# PHILLIPS

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · March 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280253

## Case

- **Full name:** James E. Phillips v. V. Lincoln Maintenance, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** March 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

JAMES E. PHILLIPS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00074-JPH-MG
)
V. LINCOLN Maintenance, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff James Phillips, an inmate within the Indiana Department of
Correction ("IDOC"), brought this action against Defendants Travis Crane,
Richard Yarber, Phillip Ivy, and Vanessa Lincoln, alleging that his Eighth
Amendment rights were violated when he was subjected to unreasonably cold
temperatures while housed at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash
Valley"). Mr. Phillips has moved for summary judgment, dkt. [38], and the
Defendants have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, dkt. [50]. For the
reasons below, the Defendants' motion, dkt. [50], is GRANTED and Mr.
Phillips's motion, dkt. [38] is DENIED.
I.
Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Mr. Phillips has filed a motion to strike the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, arguing that it violates Local Rule 56-1(b), (c), (d), and (i)
by improperly responding to his motion for summary judgment and adding a
collateral motion. Local Rule 56-1 governs the summary judgment process:
(b) Non-Movant's Obligations. A party opposing a summary
judgment motion must, within 28 days after the movant serves the
motion, file and serve a response brief and any evidence . . . .

(c) Reply. The movant may file a reply brief within 14 days after a
response is served.

(d) Surreply. A party opposing a summary judgment motion may
file a surreply brief only if the movant cites new evidence in the
reply or objects to the admissibility of the evidence cited in the
response . . . .

* * *

(i) Collateral Motions. The court disfavors collateral motions—
such as motions to strike—in the summary judgment process. Any
dispute over the admissibility or effect of evidence must be raised
through an objection within a party's brief.

Defendants' summary judgment filings, however, do not violate Local
Rule 56-1. This case is proceeding on cross-motions for summary judgment
because both Mr. Phillips and Defendants have moved for summary judgment.
See dkt. 50; dkt. 59. Defendants therefore filed one response in opposition to
Mr. Phillips's motion, dkt. 45; dkt. 49, and a separate brief in support of its
own motion for summary judgment, dkt. 52. That does not make any of
Defendants' briefs an improper reply or surreply under Local Rule 56-1(b)–(d).
Also, Defendants' motion to substitute its response in opposition brief was filed
to correct citation errors, so it is not an improper collateral motion under Local
Rule 56-1(i).1 Even if any of Defendants' filings had violated Local Rule 56-1,

1 The Defendants have filed a motion to substitute their response in opposition to Mr.
Phillips's motion for summary judgment, dkt. [49], due to errors in the original
response, dkt. 45. That motion, dkt. [49], is GRANTED, so the Court considers the
revised response at docket 49-1 rather than the original response.
that rule allows the Court to "in the interest of justice or for good cause, excuse
failure to comply strictly with this rule. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(l). The Court would
do so here because Defendants' filings appropriately address the designated

evidence and issues before the Court at summary judgment.
Mr. Phillips's motion to strike is therefore DENIED. Dkt. [59].
II.
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

B. Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is
unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,
instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-
finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has
to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it
need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. Of
Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the
basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or
genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to
particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a
movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered
undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e).
When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, all reasonable
inferences are drawn in favor of the party against whom the motion at issue was
made. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Tripp v. Scholz,
872 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2017)). The existence of cross-motions for summary

judgment does not imply that there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J.
Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Loc. Union
150, AFL-CIO, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
B. Factual Background
Mr. Phillips's motion for summary judgment includes some facts
unrelated to the claims in this case and other "facts" that are conclusory legal
statements. The Court considers only facts supported by admissible designated
evidence. See S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e) ("A party must support each fact the party

asserts in a brief with a citation to . . . admissible evidence. . . . The citation
must refer to a page or paragraph number or otherwise similarly specify where
the relevant information can be found in the supporting evidence."); Daugherty
v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Summary judgment is not a time
to be coy: conclusory statements not grounded in specific facts are not
enough.") (cleaned up). The following facts are not in dispute except at noted.
1. The Parties

Mr. Phillips was housed at Wabash Valley within B East 500 Range in
the Secured Confinement Unit (SCU) starting on October 6, 2023. Dkt. 46-1 at
13-16, 35-36.
Defendant Richard Yarber was employed by IDOC as a Lieutenant within
the SCU at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 46-2 at 1. Defendant Phillip Ivy was employed
by IDOC as a Sergeant within the SCU at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 46-3 at 1.
Defendant Travis Crane was employed by IDOC as an Officer within the SCU at
Wabash Valley. Dkt. 46-4 at 1.

Defendant Vanessa Lincoln was employed by IDOC as a clerical assistant
within Wabash Valley's maintenance department. Dkt. 46-2 at 1. As a clerical
assistant within the maintenance department, her duties and responsibilities
included checking incoming mail, checking emails for submitted work orders,
printing work orders and providing them to the appropriate maintenance staff,
and ordering parts as needed. Id. She did not have authority over temperature
settings within the housing units and sometimes responded to grievances sent
to the maintenance department. Id. at 2.

2. Temperature Issues at Wabash Valley
Within the B East 500 range in the SCU there was an Indoor Recreation
Pad Access Door that led to an indoor recreation pad. Dkts. 46-2 at 2, 46-3 at
2. The recreation pad contained a partially ventilated area towards the ceiling
with small holes. Dkts. 46-2 at 2, 46-3 at 2. The parties dispute whether the
door was "broken." Dkt. 38 at 5. The door was a solid steel door that had small
airflow gaps that were covered with a brushing material to prevent airflow

around the door into the range. Dkts. 46-2 at 2-3, 46-3 at 2, 46-4 at 2.
Additionally, blankets were placed along the bottom of the Indoor Recreation
Pad Access Door to further prevent airflow into the range. Id. Lt. Yarber
testified that discussions were conducted regarding sealing the door with a
rubber piece; however, it was determined that the rubber would cause the door
to not operate correctly due to catching. Dkt. 46-2 at 2-3. Mr. Phillips's cell was
located six cells away from the Indoor Recreation Pad Access Door at the
farthest end of the range. Dkt. 46-1 at 32.

During the relevant period, the lowest temperature at Wabash Valley
within the SCU was 63 degrees Fahrenheit during the day and 60 degrees
Fahrenheit during the night. Dkt. 46-6.
Defendant Yarber testified that when he was made aware of complaints
of cold temperatures in the SCU, he went to the reported area, removed the
inmate, and took the temperature of the cell walls and vent to check the
temperature of the cell and incoming air. Dkt. 46-2 at ¶ 7. When Defendants
Yarber and Ivy personally checked the temperatures using a laser thermometer

in the SCU, they did not witness low temperatures. Dkts. 46-2 at 2, 46-3 at 1.
While housed in the SCU, Mr. Phillips had a mattress, two sheets, a
winter coat, a jumpsuit, t-shirt, socks, shoes, and a toboggan. Dkt. 46-1 at 38-
39. The parties dispute whether Mr. Phillips was provided additional blankets,
but Lt. Yarber testified that incarcerated individuals were provided two
blankets and additional clothing, and blankets could be provided to inmates as
requested. Dkt. 46-2 at 2.

The parties dispute whether Mr. Phillips requested to speak with
Defendants Yarber, Crane, and Ivy regarding alleged leaks from the recreation
door. Dkt. 38 at 5. Each of these Defendants has no recollection of Mr. Phillips
communicating with them about cold temperatures in the SCU. Dkt. 46-4 at ¶
6, 122; dkt. 46-3 at ¶ 17; dkt. 46-2 at ¶ 19.
Mr. Phillips filed a grievance alleging cold temperatures in his cell and
that the recreation access door was broken. Dkt. 46-5 at 2-3. Defendant
Lincoln responded to that grievance in early January 2024. Id. After she spoke

with the facility's Physical Plant Director, it was determined that the heating
system was working properly within the unit and that maintenance staff were
discussing options to help prevent airflow around the recreation access door.
Id.
Around February 6, 2024, Mr. Phillips was moved from the B East 500
range to another range. Dkt. 51-1. Mr. Phillips never sought any medical
attention for cold-related injuries. Dkt. 46-1 at 40.
C. Discussion

Mr. Phillips brings Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims
regarding the cold temperatures. Dkt. 16. Defendants argue that they are

2 Officer Crane also testified that he was stationed in the Control Pod, which "did not
contain an intercom system to the cells," limiting any direct communication channel
between Mr. Phillips and Officer Crane. Dkt. 46-4 at ¶ 6, 12.
entitled to summary judgment because (1) they did not violate Mr. Phillips's
Eighth Amendment rights; and (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt.
52.

1. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment protects prisoners from the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" by the state. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). "[P]rison officials
must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). To succeed on an
Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must show that

(1) he was incarcerated under conditions that posed a substantial risk of
objectively serious harm, and (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
that risk, meaning they were aware of it but ignored it or failed "to take
reasonable measures to abate it." Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 687 (7th
Cir. 2014); Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014).
In short, a plaintiff must establish an objective and subjective
component. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). The
objective showing means "that the conditions are sufficiently serious—i.e., that

they deny the inmate the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities,
creating an excessive risk to the inmate's health and safety." Id. (internal
quotation omitted). "According to the Supreme Court, . . . 'extreme deprivations
are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.'" Id. (quoting
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). "If under contemporary standards the conditions
cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they are not unconstitutional,
and to the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are

part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society." Id. (cleaned up).
In addition to the objective component, a plaintiff must establish a
"subjective showing of a defendant's culpable state of mind," which is one of
"deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety." Id. Thus, negligence or
even gross negligence cannot by itself support a § 1983 claim. See Huber v.
Anderson, 909 F.3d 201, 208 (7th Cir. 2018).
2. Objectively Serious Conditions

The Seventh Circuit has considered various levels and durations of cold
temperatures—and accommodations for those temperatures—in determining
whether a constitutional violation exists. See Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d
1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2016) (Eighth Amendment would have been violated if
inmate had been confined for 60 days in a cell with a broken window and
temperatures below freezing with blowers blowing and guards refusing to
provide blankets or a coat). In Mays v. Springborn, the Seventh Circuit held
that allegations of being denied adequate clothing in the winter such that the

inmate "suffered from hurt ears and numb hands, felt frostbite, and caught
colds" did "not rise to the level of the objectively serious harm necessary to
show an Eighth Amendment violation." 575 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2009). The
inmate was provided a winter coat, boots, and hat, and "did not show that he
was forced to be in the cold for long periods of time or that he suffered anything
more than the usual discomforts of winter." Id. at 646, 648.
In sum, temperatures "so low" that they "cause severe discomfort" can

violate the Eighth Amendment. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.
1997). "[C]ourts should examine several factors in assessing claims based on
low cell temperature, such as the severity of the cold; its duration; whether the
prisoner has alternative means to protect himself from the cold; the adequacy
of such alternatives; as well as whether he must endure other uncomfortable
conditions as well as cold." Dixon, 114 F.3d at 644.
Here, Mr. Phillips has not designated evidence about how cold his cell
was, except that he felt it was "extremely cold" and he could not sleep. See dkt.

38; dkt. 39 at 2. He also testified that "had no -- no thermometer or
thermostat," so he could not "guesstimate" a temperature that could "be
considered as factual." Dkt. 46-1 at 47. Mr. Phillips therefore has not contested
Defendants' designated evidence from contemporaneous temperature logs that,
during the relevant period, the lowest temperature in the SCU was 63 degrees
Fahrenheit during the day and 60 degrees Fahrenheit during the night. Dkt.
46-6. Mr. Phillips also testified that, while housed in the SCU, he had a
mattress, two sheets, a winter coat, a jumpsuit, t-shirt, socks, shoes, and a

toboggan. Dkt. 46-1 at 38-39. So even if the SCU had a broken door that let air
circulate, Mr. Phillips has not designated evidence "that he suffered anything
more than the usual discomforts of winter." Mays, 575 F.3d at 648.
Mr. Phillips therefore has not designated evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find the objectively serious harm necessary to show an
Eighth Amendment violation. See James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir.

2020) ("[A] plaintiff may not rely on mere allegations or denials in his complaint
when opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment."). The
uncontested designated evidence shows that this is not a case like Dixon,
where "ice formed on the walls and remained throughout the winter" and the
prison provided "a single blanket." 114 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Gillis
v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2006) (allegations that inmate was
forced to sleep naked on concrete floor and had to walk around his cell 14
hours a day to try to stay warm were severe enough to go to trial); Henderson v.

DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (7th Cir. 1991) (record showed, among
other things, broken windows, no heat on the cellblock, and temperatures in
the cellblock that were below freezing).
Because Mr. Phillips has not designated evidence to show a genuine
issue for trial on the objective component of his deliberate indifference claim,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
III.
Conclusion

The Defendants' motion to amend/correct, dkt. [49], is GRANTED. Mr.
Phillips's motion to strike, dkt. [59], is DENIED. The Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, dkt. [50], is GRANTED and Mr. Phillips's motion for
summary judgment, dkt. [38] is DENIED.
Final judgment will issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/18/2026 S) ans Patruck banter
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
JAMES E. PHILLIPS
106333
WABASH VALLEY - CF
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
Electronic Service Participant — Court Only
All Electronically Registered Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280253. Public record. Not legal advice.