doctor and has no advanced education or training in
epidemiology or in infectious diseases or any other medical field. See Patterson Dep.
74:02–75:01, ECF No. 70-1 (confirming that she is not a “subject matter expert in
epidemiology or infectious diseases” and explaining: “Infectious diseases is a medical
term and I would say that I'm an infection preventionist, which is the nursing term,
so infectious disease is medicine, infection prevention and control is nursing.”); see
also Lauren Decl., Ex. 4, Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Seth Cohen, M.D. (hereinafter
“Cohen Report”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 70-4 (opining that a nurse working in infection control

lacks expertise “on vaccination, infectious disease, public health or epidemiology” and
noting that “[Patterson’s] position during the pandemic was administrative without
a significant patient care component”); Patterson Dep. 79:23–80:08 (“I’ve never
provided a medical diagnosis in anything.”). Patterson also does not have any
advanced training in a field such as public health, epidemiology, or biostatistics that
would confer expertise to conduct clinical investigations or analyses, undertake

literature reviews, or interpret clinical studies. Patterson Dep. 76:03–77:06
(confirming that she has no training or professional experience evaluating vaccine
clinical trial and surveillance data or designing or conducting vaccine safety or
efficacy studies). Further, she has no research experience or publications related to
COVID-19. Id. at 85:12–85:15. And she has never taught at a college or university.
Id. at 85:21–85:24. Patterson testified that she would defer to scientific and medical
experts when it comes to vaccine efficacy and safety. Id. at 76:25–77:09. Patterson

testified that she has not ever served as an expert witness, is “very novice[],” “ha[sn’t]
done this before[,]” id. at 31:14–32:09, found the process to be “overwhelming[,]”
remarked on the “tremendous amount of information to pull together[,]” id. at 39:11–
40:13, and stated, “this is an unbelievable amount of information and I honestly had
no idea that it was going to be this much reading[,]” id. at 44:23–45:12.
The purpose of a court’s gatekeeping role “is to make certain that an expert . .
. employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.

137, 152 (1999). Here, the Court concludes that Patterson does not have sufficient
knowledge, education, or training to offer a scientific or medical opinion about proper
hospital COVID-19 pandemic policy.
Plaintiffs contend that if Patterson does not qualify as a scientific or medical
expert, she does qualify to offer expert opinion based on her knowledge and
experience as an infection control nurse at SLMC during the pandemic. Pl. Sur Reply

at 6, ECF No. 74. Patterson testifies that in her role as nurse infection preventionist,
she helped develop the weekly testing program at SLMC for employees with approved
accommodations. Patterson Dep. 140:08–140:23. Plaintiffs concede that Patterson’s
opinions on “the effectiveness of the vaccine, the possibility of other treatments for
Covid-19, and the extent of protections conferred by natural immunity are tangential
to her core opinions that are directly tied to her qualifications.” Pl. Sur Reply at 6.
Accordingly, the Court strikes Patterson’s testimony as to vaccine safety and efficacy,

alternative COVID-19 treatments, and COVID-19 protection acquired from natural
immunity.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Fed. Rule Evid. 702 (emphasis added).
“This language makes no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge
and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147. “It makes
clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony.” Id.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that although Patterson is not qualified to offer
scientific or medical opinion, she is qualified to offer expert testimony based on her
knowledge and experience as a nurse infection preventionist at SLMC during the
pandemic.
B. Patterson’s Infection Preventionist Testimony is Neither Reliable nor
Relevant
A court’s “gatekeeping” duty under Rule 702 and Daubert “applies not only to
testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’
and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. “Daubert pointed out
that Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses testimonial latitude

unavailable to other witnesses on the ‘assumption that the expert’s opinion will have
a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [that witness’s] discipline.’” Id.
Even non-scientific testimony based on knowledge and experience must be
both reliable and relevant under Rule 702. Id. Patterson’s testimony fails to meet
either of these requirements.
1. Patterson’s Opinions are not Reliable
To be reliable, expert testimony must be “based on sufficient facts or data,”

must be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and must reflect “a reliable
application of those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed. R.
Evid. 702. Reliable expert testimony must be based on sufficient facts or data—on
external objective sources, not on “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. And an expert must show the court that they have used
reliable methodology based on facts and data to reach their conclusions. In re

Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (“In the absence of independent research or peer review, experts
must explain the process by which they reached their conclusions and identify some
type of objective source demonstrating their adherence to [sound methodology].”).
“[T]he test under Daubert is not the correctness of the expert's conclusions but the
soundness of [the] methodology.” Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010),

as amended (Apr. 27, 2010) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595). However, “[a] court
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and
the opinion proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (finding
nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requiring the admission
of opinion evidence connected to existing data “only by the [say so] of the expert”).
Patterson’s opinions are not reliable because they are not based on sufficient
facts or data, nor are they the product of reliable principles and methods.

First, Patterson’s opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data because (1)
she based her opinions on an incorrect understanding of the OHA Rule, and (2) she
provides no documentation or data to support the work she claims to have done at
SLMC. Patterson testified that her SLMC team “follow[ed] OHA guideline[s] to the
letter[,]” Patterson Dep. 124:20–125:16, and that she believed SLMC’s weekly testing
program was “valid and credible” because it was recommended by OHA and that
OHA’s “source was the [CDC],” id. at 136:21–137:04; see also id. at 137:07–137:23
(opining that hospitals licensed by the OHA should follow the OHA’s
recommendations “to the letter”). In her expert report, Patterson stated that “[d]ue

to the limited COVID vaccine efficacy and substantial health risks, SLMC also chose
to follow the OHA recommendations for weekly testing in lieu of vaccination for those
employees with medical and religious exceptions.” Am. Patterson Rep. at 10. But
Patterson was not aware that OHA had amended its initial August 5, 2021 rule to
remove the testing option a short three weeks after it had been issued. Patterson
Dep. 148:10–149:12 (“I haven’t seen this version [of the OHA rule] before.”).

Patterson testified that she helped implement a testing program for unvaccinated
SLMC employees with approved exceptions and that her team at SLMC followed the
OHA rule “to the letter,” yet she did not know that OHA had removed the testing
option from its rule.
Patterson also provides no documentation for the program she claims to have
developed or implemented, and she provides no data about the clinical variables or
outcomes of that program. See Patterson Dep. 113:14–114:01 (stating that SLMC

tracked COVID-19 hospitalizations, on-site acquired cases and deaths and that she
thought SLMC “compared very well” to other Oregon hospitals but that she does not
have that data); id. at 115:03–25 (stating that she did not know whether any severely
ill patients were transferred out of SLMC because she has no data and is recalling
from memory and explaining that the data “all belongs to the hospital[,]” so she
cannot access it); id. at 129:15–130:05 (admitting that when she stated in her report
that SLMC hospital-acquired COVID-19 cases were “infrequent,” she based that
statement on her memory because she lacks access to the data); id. at 130:06–129:10
(admitting that without the SLMC data, she cannot compare SLMC hospital-acquired

infection rates to those of PeaceHealth); id. at 131:01–131:04 (stating that even
though she lacks access to the data “if there was something very significant and
glaring, I would have remembered”); id. at 131:07–131:12 (stating that she does not
have SLMC data comparing the number of hospital-acquired cases from vaccinated
versus unvaccinated caregivers); id. at 132:04–133:02 (stating that she lacks access
to SLMC’s contact tracing policy or any underlying contact tracing data); id. at

141:05–142:08 (confirming that she helped develop the SLMC weekly testing
program but does not have any documents or underlying data about that program).
Given the facts of this case, recalling facts, data, and policy from memory without
underlying documentation or data is insufficient to support expert testimony.
The Court concludes that Patterson’s testimony is not based on sufficient facts
and data because Patterson’s opinions rely on her misunderstanding of the OHA Rule
and because Patterson fails to provide any underlying documentation or data to

support her testimony.
Second, Patterson’s opinions are not reliable because, in addition to failing to
provide documentation and data, she also did not use reliable principles and methods
to produce her opinions. In fact, Patterson did not produce her opinions at all. She
did not conduct her own research, produce her own exhibits, or author significant
parts of her Reports. A court must consider “whether the expert [is] proposing to
testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,

43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (Daubert II).
Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires that an expert witness
prepare and sign a written expert report. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Rule 26 does not contemplate that an expert would offer a report not of her own
making. In fact, “it would be fundamentally misleading[] and could do great damage
to the integrity of the truth finding process, if testimony that was being presented as

the independent thinking of an ‘expert’ in fact was the product, in whole or significant
part, of the suggestions of counsel.” Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D.
384, 395–96 (N.D. Cal. 1991). “[E]xpert reports may be discredited if they ‘merely
express the opinions of the lawyers who hired them.”’ McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 710
F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1118 (D. Or. 2010) (quoting Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204
F.R.D. 277, 294 (E.D. Va. 2001)).

When asked whether Plaintiffs’ attorney “provided [Patterson] with any facts
or substantive input” for her Reports, Patterson testified:
I asked [Plaintiffs’ attorney] to coach me in order to prepare this
document, so I would have to go look at those individual paragraphs in
order to tell you specifically if—exactly what may or may not have been
exactly my words, but I asked—I asked for coaching in order to prepare
this document because I’ve never done this before . . .
Patterson Dep. 170:12–18.
Plaintiffs’ counsel not only “coached” Patterson but also provided her with the
studies and exhibits she used in her Reports. Patterson Dep. 106:13–108:16; see also
id. at 27:18–28:20 (testifying that Plaintiffs’ counsel provided her with a copy of the

French Report to use as a model); id. at 95:24–96:12 (testifying that she used the
“beautifully written” French Report as an example to draft her Reports); id. at
149:13–150:19 (testifying that Plaintiffs’ counsel drafted the part of her expert report
comparing PeaceHealth and SLMC and contradicting a statement in her report that
she reviewed Plaintiffs’ job descriptions); id. at 171:02–171:24 (explaining that she
started writing the rebuttal report the morning of her deposition and that she wrote

the rebuttal report in response to the “[w]rong physician[,]” not in response to
Defendant’s expert, Dr. Koekkoek); id. at 150:06–150:19; 167:20–170:18 (explaining
that Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote entire paragraphs of her Reports).
Plaintiffs’ counsel not only provided Patterson with the French Report to use
as a “model”—a report rejected by numerous courts in this district,3 including this

3 The French Report, written by Dr. Richard Scott French, has been offered as
expert opinion in many prior similar cases litigated by Plaintiffs’ counsel. The French
Report has been rejected as junk science by numerous courts in this district. See, e.g.,
Sano v. PeaceHealth, Inc., No. 6:22-cv-01210-MTK, 2024 WL 4979429, at *2–5 (D. Or.
Dec. 4, 2024) (“The [c]ourt has reviewed the French Report and finds that every
portion of it falls below the admissibility standard.”); Goff v. PeaceHealth, No. 6:22-
cv-01991-MTK, 2024 WL 4979432, at *2–*5 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2024) (same); Parsons v.
PeaceHealth, No. 6:22-cv-01246-MTK, 2024 WL 4979430, at *2–5 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2024)
(same); Parker v. PeaceHealth, No. 6:23-cv-00450-MTK, 2024 WL 4993472, at *2–5
(D. Or. Dec. 5, 2024) (same); Cline v. PeaceHealth, No. 6:23-cv-01985-MTK, 2025 WL
295113, at *2–5 (D. Or. Jan. 24, 2025) (same); Gemmrig v. Asante Three Rivers Med.
Ctr., LLC (Gemmrig I), No. 1:22-cv-01814-AA, 2025 WL 1787524, at *3–6 (D. Or. June
25, 2025), adopted sub nom. Gilinsky v. Asante, No. 1:23-cv-00799-CL, 2025 WL
2170528 (D. Or. July 31, 2025) (same).
Court—but counsel also provided scientific and medical studies to Patterson that
counsel re-named according to the conclusions that counsel urged Patterson to reach.
Id. at 107:16–108:16; see also, e.g., Janzen Decl., Ex. P, No. 10 (“Exhibit 10 Cleveland

Clinic Article Showing Vaccines Dont [sic] work”), ECF No. 62-16. Patterson also
testified that she did not fully read all of the literature cited or relied on in her Reports
because serving as an expert witness in these cases “is over and above my full-time
[job]” and “this is an unbelievable amount of information and I honestly had no idea
that it was going to be this much reading.” Id. at 44:23–45:12.
When asked whether she had viewed the PeaceHealth data on hospital-

acquired infection, Patterson stated “I read some of [Dr. Koekkoek and Ms. Kroll’s] .
. . information. . . . What was I supposed to do with it?” Id. at 116:08–116:25. Finally,
Patterson was not able to provide basic information about PeaceHealth—its facilities,
its infection control methods, its finances, or the types of jobs Plaintiffs performed.
Id. at 150:20–153:15.
“To carry out its gatekeeping role, a district court must find that an expert's
testimony is reliable—an inquiry that focuses not on ‘what the experts say,’ or their

qualifications, ‘but what basis they have for saying it.”’ United States v. Holguin, 51
F.4th 841, 854 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1316). The Court
concludes that Patterson did not conduct her own research, she did not undertake an
independent analysis of the facts and data, and she did not author significant parts
of her own Reports. Patterson’s opinions not only lack factual basis; they also are not
the product of reliable principles and methods.
2. Patterson’s Opinions are not Relevant
Rule 702 provides that expert testimony is admissible if it will “will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid.

702. Rule 702 also requires that “the expert’s opinion reflect[] a reliable application
of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Id. That is, an expert’s
testimony must be relevant.
Even if Patterson’s testimony were reliable, it is not relevant. Patterson lacked
the relevant facts and data to compare SLMC to PeaceHealth. Patterson testified
generally about the differences between the two healthcare employers. See, e.g.,
Patterson Dep. 116:08–116:25 (“being a smaller, single hospital versus a system, we

weren’t comparable [to PeaceHealth] in all ways, in all situations”); id. at 114:04–
114:17 (explaining that SLMC “actually compared maybe slightly better [than other
Oregon hospitals] in some cases, because we had the advantages of being . . . a smaller
facility with less patient volumes . . . and a smaller community”). She also testified
that she lacked the relevant facts and data to compare PeaceHealth to SLMC. Id. at
129:06–130:10. Importantly, the undue hardship standard at issue requires that an

employer tasked with an accommodation decision consider the facts before them at
the time they made the decision. See Lavelle-Hayden v. Legacy Health, 744 F. Supp.
3d 1135, 1152 (D. Or. 2024) (“It is appropriate to confine the analysis to the
information available to the employer when it made its undue hardship decision.”).
That healthcare facilities faced with different facts may have made different undue
hardship decisions is irrelevant.
In sum, Patterson’s testimony is neither reliable nor relevant. Patterson’s
testimony is not “based on sufficient facts or data,” is not “the product of reliable
principles and methods,” and fails to reflect “a reliable application of the principles

and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. For that reason, Patterson’s
testimony is not admissible under Rule 702 and is struck in its entirety.
II. Religious Discrimination Employment Claims

All four Plaintiffs bring claims against PeaceHealth under Title VII and ORS
659A.030 for failing to accommodate their religious views by not allowing them to
work as unvaccinated healthcare employees. All Plaintiffs applied for and were
granted a religious exception to the PeaceHealth’s COVID-19 vaccination
requirement. All Plaintiffs were placed on unpaid administrative leave and later
either found a different job or were terminated.
PeaceHealth moves for summary judgment on the undue hardship defense to
Plaintiffs’ Title VII religious discrimination claims.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer . . . “to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's . . . religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
ORS 659A.030 provides a state analogue. “Because [ORS] 659A.030 is modeled after
Title VII, [a] plaintiff’s state law discrimination claim can be analyzed together with
her federal discrimination claim.” Pullom v. U.S. Bakery, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1100
(D. Or. 2007).
“A claim for religious discrimination under Title VII can be asserted under
several different theories, including disparate treatment and failure to
accommodate.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004).

To establish a prima facie claim of religious discrimination under a failure-to-
accommodate theory, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they “had a bona fide religious
belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty”; (2) they “informed
[their] employer of the belief and conflict”; and (3) “the employer discharged,
threatened, or otherwise subjected [them] to an adverse employment action because
of [their] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Id. at 606. Once a plaintiff has

made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it “initiated
good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee’s religious practices or
that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.”
Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2023)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). If the employer establishes undue
hardship, the analysis is done and summary judgment should be granted. See
Peterson, 358 F.3d at 608.

Defendant contends that even assuming that Plaintiffs establish a prima facie
case of religious employment discrimination, there is no genuine dispute of material
fact that Plaintiffs could not perform their jobs 100% remotely and that it would have
been an undue hardship to allow them to work in person during the relevant
timeframe. Def. Mot. at 21, 23.
Plaintiffs contend that there are issues of material fact as to whether other
“less-restrictive” accommodations were available. Pl. Resp. at 4, ECF No. 57.

A. Plaintiffs Could not Perform their Jobs Remotely
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs could not have performed 100% of their jobs
remotely.
1. Elizabeth Combs

Combs was employed as a cook in the PeaceHealth kitchen from 2012 until
2021. Combs Decl. ¶ 2. Combs requested and was granted a religious exception to
Defendant’s vaccination requirement. Id. Combs was placed on administrative leave
and was later terminated in April 2023. Id. ¶ 12.
Combs testified that she “worked in the back of the kitchen by the coolers to
manage the packaged cold items that were sent to other PeaceHealth facilities, [their]
cafeteria, and for the tray line[,]” that “[her] station was in the back of the kitchen[,]”
and that normally she worked alone but occasionally had help from others. Id. ¶¶ 3,
4; Le Decl. ¶ 40 (classifying job as “direct contact with other caregivers and indirect

contact with patients” and providing description of job’s essential functions). Combs
testified that, on August 31, 2021, she “participated in a schedule[d], recorded phone
conversation with PeaceHealth’s HR representative, [her] manager . . . and [her]
union representative[.]” Id. ¶ 5. She was told that there was no remote work for her
because “[she] couldn’t cook from home.” Id. ¶ 6. Combs testified that “none of the
remote positions pertained to [her] career as a cook[,]” and that “[she] did not meet
the minimum requirements to apply for those positions.” Id. ¶ 7.
2. Thomas Johnston

Johnston was hired as a “Registered Cardiovascular Invasive Specialist” at
PeaceHealth on January 18, 2021. Johnston Decl. ¶¶ 1–2. Johnston requested and
was granted a religious exception to Defendant’s vaccination requirement. Id. ¶ 5.
Johnston was placed on administrative leave and, in April 2023, decided “to part ways
with PeaceHealth.” Id. ¶ 15.
Johnston testified that he performed three roles: (1) a “scrub assistant” who
“scrubbed in with the physician and assisted with sterile equipment[;]” (2) a
“circulating technologist” who “would obtain and open sterile supplies needed for the

procedure[;]” and (3) a “monitoring technologist” who “would be stationed at a
computer to document what equipment was used and where in the patient’s body.”
Id. ¶ 3; Le Decl. ¶ 45 (classifying job as “direct patient care” and providing description
of job’s essential functions).
Johnston testified that after PeaceHealth updated its vaccination policy (to
remove the testing option), he was told that he would be placed on unpaid

administrative leave “since [he] worked directly with patients and could not perform
[his] job completely remote[.]” Id. ¶ 7. He hoped instead to work in the cardiac
catheterization lab because he had catheterization lab billing experience and testified
that “[he] could have helped with Cath Lab chart review [or] worked remotely on post-
image processing[.]” Id. ¶ 9. He testified that Peace Health “did not have any
dialogue with [him] about any of these possible accommodations.” Id. ¶ 10.

3. Kimberly Herechberger
During the relevant timeframe, Herechberger was a per diem Neonatal ICU
nurse. Am. Herechberger Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7. Herechberger requested and was granted a
religious exception to COVID-19 vaccination. Id. ¶ 1. Herechberger was placed on

unpaid administrative leave and later terminated. Id. ¶¶ 1, 12–14.
Herechberger testified that, as a Neonatal ICU nurse, she “provid[ed] bedside
care for neo-natal patients.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 7; Le Decl. ¶¶ 64, 65 (classifying job as “direct
patient care” and providing description of job’s essential functions). Herechberger
testified that “[she] could have safely performed [her] job wearing an N95 mask and
doing weekly testing for COVID-19.” Id. ¶ 7. She also testified that “[she] could have

transitioned to fully remote clerical work[,]” id. ¶ 8, but that PeaceHealth “did not
engage in any real negotiation or discussion with [her] regarding a reasonable
accommodation[,]” id. ¶ 9, and that “[she] was not offered any type of accommodation
other than unpaid administrative leave[,]” id. ¶¶ 10–11.
4. Michelle Boltz
Boltz testified that she was hired by PeaceHealth as an RN in the Short Stay
Unit in 2013. Boltz Decl. ¶ 2. Blotz requested and was granted a religious exception.

Boltz Decl. ¶ 12. Boltz was placed on administrative leave and later found other
work. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
Boltz testified that, as an RN in the Short Stay Unit, “[she] would receive the
patient and then stay in the room with the patient to prepare the patient for
surgery[,]” “ask the patient questions[,]” “start IVs and do other hands-on work with
the patient.” Id. ¶ 2; Le Decl. ¶ 56 (classifying job as “direct patient care” and
providing description of job’s essential functions). She testified that she could have
worked remotely doing “preadmission testing,” (“PAT”), a position that involved
calling patients before surgery and asking questions “to determine how many

surgeries the person has had and what medications they take.” Id. ¶ 4. She testified
that she could have been placed in PAT because, when she was pregnant, she had
been placed in PAT as an accommodation. Id. ¶ 5. She testified that she also could
have “work[ed] remotely . . . to make follow-up phone calls to check on patients post-
surgery.” Id. ¶ 7. But she was told that there was no remote work for her. Id. ¶ 8.
She testified that she changed jobs in March 2022, when “[she] was hired by [her]

current hospital employer as a nurse in a short stay unit[,]” and “[her] religious
exemption was accepted[.]” Id. ¶ 12.
In sum, due to the nature of Plaintiffs’ jobs, the parties do not dispute that
Plaintiffs could not perform their job 100% remotely.
B. Undue Hardship Standard
To defeat an employee’s Title VII failure-to-accommodate religious
discrimination claim, an employer must show “that it could not reasonably

accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at
1224.
Plaintiffs contend that “[u]nder Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), Title VII
required PeaceHealth to consider reasonable alternatives for exempt employees and
then prove that accommodating each Plaintiff would impose substantial increased
costs to its particular business.” Pl. Resp. at 3. Plaintiffs contend that PeaceHealth
could have instituted accommodations for in-person work such as masking, testing,
distancing, “cohorting with low-risk teams or non-patient areas;” “temporary duty
modification or task reallocation;” “reassignment to vacant lower-risk positions;” or

“changes within the facility network” without incurring such costs. Id. at 8.
To prevail on an undue hardship defense under Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447,
470–71 (2023), “an employer must show that the burden of granting an
accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct
of its particular business.” To assess “substantial increased costs,” Groff directs
courts to “take[] into account all relevant factors . . . including the particular

accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size[,] and
operating cost of [an] employer[]” and to “resolve whether a hardship would be
substantial in the context of an employer's business in [a] common-sense manner.”
Id. at 471 (emphasis added). Groff thus directs courts to examine all “relevant
factors” and “their practical impact,” not just economic costs.
In the COVID-19 vaccination context, the Ninth Circuit recently held that

relevant undue hardship factors under Groff include: (1) “health and safety costs[,]”
which the court analyzed as health and safety risks to the plaintiffs’ coworkers and
to the public they served; (2) the employer’s “operational burden;” (3) and the
employer’s “financial costs.” Petersen v. Snohomish Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 150 F.4th
1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 2025) (affirming summary judgment for the employer on its
undue hardship defense to unvaccinated firefighters’ Title VII failure-to-
accommodate claims).
The EEOC also provides guidance as to relevant factors in the COVID-19
context. “Costs to be considered include not only direct monetary costs but also the
burden on the conduct of the employer's business—including, . . . the risk of the

spread of COVID-19 to other employees or to the public[.]” What You Should Know
About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, § L.3
(“EEOC Guidance”).4 To determine whether a COVID-19 accommodation would
create an undue hardship, the EEOC recommends that employers consider:
• the proportion of employees in the workplace who already are
partially or fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and the extent of
employee contact with nonemployees[;]
• the burden on the conduct of the employer’s business—including . . .
the risk of the spread of COVID-19 to other employees or to the
public;
• whether the employee requesting a religious accommodation to a
COVID-19 vaccination requirement works . . . in a solitary or group
work setting, or has close contact with other employees or members
of the public (especially medically vulnerable individuals); and
• the number of employees who are seeking a similar accommodation,
i.e., the cumulative cost or burden on the employer.

Id.
Groff did not displace pre-existing EEOC guidance. Rather, Groff stated that
“a good deal of the EEOC’s guidance [as to undue hardship] is sensible and will . . .
be unaffected by our clarifying decision[.]” Groff, 600 U.S. at 471; see also Petersen,
150 F.4th at 1220 (“Groff tells us that we may look to EEOC guidance to help
determine if . . . health and safety costs would have imposed an undue hardship on

4 EEOC, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT COVID-19 AND THE ADA, THE
REHABILITATION ACT, AND OTHER EEO LAWS, § L.3 (updated May 15, 2023)
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-
rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws (last visited Mar. 13, 2026).
[an employer].”); Lavelle-Hayden, 744 F. Supp. 3d. at 1151 (“Consistent with the pre-
and post-Groff authority, . . . it is appropriate to consider not only calculable economic
costs but also non-economic costs, like the cost to an employer's mission and potential

safety risks, in analyzing undue hardship.”).
Accordingly, to determine whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on an employer, courts in this district consider: (1) the information available
at the time the employer made its undue hardship decision; (2) the economic and non-
economic costs of the accommodation; and (3) the cumulative or aggregate effects of
accommodations requested by multiple, similarly situated employees. Lavelle-

Hayden, 744 F. Supp. 3d. at 1151–52.
1. The Information Available at the Time

To determine undue hardship, “it is appropriate to confine the analysis to the
information available to the employer when it made its undue hardship decision.”
Lavelle-Hayden, 744 F. Supp. 3d at 1152. “To judge an employer's undue hardship
decision based on knowledge and information developed after the fact would hold that
employer to an impossible standard.” Id.
Dr. Koekkoek’s unrebutted testimony shows that the information available to
the Ethical Discernment Team when it formulated its vaccination policy included: (1)
the OHA Rule, Def. Mot. at 27; Dr. Koekkoek Decl. ¶¶ 30, 51; (2) then-current
scientific and medical data including recommendations from CDC, OHA, OHSU, and
peer-reviewed studies from established medical authorities, as to the nature of the

pandemic and the safety and efficacy of the vaccine and other mitigation methods, id.
at 27–28; Dr. Koekkoek Decl. ¶¶ 18, 19, 26, 28, 31–41; (3) PeaceHealth’s internal
epidemiologic data that showed that hospital patients were more likely to be infected
with COVID-19 by unvaccinated caregivers than by vaccinated caregivers, id. at 28;

Dr. Koekkoek Decl. ¶ 21; Kroll Decl. ¶¶ 17–19, and that the COVID-19 deaths of two
PeaceHealth patients had been traced to an unvaccinated caregiver, Dr. Koekkoek
Decl. ¶ 44; (4) that PeaceHealth’s patient population consisted largely of medically
vulnerable and unvaccinated patients, id. at 29; Dr. Koekkoek Decl. ¶¶ 7, 36, 43, 48;
Kroll Decl. ¶¶ 20, 21; and (5) the nature of PeaceHealth’s work environment, its
“religious-based mission,” and its “legal and moral duty” to protect patients and staff

from the threat of “severe illness or death[,]” id. at 29; Dr. Koekkoek Decl. ¶¶ 6, 42–
44.
The unrebutted scientific and medical evidence, reviewed and considered by
the Ethical Discernment Team, showed that COVID-19 vaccines were safe and
effective, reduced transmission, and “offered high levels of protection against severe
illness and death from COVID-19,” Koekkoek Decl. ¶¶ 32–34, 36, 38, 39, 40, that
vaccination was superior to natural immunity in preventing re-infection, id. ¶ 41,

that “other methods—such as PPE (including N95 masks), testing, social distancing,
restrictions on visitation, and additional hand hygiene protocols—were already the
‘baseline’ requirements, do not provide continuous protection 24 hours per day, and
are susceptible to human error[,]” id. ¶ 44, that PPE must be worn “constantly and
appropriately” and is often not, for example, in breakrooms when people are eating
and drinking, id., that testing is problematic because “by the time an individual tests
positive, they have often been contagious for 48 hours prior to the test[,]” id. ¶ 45,
and that physical distancing is “not practicable, if not impossible,” in a health care
setting, id.

2. The Costs of Accommodation

To determine the costs of accommodation, Groff directed courts to “take[] into
account all relevant factors . . . including the particular accommodations at issue and
their practical impact in light of the nature, size[,] and operating cost of [an]
employer[]” and to “resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the context
of an employer's business in [a] common-sense manner[.]” Groff, 600 U.S. at 471.
Relevant factors may include health and safety risks to the public and to other
employees in the workforce; an operational burden created by absenteeism,
scheduling disruption, and the inability to respond to emergencies; and financial
costs. See Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1220 (“[O]utbreaks among firefighting teams [from
unvaccinated co-workers] would lead to potentially severe limits on EMS and

firefighting responses in the community.”); see also Groff, 600 U.S. at 475 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“Because the ‘conduct of [a] business’ plainly includes the
management and performance of the business’s employees, undue hardship on the
conduct of a business may include undue hardship on the business’s employees. . . .
Indeed, for many businesses, labor is more important to the conduct of the business
than any other factor.”); Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Ent., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 3d 1117,
1134, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2023), aff'd, No. 23-4340, 2025 WL 655065 (9th Cir. Feb. 28,

2025) (“Numerous courts have found the possibility of an unvaccinated individual
getting others sick to be a non-speculative risk that a court may consider when
performing an undue hardship analysis.”) (collecting cases); Melino v. Bos. Med. Ctr.,
127 F.4th 391, 397 (1st Cir. 2025) (“permitting [a registered nurse] to work

unvaccinated would pose an undue hardship ‘by increasing the risk of COVID-19
transmission amongst staff and patients”’); Hall v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc.,
155 F.4th 747, 754–55 (4th Cir. 2025) (holding that “[a]llowing over two hundred
religious-exemption claimants to remain unvaccinated would have unacceptably
increased the risk of COVID-19 transmissions and outbreaks” and constituted undue
hardship, but also noting that “[i]t is likely that granting even [a] single religious

exemption would have constituted an undue hardship for the hospital system.”).
Plaintiffs contend that PeaceHealth could have instituted their proposed
accommodations without undue hardship. But Plaintiffs’ proposed accommodations
are in-person work accommodations, and Plaintiffs do not rebut the evidence that
their proposed accommodations, individually or in combination, were markedly
inferior to vaccination in reducing COVID-19 transmission and, in the case of
breakthrough infection, in reducing morbidity, mortality, and re-infection. This

alone—the increased health and safety risks to patients and staff would have
constituted a substantial cost and undue hardship. See Koekkoek Decl. ¶ 50 (“We
believed that the potential costs to human life exceeded any increased financial costs
that PeaceHealth incurred as a result of this [exception] policy.”) Plaintiffs also do
not rebut the evidence that the increased transmission of COVID-19 to staff would
have created substantial operational burdens such as increased absenteeism,
scheduling disruptions, and impaired ability to deliver healthcare. And Plaintiffs do
not rebut the evidence that the increased transmission of COVID-19 to patients
would have created substantial operational burdens such as prolonged hospital stays

and reduced capacity to deliver healthcare delivery. Finally, Plaintiffs do not rebut
the evidence that monitoring and enforcing compliance with such accommodations
also would have created a substantial operational burden and substantially increased
financial costs.
Plaintiffs maintain that, because, on April 12, 2023, PeaceHealth permitted
unvaccinated employees to return to work with N95 and KN95 masking, a reasonable

jury could infer that there were other reasonable accommodations for unvaccinated
employees in 2021. Pl. Resp. at 14–15. Plaintiffs maintain that PeaceHealth’s
failure to reinstate Plaintiffs in April 2023 when it allowed unvaccinated employees
to return with a masking requirement Dr. Koekkoek testified that in April 2023, after
“a careful review of scientific evidence and regulatory requirements,” PeaceHealth’s
medical and clinical leadership determined “that the exposure risk had sufficiently
lessened such that it would no longer cause undue hardship to allow unvaccinated

workers . . . to return to work in person, provided they complied with additional
protective measures, including wearing an N95/KN95 mask at all times while in any
PeaceHealth facility.” Koekkoek Decl. ¶ 54. On May 11, 2023, OHA likewise
suspended the OHA Rule effective May 11, 2023, based on then-current medical and
scientific data. See former OAR 333-019-1010(4) (temporary suspension effective
May 11, 2023, to Nov. 6, 2023). Plaintiffs do not prevail in their argument because
PeaceHealth’s April 2023 return-to-work decision was based on the facts that existed
in 2023, which were different from the facts that existed when PeaceHealth
formulated its vaccine mandate policy.

Plaintiffs also maintain that PeaceHealth’s failure to reinstate Plaintiffs in
April 2023 indicates that “the asserted hardships were, in fact, pretextual[]” and
supports their Title VII claims for disparate treatment and retaliation. Pl. Resp. at
17, 15 (and setting out the elements of Title VII disparate treatment and retaliation
claims). First, PeaceHealth provided an extensive record as to how it decided to
implement a vaccination requirement, which Plaintiffs fail to rebut and which defeats

Plaintiffs’ assertion of pretext. Second, Title VII disparate treatment and retaliation
claims are distinct from Title VII failure-to-accommodate claims. PeaceHealth’s
consolidated Motion for Summary Judgment, at issue here, was expressly limited to
PeaceHealth’s defense of Plaintiffs’ failure to accommodate claim and is unrelated to
any other claims Plaintiffs may or may not have.
3. The Aggregate Effects
When multiple, similarly situated employees request accommodation, it is

appropriate for a court to “consider the aggregate or cumulative effects of an
accommodation[.]” Lavelle-Hayden, 744 F. Supp. 3d at 1152; see also Petersen, 150
F.4th at 1220 (“The cost of accommodating nearly twenty-five percent of its
firefighters is substantial. . . . And given the circumstances, there can be no doubt
that granting that many exemptions would have hamstrung [the Fire and Rescue’s]
operations.”); Kather v. Asante Health Sys., No. 1:22-CV-01842-MC, 2025 WL
1788267, at *7 (D. Or. June 25, 2025) (“In addition to the administrative strain, the
sheer number of exception requests compounded the undue hardship inherent in
allowing unvaccinated individuals to work in person because the cumulative risk [to

the health and safety of patients and the workforce] would have been much greater
than the individual impact of any single unvaccinated employee.”).
By August 31, 2021, PeaceHealth had received exception requests from 267
healthcare employees in Oregon, and over 800 healthcare employees system wide. Le
Decl. ¶ 20. By August 31, 2021, PeaceHealth approved 213 religious exception
requests in Oregon alone. Id. While PeaceHealth was able to accommodate some of

those caregivers with remote work, id. ¶¶ 23–24, it was not able to accommodate
Plaintiffs. Further, the “unprecedented flood of exception requests . . . placed an
incredible strain on an already exhausted staff to cover shifts and hire and train
contract healthcare workers.” Id. ¶ 22. The aggregate health and safety, operational,
and financial costs of accommodating hundreds of unvaccinated employees would
have multiplied, if not exponentially increased, the risk and cost burden during the
relevant timeframe.

Plaintiffs do not address the aggregate impact of accommodating hundreds of
unvaccinated employees on the worksite. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that PeaceHealth
failed to “engage[] in an individualized, good-faith interactive process before imposing
unpaid leave on each plaintiff.” Pl. Resp. at 4. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that
PeaceHealth should have considered in each case “[w]hether less-restrictive
accommodations (assignment or location changes, cohorting, schedule segregation,
enhanced PPE, and/or testing) were available without causing undue hardship to
PeaceHealth.” Id.
First, Plaintiffs do not rebut the testimony that PeaceHealth conducted a fact-

intensive inquiry to formulate an exception and accommodation policy. That policy
was a response to the large number of unvaccinated employees with exceptions and
the need for a reasonable and consistent approach that applied to all unvaccinated
employees. Plaintiffs do not say why PeaceHealth’s policy did not apply to them or
why it failed to address their individualized situations or why PeaceHealth should
have treated them differently from other similarly situated unvaccinated employees.

Second, because PeaceHealth had already determined that in-person contact
with unvaccinated caregivers posed an “unjustifiable” health and safety risk to
patients and co-workers, the only question to be determined as to each employee was
“whether the [employee] could perform the essential functions of their position 100%
remotely.” Le Decl. ¶ 23. Employees that could perform the essential functions of
their position 100% remotely were permitted to work remotely and otherwise were

placed on unpaid leave. Plaintiffs do not dispute that they could not perform their
jobs 100% remotely. If an employer can show that no accommodation was possible
without undue hardship, that employer “[i]s not required to discuss an infeasible
alternative accommodation.” Bordeaux, 2025 WL 655065, at *1 n.3 (citing EEOC v.
Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiffs contend that PeaceHealth could have reassigned them to remote
positions. Johnston testified that he could have done cath lab billing or helped with
chart review or worked remotely on post-image processing. Johnston Decl. ¶ 9.
Herechberger testified that “[she] could have transitioned to fully remote clerical
work.” Herechberger Decl. ¶ 8. And Boltz testified that she could have worked

remotely by calling surgical patients before admission “to determine how many
surgeries the person has had and what medications they take[,]” Boltz Decl. ¶ 4, or
could have “work[ed] remotely . . . to make follow-up phone calls to check on patients
post-surgery[,]” id. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs do not say whether they applied for any remote
position or whether those positions were available. To create new remote positions
for Plaintiffs and other unvaccinated employees, PeaceHealth would have had to

manufacture hundreds of redundant or unneeded positions that would have added a
substantial operational and cost burden to a hospital system that was already
severely stressed. “[A]n employer is not required to restructure an employee’s duties
or pass them off to another worker if doing so would be an undue hardship.” Kather,
2025 WL 1788267, at *8; see also Lake v. HealthAlliance Hosp. Broadway Campus,
738 F. Supp. 3d 208, 220–21 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) (holding that operational impacts from
restructuring unvaccinated healthcare worker’s position to avoid contact with others

would have created an undue hardship).
In sum, Plaintiffs fail to rebut the evidence that shows that allowing them to
work in person, regardless of accommodation, would have increased the risk of
COVID-19 transmission to patients and staff, created substantial operational
burdens, and substantially increased financial costs to PeaceHealth’s business.
Accordingly, PeaceHealth is entitled to summary judgment on its undue hardship
defense to Plaintiffs’ Title VII and Oregon religious discrimination claims.

III. Disability Discrimination Employment Claim

Plaintiff Boltz also brings a claim against PeaceHealth under the ADA and
ORS 659A.112 for failing to accommodate her medical disability. See Compl. ¶¶ 32–
42, No. 6:24-cv-00246-AA, ECF No. 1. She applied for a medical exception to
PeaceHealth’s vaccination requirement but was denied. Le Decl. ¶ 58, Ex. 16-C, ECF
No. 50-30. PeaceHealth moves for summary judgment on the undue hardship and
direct threat defenses to Plaintiff’s ADA claim.
Under the ADA, it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §
12112. “The ADA treats the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation as an act
of discrimination if the employee is a ‘qualified individual,’ the employer receives

adequate notice, and a reasonable accommodation is available that would not place
an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business.” Snapp v. United
Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
Like Title VII, the ADA and Oregon analogue provide a two-step analysis for
failure to accommodate claims. See Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prod., Inc., 878 F.3d 794,
798–99 (9th Cir. 2017) (setting out the elements of a prima facie ADA claim). Once a

plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant who may
invoke one of two affirmative defenses: (1) that the accommodation “would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business;” or (2) that the plaintiff would “pose
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.” 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12113(b); see also 29 CFR § 1630.15. PeaceHealth contends that
even assuming that Boltz establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination,
there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Boltz could not have performed her
job 100% remotely and that it would have been an undue hardship to allow her to
work in person during the relevant timeframe. Def. Mot. at 21, 23.
A. Undue Hardship

The ADA undue hardship standard requires a showing of “significant difficulty
or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10). To determine “significant difficulty or expense,”
courts rely on EEOC Enforcement Guidance.5 EEOC Enforcement Guidance directs
courts to determine “significant difficulty or expense,” by considering the nature and
cost of the accommodation, the employer’s financial resources, the number of persons
employed, the impact on expenses and resources, and the impact of the
accommodation on the employer’s type of operation including the structure and

functions of the workforce. EEOC Enforcement Guidance; ORS 659A.121(2)(a–d).
Though Title VII and ADA undue hardship standards are not identical, they
contemplate similar factors. While Title VII contemplates “substantial cost” in the

5 EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION & UNDUE
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT NO. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002),
(https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonable-
accommodation-and-undue-hardship-under-ada#undue (last visited Mar. 13, 2026);
ORS 659A.121(2)(a–d).
context of the employer’s business, the ADA contemplates “significant difficulty or
expense” in light of the “type of operations[,]” and “composition, structure and
functions of the [employer’s] workforce[.]” Like Title VII, the ADA defense

contemplates both economic cost (“expense”) and non-economic cost (“difficulty”). And
both determinations are made in the context of an employer’s business.
Here, the undue hardship analyses under Title VII and the ADA produce the
same outcome. The health and safety risks to patients and staff from accommodating
Plaintiff and other hundreds of other employees with vaccination exceptions in a
health care facility during the pandemic would have constituted significant difficulty.

The operational burdens (from increased absenteeism, disrupted scheduling,
impaired ability to deliver healthcare services) would have constituted significant
difficulty. And the increased financial costs from the increased health and safety
risks and from the increased operational burden would have constituted significant
expense.
Plaintiff contends that PeaceHealth does not meet its burden to prove undue

hardship on Plaintiff’s ADA claim because PeaceHealth failed to engage in an
interactive process to identify an effective accommodation. Pl. Resp. at 11. “[A]n
employer cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage if there is a genuine dispute
as to whether the employer engaged in good faith in the interactive process[]” but this
is so only “if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible.” Snapp, F.3d at
1097 (emphasis in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “In
other words, there exists no stand-alone claim for failing to engage in the interactive
process.” Id. “Rather, discrimination results from denying an available and
reasonable accommodation.” Id.
Here, PeaceHealth determined that there was no available and reasonable

workplace accommodation for unvaccinated employees, even after considering a
range of alternatives. The ADA requirement to engage in an interactive process
stems from the “inherent informational imbalance between employers and
employees” and the fact that employers may have “superior knowledge regarding
possible alternative positions.” Id. “[T]he employee typically will have proposed some
accommodation, but . . . ‘[t]he range of possible reasonable accommodations, for

purposes of establishing liability for failure to accommodate, can extend beyond those
proposed.”’ Id. Plaintiff provides no evidence that PeaceHealth failed to consider or
withheld information about possible reasonable accommodations for in-person
caregivers or that there was an available accommodation that would have protected
patients and staff as effectively as COVID-19 vaccination. An employer is not
required to fundamentally alter the nature of a job or create a new position to
accommodate an employee with a disability. See White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d

357, 362 (10th Cir. 1995); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (‘“qualified individual’ means
an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds[.]”); 42
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (“‘reasonable accommodation’ may include . . . reassignment to
a vacant position”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff, an RN who helped prepare patients
for surgery, does not dispute that she delivered direct patient care and could not
perform her job 100% remotely. Boltz Decl. ¶ 2. And she does not say whether she
applied for any remote job or whether any of those jobs were available.
In sum, the Court concludes that there are no issues of material fact that

unvaccinated caregivers, regardless of accommodation, would have imposed both a
significant difficulty and a significant expense on PeaceHealth’s business.
Accordingly, PeaceHealth is entitled to summary judgment on its undue hardship
defense to Plaintiff’s ADA and Oregon disability discrimination claim.
B. Direct Threat
A direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the

health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by
reasonable accommodation.” Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1028
(9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(r)). A direct threat determination “shall be
based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. In weighing the risks
and their magnitude, “the views of public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public
Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are of special weight and

authority.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998). Here, that also includes
OHA. In reviewing those authorities, courts consider: (1) the “duration of the risk;”
(2) the “nature and severity of the potential harm;” (3) the “likelihood that the
potential harm will occur;” and (4) the “imminence of the potential harm.” Echazabal,
336 F.3d at 1028. “The determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall
be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely
perform the essential functions of the job.” Id.
Plaintiff does not rebut then current scientific and medical evidence, including

evidence from the CDC, NIH, OHA, and other authorities that, during the relevant
timeframe, (1) the duration of risk was unknown; (2) the nature and severity of
potential harm was grave given the large number of deaths that the COVID-19 Delta
variant were causing; (3) the likelihood that the harm would occur was high given
the increased risk of transmission from an unvaccinated caregiver especially to a
medically vulnerable patient; and (4) the potential harm was imminent, as evinced

by the “cooling bays” that PeaceHealth had to create to hold dead bodies.
PeaceHealth determined, based on the “most current medical knowledge” and
“best available objective evidence,” that unvaccinated employees, regardless of
accommodation, posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety
of patients and others in the workplace. Plaintiff offers no contrary evidence that,
despite her vaccination status, she could have safely performed the essential

functions of her job. Accordingly, PeaceHealth is also entitled to summary judgment
on its direct threat defense to Plaintiff’s ADA and Oregon disability discrimination
claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 47, and Defendant’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 69.

Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
It is so ORDERED and DATED this __1_7__th___ day of March 2026.

/s/Ann Aiken
ANN AIKEN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11288806. Public record. Not legal advice.