# Musteen

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · March 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11279840

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher Musteen v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** March 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11279840

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding an ALJ need not include additional complaints in the hypothetical not supported by substantial evidence

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER MUSTEEN PLAINTIFF
V. CASE NO. 5:24-CV-05243
COMMISSIONER, Social .
Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court are the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 14)
of the Honorable Spencer G. Singleton, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas, and Plaintiff Christopher Musteen’s Objection to the R&R (Doc. 15).
The R&R advises the Court to affirm the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) decision to
deny social security disability benefits to Mr. Musteen. In light of Mr. Musteen’s objection,
the Court has now reviewed the entire case de novo, as is required by 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and AFFIRMS
the ALJ’s decision. .
l. BACKGROUND
Mr. Musteen filed his application for disability insurance benefits on January 22,
2021, alleging he suffered from PTSD, lumbosacral injury, left and right lower
radiculopathy, tension headaches, traumatic brain injury, right lateral collateral ligament
sprain, left shoulder impingement syndrome, and arthritis—with an alleged onset date of
December 30, 2020. Mr. Musteen’s application was initially denied on June 9, 2021, and
again denied upon reconsideration on October 8, 2021. He filed an appeal and requested
an administrative hearing, which was held on August 18, 2022. The ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision on September 6, 2022. Mr. Musteen then filed a Request for Review
of Hearing with the ALJ on October 11, 2022, which was remanded by the Appeals
Council on August 9, 2023.
On remand, Mr. Musteen had a second hearing on February 8, 2024, where he
and Vocational Expert Katrina Mason both testified. Mr. Musteen was represented by
Kenneth Kieklak at the second hearing. Following the hearing, the ALJ entered an
unfavorable decision on May 13, 2024. In this decision, the ALJ determined that Mr.
Musteen had the following severe impairments: unspecified trauma-related disorder;
unspecified anxiety; degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; left
clavicle acromioplasty with ongoing pain; right ankle stress fracture and tenosynovitis;
right elbow pain; and headaches. However, the ALJ concluded that these impairments

did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of
Impairments in Appendix |, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. .
According to the ALJ, Mr. Musteen retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with several postural, manipulative, environmental,
and mental restrictions. With the help of vocational expert testimony, the ALJ concluded
that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Mr.
Musteen could perform, given his functional restrictions. Social Security Disability
Benefits were therefore denied.
ll. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews “the ALJ’s denial of disability insurance benefits de novo to
ensure that there was no legal error and that the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th

Cir. 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance,” but it is enough that “a reasonable mind would find adequate to support
the Commissioner's conclusion.” Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotations omitted). The Court considers “evidence that both supports and
undermines the Commissioner’s decision in deciding whether existing evidence is
substantial.” Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court must affirm
the ALJ's decision if the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support it. /d.
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's
decision, the court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the
record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would have
decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In other
words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from
the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the Court
must affirm the ALJ's decision. /d.
Ill. OBJECTION
Mr. Musteen argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the extent of his disability
when determining his RFC and that the Magistrate Judge overlooked this error in the R&R.
Specifically, Mr. Musteen claims that the RFC should have included additional limitations
based on his headaches. Mr. Musteen testified to various subjective symptoms that he
claims result in “significant barriers to work,” such as light sensitivity, dizziness, fatigue,
nausea, irritability, slowness in mental functioning, and the amount of time he would be
off-task or away from work due to the aforementioned symptoms. (Doc. 15, p. 6). Mr.
Musteen contends that the ALJ erred by not including these limitations in his RFC while

“providing no reason to reject Musteen’s testimony.” /d. However, after review, the Court
finds substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s RFC determination.
A social security claimant's RFC is “the most [he] can still do despite [his]
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is well established that a “claimant’s RFC is a
medical question” regarding “the claimant's ability to function in the workplace.” Hensley
v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016). An RFC determination must be “based on
all of the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [his] limitations.” /d. The
claimant carries “[t]he burden of persuasion to prove disability and to demonstrate RFC.”
Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, “[t]he ALJ may disbelieve subjective complaints if there are
inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole.” /d. at 792 (internal quotation omitted). “The
credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the
courts.” Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir. 2001). “In analyzing a
claimant’s subjective complaints . . . an ALJ must consider: (1) the claimant's daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the condition; (3) dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (4) precipitating and aggravating factors;
and (5) functional restrictions.” Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citation modified). These factors are derived from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Polaski
v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). “If an ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's
testimony and gives good reason for doing so,” the court will “defer to that judgment.”
Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Dixon v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d
237, 238 (8th Cir. 1990)).

In this matter, the ALJ determined that Mr. Musteen retained the RFC to perform
sedentary work except that he could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl; could occasionally overhead reach bilaterally; and could have no concentrated
exposure to hazards such as dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. (Doc. 8, p.
21). Additionally, the ALJ determined that Mr. Musteen was able to do work only where
interpersonal contact is routine but superficial; the complexity of tasks is learned by
experience with several variables and judgment within limits; and the supervision required
is little for routine, but detailed for non-routine, tasks. /d. The ALJ indicated that he
properly considered and evaluated Mr. Musteen’s subjective complaints in view of the
Polaski factors and further explained that Mr. Musteen’s “statements about the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms” were “not entirely consistent with the
medical records” and other evidence in the record. /d. at pp. 30-34.
For example, Mr. Musteen reported that he takes his children to school each
morning and picks them up in the afternoon; helps care for pets; does daily chores and/or
errands; is able to perform personal care tasks without problems; prepares simple foods
regularly; uses a riding lawn mower; does house hold tasks, such as light cleaning,
laundry, and ironing; drives a vehicle; uses a phone and computer; independently shops
online and in stores; is able to count change and pay bills; enjoys reading; is able to leave
his home unaccompanied; and follows written instructions fairly well. /d. at p. 32. Even if
Mr. Musteen qualified some of these activities by saying he could only perform them
occasionally or with breaks, the ALJ correctly concluded that Mr. Musteen is still able to
engage in gainful activities despite suffering some minor degree of limitation.

Similarly, the treatment records reflect that Mr. Musteen goes to the gym regularly
(and was observed by his orthopedist to be very muscular), does yard work, plays
basketball, drives during extended road trips, participates in social activities for his
children, and was able to work part-time at the post office. /d. Likewise, Mr. Musteen has
no physician-imposed functional restrictions that would preclude work activity pursuant to
his RFC. Another relevant Polaski factor considers the “dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of medication.” Wildman, 596 F.3d at 968. The record shows that Mr. Musteen’s
headaches and related symptoms improve with treatment and medications. Specifically,
Mr. Musteen receives regular Botox injections that reduce the frequency and severity of
his migraine headaches. /d. at p. 31. “An impairment which can be controlled by treatment
or medication is not considered disabling.” Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir.
2002).
In his objection, Mr. Musteen fails to recognize that his RFC was influenced by the
ALJ’s decision to “discredit[ ]” his allegations regarding the severity of his headache-
related limitations because they were inconsistent with the record, including his daily living
activities and response to treatment. Hogan, 239 F.3d at 962. The Court “give[s] the ALJ
deference in that determination.” Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005).
Thus, “the ALJ was not obligated to include limitations from opinions he properly
disregarded.” Wildman, 596 F.3d at 969. Both the ALJ and the R&R correctly noted that
Mr. Musteen suffers to some extent from migraine headaches; however, Mr. Musteen did
not demonstrate that his migraine-related symptoms rendered him unable to perform the
activities identified in the ALJ’s RFC determination.

Because the ALJ appropriately considered the medical evidence supporting Mr.
Musteen’s headache-related claims and nonetheless determined that he could perform
sedentary work with some limitations, the Court concludes that Mr. Musteen’s RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the ALJ
properly included only those limitations supported by the record as a whole in the
hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert while excluding other alleged
limitations that the ALJ had reason to discredit. See Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 595
(8th Cir. 1999) (holding an ALJ need not include additional complaints in the hypothetical
not supported by substantial evidence). Therefore, the Court finds no error of law, and
substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs Objection is OVERRULED, the
Magistrate Judge's R&R is ADOPTED, and the ALJ's decision to deny benefits is
AFFIRMED. Plaintiffs case is Deas PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this go day of my h, 2026.
gk
ul QIHY L. BR OOKS
CHIEFWh D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11279840. Public record. Not legal advice.