# Lminggio

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · March 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280095

## Case

- **Full name:** Micah Terrall Deanthony Lminggio v. Brian English et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** March 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280095

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing “duration” is a component that plays a part in determining whether a liberty interest exists

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MICAH TERRALL DEANTHONY
LMINGGIO,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24cv574 DRL-SJF

BRIAN ENGLISH et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Micah Terrall Deanthony Lminggio, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a second
amended complaint (ECF 15) after the court determined his amended complaint failed to
state any claims. See ECF 12. “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen the
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When a
plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, the court must give his allegations liberal
construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, a plaintiff can plead
himself out of court if he pleads facts that preclude relief. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d
827, 830 (7th Cir. 2007); McCready v. Ebay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006).

Mr. Lminggio alleges he was taken to “a shower with a cage around it” within the
Miami Correctional Facility at approximately 6:15 pm on August 15, 2023. ECF 15 at 1.
He remained there for approximately eight-and-half-hours.1 He claims the shower was
“covered with urine & feces.” Id. The smell caused him to vomit. There was no chair, so
he had to stand or squat. He asked to use the bathroom for three hours, but Sgt. McKibbin
refused. Instead, Sgt. McKibbin handed him a Styrofoam tray from the ground, and Mr.

Lminggio eventually defecated onto it. While defecating, he slipped on feces, which
“caus[ed] something to pop in Plaintiff’s back and right foot.” Id. at 2. He doesn’t allege
anyone saw him slip, nor does he allege he requested medical attention when it
happened. At approximately 2:45 am, he was placed back in a regular cell. He says, “all
my property was taken by staff, nothing to eat with, nothing to drink with, the cell bright

light stay on all night until the following evening. Not to mention the cell Plaintiff was
placed in was frozen cold.” Id. Mr. Lminggio claims he “wasn’t afforded a hearing to
present evidence and plead my case as to why I should have my allowable clear violation
of Plaintiff due process rights.” Id. He filed “three grievances all to no avail.” Id. He has
sued Warden Brian English, Sgt. D. McKibbin, Michael Gapski, K. Williams, Issac, and

1 In his second amended complaint, he says he remained there for “over eight hours.” ECF 15 at
1. This is consistent with his amended complaint, in which he specifically stated he was “locked
in a shower cage from 6:15pm until 2:45am.” ECF 6 at 2.
Witaker for compensatory damages, and he seeks an injunction “ordering defendants to
refrain from unconstitutional practice denying prisoners human rights.” Id. at 3.2

As an initial matter, Mr. Lminggio doesn’t describe any actions by Warden English
that would subject him to liability. He isn’t mentioned anywhere in the body of the
complaint, and the fact that he generally oversees the prison doesn’t state a claim. “’[N]o
prisoner is entitled to insist that one employee do another’s job,’ and the division of labor
is critical to the efficient functioning of the organization.” Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861
F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir.

2009)). There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and “public
employees are responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Burks, 555
F.3d at 594, 596. The same is true of K. Williams, Issac, and Witaker—they aren’t
mentioned in the body of the complaint, and it’s not clear what role they played, if any,
in the events that transpired. See Moderson v. City of Neenah, 137 F.4th 611, 617 (7th Cir.

2025) (“A defendant cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation if she did not cause
or participate in the alleged violation.”) (citation omitted)). These defendants will be
dismissed.
Likewise, although Mr. Lminggio names Michael Gapski as a defendant, he’s not
mentioned in the body of the complaint either. Construing Mr. Lminggio’s second

amended complaint generously, it may be inferred that Mr. Gapski failed to respond to

2 He lists these six defendants on the last page of his second amended complaint. ECF 15 at 3.
Warden Brian English is listed in the caption of his complaint, but nowhere in the body of the
complaint. Sgt. McKibbin is the only defendant mentioned in the body of the complaint.
Mr. Lminggio’s three grievances. But this doesn’t state a constitutional claim. See
Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting there is not a Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate grievance procedure); see also
Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that “42 U.S.C. § 1983
protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or . . .
departmental regulations”); Conner v. Hoem, 768 Fed. Appx. 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019) (“In
any case, the Constitution does not require state actors to enforce their own policies and
regulations.”) (citing Garcia v. Kankakee Cty. Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2002)).

As to Mr. Lminggio’s vague assertion that he “wasn’t afforded a hearing” before
being placed in the holding cell, the court presumes he is attempting to bring a due
process claim. The Fourteenth Amendment provides state officials shall not “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. That said, due process is only required when punishment extends the duration of

confinement or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In other
words, “disciplinary segregation can trigger due process protections depending on the
duration and conditions of segregation.” Jackson v. Anastasio, 150 F.4th 851, 858 (7th Cir.
2025) (quoting Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009)). Both

the duration and the severity of the conditions must be considered when determining
whether the prisoner’s placement in solitary confinement triggers due process
protections—the length of time must be “substantial” and the conditions must be
“unusually harsh.” Id.
Similarly, though inmates don’t generally have a liberty interest in “avoiding
transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for administrative,

protective, or investigative purposes,” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added) (citing Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608–09 & 608 n.4 (7th Cir. 2005)—
the same analysis applies with regard to duration and the harshness of the conditions,
see, e.g., Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prisoners do not have a
constitutional right to remain in the general population, . . . but both the duration and the
conditions of the segregation must be considered in determining whether due process is

implicated.”) (cleaned up); Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98 & n.2–3 (collecting cases that held
segregation of two to ninety days does not trigger due process concerns and stating, “In
a number of other cases, we have explained that a liberty interest may arise if the length
of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that the conditions of
confinement are unusually harsh.”); Lekas, 405 F.3d at 612 (finding that up to ninety days

in segregation does not affect liberty); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005)
(recognizing “duration” is a component that plays a part in determining whether a liberty
interest exists). Once an inmate shows a particular placement implicates a liberty interest,
he has a right to a meaningful review, which periodically “evaluates the prisoner’s
current circumstances and future prospects, and, considering the reason(s) for his

confinement to the program, determines whether that placement remains warranted.’”
Isby, 856 F.3d at 527 (quoting Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2012)).3

3 Of note, “for any term of solitary confinement lasting more than days but less than years,
qualified immunity will often apply to claims for damages. For segregation terms measured in
Here, it’s unclear whether Mr. Lminggio was placed in the shower cage following
a disciplinary infraction or whether he was placed there for some other reason. Either

way, he admits he remained there for a total of only eight-and-a-half hours. He complains
about the lack of a toilet or seat and asserts that the shower was covered in urine and
feces.4 While the conditions described were not sanitary, Mr. Lminggio acknowledges
they were fleeting—he was placed there in the early evening and then moved to a
different cell by 2:45 am, essentially in the middle of the night. Even if the conditions were
as he described, the length of time he spent in them can’t be classified as substantial.

Accordingly, these allegations don’t state a viable due process claim. See e.g., Jackson, 150
F.4th at 860–61 (stressing the “combined import” of both duration and conditions and
finding that “segregation for a matter of months in repulsive and unsanitary conditions
can deprive a prisoner of protected liberty”); Isby, 856 F.3d at 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (both
duration and conditions must be considered); Williams, 849 Fed. Appx. at 157 (describing

30 days as “a duration so brief that it foreclosed any implicated liberty interest”).
When an inmate’s placement does not trigger any due process concerns, he may
still have a claim regarding the conditions of his confinement under the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits conditions of confinement that deny inmates “the minimal

months, even if an inmate’s segregation amounted to a deprivation of a liberty interest, it is
unlikely that prison officials could be held responsible for incorrectly guessing otherwise due to
the ambiguity of the parameters of the law.” Jackson, 150 F.4th at 858–59 (citation and quotations
omitted).

4 He doesn’t provide additional details about the cell. He simply describes it as “a shower with a
cage around it” (ECF 15 at 1), which suggests it was at least partially open-aired and not fully
enclosed.
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773 (citations omitted); see
also id. at 772-73 (“The issue of cell conditions in TLU is best analyzed as a claim brought

under the Eighth Amendment.”).
Although “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter,
bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation, Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir.
2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). An officer can violate the
Constitution if he or she exhibits deliberate indifference to hazardous conditions that may

seriously harm an inmate. Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2021). Deliberate
indifference encompasses both objective and subjective components:
A prisoner challenging conditions of confinement must first show that the
conditions were sufficiently serious as an objective matter, meaning that
they denied the inmate the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,
creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety. Second, in
covering the subjective component of the inquiry, the inmate must prove
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference—that they knew of
and disregarded this excessive risk of harm to the inmate.

Id. at 719–20 (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted). Put another way, an inmate can
state a viable claim for deliberate indifference if he alleges the defendant “deliberately
ignored a prison condition that presented an objectively, sufficiently serious risk of
harm.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
“Generally speaking, challenges to conditions of confinement cannot be
aggregated and considered in combination unless ‘they have a mutually enforcing effect
that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable need such as food, warmth, or
exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue
blankets.’” Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). Allegations of vague “overall conditions” aren’t sufficient. Id.

Regarding state of mind, “[d]eliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below intent
and poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a
total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Stockton v.
Milwaukee Cty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir.
2022) (stating that deliberate indifference claims will fail absent evidence of “callous

disregard” for inmate wellbeing). “Negligence, or even objective recklessness, is
insufficient to satisfy deliberate indifference.” Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615.
Here, Mr. Lminggio alleges he was placed in a holding cell for eight-and-a-half
hours that was covered in urine and feces and didn’t contain a toilet or anywhere to sit.
After three hours of asking to use the bathroom, he was handed a tray by Sgt. McKibbin

and told to defecate on it. It’s undisputed that prisoners can’t be held in “shockingly
unsanitary cells.” Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 7–8 (2020) (prisoner held in deplorable
conditions with feces and raw sewage everywhere for “six full days”); see also Vinning-El
v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases establishing that holding inmates
in a feces and blood covered cell without a working sink or toilet for anywhere from

thirty-six hours to six days was inhumane). However, both duration and mitigation play
a part in the Eighth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Taylor, 592 U.S. at 7–10 (case remanded
to determine whether conditions were “compelled by necessity or exigency” and whether
they could have been “mitigated, either in degree or duration”); Johnson, 29 F.4th at 904
(“frequency, severity, [and] duration of the unsanitary cell conditions” must be
considered); Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he duration of the

condition . . . determines whether the conditions of confinement are unconstitutional.”);
Stephens v. Cottey, 145 Fed. Appx. 179, 181 (7th Cir. 2005) (“As is the case under the Due
Process Clause, a short-term deprivation is less serious for Eighth Amendment purposes
than a long-term one.”) (collecting cases)).
In a recent case analogous to Mr. Lminggio’s situation, an inmate was housed in a
medical segregation cell at the East Moline Correctional Center for 31 days following an

altercation with another inmate. Gills v. Hamilton, 164 F.4th 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2026). The
cell was unsanitary and lacked a sink, toilet, and running water. Id. The court
acknowledged that “forcing a prisoner to live in egregiously unsanitary conditions
satisfies the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test.” Id. at 646 (citing Taylor,
592 U.S. at 7–10). Mr. Gills’ living conditions were described as follows:

[H]e was intermittently denied the use of a toilet or sink—on multiple
occasions for approximately eight hours—and at times had to improvise in
his cell. There’s evidence that Gills’s cell was cleaned after these incidents,
but the record shows that he was forced to live alongside his waste for long
stretches and had no way of cleaning himself.

Id. at 646. The court “assume[d] without deciding” that the conditions violated the
objective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis but noted it was “debatable given the
intermittent nature of [the inmate’s] experience.” Id. In any event, the court concluded
that although some guards were aware of the conditions, there was no Eighth
Amendment violation because officers took steps to “mitigate the situation.” Id. Of note,
while he was forced to urinate and defecate on the floor several times, his cell was cleaned
on occasion, and he was never “barred from using the facilities for longer than a single
[eight hour] guard shift at a time.” Id. This comports with the Supreme Court’s

acknowledgement that even when conditions may be “deplorably unsanitary,” duration
and mitigation attempts are relevant to determining whether an Eighth Amendment
violation exists. Taylor, 592 U.S. at 8–9.
Similarly, even if the conditions Mr. Lminggio was subjected to could be construed
as objectively serious—which is debatable given the short-term, temporary nature of the
placement—he admits he was moved to a new cell after only eight-and-a-half hours. It’s

undisputed that he didn’t spend a full night in the holding cell. Gills found the conditions
were sufficiently mitigated by occasional cleaning of the human waste and the fact that
he wasn’t deprived of the use of a bathroom for more than eight hours at a time. Here,
even greater steps to mitigate were taken, as Mr. Lminggio was removed from the
unsanitary situation completely after approximately eight hours.5 Based on these

allegations, Mr. Lminggio hasn’t stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim. See Edwards,

5 Although he was given an opportunity to amend to clarify his claims, Mr. Lminggio’s
description of the cell he was removed to is exceedingly sparse. He alleges only that the officers—
he doesn’t say who—took his property leaving him with no utensils or a cup. He claims the cell
was “frozen cold” and that the lights stayed on “all night until the following evening.” ECF 15 at
2. He doesn’t say he was deprived of bedding or clothes, nor does he provide additional details
about duration or temperature. Either way, these scant allegations aren’t sufficient to state a
claim. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff must do better
than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that
something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”). This is especially true
considering he was placed into the cell at approximately 2:45 am, so the light disruption was
undeniably short-term and minimally disruptive. See Vasquez v. Frank, 290 Fed. Appx. 927, 929
(7th Cir. 2008) (“24–hour lighting involving a single, 9–watt fluorescent bulb does not objectively
constitute an extreme deprivation.”) (quotations and citation omitted).
478 F.3d at 830 and McCready, 453 F.3d at 888 (plaintiff can plead himself out of court if
he pleads facts that preclude relief).

Regarding Mr. Lminggio’s specific claim that he was forced to defecate on a
Styrofoam tray—which appears to have been the main focus of his lawsuit since its
inception—a cell without a toilet or sink, on its own, doesn’t violate the constitution. See
Gills, 164 F.4th at 645–46 (collecting cases). In general, though “long-term deprivations of
modern toilet facilities” can potentially violate the Eighth Amendment, “temporary
imposition[s]”do not. White v. Knight, 710 F. Appx. 260, 261–62 (7th Cir. 2018). As stated

in the court’s prior screening order, the fact that Mr. Lminggio had to defecate on a tray
after approximately three hours of being in the holding cage is unfortunate. The court
doesn’t “mean to minimize the discomfort, pain, or embarrassment that even slight limits
on toilet access can cause.” Id. at 262. But a one-time, short-term deprivation isn’t the type
that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. He admits he was moved out of the

holding cell or shower cage within eight-and-a-half hours, and he doesn’t allege his new
cell lacked a toilet or that he was otherwise prevented from using bathroom facilities. As
such, Mr. Lminggio’s allegations aren’t sufficient to suggest Sgt. McKibbon or any of the
other defendants violated the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 261–62 (affirming dismissal
of complaint where prison policy limited access to toilets during lockdowns, which

caused plaintiff to defecate once on his cell floor and another time in a bag after a guard
refused to let him use a toilet and told him to “[defecate] on himself”); see also Cunningham
v. Eyman, 17 Fed. Appx. 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2001) (inmate who urinated and defecated on
himself after being denied bathroom access was forced to spend “four to five hours in
soiled clothing” but court found “[t]hough certainly unpleasant, these hardships were
temporary and as this court’s case law makes clear, they were not of sufficient severity to

implicate the Eighth Amendment”).
For these reasons, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because
the second amended complaint doesn’t state any claims for which relief can be granted.
SO ORDERED.
March 9, 2026 s/ Damon R. Leichty
Judge, United States District Court

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11280095. Public record. Not legal advice.