# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · March 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280755

## Case

- **Full name:** Estate of Allegra Warnick, Deceased v. Benton County, Arkansas; Shawn Holloway, Benton County Sheriff; Officer Riley McCarver, Rogers Police Department; Officer Kaden Dickson, Rogers Police Department; and the City of Rogers, Arkansas
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** March 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280755

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding Saucier protocol to be beneficial as it is difficult to determine whether a right is clearly established without deciding exactly what the established right is
- holding pre-trial detainee, who was found standing next to creek, soaking wet, and reporting that his vehicle was going to “blow up,” and who was combative during arrest, did not have objectively serious medical need

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

ESTATE OF ALLEGRA WARNICK,
Deceased PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 2:25-cv-02085- MEF

BENTON COUNTY, ARKANSAS;
SHAWN HOLLOWAY,
Benton County Sheriff;
OFFICER RILEY MCCARVER,
Rogers Police Department;
OFFICER KADEN DICKSON,
Rogers Police Department; and the
CITY OF ROGERS, ARKANSAS DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss filed by Officer Riley McCarver
(“Officer McCarver”), Officer Kaden Dickson (“Officer Dickson”), and the City of Rogers,
Arkansas’ (“City of Rogers”), and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Benton County
Sheriff Shawn Holloway (“Sheriff Holloway”) and Benton County, Arkansas’ (“Benton County”).
(ECF Nos. 26, 35). The case is before the undersigned by consent of the parties. (ECF No. 29, ¶
11). Plaintiff has filed responses in opposition to both motions, and said motions are ripe for
resolution. (ECF No. 32, 37).
I. BACKGROUND
Trenton Reick, Special Administrator (ECF No. 2-1), brings this cause of action on behalf
of the Estate of Allegra Warnick, deceased, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Arkansas Civil Rights
Act § 16-123-101, et seq, and the Arkansas Constitution for the alleged wrongful death of Allegra
Warnick (“Ms. Warnick”) while detained at the Benton County Detention Center. (ECF No. 2).
Plaintiff insists that all Defendants are liable for Ms. Warnick’s death due to deliberate indifference
to her medical needs and violations of her constitutional right to receive medical care. Further, the
Plaintiff raises claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress for their failure to respond to
Ms. Warnick’s pleas for help and requests for medication.
In support of their Motion to Dismiss, the City of Rogers and Officers Dickson and

McCarver attached a copy of Officer Dickson’s body worn camera footage documenting the
Officers’ contact with Ms. Warnick. (ECF No. 27-1). Plaintiff has raised no objection to the entry
of this video, there is no question as to its authenticity, and the undersigned deems the video to be
“necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” See Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 732 n.2 (8th Cir.
2019) (citing Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012)). Although not
specifically mentioned in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations are clearly based on events
depicted in said video. Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017).
Accordingly, we will consider it together with the pleadings, supplementing the factual discussion
with information from the body camera video.1 See Aumick v. Berkshire, 2021 WL 12271641, *1
0F
(W.D. Mo. July 12, 2021).
On February 4, 2025, at around 2:58 p.m., Rogers Police Officers McCarver and Dickson
were dispatched to the Casey’s gas station on Hudson Road in Rogers, Arkansas, to perform a
welfare check on a woman sitting in front of a fuel pump.2 (ECF Nos. 2, 27). A witness told
1F
officers that the woman had indicated she was “coming down off something hard” and needed
help. (ECF. No. 2, ¶ 9).

1 The body camera video is timestamped. Therefore, the Court will refer to various points in the
video based on the timestamp.
2 Officer McCarver’s trainee was also in attendance but is not named as a party in this lawsuit.
(ECF No. 2, ¶ 12).
Upon arrival, Officer Dickson approached the woman while Officer McCarver remained
in his vehicle. The woman was seated on the ground near fuel pump 10 rocking back and forth
and cradling a dog between her legs. (ECF No. 27-1, Officer Kaden Dickson’s Body Worn Camera
Video, at 0:00:27). She wore a black 3/4 zip sweater, green pants, and soiled yellow socks with no

shoes. When asked if she had shoes, the woman indicated that it was a long story. (Id. at 0:01:55).
Her hair was disheveled, her sweater was covered in dog hair, and she had either dirt or marks on
her face. (Id. at 00:00:27, 0:29:25). Beside her lay a pink dog harness, a black plastic bag with a
bottle inside, and a Styrofoam food container with a spoon on top.
The woman ultimately identified herself as Allie Warnick and provide her date of birth,
although she did not have any identification. (ECF No. 27-1, 0:02:13; 0:05:13). Dickson advised
Ms. Warnick that Casey’s wanted her off its property. She asked several times if Dickson could
give her a ride to her friend’s or boyfriend’s house, but Dickson explained that he was not allowed
to transport her anywhere except jail. (Id. at 0:01:45, 0:02:55, 0:04:28, 0:10:28, 0:35:10).
Dickson asked dispatch to run her information through their database, and it was

discovered that she had an outstanding warrant out of Franklin County, Arkansas. While awaiting
confirmation that Franklin County did in fact want Ms. Warnick transported, Dickson asked her a
series of questions concerning her use of intoxicants. Ms. Warnick indicated that she had a little
to drink that day but did not use drugs. (Id. at 0:10:16). When pressed concerning the amount of
alcohol consumed, she replied, “not enough.” (Id. at 0:13:36).
Dickson informed Ms. Warnick that she had a warrant. (ECF No. 27-1, 0:11:54). She
asked if he would agree not to arrest her if she could find a ride. (Id. at 0:12:51). Upon
confirmation that Franklin County did want her transported to the Benton County Detention
Center, Ms. Warnick gave a litany of reasons why she could not go to jail. Her reasons included
having had a fight with her boyfriend and needing to smooth things over with him, concern for her
dog and its puppies, business at the casino in Siloam Springs, and needing her medication. (Id. at
0:14:20, 0:16:11, 0:17:33, 0:18:24, 0:19:11, 0:19:20, 0:20:54). When Dickson inquired about her
medication, Ms. Warnick indicated that she takes Ativan, and that it was at her boyfriend’s house.

(Id. at 0:19:20). Dickson did not appear to be familiar with the medication, mispronouncing it as
Adderall, and opined that he did not think it was a life-or-death medicine. (Id. at 0:19:37). Ms.
Warnick said she needed to take her medication because she experienced “alcohol withdrawals
and stuff.” (Id. at 0:19:35; 0:26:32).
Someone from the animal shelter arrived and picked up the dog. (ECF No. 27-1, 0:27:45).
Thereafter, Dickson placed Ms. Warnick in the patrol car and collected her belongings, which
included a bottle later determined to contain vodka. (ECF No. 27-1, 0:29:25). During the transport
to the jail, Ms. Warnick continued to try and bargain with Dickson not to take her to jail. It is
difficult to hear her quiet voice over the radio, police radio, and road noise, but she did mention
her medication at least twice. (Id. at 0:40:40). They arrived at the Benton County Detention Center

at 4:10 p.m., and Dickson escorted Ms. Warnick into the intake area. (Id. at 0:57:15; 1:00:22).
Ms. Warnick was able to walk on her own. As they walked down the hall, she said, “I told you I
have medicine to take.” (Id. at 1:02:25). Dickson responded, “Ok. Cool.”
When Ms. Warnick began mumbling and making nonsensical statements, Dickson placed
his hand on the center of her back and guided her to the booking room. (ECF No. 27-1, 1:03:09).
At 4:17 p.m., an intake jailer asked Dickson to turn off his body camera and he complied. (Id. at
1:04:06). Dickson’s bodycam ends at this point and neither party has submitted video from the
Benton County Detention Center.
According to the Complaint, Dickson noted no alcohol and no drugs on her arrest report.
Thereafter, Ms. Warnick was allegedly unable to complete the booking process and placed in a
drunk tank. (ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 20, 29). On February 5, 2025, Sheriff Holloway advised Ms. Warnick’s
father that she had refused breakfast at 6:00 a.m. that morning and deputies found her unresponsive

in her cell at 6:30 a.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22). At 7:09 a.m., an officer with the Bentonville Police
Department entered the booking area to serve a warrant and observed deputies with Ms. Warnick.
Said officer requested EMS and stated that jail staff advised they had administered Narcan. (Id. at
¶¶23, 24). Ms. Warnick was transported to the hospital and later pronounced dead. (Id. at ¶¶ 28,
30).
Plaintiff filed suit on August 13, 2025. (ECF No. 2). On September 11, 2025, Rogers
Police Department filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, claiming the Rogers
Police Department was not an entity subject to suit. (ECF No. 8). Benton County and Sheriff
Holloway filed an answer on September 16, 2025. (ECF No. 12).
Pursuant to Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute the City of Rogers for Rogers Police

Department (ECF No. 15), the Court terminated Rogers Police Department as a defendant on
September 29, 2025. (ECF No. 18). As such, their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
(ECF No. 8) was deemed moot. (ECF No. 24).
The City of Rogers and Officers Dickson and McCarver filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim on November 17, 2025, contending that neither officer was deliberately
indifferent to Ms. Warnick’s medical needs or violated her constitutional rights; both officers were
entitled to qualified immunity; the Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the City of Rogers; and
the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(ECF No. 26). On December 1, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to said motion,
arguing that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Warnick’s objectively obvious serious
medical needs, as she is seen rocking back and forth, mumbling, and repeatedly asking for help;
the officers mocked her condition and made jokes about her inability to answer questions and
ignored her pleas for help; and illegally seized Ms. Warnick and took her to jail rather than seeking

out medical attention. (ECF Nos. 32, 33). Asserting municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiff further insists that the City of Rogers is also responsible for the officers’ indifference
because it ratified the officers’ behavior by failing to discipline them for their actions.
On February 9, 2026, Benton County, and Sheriff Holloway filed a Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings seeking dismissal because the Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of an
unconstitutional official policy as is required to establish a claim against the County; and has not
pled sufficient facts to establish the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees; deliberate indifference to or
tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice
to the officials of that misconduct; an injury by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom,

inadequate officer training practices; deliberate indifference to the rights of others in adoption of
those training practices; and that said failure to train resulted in a constitutional violation. (ECF
Nos. 35, 36). Additionally, Sheriff Holloway contends he cannot be held liable under the theory
of respondeat superior because the Plaintiff has not shown that he received notice of a pattern of
unconstitutional acts committed by his subordinates, demonstrated deliberate indifference to or
tacit authorization of the offensive acts, or failed to take sufficient remedial action proximately
causing injury to Ms. Warnick. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to said motion,
maintaining that Sheriff Holloway is liable because he was personally involved in the care and
custody of Ms. Warnick.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The notice pleading standard of Rule
8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give “a short and plain statement...showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To meet this standard and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requirement of facial plausibility means the
factual content of a Plaintiff’s allegations must “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1128
(8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
The Court must grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Lustgraaf
v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872–73 (8th Cir. 2010). However, if a claim fails to allege one of the
elements necessary to recover on a legal theory, the Court must dismiss that claim for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Delker v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 21 F.4th 1019,
1024 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562). Threadbare recitals of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). Thus, Rule 8 does not “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. “A pleading that merely pleads ‘labels
and conclusions,’ or a ‘formulaic recitation’ of the elements of a cause of action, or ‘naked
assertions’ devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice.” Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817-
18 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Although courts must accept all factual
allegations as true, they are not bound to take as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.
Similarly, a court may grant a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “when
there is no dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2006). When ruling on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the court applies the same standard it would use to address a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ashley Cnty.
v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). “[T]he pleadings themselves, materials embraced
by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record” are considered.
Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss
In the Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts that Officers Dickson and McCarver were
deliberately indifferent to Ms. Warnick’s serious medical need when they failed to request an EMS

check prior to her arrest despite obvious signs of both mental and physical distress and knowledge
that she was “coming off something hard”; ignored her pleas for help and statements that she
needed her medication; mocked and made fun of her; and noted no alcohol or drugs on her arrest
report despite the fact she told them she had consumed some alcohol that day and possessed a half-
gallon of vodka at the time of her arrest. The officers and the City of Rogers insist the Plaintiff
has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Ms.
Warnick’s medical needs and/or violated her constitutional rights. As such, they assert the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Further, they contend the Complaint lacks sufficient
evidence to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
1. Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due

process clause, relying on both Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment cases alike. Poemoceah v.
Morton County, 117 F.4th 1049, 1055 (8th Cir. 2024); Hott v. Hennepin County, 260 F.3d 901, 905
(8th Cir. 2001). “A plaintiff claiming deliberate indifference must establish objective and
subjective components.” Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2013). “The objective
component requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an objectively serious medical need,” while “[t]he
subjective component requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant actually knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, such need.” McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2009)). This latter component requires the
official to “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and ... draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

“[T]he district court can infer knowledge if the risk was obvious.” Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d
856, 862 (8th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).
“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations
omitted). “To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, a
serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal recklessness:
disregarding a known risk to the [detainee’s] health.” Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th
Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has stated that this
“onerous standard requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross negligence, but
less than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of serious harm to
the inmate.” Thompson, 730 F.3d at 747 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus,
behavior to include passing out in the booking area, nearly falling out of the seat, an inability to

sign their name and answer questions, and an inability to answer questions about their medical
needs has been found to constitute objective evidence of a serious medical need. Id. at 749; Barton,
908 F.3d at 1124. On the other hand, knowledge that a detainee has taken methamphetamine
standing alone does not. Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 810 (8th Cir. 2006).
In the present case, there is no contention that a doctor has diagnosed Ms. Warnick with a
serious medical need that required treatment. Thus, we must determine whether it would be
obvious to a layperson that Ms. Warnick required immediate medical attention at the time Officers
Dickson and McCarver first contacted her, when Dickson transported her to the jail, and/or when
Dickson booked her in at the Benton County Detention Center. Accepting Plaintiff’s facts as true,
we will assume the officers knew Ms. Warnock was “coming down off something hard.” When

they arrived on scene at the Casey’s, Ms. Warnick was sitting on the ground in front of a gas pump,
cradling her dog in her lap, and rocking back and forth. She explained that she had walked away
after having an argument with her boyfriend. Except for shoes, she appeared to be appropriately
dressed, wearing a 3/4 zip sweater, pants, and socks. Her soiled yellow socks resembled the socks
provided by a hospital, reinforcing the officers’ suspicion that Ms. Warnick was under the influence
of something. Likewise, the vodka found in the plastic bag sitting next to Ms. Warnick alerted
them that she had also consumed alcohol; however, when Dickson asked her what she had taken,
she denied taking anything. In fact, she stated that she did not use drugs. Ms. Warnick did admit
to consuming some alcohol, but she did not quantify the amount consumed other than to say it was
“not enough.” Id. (jailer did not know inmate required medical attention although he had
knowledge inmate was likely under influence of methamphetamine where inmate would not
answer questions about his drug use).
Despite her obvious intoxication, Ms. Warnick was able to recite her name and date of

birth. Although she did not appear to fully understand the reason for her arrest and seemed
preoccupied with her dog’s safety, getting to her friend’s house, and smoothing things over with
her boyfriend, she did understand that she was being arrested. Ms. Warnick did not mention
anything about her medication to the officers until after Dickson informed her that she was being
arrested on an outstanding warrant. She told Dickson that her medication was at her boyfriend’s
house and that it was important because she experienced alcohol withdrawals. However, Ms.
Warnick did not continuously request her medication. Instead, she spent most of the time pleading
with Officer Dickson not to take her to jail.
While it was obvious that Ms. Warnick was under the influence of something and
experiencing some emotional upset over a disagreement with her boyfriend, we cannot say that it

would be obvious to a layperson that she required immediate medical attention at any point during
her encounter with Officers Dickson and McCarver. Id. at 809 (holding pre-trial detainee, who
was found standing next to creek, soaking wet, and reporting that his vehicle was going to “blow
up,” and who was combative during arrest, did not have objectively serious medical need). Further,
the fact that Ms. Warnick stated she needed her medication because she experienced “alcohol
withdrawals and stuff” did not create a presumption that she required immediate medical attention.
At the time of her interaction with the officers, she did not exhibit symptoms consistent with
moderate to severe alcohol withdrawal. And, given the fact that she had alcohol in her possession,
there was no reason for the officers to assume she was experiencing withdrawal symptoms at that
time. Therefore, a layperson would not leap to the conclusion that Ms. Warnick needed medical
attention, even if they were aware that she was intoxicated.
2. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields officials from liability “unless the official’s conduct violates a

clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2011). The court must consider whether,
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts show a violation of a particular
constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Analysis of a qualified immunity
claim is a two-step inquiry: (1) do the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a
constitutional or statutory right, and (2) was that right clearly established at the time of the
defendants’ alleged misconduct.” Mitchell v. Shearrer, 729 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). “[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that this inquiry “must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). Therefore, to lose the shield of immunity, an

officer must have been “plainly incompetent” or have knowingly violated the law. Gladden v.
Richbourg, 759 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). If “no reasonable fact
finder could answer yes to both of these questions,” the officer is entitled to immunity. Nelson v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2013).
Officers “are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’
the specific facts at issue.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104-105 (2018) (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 14 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis deleted)). “The
dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of [the] particular conduct is clearly
established.’” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13 (quoting Aschroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)
(emphasis in original)). And the Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving the law was clearly
established. Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2002).
Because there is no evidence of an objectively serious medical need that required
immediate medical attention, Officers Dickson and McCarver were not deliberately indifferent to

Ms. Warnick’s medical needs, did not violate her right to medical care, and are entitled to qualified
immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (finding Saucier protocol to be
beneficial as it is difficult to determine whether a right is clearly established without deciding
exactly what the established right is).
3. Municipal Liability
Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of an underlying constitutional
violation. If no constitutional violation occurred, the city cannot be held liable, even if its policies
or practices were deficient. Partridge v. City of Benton, Arkansas, 2025 WL 3139026, at *2 (8th
Cir. 2025) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam)); Rogers
v. King, 885 F.3d 1118, 1122 (2018).

Because we have concluded that Officers Dickson and McCarter did not violate Ms.
Warnick’s constitutional rights, there is no municipal liability. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
against the City of Rogers must also be dismissed.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Arkansas, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is also known as the tort
of “outrage.” Patrick v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 221, 17, 489 S.W.3d 683, 695 (2016).
To establish a claim for outrage, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should
have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and was utterly intolerable in a civilized
community; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the
plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected
to endure it.

FMC Corp., Inc. v. Helton, 360 Ark. 465, 484-85, 202 S.W.3d 490, 504 (2005).
Arkansas courts give “a narrow view to the tort of outrage” and require “clear-cut proof to
establish the elements in outrage cases.” Id. Liability attaches only when “the conduct has been
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id.
However, “[m]erely describing the conduct as outrageous does not make it so.” Id.
Here, the Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that Officers Dickson and McCarter’s conduct
rose to such an extreme level. We have concluded that it was not obvious to a layperson that Ms.
Warnick required immediate medical attention. Therefore, their failure to seek out medical
attention for her was not beyond all possible bounds of decency and utterly intolerable. Plaintiff’s
outrage claim against the officers must also be dismissed.
B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Plaintiff also asserts claims against Sheriff Holloway and Benton County, for deliberate
indifference and failure to provide adequate supervision and training of its agents and employees
who were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Warnick’s serious medical needs by failing to request a
medical assessment of Ms. Warnick upon her arrival at the jail; ignoring her pleas for help; failing
to regularly check on her while she was in the drunk tank, and failing to call for EMS when they
found her unresponsive. Further, he contends the Defendants ignored the observations of jailers
and deputies.
1. Sheriff Holloway
A sheriff can be held individually liable under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for constitutional violations
arising from his own actions, provided certain conditions are met. Liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 is personal, meaning that a Plaintiff must demonstrate that the sheriff, through his own
individual actions, violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Keup v.

Sarpy Cnty., 709 F. Supp. 3d 770 (D. Neb. Dec. 21, 2023). In other words, the plaintiff must show
that the sheriff either directly participated in the constitutional violation or that his failure to
properly supervise or train subordinates caused the violation. Elder v. Gillespie, 54 F.4th 1055,
1065-1066 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2014)). However,
“[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(internal quotation omitted); see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
In this case, the Plaintiff contends that Sheriff Holloway was personally involved in the
care and custody of Ms. Warnick as he was in direct control of the Benton County Detention Center
while Ms. Warnick was incarcerated. Sheriff Holloway told her father that she refused breakfast

at 6:00 a.m.; at 6:30 a.m. deputies found her unresponsive in her cell and had her transported to
the hospital; Ms. Warnick died at the hospital; and he did not report a death in the facility. Further,
he asserts that Ms. Warnick was jailed for 15 hours, in obvious need of medical attention, so
distressed she could not be booked, and repeatedly asked for help. Holloway’s staff reportedly
failed to administer aid, evaluate her, or check on her during that 15-hour period. Further, when
she was found unresponsive at 6:30 a.m., the jailers administered Narcan but did not call for EMS.
Instead, 40 minutes later, at 7:09 a.m., a Bentonville Police Officer serving a warrant in the facility
phoned EMS. Plaintiff insists either Sheriff Holloway failed to train his employees, or an unwritten
policy existed at the jail which Sheriff Holloway tacitly approved. Accordingly, the undersigned
concludes that the Complaint contains enough facts to state the grounds upon which it rests;
namely, that Sheriff Holloway’s liability is premised on a failure to train and/or supervise his
employees.
As such, at this point in the litigation, Sheriff Holloway’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings must be DENIED.
2. Benton County
“Liability for a constitutional violation will attach to a municipality only if the violation
resulted from an official municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure
to train or supervise an official or employee.” Bolderson v. City of Wentzville, 840 F.3d 982, 985
(8th Cir. 2016). The Eighth Circuit has stated, “[a] policy can be inferred from a single decision
taken by the highest officials responsible for setting policy in that area of the government’s
business.” Dahl v. Rice Cnty., 621 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2010). Thus, a single violation of
constitutional rights could trigger municipal liability, where the violation is accompanied by a
showing that the municipality had ‘failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations

presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.’” Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota,
486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409,
(1997)). For a single violation to trigger municipal liability under this theory, the “need for training
or other safeguards” must be “so obvious at the time of this incident that the [defendant's] actions
can properly be characterized as deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”
Id.
Here, the Plaintiff contends that Sheriff Holloway and Benton County’s failure to provide
supervision and training to its agents and employees directly resulted in the death of Ms. Warnick.
If proven, the need for training and other safeguards would be so obvious as to constitute deliberate
indifference to Ms. Warnick’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Benton County’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings must be DENIED at this stage in the litigation.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
As previously mentioned, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known

as outrage, requires a showing that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should
have known that emotional distress was the likely result from his conduct; the conduct was extreme
and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and was utterly intolerable in a civilized
community; the actions caused the plaintiff’s distress; and the emotional distress suffered was so
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. FMC Corp., 360 Ark. at 485, 202
S.W.3d at 504. If proven, we find that the alleged actions and/or inactions of Sheriff Holloway
and Benton County in failing to watch Ms. Warnick and to promptly request medical treatment on
her behalf when she was found unresponsive could rise to the level of outrage. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Sheriff Holloway and Benton
County must also remain.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the City of Rogers and Officers Dickson and McCarver’ Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 26) is hereby GRANTED and those parties are dismissed from the suit. Sheriff
Holloway and Benton County’s Motion for Judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 35) is DENIED,
and the case will proceed to discovery.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 23rd day of March 2026.
/s/
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280755. Public record. Not legal advice.