# Anderson

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280252

## Case

- **Full name:** Lamar Anderson v. Mohammed Siddiqui, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

DIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LAMAR ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-CV-00221-SPM

MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment—one filed
by Defendants Mohammed Siddiqui, M.D.; Reynal Caldwell, M.D.; and Michael
Moldenhauer, N.P. (Doc. 62), and the other filed by Defendants Angela Crain and
Amy Lang (Doc. 56). Having been fully informed of the issues presented, both Motions
for Summary Judgment are GRANTED.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pro se Planintiff Lamar Anderson, an inmate currently incarcerated at
Western Illinois Correctional Center, filed this action on January 26, 2022. (See Doc.
1; Doc. 56, p. 1). He brings multiple Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging inadequate treatment of his eczema while incarcerated at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”). (Docs. 1, 8). Following preliminary review under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court consolidated Anderson’s claims into a single Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Siddiqui, Caldwell,
Moldenhauer, Crain, and Lang for failing to provide adequate treatment for his
eczema. (Doc. 8, p. 3).
According to the operative Complaint, Anderson developed eczema while

incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center. (Doc. 1, p. 3). After he was transferred
to Menard Correctional Center, he began to experience difficulties obtaining the
medications previously prescribed for his condition. (Id., pp. 3–5). He submitted
multiple grievances during his time at Menard regarding the adequacy of his medical
treatment for his eczema. (See id., Exs. A, B, C, E). Although Anderson eventually
received prescriptions for Benadryl and a topical ointment, he alleges that refills were

not consistently provided in a timely manner and that follow-up care was delayed.
(Id., pp. 3–5). Anderson’s interactions with Defendants regarding the treatment of
his skin condition form the basis of his deliberate indifference claim.
Defendants filed two Motions for Summary Judgment on November 13, 2023,
one filed by Caldwell and Siddiqui and one by Lang and Crain. (Doc. 34, 37). Both
Motions argued that Anderson had not properly exhausted his administrative
remedies as is required by Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq.

(“PLRA”). (See Docs. 34, 37). The Court denied both Motions on August 21, 2024. (Doc.
49).
Defendants Crain and Lang then filed the present Motion for Summary
Judgment on July 23, 2025 and Siddiqui, Caldwell, and Moldenhauer filed their own
Motion for Summary Judgment three months later. (Docs. 56, 62). Anderson
responded in opposition to both Motions. (Docs. 58, 74). Only Siddiqui, Caldwell, and
Moldenhauer submitted a Reply. (Docs. 75). Accordingly, both Motions for Summary
Judgment are ripe for review.
APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL STANDARDS

The Court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.
2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Once the moving party has set forth the basis
for summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go
beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–
23 (1986). Stated another way, the nonmoving party must offer more than
“[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts,” to establish a genuine issue
of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A genuine issue of material fact arises
only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to
return a verdict for that party.” Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 640–41
(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2008)).
The non-movant cannot simply rely on its pleadings; the non-movant must present
admissible evidence that sufficiently shows the existence of each element of its case
on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Midwest Imports., Ltd. v. Coval, 71
F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596

(7th Cir. 1995); Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391,
394 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24).
ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Such prohibition requires that

the government provide “medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration” and safeguards the prisoner against a lack of medical care that “may
result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose.” Id. at 103. Accordingly, deliberate indifference to the “serious medical needs
of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by
the Constitution.” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th
Cir. 2009). However, a prisoner is entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a

substantial risk of serious harm”—not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112
F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
Claims for deliberate indifference have an objective and a subjective
component. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, a plaintiff must
establish that he suffered from an objectively and sufficiently serious medical
condition and that the defendants actually knew of, but disregarded, a substantial
risk to his health. Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2017). “Intentional
delays in medical care may constitute deliberate indifference, even if the inmate’s
medical condition is non-life threatening.” Id. at 722 (quoting Arnett v. Webster, 658

F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011)). “A doctor’s choice of ‘easier and less efficacious
treatment’ for an objectively serious medical condition also may be sufficient but
‘mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment’ is not enough to support an
Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (first quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 n.10 then
quoting Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010)) (citation modified).
Additionally, it is well-settled that mere negligence is not enough to establish

a defendant’s deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
347–48 (1986). In fact, even gross negligence is insufficient. King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d
1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, deliberate indifference is comparable to criminal
recklessness. Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing King, 680 F.3d
at 1018). In the context of a deliberate indifference claim, “reckless describes conduct
so dangerous that the deliberate nature of the defendant’s actions can be inferred.”
Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation

modified).
Meeting the subjective prong is more difficult in cases alleging inadequate
care. Without more, a “mistake in professional judgment cannot be deliberate
indifference.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.
2016). The Seventh Circuit has explained:
By definition a treatment decision that’s based on professional judgment
cannot evince deliberate indifference because professional judgment
implies a choice of what the defendant believed to be the best course of
treatment. A doctor who claims to have exercised professional judgment
is effectively asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpable mental
state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that claim, the doctor is
entitled to summary judgment.

Id. (citing Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 805–06 (7th Cir. 2016)). This is in contrast to
a case “where evidence exists that the defendant knew better than to make the
medical decision that he did.” Id. (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 731 (7th
Cir. 2016)) (citation modified). A medical professional’s choice of an “easier and less
efficacious treatment” can rise to the level of violating the Eighth Amendment only
where the treatment is known to be ineffective but is chosen anyway. Berry, 604 F.3d
at 441 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 n.10). The Seventh Circuit has “characterized
the standard as imposing a high hurdle on plaintiffs because it requires a ‘showing
as something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of
serious risks.’” Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Collins
v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2006)).
The first question before the Court is whether Anderson’s eczema qualified as
a “serious” medical condition. For the purposes of an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim, a serious medical condition is “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Wynn v. Southward, 251
F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373). The Supreme
Court has noted that medical conditions far less critical than “life-threatening” are

sufficiently serious. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. In applying this principle, the Seventh
Circuit has held that an infected pilonidal cyst, minor lacerations, bruises, and
irritated eyes, and rheumatoid arthritis are all, independently, sufficiently serious.
See Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1370; Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917–18 (7th Cir. 1996);

Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. However, the Seventh Circuit put common colds, toes with
removed toenails, and mild asthma as being outside the ambit of “serious” medical
needs. See Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1372 (citing Gibson v. McEvers, 631 F.2d 95 (7th
Cir. 1980); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1126 (1997); Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1996)).
While the Seventh Circuit has not specifically addressed whether eczema is a

serious medical condition, this Court has previously held on multiple occasions that
painful rashes requiring “multiple creams, steroids, and antihistamines” were
“objectively serious.” See Boclair v. Wills, No. 21-CV-00289-SPM, 2024 WL 3673136,
at *8 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2024) (citing Parada v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 19-
CV-00056-SPM, 2023 WL 3918957, at *4 (S.D. Ill. June 9, 2023)); see also Franklin v.
Gladson, No. 14-CV-1102-JPG-RJD, 2018 WL 481882, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2018)
(finding scabies to be objectively serious, particularly given it was treated with a

prescription ointment.). Here, the record shows that Anderson’s eczema was treated
with multiple antihistamines and topical steroids over several years, including
Benadryl, Allegra, Zyrtec, Fluocinonide, and various steroid creams. (See Doc. 56, Ex.
A, 19:4–20:17; id., Exs. F, H, I, T,; Ex. U; Ex. W; Ex. X; Doc. 63, Ex. E, pp. 366, 448,
450; Doc. 56, Ex. A, 35:20–36:12; Ex. H; Ex. K; Ex. M; Ex. O; Ex. R; Ex. W; Ex. X).
In his deposition, Anderson claimed that his condition involves two different
kinds of flare-ups on his skin: one in which it feels as though something is “coming
out of [his] skin” and the other in which he has dry rashes on different parts of his

body. (Doc. 56, Ex. A, 21:6–13). He stated that the Benadryl and topical steroids were
effective in managing his skin condition. (Id., Ex. A, 20:21–21:2, 59:1–3, 66:17–19).
Based on this record, the Court concludes that Anderson’s eczema constituted a
sufficiently serious medical need under the first prong of the deliberate indifference
standard. See Cesal, 851 F.3d at 721.
The Court next turns to the question of whether each of the medical provider

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Anderson’s eczema. Since Anderson’s
Complaint broadly accuses the Defendants of deliberate indifference toward his skin
condition, to assess potential liability, the Court must evaluate the undisputed
conduct of each Defendant individually.
I. Defendant Siddiqui
Dr. Mohammed Siddiqui served as Medical Director at Menard from June 12,
2017 through August 2021. (Doc. 63, Ex. B, ¶ 2). Anderson’s allegations against him

span from April 17, 2017, to July 28, 2021. (Id., Ex. A, 98:6–16). During that period,
Dr. Siddiqui evaluated Anderson on multiple occasions, including several visits
specifically addressing his eczema and associated itching.
When Anderson transferred to Menard in December 2016, he had an active
prescription for Benadryl that expired shortly thereafter. (See id., Ex. E, pp. 2, 4–6,
9–10). On April 17, 2017, Dr. Siddiqui first evaluated Anderson for complaints related
to eczema. (Id., Ex. E, p. 14). Anderson reported that Benadryl was the only
medication that relieved his itching and that he had been taking it for approximately
two years. (Id.). Dr. Siddiqui renewed the prescription, ordering Benadryl 25 mg twice

daily for three months. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 14, 126).
On November 20, 2017, Anderson again visited Dr. Siddiqui with complaints
related to his chronic eczema. (Doc. 63, Ex. E, pp. 25, 139). Dr. Siddiqui observed
lesions on Anderson’s torso to be consistent with lichen planus and prescribed
Benadryl 25 mg twice daily for six months, along with a topical steroid (triamcinolone
0.1% cream) to be used as needed. (Id.). Anderson returned to Dr. Siddiqui on May

14, 2018 and reported persistent itchiness; Dr. Siddiqui observed eczematous lesions
on his torso. (Id., Ex. B, ¶ 26). The two discussed continuing Benadryl and
triamcinolone, and Dr. Siddiqui prescribed both medications for one year. (Id., Ex. E,
pp. 46, 151).
On August 22, 2018, Dr. Siddiqui evaluated Anderson primarily for elevated
blood pressure. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 48, 154). Because of Anderson’s hypertension, Dr.
Siddiqui initiated Lopressor (metoprolol), a medication used to treat high blood

pressure, and discontinued Benadryl. (Id.). According to Dr. Siddiqui, Benadryl can
interfere with Lopressor’s metabolism and increase the risk of adverse effects. (Id.,
Ex. B, ¶ 29). Given Anderson’s elevated blood pressure, Dr. Siddiqui elected to trial
the antihypertensive medication without Benadryl. (Id.). Anderson disagreed with
that decision but provided no medical evidence disputing Dr. Siddiqui’s rationale.
(Doc 74, ¶ 26; Doc. 75, ¶ 26).
On October 31, 2018, Anderson once again returned to Siddiqui with
complaints of generalized skin lesions. (See Doc. 63, Ex. E, pp. 51, 156). Dr. Siddiqui
assessed the lesions as likely lichen planus and noted that Benadryl had been

effective for itching. (Id.). Because Anderson’s blood pressure was normal, and he
appeared to not be experiencing adverse effects from Lopressor, Siddiqui re-
prescribed Benadryl and referred Anderson for consideration of a skin biopsy. (Id.,
Ex. E, pp. 51, 156; Ex. B, ¶¶ 29, 30).
On May 28, 2019, Dr. Siddiqui documented that Anderson’s eczema had
improved with steroid treatment and renewed triamcinolone. (Id., Ex. E, p. 63). On

July 22, 2019, Anderson again sought Benadryl for treatment for eczema. (Id., Ex. E,
pp. 66, 168; Ex. B, ¶ 37). The medical note reflects that he reported improvement in
itching while on Benadryl and Dr. Siddiqui prescribed Benadryl 25 mg twice daily for
three months. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 66, 168). During a November 27, 2019, chronic clinic
visit, Dr. Siddiqui noted Anderson’s history of eczema and generalized lichenoid
lesions, renewed Benadryl and triamcinolone and again referred Anderson for a
biopsy. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 111–12, 176).

Later visits in 2020 and 2021 primarily addressed hypertension management,
abnormal laboratory results, headaches, and an evaluation of a longstanding scalp
lesion. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 92, 100–01, 117–18, 196, 212, 214, 307). The record reflects that
eczema was not discussed at those visits. (Id., Ex. B, ¶¶ 42, 44, 47). Dr. Siddiqui’s
final documented encounter with Anderson occurred on July 28, 2021, shortly before
he left his position at Menard. (Id., Ex. E, p. 307; id., Ex. B, ¶ 48).
In sum, the record shows that Dr. Siddiqui repeatedly evaluated Anderson for
eczema and related itching, prescribed medications including Benadryl, and renewed
those prescriptions on a regular basis. Although he temporarily discontinued

Benadryl due to concerns about a potential interaction with an antihypertensive
medication, he reinitiated the medication once Anderson’s blood pressure stabilized.
Additionally, Dr. Siddiqui referred Anderson for further dermatologic evaluation on
multiple occasions.
Anderson asserts that Dr. Siddiqui deprived him of the Benadryl necessary to
treat his eczema. In his deposition, Anderson identified only one instance—between

August 22, 2018, and October 31, 2018—when Dr. Siddiqui discontinued the
medication. (See id., Ex. A, 105–06; id., Ex. E, pp. 48, 51). As discussed supra, Dr.
Siddiqui made this decision due to concerns about Anderson’s elevated blood pressure
and elected to discontinue Benadryl because of a potential interaction with Lopressor.
While Anderson disagreed with the decision, believing it unrelated to his condition,
the record reflects that Dr. Siddiqui’s determination was grounded in medical
judgment, as he believed Benadryl could interfere with Lopressor’s effectiveness and

increase the risk of adverse effects. (Id., Ex. B, ¶ 29).
The Seventh Circuit has stated that “[o]ne thing which has long been clear in
our Eighth Amendment cases is that the amendment is not coterminous with a
medical malpractice claim.” Forbes, 112 F.3d at 266 (citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84
F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996); Oliver, 77 F.3d 156; Snipes, 95 F.3d 586). Additionally,
prisoners are “not entitled to the best care possible” but rather “to reasonable
measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 267. When a prisoner
sought “specific treatment and foolproof protection from infection,” the Seventh
Circuit stated that “the Eighth Amendment does not provide her with either.” Id. at

266 (citation modified).
Here, Siddiqui’s decision was made in a context where he was aware of
Anderson’s prior use of Benadryl to treat his symptoms. Although Dr. Siddiqui did
not yet know whether other treatments like topical steroids would be effective, he
instructed Anderson to return if his symptoms worsened, and he adjusted treatment
accordingly when they did. (Id., Ex. A, 49:9–16; id., Ex. B, ¶ 29; id., Ex. E, p. 63).

Anderson also conceded that no medical professional had told him his condition
worsened due to treatment provided by Dr. Siddiqui. (Id., Ex. A, 99:23–100:2). “In the
Eighth Amendment context, medical professionals receive a great deal of deference
in their treatment decisions.” Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 932 F.3d 513,
519 (7th Cir. 2019). There is only a Constitutional violation if “no minimally
competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances.” Id.
(citing Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1997)).

Based on the record, the Court concludes that Dr. Siddiqui’s decisions reflected
medical judgment rather than deliberate indifference. When Siddiqui temporarily
discontinued Benadryl, he advised Anderson to return if his condition worsened, and
when it did, Siddiqui corrected course. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 754 (“[a] prison
physician cannot simply continue with a course of treatment that he knows is
ineffective in treating the inmate’s condition.”). Therefore, even when construing the
evidence in Anderson’s favor, no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Siddiqui acted
with deliberate indifference, meaning that summary judgment shall be granted for
Dr. Siddiqui.

II. Defendant Caldwell
The Court now evaluates the undisputed evidence concerning Dr. Reynal
Caldwell and his role in Anderson’s medical treatment. Dr. Caldwell was employed
by Wexford Health Sources as a Traveling Medical Director from May 18, 2015,
through August 8, 2024. (Doc. 63, Ex. C, ¶ 2). Between 2018 and 2020, he provided
medical services at various correctional facilities in Southern Illinois on an as-needed

basis including Menard. (Id.). Anderson testified that his claims against Dr. Caldwell
relate to the period from December 21, 2018, through February 11, 2020, in which he
visited Dr. Caldwell four times. (Id., Ex. A, 97:21–98:4).
Dr. Caldwell’s first encounter with Anderson occurred on December 21, 2018,
during a General Medicine Chronic Clinic visit. (Id., Ex. C, ¶ 28). The purpose of the
appointment was to evaluate Anderson for a possible skin biopsy related to his
eczema. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 56, 107–08, 159). After examining Anderson’s skin, Dr.

Caldwell concluded that the presentation was consistent with eczema and that a
punch biopsy was not clinically indicated. (Id., Ex. C, ¶ 28). He noted that Anderson’s
symptoms responded to Benadryl and prescribed Benadryl 25 mg twice daily for six
months. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 56, 107–08, 159).
Nearly one year later, Anderson was again referred to Dr. Caldwell for further
evaluation, including consideration of a biopsy due to his history of eczema, pruritus,
and generalized lichenoid lesions. (Doc. 63, Ex. E, pp. 111–12, 176). Based on that
referral, Dr. Caldwell saw Anderson on December 10, 2019. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 71, 178).
At that visit, Dr. Caldwell prescribed Kenalog (triamcinolone), a topical

corticosteroid, and Zyrtec, an antihistamine, for a ninety-day period, and instructed
Anderson to return in thirty days. (Id.). Dr. Caldwell testified that his examination
again led him to conclude that a punch biopsy was not medically necessary. (Id., Ex.
C, ¶ 37). Anderson requested additional testing because he was frustrated with
recurring flare-ups and what he viewed as lapses in follow-up care. (Doc. 74, ¶ 37).
Anderson identified no evidence suggesting that a biopsy was required, and Dr.

Caldwell continued to maintain that the condition was consistent with eczema and
manageable with medication. (Doc. 63, Ex. C, ¶ 37; Doc. 75, ¶ 37). At a follow-up
appointment on January 7, 2020, Dr. Caldwell noted that Anderson’s rash was
controlled with Kenalog, and no new medications or further treatment were ordered.
(Doc. 63, Ex. E, p. 73).
On January 29, 2020, Dr. Caldwell evaluated Anderson for an unrelated
concern involving a lump on his lip, which was removed two weeks later. (Doc. 63,

Ex. E, pp. 77, 79). Anderson’s eczema was not addressed during either the evaluation
or the removal visit, and Dr. Caldwell testified that this was his final encounter with
Anderson. (Id., Ex. C, ¶¶ 39, 40).
In summary, the undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Caldwell saw Anderson
on several occasions for eczema-related complaints, assessed his condition as
consistent with eczema, prescribed antihistamines and topical steroids, and declined
to perform a biopsy based on his clinical judgment. Accordingly, the Court does not
find Caldwell’s behavior tantamount to deliberate indifference.
While Anderson’s primary criticisms of Dr. Caldwell involved delays in

renewing his prescriptions, he acknowledged that those issues couldn’t be blamed on
Dr. Caldwell. (Doc. 63, Ex. A, 27:5–28:13, 105:5–8). When asked whether he believed
Dr. Caldwell had done everything he could to ensure that Anderson’s medications
would be renewed and provided after they expired, Anderson answered yes. (Id., Ex.
A, 55:4–8). Anderson’s only remaining criticism was that Dr. Caldwell did not perform
a punch biopsy. (Doc. 63, Ex. A, 27:5–13). However, a prisoner’s disagreement with a

physician’s chosen course of treatment, standing alone, does not establish deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Snipes, 95 F.3d at 591. Dr. Caldwell
determined through visual examination that Anderson’s condition was consistent
with eczema and that a punch biopsy was not medically necessary. (Doc. 63, Ex. C, ¶
28) Accordingly, the Court finds that judgment medically reasonable.
When considering the undisputed facts of this matter in light of circuit
precedent, it is clear that Dr. Caldwell’s conduct could not be found by a jury to be

“something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of
serious risks.” Rosario, 670 F.3d at 821 (quoting Collins, 462 F.3d at 762). Therefore,
summary judgment shall be granted in favor of Defendant Caldwell, as well.
III. Defendant Moldenhauer
Next, the Court reviews the undisputed evidence concerning Michael
Moldenhauer and his role in Anderson’s medical treatment. Moldenhauer has been
employed as a Nurse Practitioner by Wexford Health Sources, Inc. since January 15,
2013. (Doc. 63, Ex. D, ¶ 2). While at Menard, Moldenhauer saw Anderson
intermittently between March 4, 2018, and December 16, 2022. (Id., Ex. A, 97:11–20).

Moldenhauer’s first documented encounter with Anderson occurred on March
4, 2018; Anderson presented with a rash on his torso and reported that he had
previously been prescribed Benadryl. (Doc. 63, Ex. E, pp. 41, 148). Moldenhauer noted
itching and areas of darkened skin. (Id.). Anderson requested a long-term
prescription for Benadryl, which had previously been ordered by Dr. Siddiqui. (Id.).
In response, Moldenhauer prescribed a short three-day course of Benadryl 25 mg

twice daily and referred Anderson to Dr. Siddiqui for further evaluation regarding
the appropriateness of long-term use. (Id., Ex. D, ¶ 21). Moldenhauer explained that
under IDOC policy, Benadryl was generally not prescribed long-term for medical
conditions and that extended use was typically limited to psychiatric indications.
(Id.). He further stated that the short-term prescription was intended to provide
interim relief pending physician review. (Id.). Moldenhauer explained that once he
issued a referral, nursing staff were responsible for placing the patient on the

appropriate call line and that he did not control or create provider schedules. (Doc.
63, Ex. D, ¶ 22). Thus, although he initiated the referral, the actual scheduling was
handled by other personnel. (Id.).
On April 20, 2018, Anderson again presented to Moldenhauer with complaints
of dry skin related to his eczema. (Id., Ex. E, p. 45). During that visit, Moldenhauer
recorded that he observed no objective signs of dryness or eczema, described the
examination as normal, and noted that Anderson had already been referred to Dr.
Siddiqui. (Id.). Because he did not observe clinical signs of eczema at that time and a
referral was already pending, Moldenhauer did not issue an additional referral or

prescribe Benadryl. (Ex. D, ¶ 24).
On September 8, 2021, Anderson next presented to Moldenhauer with
complaints of a rash, worsening nighttime itching, and an expired Benadryl
prescription. (Doc. 63, Ex. E, pp. 397–98, 418). Moldenhauer recorded that he did not
observe a rash on examination. (Id.). Nevertheless, in response to Anderson’s
reported symptoms, he prescribed Benadryl 25 mg once daily for one month and

triamcinolone cream. (Id.). He also submitted a dermatology referral, noting
Anderson’s reported history of dermatologic evaluation and his request for renewed
medications. (Id., Ex. E, p. 367).
On December 3, 2021, Moldenhauer saw Anderson for renewal of his Benadryl
prescription. (Doc. 63, Ex. E, pp. 329, 423). He documented rough, dry skin on
Anderson’s lower body and noted that a dermatology appointment was expected in
January 2022. (Id.). He prescribed Benadryl 25 mg for one month and Triamcinolone.

(Id.). On March 1, 2022, nursing staff recorded verbal orders from Moldenhauer
renewing T-Gel shampoo, Kenalog ointment, and Benadryl 25 mg for six months. (Id.,
Ex. E, pp. 341, 428). Later, on December 16, 2022, after reviewing dermatology notes,
Moldenhauer prescribed Allegra, Zyrtec, Benadryl, and fluocinonide solution for one
year in accordance with dermatology recommendations. (Id., Ex. E, pp. 366, 448, 450).
These records reflect continued medication management of Anderson’s skin
complaints, including implementation of specialist recommendations.
The most contentious part of Moldenhauer’s care was his visit with Anderson

on March 4, 2018, wherein he prescribed Benadryl for only three days. (Id., Ex. E, pp.
41, 148). When asked why he was suing Moldenhauer, Anderson pointed specifically
to this interaction, asserting that he disagreed with the short duration of the
prescription because it would not remain effective in his system for a sufficient period.
(Id., Ex. A, 29:4–20).
The Court first considers that, as stated before, Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference does not apply simply because a patient disagrees with a practitioner’s
course of treatment. Snipes, 95 F.3d at 591. Here, the short-term order of Benadryl
was prescribed after Moldenhauer noted that long-term Benadryl was prescribed by
Dr. Siddiqui. (Id., Ex. D, ¶ 21). Moldenhauer intended the short-term order to provide
temporary relief until Anderson could be reevaluated by Dr. Siddiqui. (Id.). He
further explained that IDOC policy generally restricted long-term Benadryl
prescriptions to psychiatric indications. (Id.). In his role as a Nurse Practitioner,

Moldenhauer followed that policy while simultaneously referring Anderson back to a
physician for further assessment.
However, Anderson did not see Dr. Siddiqui until May 14, nearly two and a
half months after Moldenhauer issued the referral. (Id., Ex. D, ¶ 22). Given the gap
between the three-day Benadryl order and the eventual long-term prescription by Dr.
Siddiqui, the Court considers whether this delay could constitute delayed medical
treatment, which may support a finding of deliberate indifference. See Berry, 604 F.3d
at 441 (“A significant delay in effective medical treatment also may support a claim
of deliberate indifference, especially where the result is prolonged and unnecessary

pain.”). However, even in cases of delayed treatment, a plaintiff must present
evidence that the defendant acted with the requisite bad intent in causing the delay.
Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, Moldenhauer explained
the basis for his decision, including IDOC policy limitations and the need for
physician review, and the Court finds no evidence of bad intent. Moreover,
Moldenhauer demonstrated that he was not responsible for scheduling his own or

other providers’ call lines. (Doc. 63, Ex. D, ¶ 22). Considering the circumstances, the
Court concludes that Moldenhauer’s conduct does not amount to “something
approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks,”
i.e., deliberate indifference. Rosario, 670 F.3d at 821 (quoting Collins, 462 F.3d at
762).
Viewed as a whole, the undisputed record shows that Moldenhauer evaluated
Anderson when he presented with complaints of itching and rash, documented his

clinical findings, prescribed medication, and referred him to other practitioners for
further assessment. Although Anderson disagreed with the dosing and duration of
certain prescriptions, the record reflects ongoing evaluation and treatment rather
than a refusal to address his skin condition. Construing the evidence in Anderson’s
favor, no reasonable jury could conclude that Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer acted
with deliberate indifference and summary judgment shall be granted in
Moldenhauer’s favor.
IV. Defendants Lang and Crain

Finally, the Court addresses the undisputed evidence concerning Amy Lang
and Angela Crain and their respective roles in Anderson’s medical care. Because both
assert qualified immunity, their conduct is addressed together.
Lang works as a nurse at Menard. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Anderson contends that Lang
acted with deliberate indifference by refusing to renew his medications and by
preventing him from seeing a doctor. (Doc. 63, Ex. A, 117:1–120:2). However,

Anderson acknowledges that Lang lacked authority to prescribe medications and that
he ultimately was able to see a physician after submitting several grievances. (Id.,
119:22–120:3–11).
Ms. Crain serves as a healthcare unit administrator at Menard. (Id., 114:7–
10). Anderson argues that, because she is responsible for ensuring that medical staff
perform their duties, she is liable for his inability to obtain timely medication
renewals. (Id., 115:20–116:16). Crain responds that “it is the offender’s responsibility

to monitor the expiration date of his medication orders and submit a written request
to NSC for medication renewal,” and that on both occasions when Anderson’s
prescriptions expired, he failed to submit the required written request. (Doc. 56, Exs.
B, C).
Lang and Crain move for summary judgment on both deliberate indifference
and qualified immunity grounds. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. Deliberate Indifference
The Court first addresses Anderson’s claim that Lang refused to prescribe
Anderson his medication. Failure to prescribe medication when an individual does

not have the authority to prescribe medication has been consistently rejected as a
basis for a deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., Patterson v. Wexford Health Care
Servs., No. 222CV00113JRSMJD, 2024 WL 1012961, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 8, 2024);
Harlow v. Hamlyn, No. 3:24-CV-956-HAB-SLC, 2024 WL 5007453, at *3 (N.D. Ind.
Dec. 6, 2024); Thompson v. Conant, No. 1:12-CV-1177-SEB-TAB, 2013 WL 4543042,
at *9 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2013), aff’d, 559 F. App’x 557 (7th Cir. 2014). Because Nurse

Lang’s ability to prescribe medication was lacking, Lang’s failure to prescribe
Anderson his medication does not equate to her ignoring Anderson’s complaints or
requests. Rather, she was simply unable to address them. Accordingly, Nurse Lang
did not act with deliberate indifference on this point.
Turning to Anderson’s argument that Lang denied his requests to see doctors
between 2017 and 2020, the Court concludes this is without merit. Anderson’s
medical records, discussed in detail throughout this Order, show that he saw doctors

regularly during this time. Without evidence of a specific instance where Lang’s
denial caused a delay in Anderson’s medical care, it is difficult to make a case for
deliberate indifference. See Gallo v. Sood, 651 Fed. App’x 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding that a nurse was not found to act with deliberate indifference where plaintiff
had not shown that her actions caused a month-long delay resulting in later
suffering). Anderson stated in his Deposition that he filed grievances in response to
Lang’s denial, but the grievances in question do not mention Lang by name. (See Doc.
1, Ex. A; id., Exs. B, C, E). In fact, in the grievance dated March 16, 2018, Anderson
stated that “the nurse” put him in to see a doctor and that he did see a doctor. (Id.,

Ex. B). Accordingly, the Court finds that Nurse Lang did not act with deliberate
indifference on this point.
Next, the Court addresses Anderson’s claim against Crain, namely, that she
was responsible for ensuring that medical staff performed their duties and could be
held liable when he failed to receive his medication. (Id., 115:20–116:16). To establish
deliberate indifference against a nonmedical prison official, a plaintiff must show

more than dissatisfaction with the outcome of medical care; they must show that the
administrator knew something was amiss with the acting physician’s treatment See
Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478–79. (7th Cir. 2017). The Seventh Circuit has held
that prison administrators are generally entitled to rely on the judgment of medical
professionals. Id. Where an inmate is under the care of qualified medical providers,
a nonmedical official may ordinarily assume that the inmate’s treatment is being
appropriately managed. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010–12 (7th Cir.

2006); Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, a nonmedical
official is entitled to summary judgment when she responds reasonably to an inmate’s
complaint, such as by confirming that the inmate has been evaluated or is scheduled
to receive medical attention, even if the inmate disagrees with the medical course
ultimately provided. See Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1010–12.
The undisputed record shows that Crain’s involvement consisted of responding
to grievances regarding expired Benadryl prescriptions. On March 3, 2020, she noted
that Anderson’s prior order had expired on November 21, 2019, and that a new order

was issued six days later. (Doc. 56, Ex. B). She further explained that inmates are
responsible for monitoring expiration dates and submitting written requests for
renewal. (Id.). On November 22, 2021, Crain responded to another grievance by
confirming that Anderson’s Benadryl prescription had expired on October 7, 2021,
that no renewal request had been submitted, and that he would be scheduled for
medication renewal. (Doc. 56, Ex. C).

Although Anderson contends that she failed to act promptly, the record reflects
that she reviewed the medication history and directed him through the established
renewal process when necessary. (Id., Ex. B). There is no evidence that Crain
prescribed, denied, or interfered with medical treatment, or that she disregarded a
known risk to Anderson’s health. Rather, her role was limited to administrative
oversight and grievance review, and she was entitled to rely on medical staff to
determine the appropriate course of treatment. Therefore, the Court finds that when

construing the evidence in favor of Anderson, the Court finds that Ms. Crain did not
act with deliberate indifference.
B. Qualified Immunity
Lang and Crain also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (See
Doc. 56, pp. 11–12). While the Court need not assess Defendants Lang and Crain’s
qualified immunity argument due to the fact that Anderson’s Eighth Amendment
claims do not survive Lang and Crain’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court
will briefly discuss the applicability of qualified immunity to the instant facts.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because

“[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
(Doc. 56, p. 11 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). They argue
that “to determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a two-part
inquiry is required: (1) whether a constitutional right would have been violated on

the facts alleged, and (2) whether the right alleged to have been violated was clearly
established.” (Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001))). Defendants argue
that a constitutional right was not violated because Defendants were not deliberately
indifferent toward Anderson’s medical needs and that no clearly established right
was violated because neither Defendant observed Anderson’s rash nor did he suffer
any serious injury from intermittent medical delay. (Id., pp. 11–12).
Regarding Anderson’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit has

established that “[w]hen considering deliberate-indifference claims challenging the
medical judgment of prison healthcare personnel, qualified-immunity analysis
requires us to frame the legal question with reasonable specificity.” Campbell v.
Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2019). In Campbell, the Seventh Circuit
determined that “[t]he proper inquiry is whether then-existing caselaw clearly
established a constitutional right to gender-dysphoria treatment beyond hormone
therapy” not “that ‘denying effective treatment’ for Campbell’s medical condition
violates the Eighth Amendment” because the latter “formulation—which is basically
a highly conceptualized version of the deliberate-indifference standard—is far too

general.” Id. at 546. Additionally, “‘[f]or purposes of qualified immunity, [the Eighth-
Amendment] duty’ to treat prisoners’ serious medical conditions ‘need not be litigated
and then established disease by disease or injury by injury.’” Id. at 548 (quoting Est.
of Clark, 865 F.3d at 553). Moreover, “[w]hen prison officials utterly fail to provide
care for a serious medical condition, the constitutional violation is obvious and
qualified immunity offers little protection.” Id. (citing Orlowski v. Milwaukee County,

872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017)).
Here, Defendants’ argument succeeds because prison officials did not persist
in ineffective treatments. See id. at 547 (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655
(7th Cir. 2005) (citing Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30). It has clearly been established
that the Defendants treated Anderson’s eczema to the extent necessary in their
respective roles. Further, like in Campbell, there is no Circuit precedent indicating
that the chosen course of care for Anderson’s eczema violated a constitutional right,

meaning the Defendants were not on notice of a constitutional violation and would be
entitled to qualified immunity if the Court reached that question.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Mohammed Siddiqui, Reynal
Caldwell, and Michael Moldenhauer’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 62) and
Defendants’ Amy Lang and Angela Crain’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56)
are both GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court
is DIRECTED to close this case on the Court’s docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 13, 2026

/s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280252. Public record. Not legal advice.