# Walker & Associates, Inc. v. Cecilia Walker Heffington

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · March 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280931

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 24, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Judge Carma Dennis McGee
- **Judges:** Judge Carma Dennis McGee
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280931

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the fact that one party “refused to execute more formal documentation, does not, ipso facto, negate the trial court’s ruling that a valid and enforceable settlement was, nonetheless, reached in this case”

## Opinion text

03/24/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
April 22, 2025 Session

WALKER & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CECILIA WALKER HEFFINGTON,
ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County
No. CH-22-0488 Melanie Taylor Jefferson, Chancellor
___________________________________

No. W2023-01360-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

This is an appeal from a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to enforce a settlement
agreement. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the parties
had reached an enforceable agreement. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
and Remanded

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN
STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and VALERIE L. SMITH, J., joined.

W. Lewis Jenkins, Jr., Dyersburg, Tennessee, for the appellants, Walker & Associates, Inc.,
and Ceil Walker.

Jonathan C. Hancock and W. Preston Battle, IV, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees,
Cecilia Lona Walker Heffington, Matthew Heffington, and Cecilia Lona, LLC.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it
shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not
be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
Ceil Walker is president and CEO of Walker & Associates, Inc., an advertising
agency in Memphis. Her daughter, Cecilia Walker Heffington, was employed at Walker
& Associates for several years. In 2022, Walker & Associates filed this lawsuit against
Mrs. Heffington, her husband Matthew Heffington, and Cecilia Lona, LLC, which is a
company formed by Mrs. Heffington. The complaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Heffington
had developed the company to directly compete with Walker & Associates all while Mrs.
Heffington remained employed by Walker. The complaint asserted ten separate counts:
breach of duty of loyalty; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract of a non-compete
agreement; breach of contract of a nondisclosure/confidentiality agreement; violation of
the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act; tortious interference with contract; conversion;
unjust enrichment; civil conspiracy; and a claim for injunctive relief. The defendants filed
an answer, counterclaim, and third-party complaint. It asserted various claims on behalf
of Mrs. Heffington against Walker & Associates and also Ms. Ceil Walker. Those claims
included unjust enrichment and violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid
wages, overtime, and retaliation.

In November 2022, the original defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Heffington and Cecilia
Lona, LLC, filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. The motion was supported
by a declaration of Mrs. Heffington, a declaration of Mr. Heffington, and a copy of the
following email sent from the email address of Mr. Heffington to all of the parties and their
attorneys, with the “Subject” line stating “Settlement Agreement Reached”:

Between Ceil Walker and Walker & Associates, Inc. (“Walker”) and
Matthew Hef[f]ington, Cecilia Heffington, and Cecilia Lona, LLC
(“Defendants”) (collectively with Walker, the “Parties”).

Defendants to pay Walker lump sum of $75,000 within 14 days of execution
of separate Confidential Settlement Agreement to be prepared by counsel for
the Parties.

Mutual release by all Parties.

All Parties to dismiss their claims with prejudice within three business days
following payment.

/s/ Matthew Heffington
/s/ Cecilia Lona Walker Heffington
/s/ Ceil Walker

Ms. Walker had responded to this email message with the following statement: “I agree.
Happy to have my Family back together!!!!”

-2-
According to the declarations of Mr. and Mrs. Heffington, Ms. Walker had sent an
email to both of them on October 13, 2022, “requesting a meeting at her house without
counsel present to discuss a potential resolution” of all claims between the parties in the
lawsuit. The declarations stated that Mr. and Mrs. Heffington had attended a total of three
meetings at Ms. Walker’s home between October 13 and November 2. According to the
declarations, the parties spent more than seven hours over the span of the three meetings
negotiating and ultimately agreeing upon the terms of the settlement agreement email that
they all signed and sent to all counsel at 4:46 p.m. on November 2. However, according to
the declarations, “Ms. Walker refuses to sign a settlement agreement as we mutually agreed
upon on November 2, 2022.” The defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement
also stated that the Heffingtons would be present in court at the hearing on the motion
“should the Court wish to take evidentiary proof regarding this matter.” The motion stated
that the defendants had submitted drafts of an agreement to Ms. Walker and made multiple
attempts to procure her signature, but she refused to execute an agreement as required by
the November 2 email she signed. Nevertheless, the defendants argued that this “does not
negate the fact that a binding settlement was reached between the parties.” They argued
that the email contained all material terms of the settlement -- payment, a mutual release,
dismissal of all claims with prejudice, and maintaining the confidentiality of a settlement
agreement -- and it was enforceable. They asked the trial court to grant their motion and
order Ms. Walker to sign the agreement drafted by counsel, as it was simply “more formal
documentation” of the email agreement.

Walker & Associates and Ms. Walker filed a response in opposition to the motion
to enforce the settlement agreement. They argued that the motion was “based in part on
witness testimony in which there is a very real factual dispute,” so they sought an
opportunity to depose the defendants based on the allegations in their declarations.
Pertinent to this appeal, they also argued that the payment of funds was contingent on
execution of a separate agreement prepared by counsel, and they claimed that the parties
still had not agreed upon such a separate agreement. They argued that there was no
“meeting of the minds” on all material terms and that the parties’ agreement referencing
the execution of a separate agreement was in essence “an agreement to agree.” They
attached emails exchanged between the parties since the email agreement was sent on
November 2. They also cited the following statements from Ms. Walker’s deposition
testimony:

“Well, this was an agreement to have our attorneys come up with their
agreement.”

“And by that, I meant the agreement that is drafted by both counsels, that we
will agree what is in the agreement.”

“Q. . . . The four corners of that e-mail, that document in your hand says that
the Defendants will pay $75,000 in exchange for an agreement from the
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parties to dismiss all of the lawsuits. That’s what it says; is that right?
A. Yes. Once the counsel get together and come up with the agreement. This
is not the agreement, sir.”

“Sir, with all due respect, I was depending on my counsel here to come up
with the agreement.”

Citing the parties’ emails and deposition testimony, Ms. Walker and Walker & Associates
contended that the parties each had a different understanding of what would be contained
in the separate “Confidential Settlement Agreement” to be prepared by counsel. They
claimed that it was clear from Ms. Walker’s emails and deposition testimony that she
intended for the separate agreement to contain additional material terms that were
discussed during the meetings. They argued that the Confidential Settlement Agreement
was itself “a material term of the email agreement, yet the terms of which were never
agreed or consented to by the parties at the time of the email.” Ms. Walker and Walker &
Associates contended that “at best the Parties made an agreement to a future agreement
with separate terms not yet contemplated at the conclusion of the meetings between them.”
Thus, they characterized the email agreement as contingent on a future agreement that
never came to fruition.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion on August 10, 2023. Counsel for the
defendants began by noting that the parties had already attended a full day of mediation
before Ms. Walker requested that the parties meet without counsel at her house to try to
resolve the case. They argued that when the parties put their agreement into email form
and signed it, that formed a binding and enforceable contract. They suggested that Ms.
Walker was simply trying to unilaterally add terms after-the-fact. In response, Ms. Walker
and Walker & Associates admitted that “if the agreement was we’re going to pay Ceil
Walker $75,000 and we are each going to dismiss the case and we are not going to talk
about it, we wouldn’t be here today because that would be a binding contract.” However,
they reiterated their position that there was no meeting of the minds because they disagreed
as to the substance of the separate Confidential Settlement Agreement to be prepared by
counsel. Their counsel acknowledged that “[o]ne would infer that it’s going to be a
confidentiality clause,” but he insisted “that’s not all there was.” Counsel suggested that
the parties discussed whether Mrs. Heffington would return to work at Walker, and he
argued “there were countless other terms that if called to testify she would tell you the other
terms that they discussed that she believed, she believed were part of the agreement.” The
defendants disagreed, insisting that the parties’ agreement only consisted of the terms set
forth in the email. They explained, “Those terms are the parties, the amount, when it gets
paid, the fact that a confidential agreement will be prepared, a mutual release, the claims
will be dismissed with prejudice, and it will happen within three business days following
payment.” The defendants asked the court to enter an order enforcing those terms of the
email as a settlement agreement. However, they noted that if the court ordered them to go
back and work to enforce the agreement by building out other terms, they would do that
-4-
too.

The trial judge then announced her oral ruling, which was later incorporated into
the court’s final order. At the outset, the trial judge noted that she had only heard from the
defendants via their affidavits or declarations, and she had only seen excerpts of the
deposition of Ms. Walker. She stated that she had been wondering “what else was said” in
Ms. Walker’s deposition and whether the defendants had also been deposed “so that there
could be some clarity as it related to exactly what was supposed to be in the confidential
agreement.” Nevertheless, the trial judge announced that “this Court is going to enforce
this agreement.” As for its terms, the trial judge explained that she could see, based on the
email, that they entered into an agreement whereby the defendants were going to pay
Walker & Associates $75,000 within 14 days of entering into a confidential settlement,
“the terms of which that’s what these parties need to continue to work out,” there was going
to be a mutual release by all parties, and the parties were going to dismiss their claims with
prejudice. Thus, she explained:

[T]hose are the terms. That a confidential agreement would be drafted and
that all parties were to dismiss their claims with prejudice and there was a
mutual release to be entered into and signed by all the parties and payment
of $75,000 was to be done within 14 days. That’s what I find they agreed to.

The trial judge then stated again that “the Court was wondering what else did they agree
to,” and she said the question becomes whether the family could sit down and come up
with the additional terms. The judge stated that if she needed to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on what was discussed she was willing to do that. Still, however, she explained
her conclusion that when Ms. Walker responded to that email saying she agreed and was
glad to have her family back, the parties had come up with an acceptable agreement even
if it was never put in the documents. She stated that it was her intention to enforce the
agreement because she believed one was made.

The trial court also entered a written order enforcing the settlement agreement. It
stated that the court had been presented with an email containing the subject line
“Settlement Agreement Reached” and the parties’ “agreed material settlement terms.” The
order stated that the email “is an enforceable agreement.” The court found that the parties
agreed to the following terms: the defendants agreed to pay Walker the lump sum provided
within 14 days of execution of a separate confidential settlement agreement; all parties
agreed to dismiss their claims with prejudice within 3 days following payment; and they
agreed to execute a mutual release. The order noted that the court’s ruling granting the
motion to enforce the settlement agreement “ends the underlying case.” The court ordered
the parties to execute a separate confidential settlement agreement to be prepared by
counsel. However, if the parties could not agree on terms, the court ordered them to appear
for an evidentiary hearing at which point the court would make findings and enter a
separate order declaring the binding terms. Ms. Walker and Walker & Associates filed a
-5-
notice of appeal. This Court entered a show cause order stating that the order appealed did
not appear to be a final judgment because it directed the parties to execute a settlement
agreement or appear for an evidentiary hearing, and the appellate record did not contain
any separate confidential settlement agreement.

The trial court then held an evidentiary hearing on July 17, 2024. The trial judge
explained that she still found that the email constituted an enforceable agreement, but she
wanted to hear from the parties so that they could express “what they thought they agreed
to and see if I hear anything that’s common.” Mrs. Cecilia Heffington was the first to
testify. She explained that she and her husband received an email from her mother inviting
them to her house to attempt to bring the family back together and end their “legal
situation.” She testified that the parties met there on three separate occasions, and each
side brought agendas of topics they wanted to discuss. She said that at the end of the third
meeting, they reached an agreement that was memorialized in the email. She explained
that the parties all “signed” the email together. When asked what the terms of the
agreement were, Mrs. Heffington stated, “Seventy-five thousand dollar payment to my
mother to be executed within 14 days, and that we would all drop our cases against one
another.” When asked if any other specific terms were discussed as part of the agreement,
Mrs. Heffington said, “No. We had to get the payment out of the way to get our relationship
back on track.” She explained that the payment was “the number one focus on how to
move forward and how to get the attorneys out of this situation.” Thus, according to Mrs.
Heffington, “The understanding was we would make payment, we would dismiss our
lawsuits, and we had a very, very long journey of therapy to even begin thinking about
what the next phase of our relationship personally or professionally looked like.” She
conceded that, over the course of three days, the parties had talked about a lot of things that
were not included in the email agreement. She testified that the parties were unable to sign
the settlement agreement after their meetings because her mother refused.

Matthew Heffington testified next. He similarly testified that the parties met and
discussed how they could resolve the lawsuit and counterclaim, and at the end of the third
day, they came to an agreement. He testified that he authored the email confirming their
settlement, and then Ms. Walker looked at it twice before the parties collectively agreed to
send it to their attorneys. He explained that he typed it while they were all in the same
room and that Ms. Walker did not modify the language at all or suggest that anything was
wrong with it. To the contrary, he said she was absolutely in agreement with the terms and
confirmed that again with her email in response. When asked about his understanding of
the terms of the agreement, he explained, “We would drop all the cases between each other,
pay her $75,000, and then potentially start therapy and hope to get the family back
together.” He noted, however, that the last topic regarding therapy was “[n]ot at all” a
requirement of their agreement.

Mr. Heffington testified that the parties had been unable to sign a settlement and
release since that final meeting. He acknowledged an email he sent in the week after their
-6-
meeting in which he wrote, “Dearest mother-in-law, let’s keep this on track. That’s our
goal as well. We collectively agreed that we need to get a settlement in place to drop the
lawsuits before we could begin to weigh in to the details about how the LLC would operate
going forward . . . .” Mr. Heffington testified that the parties already had an agreement in
place in the form of the settlement email. He explained that the issue regarding how the
LLC would operate going forward “was not part of the agreement.” He explained that the
parties discussed a lot of things during their meetings over the course of three days,
including “everything from the weather to Titans football.” However, he insisted that their
agreement was solely with regard to “what I put in the email.” He added, “There were a
number of things we needed to work on as a family, but that would come after if she
followed through with what we agreed to.” In another email, Mr. Heffington had stated
that he and his wife would commit to meeting again and “working through those details . .
. once these lawsuits have been dismissed.” He testified that the “details” they were
discussing were with respect to family therapy.

Finally, the trial court heard testimony from Ms. Walker. The trial judge reiterated
that she was “standing firm” on her prior ruling regarding the enforceability of the
agreement, but she was just trying to allow Ms. Walker and Walker & Associates to have
an opportunity to put on proof “so that they can have their day in court.” Ms. Walker
testified that she had requested that the parties have direct meetings without their attorneys
in order to try and reach some kind of resolution of the case. She said she requested that
negotiations occur in this way because the parties themselves “really were not talking,”
and she thought “we could make headway and get these things resolved and come to a
conclusion and move forward in our family life.” She explained that she had prepared an
agenda with topics she wanted to discuss, which included “getting the family back
together,” protecting her husband’s legacy, damages, payment of legal expenses, and future
communication. Ms. Walker testified that she would not have made an agreement “to
dispose of things that did not involve addressing the family issues.” She admitted that in
response to Mr. Heffington’s email, she wrote, “I agree. Happy to have my Family back
together!!!!” Still, Ms. Walker testified that she believed the Confidential Settlement
Agreement executed by their counsel “would address these agenda items that we talked
about,” including getting the family back together, whether the LLC would be dissolved,
whether its clients would be rolled back into the company, if the parties would start working
together again, and whether there was a path for Mrs. Heffington to become president of
the company. Ms. Walker was asked, “When you said ‘I agree’ in that email, did you think
all of these things were included in your agreement?” She responded, “No.” She believed
that “our counsels will work out the agreement details.” Thus, Ms. Walker took the
position that “[i]t was an agreement that we were working on that our counsels were going
to formulate the agreement and neither party was going to sign an agreement unless it had
everything in there that we agreed in.” She said, “I believe that the documents that were
being prepared by both counsels would include what I believed and [as] well as they had
things they wanted to put in that they agreed that we never even discussed.” When asked
if she could identify a single additional contract term that all parties had agreed on, she
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initially said “[t]here’s lots of them” but when pressed further said “I don’t know.” She
again stated that she believed the separate confidential settlement agreement would address
a wide range of issues, including whether Mrs. Heffington would wind down her LLC and
“wind it back into” Walker, whether she would return to work at Walker, figuring out what
the total damages were and legal expenses. Thus, according to Ms. Walker, at the
conclusion of that third meeting, “there were still other terms that had to be worked out”
that the parties had not agreed on, and “that was what the attorneys were going to do.”

In closing arguments, counsel for the defendants asked the court to consider the
caption of the email stating, “Settlement Agreement Reached.” He claimed that the
execution of a more formal document by counsel was a mere formality, not a call for the
attorneys to negotiate all the material terms of an agreement. Counsel argued that the
parties had agreed to dismissal of the lawsuit upon the payment of $75,000, and Ms. Walker
admitted that there was no meeting of the minds on any other term. He suggested that Ms.
Walker simply had “a list of things she’s sorry she didn’t include when she did agree.” He
also suggested that no one would agree to accept $75,000 for dismissal of a lawsuit and
then say the most important terms of the agreement had not been reached. He characterized
this as “buyer’s remorse.” In response, Ms. Walker and Walker & Associates argued that
the email called for execution of a separate agreement, so it was essentially an
unenforceable “agreement to agree.” They argued that there was no settlement on the
material terms of the agreement and that issues remained to be negotiated.

On July 17, 2024, the trial court entered a final order enforcing the settlement
agreement and dismissing all claims with prejudice. The court again found that the email
contained the subject line “Settlement Agreement Reached” and contained the parties’
“agreed material settlement terms.” The court again found that this was an enforceable
agreement. The court found that the parties agreed to the following terms: the defendants
agreed to pay Ms. Walker $75,000 within 14 days of execution of a separate confidential
settlement agreement; all parties agreed to dismiss their claims with prejudice within 3
days of payment; and they agreed to execute a mutual release. The court accepted these
agreed terms as the binding terms of an enforceable settlement agreement. Therefore, it
ordered the defendants to pay $75,000 within fourteen days of the order, and all claims
would be dismissed, as the parties had mutually released their claims.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Ms. Walker and Walker & Associates (collectively, “Ms. Walker”) present the
following issues for review on appeal:

1. The electronic message communication sent by Mr. Matthew
Heffington on 2 November 2022 is not an enforceable settlement
agreement, and the parties did not reach an enforceable settlement.
2. An electronic mail communication between represented parties to a
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lawsuit containing some terms and making explicit reference to an
agreement to be drafted by the attorneys for both parties is an
agreement to agree, and is not enforceable as a settlement agreement.
3. The order entered on July 17, 2024, does not reflect the trial court’s
independent judgment that the terms of the settlement agreement had
not been “hashed out.”

For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.2

III. DISCUSSION

“A settlement agreement made during the course of litigation is a contract between
the parties, and as such, contract law governs disputes concerning the formation,
construction, and enforceability of the settlement agreement.” Waddle v. Elrod, 367
S.W.3d 217, 222 (Tenn. 2012). As the Tennessee Supreme Court recently explained,

Whether a valid contract exists is a question of law. German v. Ford, 300
S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Murray v. Tenn. Farmers
Assurance Co., No M2008-00115-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3452410, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2008)). Interpretation of a contract and a
determination of the parties’ intentions related to the contract are also
questions of law. Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999).
Accordingly, “the trial court’s decisions relating to contract formation and
its interpretation of the contract are not afforded a presumption of
correctness.” German, 300 S.W.3d at 702.

Pharma Conf. Educ., Inc. v. State, 703 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tenn. 2024). In another recent
case, our Supreme Court set forth the following principles regarding Tennessee’s approach
to contract interpretation:
Looking at the broad range of Tennessee contracts cases, it is clear
that Tennessee courts have sought, albeit imperfectly, to achieve balance in
contract interpretation. The central principle endures, to interpret contracts
so as to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the contracting parties. See,
e.g., Wallis [v. Brainerd Baptist Church, 509 S.W.3d 886, 899 (Tenn. 2016)];
Dick Broadcasting [Co. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d
653, 659 (Tenn. 2013)]; Clark [v. Sputniks, LLC, 368 S.W.3d 431, 441 (Tenn.
2012)]; Allmand [v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tenn. 2009)]. In
effectuating this principle, our courts have noted that judges “are entitled to

2
We note that neither party raised any issue regarding the parol evidence rule. Thus, we do not
discuss it in this appeal. See Rhea v. Marko Const. Co., 652 S.W.2d 332, 333-34 (Tenn. 1983) (“[A]ppellees
contend that this testimony violated the parol evidence rule. The record contains no indication that there
was any objection made to it, however, so that that question is not properly before us.”)
-9-
place themselves in the same situation as the parties who made the contract,
so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them, and so as to judge of
the meaning of the words and of the correct application of the language to
the things described.” Staub [v. Hampton, 101 S.W. 776, 785 (Tenn. 1907)]
(quoting Nash [v. Towne, 72 U.S. 689 (1866)]); see also Ashley v. Volz, 218
Tenn. 420, 404 S.W.2d 239, 242 (1966). Courts should not be “shut out from
the same light which the parties enjoyed when the contract was executed.”
Staub, 101 S.W. at 785 . . . .
However, the strong strain of textualism in Tennessee caselaw
demonstrates resolve to keep the written words as the lodestar of contract
interpretation. See, e.g., Planters Gin Co. [v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse
Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 889-90 (Tenn. 2002)]; Guiliano [v. Cleo, Inc., 995
S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999)]; Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. [v. Regal Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975)]; Empress Health &
Beauty Spa, Inc. [v. Turner, 503 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn. 1973)]; City of
Cookeville ex rel. Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr. [v. Humphrey, 126 S.W.3d 897,
903 (Tenn. 2004)]. Tennessee has rejected firmly any notion that courts are
a fallback mechanism for parties to use to “make a new contract” if their
written contract purportedly fails to serve their “true” intentions. See Petty
[v. Sloan, 277 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tenn. 1955)]; Smithart [v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 71 S.W.2d 1059, 1063 (Tenn. 1934)]. Tennessee courts
“give primacy to the contract terms, because the words are the most reliable
indicator—and the best evidence—of the parties’ agreement when relations
were harmonious, and where the parties were not jockeying for advantage in
a contract dispute.” [Steven W. Feldman, 21 Tenn. Practice: Contract Law
and Practice § 8:14 (June 2018)].
Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 566 S.W.3d
671, 694 (Tenn. 2019).
On appeal, Ms. Walker argues that the plain language of the email and the context
of the parties’ circumstances “show only an ‘agreement to agree,’” so no enforceable
agreement exists. She argues that the intention of the parties must govern the analysis of
mutual assent, and “courts judge intention by the objective meaning of the words used and
the context of the agreement.” Ms. Walker claims that a writing asserted to be a settlement
“must show present mutual assent to terms actually included in the document.” She
contends that the objective and plain meaning of this email shows that it was a mere
“agreement to agree” to a more comprehensive agreement in the future, rather than a
definite and enforceable obligation in itself. Ms. Walker claims that the payment was
contingent on “execution of an agreement left to future negotiation and preparation.” In
her view, the email “simply agreed for a subsequent agreement whose terms were not
defined to be prepared by the parties’ attorneys.” She claims the email was a mere “initial
exchange that specifically calls for their lawyers to draft a ‘settlement agreement’ in the
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context of having discussed a large number of issues.”

“The judiciary encourages parties to work amicably to settle legal disputes outside
the court system.” Henderson v. Dwayne, No. M2024-00270-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL
658788, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2025) (citing Harbour v. Brown for Ulrich, 732
S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tenn. 1987); Lovelace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 29 (Tenn. 2013)). “Our
courts ‘retain the inherent power to enforce agreements entered into in settlement of
litigation pending before them,’ and this power exists ‘even if the parties’ agreement has
not been reduced to writing.’” Hayes v. Extreme Excavation, LLC, No. E2023-01435-
COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4375003, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2024) perm. app. denied
(Tenn. Mar. 13, 2025) (quoting Anglo-Danish Fibre Inds., Ltd. v. Columbian Rope Co.,
No. 01-2133 GV, 2002 WL 1784490, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 21, 2002)).

In this context, “[t]here is a ‘meeting of the minds’ when the parties are in mutual
assent to the terms.” Thompson v. Moody, No. W2024-01225-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL
355055, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2025) (quoting In re Estate of Josephson, No.
M2011-01792-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3984613, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2012)).
“In determining mutuality of assent, courts must apply an objective standard based upon
the parties’ manifestations.” Staubach Retail Servs.-Se., LLC v. H.G. Hill Realty Co., 160
S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tenn. 2005). “We examine ‘the parties’ objective manifestations, not
their secret intentions,’ for the presence of assent.” Am. Bd. of Craniofacial Pain v. Am.
Bd. of Orofacial Pain, 633 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting 1 Williston on
Contracts § 3:4 (4th ed., Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020)). Thus, “[w]hether mutual
assent has occurred must be determined not only from the words in the contract but also
from ‘the situation, acts, and the conduct of the parties, and the attendant circumstances.’”
Grace v. Grace, No. W2016-00650-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 6958887, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Nov. 29, 2016) (citing McMahan v. McMahan, No. E2004-03032-COA-R3-CV,
2005 WL 3287475, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2005)).

Here, after meeting for seven hours over the course of three days, the parties signed
an email with the subject “Settlement Agreement Reached,” which stated:

Between Ceil Walker and Walker & Associates, Inc. (“Walker”) and
Matthew Hef[f]ington, Cecilia Heffington, and Cecilia Lona, LLC
(“Defendants”) (collectively with Walker, the “Parties”).

Defendants to pay Walker lump sum of $75,000 within 14 days of execution
of separate Confidential Settlement Agreement to be prepared by counsel for
the Parties.

Mutual release by all Parties.

All Parties to dismiss their claims with prejudice within three business days
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following payment.

/s/ Matthew Heffington
/s/ Cecilia Lona Walker Heffington
/s/ Ceil Walker

Ms. Walker responded with the following statement: “I agree. Happy to have my Family
back together!!!!” Thus, it is clear that the parties’ negotiations culminated in mutual
assent by all parties to these material terms of the settlement. The very subject of the email
states “Settlement Agreement Reached.” Thus, we conclude that the parties contemplated
that a separate Confidential Settlement Agreement would be drafted by their attorneys to
memorialize their agreement, as more formal documentation, but the agreement was
already made. We simply cannot read the parties’ email to objectively suggest in any way
that the attorneys would attempt to negotiate and reach some separate comprehensive
agreement on a wide variety of issues that the parties may or may not have even discussed.

As we explained in American Board of Craniofacial Pain, 633 S.W.3d at 603:

Although the parties may have intended to memorialize their
agreement with a memorandum of understanding, [they] could have reached
an enforceable contract without one. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“Manifestations of assent that are in themselves
sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by
the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a
written memorial thereof.”). After all, “[p]arties who plan to make a final
written instrument as the expression of their contract necessarily discuss the
proposed terms of the contract before they enter into it and often, before the
final writing is made, agree upon all the terms which they plan to incorporate
[in the written instrument].” Id. § 27 cmt. a. So parties, either orally or
through the exchange of writings such as emails, can form a binding contract
that includes an obligation to sign a final writing that incorporates all agreed-
upon terms. Id. To be binding, the parties must agree “‘on all essential terms
that are to be incorporated in the [final writing,]’” and the final writing must
be “‘understood to be a mere memorial of the agreement already reached.’”
EnGenius Entm’t, Inc. v. Herenton, 971 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting 1 Arthur L. Corbin et al., Corbin on Contracts § 2.8, at 133-34 (Rev.
ed. 1993)). There is no binding contract “if either party knows or has reason
to know that the other party regards the agreement as incomplete and intends
that no obligation shall exist until other terms are assented to or until the
whole has been reduced to another written form.” Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 27 cmt. b.
“The ‘expression of the parties’ intent to be bound[ ] and the definitiveness with which
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they state their terms’ are related concepts.” Id. at 604 (citing Huber v. Calloway, No.
M2005-00897-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2089753, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2007)).

In the parties’ email agreement in this case, they indicate that “express agreement
had been reached on all the terms to be included” in the settlement, and the parties’ conduct
thereafter also suggests a complete agreement. See id. at 604. They expressed their intent
to be presently bound not only by signing each of their names at the bottom and sending it
to their attorneys, but also by Ms. Walker’s reply, “I agree. Happy to have my Family back
together!!!!” Thus, there is nothing in the record to show that Mr. and Mrs. Heffington
knew or had reason to know that Ms. Walker regarded the agreement as incomplete and
intended that no obligation would exist until other terms were assented to or until the whole
was reduced to another written form. See id. at 603; see also PNC Multifamily Cap.
Institutional Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Mabry, 402 S.W.3d 654, 661-63 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2012) (explaining that the fact that one party “refused to execute more formal
documentation, does not, ipso facto, negate the trial court’s ruling that a valid and
enforceable settlement was, nonetheless, reached in this case”); Probst v. Liberty Mut.
Grp., Inc., No. M2022-01477-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 774668, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Feb. 26, 2024) (“As the trial court correctly found after hearing arguments from the parties
on the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, ‘[T]here was an agreement here. No
proof to the contrary. Their nonsignature notwithstanding. That e-mail chain is specific and
explicit, and without counterproof in this circumstance represents to the Court’s mind offer
acceptance and all material terms necessary for agreement by an agent of the plaintiffs,
their then-counsel.’ For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court in its determination
that the March 17 written settlement agreement is enforceable.”).

This Court considered several arguments similar to those presented here in Harvey
v. Turner, No. M2014-00368-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1451702, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.
26, 2015) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2015), where parties announced the essential
terms of a settlement in court but failed to agree to a written settlement document thereafter.
One party “felt that there was supposed to be mention of a sewer line in the agreement.”
Id. at *2. The trial court disagreed, concluding that “[w]hat was announced to the Court .
. . was a settlement,” “the essential terms are there,” and if it was not announced in court
then “it’s not part of the settlement.” Id. The trial court reasoned that “there was a meeting
of the minds and that that issue was not part of it.” Id.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the purported settlement was unenforceable
because “the parties expected a more formal settlement agreement to be drafted and
executed.” Id. He claimed that their “agreement in principle” was “simply an
unenforceable agreement to agree.” Id. He also insisted that “[t]he formal, written
settlement agreement . . . was necessary to create a binding agreement.” Id. We recognized
that “absent mutual assent to the essential terms of a claimed settlement agreement, the
agreement cannot be enforceable.” Id. (quoting Petersen v. Genesis Learning Centers, No.
M2004-01503-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3416303, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005)).
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However, we explained that “[t]he best place to begin is with the words actually said in
court.” Id. at *3. The parties’ attorneys had announced that they had reached an agreement
in principle resolving the claims but a “more formal settlement agreement which contains
the essential terms of the documents exchanged between the parties will be executed and
will include confidentiality provisions.” Id. We rejected the argument that the in-court
announcement was “nothing more than an agreement to agree.” Id. We explained that
agreements to agree “are unenforceable in Tennessee because their terms are indefinite.”
Id. However, the conditions at issue did not make the terms indefinite or “make the
settlement an agreement to agree.” Id. We also rejected his argument that “the fact that a
formal settlement document was contemplated indicates that the settlement announced in
court was not intended to be binding.” Id. We explained that one of the factors courts rely
on in determining “the intent behind a ‘preliminary’ agreement is its completeness.” Id. If
it contains the essential terms of the transaction, “it indicates that the parties intended to be
bound to consummate the transaction.” Id. We found the agreement announced in court
was quite detailed and described by the attorneys as the essential terms of the settlement
that they would set forth in the transcript, from which they could work “in order to do a
comprehensive release.” Id. at *4. Finally, we explained that the appellant’s desire to
include language regarding the sewer line was “not material to whether a settlement
contract was created.” Id. We explained that whether a meeting of the minds occurred
was a question of fact, and the trial court’s finding that there was a meeting of the minds
as to the essential terms of the settlement was consistent with the preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at *6.

We also find this case comparable to Hayes v. Extreme Excavation, wherein this
Court concluded that “communications between the parties’ attorneys contained all the
material terms of the settlement, making the correspondence an enforceable contract,” as
they agreed that “Mr. Hayes would pay Extreme Excavation $25,000; the parties would
execute a written settlement agreement and release; each party would bear their own
attorney fees and discretionary costs; and Mr. Hayes would pay court costs.” 2024 WL
4375003, at *3. It did not matter that one of the attorneys, after conveying his client’s
agreement, had stated that he was going out of town and “we can finalize the settlement
when I return.” Id. at *2. We explained, “Despite Mr. Hayes’s attorney’s statement about
future finalization of the settlement, the essential terms were already finalized. The only
step remaining was for the parties to put their agreement in writing and sign the
agreement[.]” Id. at *4. This was not a required step for a determination that a contract
had already been formed. Id.

Ms. Walker also argues on appeal that the trial court’s own findings show that no
enforceable agreement was reached because, in Ms. Walker’s words, “additional unknown
terms existed.” We note that Ms. Walker’s own position regarding the existence of
additional terms has changed over the course of this lawsuit. She filed a response to the
motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that “at best the Parties made an
agreement to a future agreement with separate terms not yet contemplated at the conclusion
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of the meetings between them.” During the hearing, however, her counsel argued that
“there were countless other terms that if called to testify she would tell you the other terms
that they discussed that she believed, she believed were part of the agreement.” At the
conclusion of that first hearing, the trial judge announced that she found the email to be an
enforceable agreement. She explained:

[T]hose are the terms. That a confidential agreement would be drafted and
that all parties were to dismiss their claims with prejudice and there was a
mutual release to be entered into and signed by all the parties and payment
of $75,000 was to be done within 14 days. That’s what I find they agreed to.

However, the trial judge noted that she had only limited evidence before her and admittedly
“was wondering what else did they agree to.” She ultimately conducted an evidentiary
hearing and gave the parties an opportunity to testify and “have their day in court.” At the
end of the evidentiary hearing, however, the trial judge made the following comments:

What I found, or what I held August the 10th, was that the parties had come
up with an agreement, the specific terms of which today after having an
evidentiary hearing I realized were not necessarily hashed out.
But I gave the parties a road map as it related to those things that the
email outlined that I did say was in effect the agreement. And that was, one,
a $75,000 payment would be made within 14 days but here’s the catch of
them actually executing a confidential settlement agreement.
....
The easiest way for The Court to get a final order entered and still
hold firm to my ruling in August of 2023, is for me to enter an order that
outlines that this case will be dismissed; that the parties have a mutual release
of all claims as it relates to this particular case.
And then any other counseling, family counseling, therapy, whether
or not there’s a merger between Cecilia Lona LLC and Walker & Associates
to preserve the legacy of Mr. Walker, all of those other terms that they
discussed but did not actually have the specifics solidified enough to put in
an agreement, I cannot and will not try to -- I can’t create that contract for
the parties.
And The Court – that’s not The Court’s job to create that contract. So
I will sign this final order enforcing settlement and dismissing claims with -
- I don’t know. Did they agree to dismiss claims with prejudice or without
prejudice?

MR. HANCOCK: They did with prejudice, Your Honor. That’s one of the
things they agreed.

THE COURT: Let me look at the email. Yep. With prejudice.
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Ms. Walker argues that within these comments, “the trial court specifically found the
absence of terms of an agreement, a failure to include all of the terms of an agreement in
the electronic mail communication, and the existence of an ‘agreement to agree.’” We
disagree. Although not a model of clarity, looking at this explanation as a whole, it is clear
that the trial court found that the parties reached an enforceable agreement on the terms
contained within the email, and there was no agreement to any additional terms. Notably,
the trial court’s final order did not incorporate by reference the transcript of the hearing, so
these comments by the trial judge were not adopted in the final order. “‘[T]he court speaks
through its order, not through the transcript.’” In re Rufus C., 660 S.W.3d 725, 742 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2022) (quoting In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Tenn. 2001)). The
written order simply found that the email was an enforceable agreement, as it contained the
subject line “Settlement Agreement Reached” along with “the parties’ agreed material
settlement terms.” The court found that the parties agreed to the payment of $75,000 within
14 days of execution of a separate confidential settlement agreement, the claims would be
dismissed with prejudice, and there would be a mutual release. The court found that these
were the agreed and binding terms of the enforceable settlement agreement.

Ms. Walker also suggests that “given the variation” between the statements from
the bench and the final order, “the order of 17 July 2024, does not appear to reflect the
independent judgment of the trial court,” citing Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d
303, 316 (Tenn. 2014). We disagree. The order accurately reflects the decision of the trial
court, and the record does not create doubt that the decision reviewed and signed by the
court represents the court’s own deliberations and decision. See id.; see also Black v.
Baldwin, No. M2024-00151-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 1566392, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 3, 2025) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2025).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the chancery court is hereby
affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellants, Walker & Associates, Inc., and
Ceil Walker, for which execution may issue if necessary.

s/ Carma Dennis McGee
CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280931. Public record. Not legal advice.