# Tanibajeva

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278184

## Case

- **Full name:** Rachel Tanibajeva v. Skytop Lodge Corp, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278184

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating “the presence of direct shipments will show the defendant's purposeful availment”
- stating “‘[t]he burden on a defendant who wishes to show an absence of fairness or lack of substantial justice is heavy’” (quoting Grand Ent. Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1993)
- noting foreign defendants are burdened by litigating their cases in United States forums
- finding forum states have significant interests in “enforcing their own safety regulations”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RACHEL TANIBAJEVA,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-01846
v.
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
SKY TOP LODGE CORP, et al.,

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff Rachel Tanibajeva (“Tanibajeva”) initiated this action
by filing a complaint. (Doc. 1). On September 30, 2024, Tanibajeva filed the operative second
amended complaint against Defendants Skytop Lodge Corporation d/b/a Skytop Lodge
(“Skytop”), Edelrid GmbH & Co., KG d/b/a Edelrid (“Edelrid”), Edelrid North America
d/b/a Edelrid (“Edelrid NA”), Challenges Unlimited, Inc. (“CUI”), Challenges Design
Innovations, Inc. and/or High Country Hardware (“CDI”), and Petzl America, Inc. (“Petzl”)
(collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 82). Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction filed by CUI and Edelrid. (Doc. 123; Doc. 124). For the following
reasons, CUI’s motion (Doc. 123) is DENIED and Edelrid’s motion (Doc. 124) is
GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following background is taken from the second amended complaint and, for the
purposes of the instant motion, is taken as true. (Doc. 82). On October 24, 2021, Tanibajeva,
a resident and citizen of New York, went ziplining at Skytop Lodge, a Pennsylvania resort
owned and operated by Skytop. (Doc. 82, ¶¶ 1, 2, 32, 41). Plaintiff wore Edelrid ziplining
equipment, including an Edelrid Connecto Swivel, a ziplining harness component which
connects a ziplining harness to a belay, which in turn connects to a ziplining cable. (Doc. 82,
¶ 38). While Tanibajeva was ziplining, the lower ring of the Edelrid Connecto Swivel failed
and caused Tanibajeva to fall twelve feet to the ground. (Doc. 82, ¶ 39). Edelrid and CUI
manufacture and supply ziplining equipment, including the ziplining equipment that
Tanibajeva used on the day of her accident. (Doc. 82, ¶ 3, 7). Edelrid is a German corporation.

(Doc. 82, ¶ 3). Edelrid NA is an Edelrid subsidiary incorporated and with its principal place
of business in Oregon. (Doc. 82, ¶ 4). CUI is incorporated in and with a principal place of
business in Canada. (Doc. 82, ¶ 6). CDI is a North Carolina corporation that also
manufactures and supplies ziplining equipment, including equipment used at Skytop Lodge
at the time of Tanibajeva’s accident. (Doc. 82, ¶ 7).
In the operative complaint, Tanibajeva alleges that Defendants are strictly liable for
providing Tanibajeva with defective ziplining equipment and liable for negligence in relation
to her ziplining accident. (Doc. 82). On October 23, 2024, CDI filed a crossclaim against
Skytop, Petzl, Edelrid, Edelrid NA, and CUI alleging that it is entitled to contribution and/or

indemnification from Skytop, Petzl, Edelrid, Edelrid NA, and CUI in the event it is found
liable for Tanibajeva’s injuries. (Doc. 83, at 25-26). On November 4, 2024, Skytop filed a
crossclaim against CDI, Petzl, Edelrid, Edelrid NA, and CUI alleging it is entitled to
indemnification and/or contribution from CDI, Petzl, Edelrid, Edelrid NA, and CUI in the
event it is found liable for Tanibajeva’s injuries. (Doc. 92, at 14).
CUI and Edelrid previously moved to dismiss this action for lack of personal
jurisdiction. (Doc. 46; Doc. 72). The Court denied CUI and Edelrid’s first motions without
prejudice but permitted the parties to conduct limited discovery on the issue of jurisdiction.
(Doc. 79, at 15-18). After conducting limited discovery, on July 3, 2025, CUI and Edelrid
filed renewed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 123; Doc. 125; Doc. 125; Doc.
126).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move

to dismiss a claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Like with Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss,
courts accept all allegations in a complaint as true when evaluating Rule 12(b)(2) motions.
See Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002); see also In re Chocolate
Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538, 556 (M.D. Pa. 2009). However, unlike with
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may present an affidavit
contradicting the plaintiff’s allegations establishing personal jurisdiction, and once a
defendant presents such an affidavit, the plaintiff “must present similar evidence in support
of personal jurisdiction.” Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 556. A court
may order limited discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction and consider the evidence

adduced during that discovery while deciding on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion. See Chocolate
Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73; see also Bertles v. Cycle Grp., No. CV 18-
4707, 2020 WL 1028044, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2020).
A Federal Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to
the extent permissible under the laws of the state in which the court sits. Mellon Bank (E.)
PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The forum
state in this instance is Pennsylvania, and the applicable long arm statute is codified at 42 Pa.
Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b). This statute permits courts in Pennsylvania to exercise
jurisdiction “to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may

be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the
Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b). Thus, this
Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over Defendants so long as it does not violate their
due process rights. See Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221.
With respect to this constitutional inquiry, the “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment requires that nonresident defendants have ‘certain minimum contacts with [the
forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’” Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “Having minimum
contacts with another state provides ‘fair warning’ to a defendant that he or she may be subject
to suit in that state.” Kehm Oil, 537 F.3d at 299-300 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). As such, personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause
depends upon “the relationship among the defendant[s], the forum, and the litigation.” Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants—general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d
Cir. 2007). General jurisdiction may be asserted when a non-resident defendant has
maintained “systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499
F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414–15 (1984)); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011) (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are
so “continuous and systematic” as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”)

(citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). When subject to the general jurisdiction of a state,
“that [defendant] can be called to answer any claim against [it], regardless of whether the
subject matter of the cause of action has any connection to the forum.” Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d
at 1221. Thus, general jurisdiction requires that the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
are “of the sort that approximate physical presence.” William Rosenstein & Sons Co. v. BBI

Produce, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.
Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Pursuant to Pennsylvania’s longarm statute, this Court may exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant that “contract[s] to supply services or things in this
Commonwealth.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(a)(2); see Merced v. Gemstar Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-
3054, 2015 WL 1182860, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2015). “Specific jurisdiction exists when
the claim arises from or relates to [the defendant’s] conduct purposely directed at the forum
state.” Marten, 499 F.3d at 296 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414–15 n.9). To determine

whether it has specific jurisdiction over a defendant, the Court must engage in a three-part
inquiry. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. First, the Court must consider whether the defendants
“purposefully directed [their] activities” at the forum state. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472). Second, “the litigation must ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least
one of those activities.” O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414).
Third, if the prior requirements are met, “[the Court] may consider additional factors to
ensure that exercising jurisdiction would be consistent with notions of ‘“fair play and
substantial justice.”’ O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).
III. DISCUSSION
CUI and Edelrid both contend that they have insufficient minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. (Doc. 125, at 11-25;
Doc. 126, at 9-12). CDI, Tanibajeva, and Skytop all counter that the Court has specific
personal jurisdiction over CUI and Edelrid because both companies sell ziplining products to
Pennsylvania customers and ship those products to Pennsylvania and the cause of action

relates to those contacts with Pennsylvania. (Doc. 131, at 16-33; Doc. 132, at 13-24; Doc.
133, at 7-14; Doc. 134, at 3-11; Doc. 135, at 9-15).
The parties agree that the Court does not have general jurisdiction over CUI and
Edelrid but dispute whether the Court has specific jurisdiction. (Doc. 125, at 10; Doc. 126, at
10; Doc. 131, at 19; Doc. 132, at 15; Doc. 133, at 7-14; Doc. 134, at 4-11; Doc. 135, at 11-
14). Thus, the Court must evaluate whether CUI and Edelrid 1) “purposefully directed [their]
activities” into Pennsylvania, 2) this action “arise[s] out of or relate to at least one of those
activities” and 3) “whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and
substantial justice.” Corigliano v. Classic Motor, Inc., 611 F. App'x 77, 79–80 (3d Cir. 2015)

(nonprecedential) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Malik v. Cabot Oil & Gas
Corp., 710 F. App'x 561, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2017).
Regarding the first requirement, purposeful direction requires more than a showing
that a “defendant ‘has injected its goods into the forum state indirectly via the so-called stream
of commerce.’” Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting
D'Jamoos ex rel. Est. of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 104 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also
M. S. v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 3d 604, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (stating “[t]he stream
of commerce theory has not been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court, and the Third

Circuit has declined to endorse it”). “[W]hat is necessary is a deliberate targeting of the forum,
so efforts to exploit a national market that necessarily included Pennsylvania are insufficient.”
Shuker, 885 F.3d at 780 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also M. S., 512 F. Supp.
3d at 609. A defendant purposefully directs activities into a forum state by repeatedly shipping
products to the state. See Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 33 F.3d 277, 282 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating

“the presence of direct shipments will show the defendant's purposeful availment”); see also
Allen v. Foxway Transportation, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-00156, 2022 WL 265945, at *6 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 27, 2022) (finding specific jurisdiction where a defendant “arranged or brokered
numerous shipments departing from or arriving in Pennsylvania”); see also Avicolli v. BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc., No. CV 21-1119, 2021 WL 3471167, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2021) (stating
“[c]ourts have consistently concluded a defendant who directly ships products to a forum state
has purposefully availed itself of doing business in that state”).
Regarding the second requirement of specific jurisdiction, that the cause of action
relates to the defendant’s contacts with the state, a court may still exercise jurisdiction even

where the defendant “sold the specific [products] involved in [the cause of action] outside the
forum [s]tate[.]” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 366 (2021). A
cause of action relates to the defendant’s conduct in the forum state where the defendant
repeatedly and purposefully sold products identical to those involved in the cause of action to
customers in the forum state and shipped such products to the forum state. See Ford Motor Co.,
592 U.S. at 366 (finding that Ford’s contacts with two forum states related to the cause of
action because even though the specific cars involved in the relevant car accidents were sold
outside the forum states, Ford sold identical cars within the forum states); see also Joyner v.
OFM, LLC, No. CV 22-3153, 2023 WL 8005293, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2023) (finding that

“it does not matter that the single [allegedly defective product] in question that [Plaintiff]
purchased was first shipped to [another state]” because the defendant repeatedly shipped the
same product to the forum state).
“Once a plaintiff establishes minimum contacts,” a court may exercise jurisdiction
unless the defendant meets the heavy burden of establishing that the court exercising
jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. Mendelsohn, Drucker &

Assocs. v. Titan Atlas Mfg., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 767, 774 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (stating “‘[t]he burden
on a defendant who wishes to show an absence of fairness or lack of substantial justice is
heavy’” (quoting Grand Ent. Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir.
1993)). Courts “consider ‘the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.’” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 477). Where a defendant repeatedly and

purposefully ships products to the forum state, a court may fairly exercise jurisdiction because
the defendant “‘enjoys the benefits and protection of [the forum state’s] laws’—the
enforcement of contracts, the defense of property, the resulting formation of effective
markets.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 367 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319); see Merced,
2011 WL 5865964, at *5 (stating “[i]t would be fundamentally unjust to allow a foreign
corporation to reap the economic benefits of conducting business in this forum while leaving
an injured plaintiff remediless”); see also Sullick v. United Pet Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-2950,
2015 WL 3643988, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 2015) (stating the same).
A. THE COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER CUI.
According to CUI, its only relevant contact with Pennsylvania is it indirectly selling
ziplining equipment to Skytop through CDI, a North Carolina corporation, and shipping that
equipment to Skytop at CDI’s request. (Doc. 125, at 11-23). CUI posits that such contact with
Pennsylvania is too infrequent, indirect, and unrelated to Tanibajeva’s cause of action for the
Court to exercise jurisdiction over it as a Canadian corporation. (Doc. 125, at 11-25). CDI,

Tanibajeva, and Skytop all aver that CUI has had sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania for
the Court to exercise specific jurisdiction because CUI repeatedly sold ziplining products to a
Pennsylvania resident and shipped ziplining products to Pennsylvania. (Doc. 131, at 19-33;
Doc. 133, at 7-14; Doc. 135, at 9-15).
Tanibajeva, CDI, and Skytop have sufficiently shown that CUI purposefully directed
its activities into Pennsylvania. CUI invoices reveal that CUI repeatedly sold and shipped
ziplining products to Treehouse World, a Pennsylvania business, and shipped the products to
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 131-2). CUI sold Treehouse World ziplining products identical to those
at issue in this case, such as Edelrid Connecto Swivels, and shipped those products to

Pennsylvania. (Doc. 131-2, at 7, 23, 31-32). Further, while CUI invoices show it indirectly
sold Skytop ziplining equipment through CDI, a North Carolina company, CUI’s president,
Bryan Oosterhuis admitted in a sworn declaration that CUI shipped the relevant Skytop
ziplining equipment to Pennsylvania at CDI’s request. (Doc. 131-2, at 34; Doc. 133-1, at 5).
Although the Court previously determined that this shipment alone is insufficient to establish
specific jurisdiction, CUI’s invoices reveal that the Skytop shipment is just one of multiple
repeated instances of CUI purposefully shipping ziplining equipment to Pennsylvania. (Doc.
79, at 13-14; Doc. 131-2). CUI repeatedly selling ziplining equipment to a Pennsylvania
customer and shipping ziplining equipment, including the ziplining equipment which
allegedly caused Tanibajeva’s accident, to Pennsylvania sufficiently establishes that CUI
purposefully directed activities into Pennsylvania. (Doc. 131-2; Doc. 133-1, at 5); see Renner,
33 F.3d at 282; see also Allen, 2022 WL 265945, at *6; see also Avicolli, 2021 WL 3471167, at
*3.

CUI contends that these sales and shipments are insufficient to establish specific
jurisdiction because CUI’s prior sales to Treehouse are unrelated to the cause of action. (Doc.
137, at 19-20). CUI’s argument is unpersuasive because a court may still exercise specific
jurisdiction even where the specific products involved in the cause of action were not sold in
the forum state. See Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 366; see also Joyner, 2023 WL 8005293, at *3.
Tanibajeva’s cause of action relates to CUI’s contacts with Pennsylvania because CUI
repeatedly shipped ziplining equipment to Pennsylvania that was identical to the equipment
involved in the cause of action. (Doc. 131-2, at 7, 23, 31-32); see Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at
366; see also Joyner, 2023 WL 8005293, at *3. Further, while CUI sold the specific ziplining

equipment which allegedly caused Tanibajeva’s accident to CDI, a North Carolina
corporation, it shipped the equipment to Pennsylvania. (Doc. 133-1, at 5). Accordingly, the
Court finds that CUI’s contacts with Pennsylvania relate to the instant cause of action.
Finally, the Court finds that exercising specific jurisdiction over CUI would “comport
with fair play and substantial justice.” Corigliano, 611 F. App'x at 79–80. The Court agrees
with CUI that it, as a Canadian corporation, would be burdened by litigating its case in
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 125, at 23-25); see Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
114 (1987) (noting foreign defendants are burdened by litigating their cases in United States
forums). However, CUI repeatedly and purposefully sold and shipped ziplining equipment to

customers in the United States and Pennsylvania. (Doc. 131-2; Doc. 133-1, at 5). Through
these shipments and sales, CUI enjoyed the benefits of doing business in both the United
States and Pennsylvania. See Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 367; see also Merced, 2011 WL
5865964, at *5.
CUI argues that Pennsylvania’s interest in adjudicating this case is limited because

Tanibajeva is not a Pennsylvania citizen. (Doc. 125, at 24-25). The Court finds this argument
unpersuasive. First, Skytop, a Pennsylvania corporation, raises a crossclaim against CUI, so
this case involves a claim against CUI brought by a Pennsylvania citizen. (Doc. 92, at 14).
Second, Tanibajeva’s accident occurred at a Pennsylvania recreational facility and was
allegedly caused by ziplining equipment that CUI shipped to Pennsylvania. (Doc. 82, ¶¶ 40-
92; Doc. 133-1, at 5). Pennsylvania has a significant interest in ensuring its recreational
facilities are safe and use safe equipment. See Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 368 (finding forum
states have significant interests in “enforcing their own safety regulations”); see also Simons v.
Arcan, Inc., No. CIV.A. 12-01493, 2013 WL 1285489, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013) (stating

“Pennsylvania has a strong interest in ensuring the safety of products that a foreign
corporation is sending into the state”). Accordingly, the Court finds that exercising personal
jurisdiction over CUI comports with fair play and substantial justice. The Court DENIES
CUI’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 123).
B. THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER EDELRID.
Edelrid contends that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it because it is a
German company that has never sold products directly to Pennsylvania customers or shipped
products directly to Pennsylvania. (Doc. 126, at 10-12). CDI, Tanibajeva, and Skytop aver
that the Court maintains specific jurisdiction because Edelrid sells ziplining products
throughout the United States and in Pennsylvania specifically through Edelrid NA. (Doc.
132, at 13-24; Doc. 134, at 4-11; Doc. 135, at 9-15).
The Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Edelrid because CDI,
Tanibajva, and Skytop have only presented evidence of Edelrid’s “efforts to exploit a national
market that necessarily included Pennsylvania” which is insufficient to establish specific

jurisdiction. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 780. CDI presents testimony and sworn statements from
Hannes Mayer (“Mayer”), a Sales Manager Professional at Edelrid, in which Mayer states
that outside of direct sales to a few long-standing American customers, all of Edelrid’s sales
to American customers go through Edelrid NA, a subsidiary based in Oregon. (Doc. 132-2,
at 3; Doc. 132-3, at 3-4). CDI also presents testimony from Mayer and pictures of marketing
materials written in English which suggest that Edelrid markets its ziplining products to
American customers through Edelrid NA. (Doc. 132-3, at 6-8; Doc. 132-4). CDI further
provides links to Edelrid’s website which states Edelrid distributes its products throughout the
United States and Canada. (Doc. 132, at 11). This evidence only establishes that Edelrid sells

products in the United States national market through a subsidiary and that some of those
products may be sold in Pennsylvania as part of the broader national market. Such a showing
is insufficient to establish that Edelrid purposefully directed activities into Pennsylvania. See
Shuker, 885 F.3d at 780; see also M. S., 512 F. Supp. 3d at 609.
The only evidence in the record CDI, Tanibajeva, and Skytop present to tie Edelrid’s
business directly to Pennsylvania are a series of invoices showing Edelrid sold products to
Liberty Mountain, a Utah corporation. (Doc. 134-1). Tanibajeva claims, without a citation to
the record, that Liberty Mountain operates a warehouse in Pennsylvania and Liberty
Mountain and other retailers sell Edelrid products in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 134, at 3-4). CDI
also provides an affidavit from James Pringle (“Pringle”), a former employer of Philadelphia
Rock Gyms, which states that the Liberty Mountain’s Pennsylvania warehouse would
“regularly purchase Edelrid[] Products” and that Pringle “specifically recall[s Edelrid] would
directly ship [merchandise, marketing, and advertising materials] to Philadelphia Rock Gyms
location(s) in Pennsylvania.” (Doc. 132-5, at 2-3). This evidence is also insufficient to

establish specific jurisdiction. First, evidence that Edelrid sold products to retailers such as
Liberty Mountain is insufficient because it only shows that Edelrid sold products to third
third-party distributors and retailers as part of a national sales campaign. See Shuker, 885 F.3d
at 780; see also M. S., 512 F. Supp. 3d at 609. Second, the only evidence that specifically
pertains to Pennsylvania is Pringle’s declaration stating that Liberty Mountain’s Pennsylvania
warehouse purchased unspecified Edelrid products from an unspecified seller and that Edelrid
shipped unspecified merchandise and marketing materials to Pennsylvania rock climbing
gyms. (Doc. 132-5, at 2-3). Even if the Court were to find this vague declaration sufficient to
establish a deliberate targeting of Pennsylvania, the Court cannot find that the cause of action

“relates to at least one of [Edelrid’s] activities” in Pennsylvania because Pringle does not
clarify what merchandise Edelrid sent to Pennsylvania rock gyms or whether the marketing
materials related to products relevant to this action. Corigliano, 611 F. App'x at 79–80; see Ohio
Sec. Ins. Co. v. Premium Food Grp., Inc., No. CV 21-15690, 2022 WL 2358425, at *5 (D.N.J.
June 30, 2022) (finding that “general statements that the defendants conducted business in
[the forum state]” are insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction (citing Witasick v. Estes, No.
CIV.A. 11-3895, 2012 WL 3075988, at *6 (D.N.J. July 30, 2012)). Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Edelrid’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 124).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, CUI’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
DENIED. (Doc. 123). Edelrid’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
GRANTED. (Doc. 124). The claims in the second amended complaint against Edelrid and
all crossclaims against Edelrid are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of personal

jurisdiction. (Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 88).
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: February 25, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278184. Public record. Not legal advice.